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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to contend and illustrate the 
hermeneutical role of discipleship in theological reflection. Secondly, it seeks to 
examine and analyze the meaning of discipleship in terms of the ethical, missiological 
and theological dimensions. These are caii'ied out tlii'ough the study of the ethics of the 
Kingdom in the theologies of Stanley Hauerwas and Jon Sobrino. Hauerwas and 
Sobrino can be considered as representatives of two "movements" or "traditions". In 
short, Hauerwas represents the anabaptist [for example, Mennonite] tradition [although I 
am aware of his Methodist background], while Sobrino represents the tradition of Latin 
American liberation theology. Obviously, their insights and conclusions differ 
considerably. However, this study does not define one as right and the other as wrong. 
Rather they are seen to be different but complementary aspects of Clnistian discipleship.
Chapter one of this thesis is concerned about the agent of the Kingdom in terms 
of spirituality and ecclesiology. For Hauerwas, Christian spirituality is primarily about 
the imitation of Christ in terms of character, vision and virtue, with particular emphasis 
on the Sermon on the Mount, while for Sobrino, Christian spirituality is principally 
about following the historical Jesus in terms of liberation, with particular reference to the 
jubilee proclamation. This basic difference in orientation unavoidably results in their 
different understanding of the church. For Hauerwas, the church is an alternative society 
which emphasizes its internal life, while for Sobrino, the church is the church of the poor 
which emphasizes its external expression. Flowever, the differences between Hauerwas 
and Sobrino have to be understood complementarity and dialectically. That is to say, 
first, Hauerwas and Sobrino illustrate that the Cliristian life has to be understood in 
terms of both vita humana and actus humanus. Secondly, they display two different 
possible and faithful options for the church to be a confessing church. Despite their 
differences, they unanimously agree that in order to be the faithful agent of the 
Kingdom, Christians have to take discipleship seriously.
Chapter two of this thesis discusses the theological use of model. In short, model 
refers to the means helping us to understand a subject, but it is not the subject itself. 
Although both Hauerwas and Sobrino do not particularly refer to the notion of model, 
Hauerwas' use of narrative and Sobrino's use of justice are examples of the use of the 
notion of model. For Hauerwas, individual human lives and traditions cannot be 
separated from the notion of narrative because of the nan'ative quality of human 
experience. In theological use, the notion of narrative emphasizes the internal histoiy of 
the Cliristian community and the cultural-linguistic model of the Cliristian religion. For 
Sobrino, the notion of justice is central because it is a response to his socio-historical
situation and Jesus is the liberator. Sobrino contends that Jesus reveals the way to the
Father as the Son; so Chr istians have to practise justice in the light of Jesus in order to be 
the children of God. Apparently, Hauerwas and Sobrino are talking of two different 
things, but they have the same underlying working hypothesis, which is discipleship. 
Moreover, the notions of narrative and justice can be respectively understood as 
examples of the narrative and metaphorical use of the theological use of model. They 
are complementary because, put analogically, if the narrative use is like a melody, the 
metaphorical use then is like a chord. Without either of them, the music cannot be 
played.
Chapter tlii'ee of this thesis examines the practice of the Kingdom. It asserts the
'primacy of praxis in theological reflection, provided that praxis is not understood as 
equivalent to pragmatism. Hauerwas' pacifism reveals his understanding of praxis in the 
context of the cultural-linguistic tradition. That is to say, Christian pacifism is solely 
built on its christological foundation and primarily addressed to the Clnistian 
community. Its strength is not to reduce the religious identity of a community to the 
general religious dimension of common human experience, but its weakness tends not to 
emphasize the need to explicate the public dimension of its religious identity. Sobrino's 
evangelization illustrates his understanding of praxis in the context of the Marxist 
tradition. In this tradition, evangelization is primarily understood as the transformation
of the sinful world. Its strength gives practice a very strong societal orientation, and 
provides a hermeneutical privilege, criterion and standpoint, by which one can test the 
interpretation of the Christian tradition. Its weakness is overshadowed by its 
socio-political relevance. Nevertheless, Hauerwas' and Sobrino's accounts help us to 
realize that the distinctiveness of the Christian identity and its social relevance are 
inter-related. Ignoring either of them distorts the Christian convictions.
The final chapter of this thesis attempts to summarize and reflect the result of the 
preceding studies about discipleship in terms of the ethical, missiological and theological 
dimensions. The ethical dimension of discipleship is concerned about a messianic 
lifestyle. It is a life of conversion, worshipping, following Jesus, being an alternative 
community and leading a life which brings transvaluation. The missiological dimension 
of discipleship relates to the promises of Jesus to be present in the apostolate, the 
sacrament and fellowship of Christians, in the "least of the bretliren", and in his parousia. 
Finally, the theological dimension of discipleship emphasizes that theology is primarily 
a practical theology in terms of the centrality of praxis and a theology of, for, and by, the 
people.
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INTRODUCTION
As a Chinese Christian who both inherits the treasure of Confucianism’ and 
is schooled by the Christian story, I am puzzled by the depiction and the adequacy 
of the philosophical [or metaphysical] illustration of Christian convictions which 
concentrates particularly on objectivity and reasoning. It is not because there is 
anything wrong with the philosophical depiction, but because it may tend to overlook 
the fact that the Christian faith is primarily a way of life rather than a system of 
thought. Therefore, no matter how impressive the philosophical depiction may be, 
its explanation is still incomplete. Besides, this tendency is damaging our 
understanding of Christian beliefs because it further disintegrates the relationship 
between faith and life, theology and life. Since the Christian faith is basically a life 
option, then any enquiry about the truth of the Cliristian faith which isolates it from 
Christian living is incompetent. My emphasis here has no intention to reduce the 
Christian faith to either a form of moralism or a form of pragmatism. Rather if the 
Christian faith primarily relates to a way of life, then a concern of the moral life of 
the agent cannot be separated from the exploration of Christian convictions.^ Thus,
 ^Generally speaking, Conflicianism in its philosophical form is basically moral-oriented. The 
great teachers o f  Confucianism are deified by people, and Confucianism thus becomes a quasi-religion. 
If it is a religion, it is a moralising religion.
 ^ Jacques Ellul strongly contends that the Christian faith cannot be considered as an 
equivalent to morality because the call to follow Jesus is not a list o f  what to do or not to do. Rather 
"Jesus' shows us fully what it means to be a free person with no morality, but simply obeying the ever- 
new Word o f God as it flashes forth." He concludes that "the behaviour to which we are summoned 
surpasses morality, all morality, which is shown to be an obstacle to encounter with God." However, 
we have to note that Ellul’s rejection o f the moralistic interpretation o f the Christian life does not 
mean that he considers the concern o f the moral life o f the agent in the Christian faith unnecessary. 
Rather what he rejects is a kind o f moralism which is constructed to substitute our own will o f good 
and evil for God’s. See his books, To Will and To Do (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), The Subversion 
o f Christianitv (Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1991), pp.69-94. Keith Ward argues that the Christian faith 
is related to morality, but he says that " a Christian system o f ethics does not simply add new duties 
[towai’ds God] to an established list o f  duties; nor does it simply give a distinctive set o f duties [like
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the truth of the Christian faith is not adequately explained in terms of philosophical 
statements or doctrines, but also needs illustration of what it really means in terms 
of Chi'istian living and practice. Christian living and practice here is called 
discipleship. An emphasis on the importance of the Christian living in the Christian 
faith suggests that discipleship is the point of departure of understanding Clnistian 
convictions, and theological reflection has one way or another to inspire our 
commitment to God. In other words, discipleship can be said to be both the means 
and the "end" of theological reflection. It is the "end", not in terms of regarding 
discipleship as an end in itself and of theological reflection, but in that, tlnough this 
process, discipleship becomes the means to communicate God’s graciousness. 
Therefore, when I am speaking about discipleship as an "end", I mean also that it is 
a means, and vice versa. I will come back to this point when I discuss the 
relationship between discipleship and the Kingdom of God. However, I realize that 
to consider discipleship as the point of departure for understanding the Christian faith 
is less convincing than to suggest that theological reflection has to promote 
discipleship, because it is quite different from the Greek philosophical way of 
thinking which Western theology inherits.^ But I consider that to take discipleship 
as the point of departure of theological reflection is theologically valid and 
significant. Dietrich Bonhoeffer said that "only he who believes is obedient, and only 
he who is obedient believes."'’ Bonhoeffer’s paradox challenges a partial view to the 
effect that obedience is primarily the consequence of belief. Ironically he affirmed 
that
agape]. It provides a different way o f  conceiving the nature o f morality, what the moral life is, what 
it is to be moral. For the Christian the moral life is an exploration into God." [See Ethics and 
Christianitv. London: Allen & Unwin, 1970, p.274]
 ^ For instance, in terms o f theory and praxis, Greek philosophy emphasizes the primacy o f  
theory, and regards praxis as something derived from theory.
 ^ D.Bonhoeffer, The Cost o f  Discipleship (London: SCM, 1966), p.54.
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for faith is only real when there is obedience, never without it, and 
faith only becomes faith in the act of obedience/
Bonhoeffer’s paradox reminds us that the Christian faith is not simply an application 
of a theory [belief] to practice [obedience], but suggests that practice [obedience] 
plays a determinate role in theory [belief]. In other words, discipleship is not only 
a result or a criterion of believing, but also leads us to believe. Therefore, 
discipleship is a hermeneutical entry point into Christian convictions. This emphasis 
does not suggest ortho-praxis versus orthodoxy because discipleship is the concrete 
meaning of orthodoxy. Nor does it suggest works versus grace because discipleship 
is not an offer that a person makes to Christ, but it is the call which creates the 
situation. An emphasis on discipleship as an entry point of theological reflection is 
to state the fact that we camiot know Jesus unless we follow him. I consider that, 
only if we take this emphasis seriously enough, can we then better understand and 
display our Clnistian faith, because there are some truths in the Christian faith which 
can only be discerned by those who are the disciples of Jesus. Eduard Schweizer, 
after almost four hundred pages of careful exegesis of the Gospel of Mark, also 
concludes that "discipleship is the only form in which faith can e x i s t .P e rh a p s  my 
remarks here seem to re-open the old controversy between orthodoxy'and pietism 
within the Lutheran tradition in the 17th century.^ To a certain extent I cannot deny 
it because pietism continually exerts its influence in different stages of church history. 
But my concern is slightly different. I am not seeking simply to explain the 
importance of the personal devotional life in the Chi istian faith. My concern is rather
 ^ Ibid., p.54.
 ^E.Schweizer, The Good News According to the St.MaiL (Atlanta: John Knox, 1977), p.386.
 ^ Briefly speaking, pietism is related to the belief o f that the Christian faith is much more 
vital than the disquisitions o f  scholastic theologians or the speculations o f philosophers because it has 
personal implications. It calls for "praxis pietatis", that is, to see the Christian faith demonstrated in 
the life o f  each individual as well as in the life o f the church. See Kurt Aland,
Christianitv, Vol.2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), pp.234-265.
to reflect what discipleship means today in relation to the Christian life, its socio- 
historical situation and the way of doing tlieology, with reference to Stanley 
Hauerwas and Jon Sobrino. Put differently, my attempt is to explore the ethical, 
missiological and theological dimension of discipleship.
Among contemporary theological approaches, no one can deny that Latin
American liberation theology takes discipleship seriously in its reflection.
Unfortunately, contemporary scholarship often concentrates on its methodology,
hermeneutical theory and political involvement [a typical example of the result of the
"intellectualization" of theology] and as a result, it fails to appreciate the essence of
liberation theology; that is, discipleship. Although I realize that to discuss the
methodology of liberation theology and the motivations of liberation theologians
should not be confused, they are inseparable because liberation theology is not a
result of intellectual awakening, but rather a result of discipleship. Without
recognizing this, the partiality and the political involvement of liberation theology
would not be properly understood and sympathetically criticized. Jon Sobrino says
that liberation theology is not an awakening from a dogmatic slumber, but from the
sleep of inhumanity. He wiites:
I was born in 1938 in Spain’s Basque region, where Ï grew up. In 
1957 I came to El Salvador as a novice in the Society of Jesus, and 
since then I have lived in this country with two notable
interruptions  When I arrived in El Salvador in 1957 I witnessed
appalling poverty, but even though I saw it with my eyes, I did not
really see it My vision of my task as a priest was a traditional one:
I would help the Salvadorans to replace their popular "superstitious" 
religiosity with a more sophisticated kind, and I would help the Latin 
American branches of the church [the European church] to grow. I 
was the typical "missionary", full of good will and Eurocentricity-
blind to reality Through one of those strange miracles [i.e. Vatican
II] which happen in history I came to realize that while I had both 
acquired much knowledge and gotten rid of much traditional baggage, 
deep down nothing had changed. I saw that my life and studies had 
not given me new eyes to see this world as it really is, and that they
hadn’t taken from me the heart of stone I had for the suffering of this
world That realization is what I experimented upon after returning
to El Salvador in 1974. And I began, I believe, to awaken from the
sleep of inhumanity But from the beginning it became quite cleai'
that truth, love, faith, the gospel of Jesus, God, the very best we have 
as people of faith and as human beings- these were somehow to be 
found among the poor and in the cause of justice/
Among the liberation theologians, I have chosen Jon Sobrino in this study simply
because I am touched by the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero on March 24, 1980
and of six Salvadorean Jesuits on November 13, 1989.^ Sobrino escaped from the
latter murder because, at that time, he was giving a short course on cliristology in
Thailand. Sobrino’s working context shows us that discipleship entails martyrdom.
This inspires me to understand profoundly why Bonhoeffer said that "when Christ
calls a man, he bids him come and die."’’’ Martyrdom is the essence of
discipleship.”
However, Latin American liberation theology is only one attempt to illustrate 
how Christian convictions are understood through discipleship. Although it is a 
concrete experience, it is still partial because it is overshadowed by its socio-political 
concern. Thus, in order to have a better understanding of discipleship as the 
hermeneutical entry point into Clnistian beliefs, we have to consider any other 
possible, or even contrasting, model. For this purpose, I find the work of Stanley 
Hauerwas very appropriate and relevant to my study. Fie is an American Methodist
® J.Sobrino, "Awakening from the Sleep o f  Inhumanity." In; The Christian Century, April 3, 
1991, pp.364~370.
9 See Romero: Martvr for Liberation (London: CllR, 1982), and J.Sobrino, Companions of 
Jesus (London: ClIR, 1990).
D.Bonhoeffer, The Cost o f Discipleship, p.79.
The Greek word o f witness is "martyria". For Jesus and the early church, witness was not 
in their successful preaching to the masses, neither in the sometimes overwhelmingly positive reaction 
to their miracles, but in their suffering and death that Jesus and the church became the true missionary.
s.Hauerwas, "The Testament o f  Friends." In: The Christian Century, February 28, 1990.
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.but influenced by the Mennonite tradition. In a sense, his theological background 
represents the Puritan tradition. Throughout his writings, we easily come across his 
emphasis upon the importance of character, virtue and vision in Christian living. For 
him, truth has to be understood in relation to truthfulness. Otherwise, it is abstract 
or an ideology. But his emphasis has nothing to do with moralism. Rather he says 
that
while learning new approaches, I am still exploring how Clnistian 
convictions require moral display for understanding what we might 
mean to claim them as true. I also continue to believe that the virtues 
can help display those convictions.... I continue to be surprised by how 
this agenda has led me to appreciate the integrity of Christian 
discourse- that is, that Chiistian beliefs do not need translation but 
should be demonstrated thiough Christian practices.”
Hauerwas’ theology does represent an important stream in contemporary Christian 
ethics which may not easily find an audience, especially given his view of 
ecclesiology, but no one can deny his seriousness and the challenge of his line of 
thought.
I have to admit that it is not an easy task to study both Stanley Hauerwas and 
Jon Sobrino together because they are so different. For instance, Hauerwas’ approach 
is more philosophical and abstract, while Sobrino’s approach is more practical and 
concrete; Hauerwas’ religious tradition is Protestant, while Sobrino’s is Roman 
Catholic; Hauerwas’ working context is in the United States, while Sobrino’s is in 
Latin America. These differences are sufficient to make my study hard to pursue. 
Despite these differences, I still discern that there is a common central theme running 
through their theologies. That is to say, they agree that the Christian faith has to be 
demonstrated through Christian practice in terms of both living under and witnessing 
to God’s Kingdom. This common concern makes my study possible and valid, albeit
.^
..
difficult.
The purpose of studying both Hauerwas and Sobrino together is twofold. 
Firstly, I attempt to make a contribution to current theological discussion about the 
relationship between faith and life by engaging in conversation with two Chiistian 
"traditions" and "movements". And the mutually enlightening interplay generated 
involves the inseparable facets of content and process in the theological task. 
Secondly, this study attempts to re-affirm a call to greater faithfulness in the direction 
of the Kingdom of God and in the light of the contours and challenges of the present 
historical situation.
Nevertheless, to study both Hauerwas and Sobrino together is not to define 
one as right and the other as wi'ong, but is rather to em'ich both our understanding of 
discipleship as the hermeneutical entry point into Christian convictions, and also show 
that theological reflection has one way or another to promote discipleship. Therefore, 
this study is not primarily a comparative study between them. Rather through 
dialogue, discussion and exchange, their differences become complementary aspects 
of the truth. However, the aim is not simply to find a middle way between them, but 
rather to accept their differences, learn to live in diversity yet in unity, with patience 
and understanding. Besides, to contend that Cliristian beliefs should be demonstrated 
through Chiistian practice is not suggesting a kind of pragmatism. Effectiveness can 
never be the criterion of the truth. Rather discipleship is God’s initiative, and through 
discipleship, we come to know Clirist.
In this study, I will concentrate on discussing and examining the ethic of the 
Kingdom of God in Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s theology simply because the theme of 
the Kingdom of God is central to them, and Christians are called to live under, and
7
It is Luke who gives us the consistent evidence o f the christological proclamation o f the 
early church; however, it also seems clear that for Luke apostolic preaching was none other than the 
announcement o f the Kingdom o f God. To be a witness o f  Jesus is to be a witness to the Kingdom 
o f  God (Lk.24:48; Acts 1:8). "To announce Jesus" and "to announce the Kingdom" are synonyms. 
This is why Lesslie Newbigin says that "what is new is that in Jesus the Kingdom is present. This 
why the first generation o f  Christian preachers used a different language from the language o f Jesus: 
he spoke about the Kingdom, they spoke about Jesus. They were bound to make this shift o f language
if they were to be faithful to the facts  the Kingdom was no longer a distant hope or a faceless
concept, it had now a name and a face- the name and the face o f the man from Nazaieth. In the New  
Testament we are dealing not just with the proclamation o f the Kingdom but also with the presence 
o f the Kingdom." (The Open Secret, London: SPCK, 1978, p.44) This was exactly what Origen meant 
when he called Christ the autobasilea: Christ himself is the Kingdom.
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witness to, God’s Kingdom. However, my attention is not to explore the biblical 
exegesis of the Kingdom of God, but rather to reflect the significance of the Kingdom 
for the Christian life. Thus, the biblical exegesis of the theme of the Kingdom of 
God is assumed rather than analyzed. Contemporary approaches to biblical 
scholarship unanimously agree upon the centrality of the Kingdom of God in Jesus’ 
teaching and ministry. Jesus did not preach himself, but the Kingdom of God. More 
importantly, his praxis reveals what the Kingdom of God is, for he himself is the 
Kingdom.” Nevertheless, regarding the Kingdom itself, Jesus’ teaching and praxis 
show us that it refers not to a separate realm over which God rules, nor to the 
specific regime of God’s rule, but to the anticipated fact of and partially 
accomplished his intervention on behalf of his people. Thus, the Kingdom of God 
means God’s kingship, rule, administration, sovereignty and lordship. In the Old 
Testament, this meaning of the Kingdom of God is obvious. For instance, the 
Pentateuch and the historical and prophetic writings consider YHWFÏ as the leader of 
his people in Ex. 15; YHWH as the real king who relativizes earthly monarchy and 
leadership in Judg.8:22, 1 Sam.8:4; YITWH as the Lord and shepherd of the people 
in Isa.6:5, Zeph.3:15. The Reign of God perhaps is a better expression than the 
Kingdom of God. But the Kingdom of God has become a technical term in theology 
and religious language and a symbol so intimately related to Jesus’ message that we 
cannot avoid it. Therefore, in the light of the Old Testament, and with the caution
of not reducing it to the geographical connotations, the Kingdom of God is still found 
serviceable.
Nevertheless, both in Jesus’ day and in the history of the church, the Kingdom
misunderstood in terms of the restoration of the national political theocracy in Israel. 
We find this idea of a restoration of the Kingdom of David in the Jewish apocrypha 
[Psalms of Solomon 5:18; 17:21-32; IV Ezra 13:35], Understandably, it is the 
interpretation which the Jewish resistance movements (such as the Zealots) gave to 
the idea at the time of Greek and Roman domination. The use of violence to 
establish this kingdom of God was not ruled out. On the other hand, in the history 
of the church, this "realized eschatology" takes the form of human achievements in 
building up the Kingdom on earth. An example of this is the social gospel movement 
represented by Walter Rauschenbush. He considered that "the Kingdom of God is 
society organized according to the will of God."”
W.Rauschenbush, The Theoiogy o f the Social Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1922),
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of God has been mistaken by Jews and Cluistians respectively. Generally, there are 
three trends of misinterpretation. Firstly, in Jesus’ day, the Kingdom of God was
- S '
Secondly, in Jesus’ day, the Kingdom of God was also misinterpreted as a 
transcendent eschatological and universal rule of God over all peoples. More or less 
in reaction to, or in frustration with the nationalist and political fighting for God’s 
Kingdom, apocalyptic writers said that God himself would come on the day of the 
Lord. He would usher in a new paradise. This is the dominant thought pattern in the 
Qumran community. On the other hand, in the history of the church, this "future 
eschatology" appears more or less the same. We consistently come across that some 
churches in history which retreat and isolate themselves from society. They are only
concerned with their own survival and salvation. In contemporary terms they are 
called sects.
Finally, in Jesus’ day, the Kingdom of God was misrepresented as a hidden 
rule of God in human hearts. That was the view of the rabbis and Pharisees. This 
"malkut" YHWH became possible through faithful fulfilment of Torah and Halakah, 
law and tradition. Conversion, repentance and observance of the law made the rule 
of God in Israel possible again. They also hastened the universal lordship of God 
over all peoples who would accept belief in YHWH as the one God and thus took on 
themselves the yoke of the Kingdom of God [Matt. 10:29f]. On the other hand, in the 
history of the church, this "individualistic eschatology" is found among those churches 
who believe that saving souls is the primary mission of the church. Their view is that 
the church does not need to participate in transforming the world, because the root 
of the problem of social injustice is personal sin. Therefore, personal conversion is 
the only way to experience the Kingdom on earth.
These three interpretations misunderstand the meaning of the Kingdom of God 
in different degrees. Basically, Hauerwas and Sobrino do not agree with any one of 
them. It is true that the New Testament talks of the Kingdom that is coming 
[Matt.7:10], and that is near [Mk.l:15], but it does not refer to a kingdom of God 
outside this world. On the contrary, in the Lord’s prayer, "Thy Kingdom Come" and 
"Thy will be done" stand side by side. Nevertheless, the Kingdom cannot be 
interpreted as a blueprint for social order or a result of human effort, because the 
Kingdom of God is always a gift of grace. The Kingdom is both God’s initiative and 
human response to God’s initiative involving a recognition of the sovereignty of the 
Kingdom over all lives. The Kingdom is always "already, not yet". Finally, as the 
Kingdom is addressed to both an individual and a community. Thus, going to either
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of these extremes distorts the nature of the Kingdom.
With regard to the possible relationship between the Christian life and the 
Kingdom, Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that the Kingdom demands a serious 
consideration of discipleship, otherwise, the Kingdom becomes cheap grace. On the 
other hand, discipleship is the way to communicate the essence of the Kingdom 
because the Kingdom is concretized in the lives of its people. Here, the work by 
Bruce Chilton and J.I.H.McDonald can further clarify this point. In Jesus and the 
Ethics of the Kingdom” , they suggest an understanding of the Kingdom in terms 
of Jesus’ parables because Jesus used parables to explain the mystery of the Kingdom. 
However, they draw our attention not to the content of parable, but rather to the use 
of parable. According to them, the telling of a parable is not simply to proclaim or 
explain a fact by means of discourse, but is rather intended to convey a point which 
is that those who hear the parables are invited to act on what they hear. In other 
words, the parable is not only to explain the truth, but also seeks to influence the 
hearer’s attitude and behaviour. For instance, what happened to the prodigal is not 
only Jesus’ story; the hearer is also invited to consider it as his/her own, and to act 
accordingly. Therefore, as conveyed in the parables, the Kingdom cannot be 
apprehended apart from action because a parable is told in expectation of the response 
of the hearers. Thus, the relationship between the Christian life and the Kingdom is 
that at one end there is the divine performance of the Kingdom, an inceptive reality 
which attracts hope. At the other end is human performance, an enacted response 
which itself elicits action. This is what we have called discipleship. However, 
Chilton and McDonald remind us that
discipleship is not the end of the Kingdom, whether it is viewed
Bruce Chilton and J.I.H.McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics o f the Kingdom (London; SPCK, 
1987), pp. 1-47.
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theologically or ethically; rather discipleship is the means by which the 
motifs and ethical themes of the Kingdom are communicated. For that 
reason, discipleship cannot be equated with the performance of the 
Kingdom. Disciples are certainly expected to perform it, in the two 
senses of conveying and enacting the Kingdom, but their function in 
preaching and healing, like Jesus’ function, is to occasion the 
performance of the Kingdom among those to whom they are sent.’^
Thus, their comment corresponds with my thesis; that is, discipleship is the
hermeneutical entry point into the Cliristian faith.
Put differently and precisely, I consider that the correlation between the 
Kingdom of God and discipleship fundamentally relates to the missiological, ethical 
and theological dimensions. It has a missiological dimension because the Kingdom 
of God is about God’s love for and his lordship over the world. Therefore, 
discipleship is nothing other than the proclaiming and acknowledging of God’s 
lordship in order to inspire others to experience the love of God. It has an ethical 
dimension because the Kingdom of God signifies a new age, a new reality. Despite 
its eschatological nature, it is here and now, and challenges our contemporary life. 
Therefore, discipleship is nothing other than to live under the reign of God in terms 
of being conformed to the Kingdom’s values so that the church can witness to the 
Kingdom, Finally, it has a theological dimension because it attempts to re-discover 
the meaning of the Kingdom of God [the central metaphor of the Christian faith] in 
terms of putting faith into practice rather than providing a philosophical explanation. 
These tluee dimensions penetrate into this study in different degrees at different 
stages. Nevertheless, these thi'ee dimensions are understood in the context of 
cliristology because Jesus is embodiment of the Kingdom and we are called to follow 
him. Without Christ, the Kingdom becomes nothing other than a secular political 
ideology, while without the Kingdom, Christ becomes nothing other than a private
Ibid, p!42.
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idol.
Although both Hauerwas and Sobrino primarily agree that the Christian life
has to be oriented in the light of the Kingdom, they have different emphases.
Sometimes their insights and conclusions differ considerably. In order to display
their interpretations and assess their contributions, I will discuss the ethics of the
Kingdom in four interrelated aspects. In chapter one, I will examine how the agent
of the Kingdom is understood in terms of Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s understanding of
spirituality and ecclesiology. The former is the essence of the Clnistian life, while
the latter suggests that although the Kingdom and the church are not identical, there
is no separation of the Kingdom from the church because
it is the community which has begun to taste [even only in foretaste] 
the reality of the Kingdom which alone can provide the hermeneutic
message Without the hermeneutic of such a living community, the
message of the Kingdom can only become an ideology and a 
programme, it will not be a gospel.”
In chapter two, I will analyze the models of the Kingdom based on the discussion of 
the preceding chapter. "Model" here refers to the means helping us to understand a 
subject, but it is not the subject itself. My attention will concentrate on Hauerwas’ 
model of narrative and Sobrino’s model of justice. In chapter tliree, in the light of 
the explication of the preceding two chapters, I will discuss on the practice of the 
Kingdom in terms of the relationship between theory and praxis in relation to the 
Christian religion. Attention will be particularly given to Hauerwas’ pacifism and 
Sobrino’s evangelization. Finally, in chapter four, based on the preceding studies, I 
shall attempt to explore the meaning of the presence of the Kingdom in terms of how 
discipleship is understood and practised in the contemporary setting, on the one hand, 
and how discipleship challenges our way of doing theology, on the other.
Lesslie Newbigin, Signs o f the Kingdom (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), p. 19.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE AGENT OF THE KINGDOM
A. INTRODUCTION
The agent of the Kingdom is about the historical representation of the 
Kingdom of God; that is, to be God’s historical agent in the ongoing work of 
salvation by being the continuation of Jesus’ universal mission. The agent is not the 
Kingdom, but is its anticipation and its fragmentary realization. Biblically speaking, 
the historical representations of the Kingdom of God are an individual Christian and 
the church. They are not two different categories because an individual Christian 
finds his/her meaning of existence in the context of the church, and the church is a 
community of people who follow Christ. But at the same time, an individual 
Christian and the church are distinct because a Christian as an individual and the 
church as a corporate represent different levels of concern. Therefore, in the 
following, when I separately discuss the agent of the Kingdom in terms of an 
individual Christian and the church, I refer to their different levels of concern instead 
of their different purposes of existence.
The issue of the agent of the Kingdom relates to the matter of what the 
identity of the agent has to be in order to represent the Kingdom of God in history. 
I consider that this matter is primarily about discipleship because of Jesus’ call to 
discipleship. Thus, on the level of an individual Christian, I will discuss the meaning 
of discipleship in terms of the concept of spirituality, and on the level of the church,
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I will examine the meaning of discipleship in terms of the relationship between the 
church and the world. As said, these two levels me interrelated. If either one of 
them is ignored, the meaning of discipleship is incomplete because one way or 
another it interiorizes and socializes the Christian faith.
Spirituality is the essence of the Cirristimi life because the Clrristimi life is not
just a group of ideas about how we might live, but about how we should live if we
are to be faithful to God. Therefore, spirituality is concerned with the shaping and
disciplining of our lives in accordance with the Kingdom’s values. However,
spirituality is often narrowly described as a state of being, frequently approached
tlrrough "spiritual exercises" and acts of discipline that put people in touch with
realities, or a Reality, not discernible in ordinary experience. As a result, this
understanding compartmentalizes life into, [roughly], the sacred and the secular [the
former being good and the latter evil]. An example of this is medieval mysticism.
Thus, in order to rediscover the dynamic meaning of spirituality, we have to
demythologize spirituality in two ways. Spirituality has to embrace both private and
public character. Spirituality is not only concerned with the cultivation of the inner
life of a person, but also this concern inevitably brings a person to be engaged in
social practice. Christian Duquoc rightly remarks that
without the stress on the necessity of the private life and of the 
religious tolermice which was the condition for it, any attempt to 
reinterpret the meaning of the public character of the Christian faith 
would be doomed from the start. The aspect of private life, far from 
being an occasion of deviation or escapism, was in fact the necessary 
form of mediation for those theologies which now call themselves 
"political theologies" or "theologies of revolution".'
Moreover, this understanding of spirituality is not confined only to the dimension of
 ^Christian Duquoc, "Spirituality: A Private or a Public Phenomenon?" In: Concilium. Vol.9, 
No.7 (London: Burns & Oates, 1971), p .l6 .
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personal reflection, but also can be attained through social practice, namely, 
liberation. These two approaches can be seen as two ways of talking about the same 
thing, so that there is no necessity, or even possibility, of making a choice between 
them. Apart from this, the essence of spirituality is a concern of following Jesus 
because following Jesus is the way in which we learn to be faithful to God.
In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss the concept of spirituality in 
Stanley Hauerwas’ and Jon Sobrino’s theology. Hauerwas and Sobrino represent two 
different emphases on and approaches to spirituality. In short, Hauerwas is more 
concerned with the private character of spirituality, while Sobrino is more concerned 
with the public character.^ At the same time, their different emphases also relate to 
their different emphases on the practical meaning of following Jesus. For Hauerwas, 
following Jesus is primaiily understood in the framework of the Sermon on the 
Mount, while for Sobrino, following Jesus is principally understood in the framework 
of Jesus’ jubilee proclamation. These differences inevitably bring different 
orientations of their theological emphases.
In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the church as the agent of the 
Kingdom. To consider the church as the agent of the Kingdom is to suggest that the 
Kingdom is not only the ultimate goal of the church, but also the Kingdom has been 
present at the church’s origin, continuously motivating and animating its mission. 
It is the origin of the church because it has been anticipated in the history of Christ. 
It is the goal of the church because of the Christian hope for future consummation 
of the church’s communion with Christ. On the other hand, to consider the church
 ^ I admit that to a certain extent this distinction is problematic because a concern o f  private 
spirituality is not necessarily confined to private life, or a concern o f public spirituality is not 
necessarily confined to public life. But for the sake o f this study, this distinction is still useful, 
provided that this does not promote a dualism.
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as the agent of the Kingdom signifies that the church is sent into the world. The 
church . the  embodi ment of the new being in a community, represents the Kingdom 
of God in history. Its representation defines how the church finds its profound 
meaning in its service for the world. In this part of the chapter, I will confine myself 
to the study about the relationship between the church and the world.
H.Richard Niebuhr’s book Christ and Culture^ can be regarded as a classical 
text in dealing with the problem of the relationship between the church and the 
world. It is true that his typology should not be considered as perfect, but it cannot 
be denied that his typology helps to locate the basic issue of the relationship between 
the church and the world. In the light of Niebuhr’s typology, Hauerwas’ proposal 
of the church as alternative society can be negatively considered as a model of 
"Christ against culture", while Sobrino’s proposal of the church of the poor can be 
negatively regarded as parallel to a model of "Christ in culture". Are these the 
correct understandings of Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s ecclesiology? Can both 
Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s ecclesiology also be seen as a model o f "Christ- the 
transformer of culture"? Interestingly enough, both Hauerwas and Sobrino are 
criticized on grounds of sectarianism with different reasons,'’ Even though Hauerwas 
and Sobrino have different emphases on the relationship between the church and the 
world, they endeavour to call the church back to be the true church of Christ; that is,
 ^ H.Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1952).
 ^ See Wilson D.Miscamble, "Sectarian Passivism?" In: Theology Today. XLIV, 1987, pp.69- 
77; and James Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation." In: Proceeding o f the Catholic Theological 
Society. Vol.40, 1985, pp.83-94. Regarding Sobrino, put more precisely, he has not been condemned 
by the Vatican. However, if  we see Sobrino to be in line with liberation theology as a whole, then 
his ecclesiology has to face the same fate and criticism as L.Boff. In September 1984, the Instruction 
on Certain Aspects o f the Theology are signed by Cardinal Ratzinger, Perfect o f the Congregation for 
the Doctrine o f the Faith, was published. In this document, liberation theology was criticized. A 
direct consequence is that the ecclesial base communities in Latin American are suppressed. See 
W.E.Hewitt, Base Christian Communities and Social Changes in Brazil (University o f Nebraska, 
1991), pp.91-105.
being faithful to its calling in terms of bearing God’s mission to the world. In what 
ways then, we are wondering, should a genuinely Christian community distinguish 
itself from the surrounding culture? In what ways should it identify with that world 
and share its life? Put briefly, what precisely does it mean to be "in" or "within" 
culture and loyal to the cause of Chiist? These are all my concerns in the second 
part of this chapter.
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B. AN INDIVIDUAL CHRISTIAN AS AN AGENT
1. HAUERWAS’ APPROACH TO SPIRITUALITY
a. Character, Vision and Virtue
Study of character and virtue does not play a significant role in contemporary 
research in Cluistian ethics'. This decline of interest can be explained as follows. 
Firstly, there is a remarkable change of understanding of ethics since the 
enlightenment. This change is caused by the importance attached by the 
enlightenment to upholding human reasoning. The "quest for the historical Jesus" is 
an excellent illustration of the impact of this movement on Cliristian theology. Any 
ethics which emphasizes character and virtue may then no longer be able to meet the 
challenge of the enlightenment because such an emphasis is considered subjective. 
Therefore, ethicists look for the so-called "standard account of morality" which 
stresses "value free", objectively and universally accessible. This shift continuously 
dominates contemporary Christian ethical thought. Secondly, since the beginning of 
the 20th century, there has been a strong protest among Cliristians themselves against 
the privatization of the Cliristian faith. This protest demands the church to take up 
its social responsibility in order to fulfil its calling, Walter Rauschenbusch’s "Social 
Gospel Movement" in the 1920s, Reinhold Niebuhi’s "Christian Realism", the World 
Christian Council’s slogan of "the Church for Others", and contemporary political 
theologies are the typical outcomes of this protest. Consequently, a personal ethic 
is less favoured and sometimes even despised. Thirdly, there is a confusion between 
a study of character and virtue, and a return to moralism. In addition to the recent
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 ^ Basically, most o f the theologians do regard a study o f character and virtue as part o f the 
discipline o f Christian ethics, but they seldom include this in their works. Typical examples are 
Ronald H.Preston, The Future o f  Christian Ethics (London: SCM, 1987) and 1.Phi lip Wogaman, A 
Christian Method o f Moral Judgment (London: SCM, 1976). However, an exceptional case is the 
work done by Ian C.M.Falrweather and James I.H.McDonald, The Quest for Christian Ethics 
(Edinburgh: Handsel, 1984).
Before embarking on the discussion of the concepts of character, vision and
 ^ A lso see Ian C.M.Fairweather and James I.H.McDonald, The Quest for Christian Ethics. 
pp.233-238. They discuss why the law model o f  Christian ethics is attractive and populai' in Christian
 ^ See Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), and 
J.M.Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (Chicago: University o f Chicago, 1968).
renewal of fundamentalist theology, a study of character is often associated with the 
fundamentalist approach to ethics which emphasizes the moral behaviour of the 
converted. This makes a study of character less attractive and promising. Finally, 
sociologically speaking, the rise of "individualism" in contemporary society also 
makes no space for the study of chaiacter. Individualism is not only a matter of 
whether a person puts the good of the community above his/her own wishes and 
inclinations or not, but also, theologically, it pushes the Christian faith into the 
private domain. In other words, the Chi'istian faith is treated as both private and
individual. Any address to a level of such "intimacy" would be considered as a
violation of one’s individuality.
Despite all these unfavourable conditions, theologians like Richard Niebuhr 
and James Gustafson still consider that a study of character (the self) is a promising 
way to approach Cluistian ethics.^ Among theologians, Hauerwas can be regarded 
as the spokesman of "an ethics of virtue or character" (if there is such a term). He 
intellectually displays the indispensability of the study of character in Christian ethics,
and perspicaciously proposes a challenging approach to Christian ethics. I-Iauerwas’
'concepts of character, vision and virtue not only arouse ethical interest, but also are 
concerned with spirituality in the deepest sense because they point sharply to a 
person’s imiermost life, that is, vita humana. In this section, I will concentrate my 
study on Hauerwas’ ideas of character, vision and virtue, and their significance.
I
ethics.
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virtue, there is a question which needs first to be clarified. That is to say, what are 
the inadequacies of the present ethical debates in which Hauerwas finds that an 
emphasis on character, vision and virtue is necessary and vital?
Fundamentally, the Christian life is one of being and doing. And Christian 
ethics then has to study both. A person needs to act from the right motive and to 
find the right content of actions in particular situations in terms of his/her 
fundamental beliefs and attitudes. Nevertheless, contemporary Christian ethics is 
more concerned with "what a person ought to do" rather than "what a person ought 
to be". The reasons for such an emphasis have already been explained above. Even 
the so-called new ethics, the Situation Ethics, suggested by Joseph Fletcher in the 
1960s is also dominated by the concern of decision-making. Undoubtedly, an ethic 
which stresses decision-making is necessary and important simply because decision­
making (choice) is part of the nature of being a human. Furthermore, an ethic 
concerned about "what a person ought to do" not only practically may solve the 
dilemma of a person’s daily life, but also provides a simpler and clearer line for a 
person to take. However, aecording to Hauerwas'*, the deficiency of the ethics of 
principle or obligation is that it treats ethics as equivalent to a matter of quandaries. 
It rules out the inseparable link between an act and an agent. Consequently, this 
ethics does nothing putting a person on the path towards being good because the 
morality of a person is assumed rather than analyzed. If ethics is concerned with 
both vita humana and actus humanus^ then, for Hauerwas, an emphasis on character, 
vision and virtue is not an attempt to replace an ethic of obligation, but rather to see 
an ethics of obligation in an appropriate context. Hauerwas says that
neither the language of duty nor of virtue excludes the other on
 ^ S.Hauerwas, Truthflilness and Tragedy (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame, 1977), 
pp. 15-27 and The Peaceable Kingdom (London; SCM, 1982), pp.19-22.
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principle, though often theoretical accounts fail to describe adequately 
the ways virtue and duty interrelate in our moral experience..... The 
recognition and performance of duty is made possible because we are 
virtuous, and a person of virtue is dutiful because not to be so is to be 
less than virtuous.^
Before turning to see in what ways an ethic of virtue may supplement the 
inadequacies of an ethic of obligation, we have first to discuss Hauerwas’ concepts 
of character, vision and virtue.
Character is defined by Hauerwas as the "qualification or determination of our 
self-agency, formed by our having certain intentions rather than others."'* It suggests 
that a person is not only accountable for his/her specific actions, but also for what 
he/she has become and is becoming. Hauerwas makes a very detailed and precise 
distinction among "having a character-trait", "being a type or kind of character", 
"being a character" and "having character".*' The first three more or less refer to a 
distinctive manner of carrying out certain activities like virtues which do not 
necessarily point to a whole person, while having character is concerned with an 
orientation of and direction to life. It links up integrity, incorruptibility and 
consistency instead of some paidicular virtues like courage and prudence. A person 
who has it is not credited with any definite traits, but the claim is made that whatever 
traits he/she exhibits, there will be some sort of control and consistency in the 
manner in which he/she exhibits them. Thus, the relationship between the first three 
and having chaiacter is that the vaiious virtues receive their particular form through 
the agent’s character.
 ^ S.Hauerwas, A Community o f Character. p .ll4 .
® S.Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life (San Antonio: Trinity University, 1985),
p .ll5 .
 ^ Ibid., pp.14-18.
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The ethical significance of chai'acter is to suggest that a person’s moral life 
is neither wholly determined by his/lier social and cultural factors nor limited to non- 
reflective accommodation to the good, but rather he/she is actively and consciously 
responsible for his/her moral life. Therefore, having character requires cultivation. 
However, Hauerwas reminds us that acquiring character is not an end in itself 
because "the moral importance of the idea of character is not that good men think a 
great deal about acquiring and having character; rather it is that the concerns 
represented by the idea of character play an essential part in their being good men."^
Hauerwas’ concept of character does create a new challenge to contemporary 
Cluistian ethical thoughts. However, to what extent does his suggestion come closer 
to the philosophical idea of "will"? Is character just like a new brand of the same 
wine of the concept of "will"? In order to discuss this, I refer to Kant’s 
understanding of will. For him, will is nothing but practical reason, and this practical 
reason is the ability to act in accordance with laws. The essence of morality is a 
good will, and consistency with this. But when Kant comes to define virtue, this 
turns out to be "moral disposition in conflict". By this he means the disposition to 
act for the sake of duty when there is a conflict with one’s inclinations. Humankind 
only has moral worth when people act simply on the principle that a course of action 
is the right thing to do. If they act as they should because they have an inclination 
so to act, while this in no way makes the act wrong, it means that the action has no 
moral worth.^ Appaiently, Hauerwas’ idea of character and Kant’s idea of will are 
not the same. The former is talking about disposition, while the latter is talking 
about choice. However, the ideas of character and will do not necessarily exclude
® S.Hauei-was, Vision and Virtue (Notre Dame; Fides, 1974), p.66.
® Michael J.Langford, The Good and the Tiue (London; SCM, 1985), pp. 168-173.
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one another because the idea of character has to include the general ability to will to 
do what is right, and the idea of will is something that arises in the very having and 
exercising of the virtues. Thus, the concept of character is to describe the goal which 
a person is to be, while the idea of will refers to the process of having character.
This relationship will be clear when we discuss Hauerwas’ other two concepts, 
namely, vision and virtue.
'■i
I.Murdoch, "Vision and Choice in Morality." In: Christian Ethics and Contemporary 
Philosophy, ed. Ian Ramsey (London: SCM, 1966), pp. 195-218, and S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue. 
pp.30-47.
S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, p.36.
Hauerwas uses the Albert Speer’s experience to illustrate that Speer, Hitler’s architect and 
minister o f armaments, was occupied by the advance o f his own career as an architect, but failed to 
see the true significance o f  his work for Hitler, Detail see S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, pp.82-98.
T.Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), pp.51-55.
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Indebted to Iris Murdoch'®, Hauerwas considers that the moral life is not 
only about "thinking clearly and making rational choice, [but also] is a way of seeing 
the world."" That is to say, a person’s actions are based on his/lier vision of what 
is most real and valuable because his/her vision determines what features of the world 
he/she will notice and what features he/she will fail to notice. In other words, vision 
governs the choices that will confront him/her and those that will not.'^ Therefore, 
the ethical significance of vision is to generate a person’s ability to see reality as it 
is. Is then vision to be understood as a synonym of world view? Thomas 
Luckmann, a sociologist, defines the world view as a historical reality that 
circumscribes a range of meaningful experiences for the individual. It determines a 
person’s orientation in the world and exerts an influence upon the conduct of a 
person that is as profound as it is taken for granted and therefore, unnoticed." 
Obviously, this is not Hauerwas’ understanding of vision because the world view is
concerned with factors determining a person’s vision, while vision is concerned with 
the ability to see the reality (but it cannot be denied that the concept of world view 
does provide us with a better knowledge of how a person’s vision is formed). 
However, the notion of discernment displayed by James M. Gustafson may help us 
to clarify Hauerwas’ view of vision." Discernment, according to Gustafson, "is 
simply to notice it, to see it, in another sense we reserve the word for a quality of 
perception, of discrimination, of observation and judgment."" He goes on to say 
that discernment is, firstly, not mechanically applied to a scheme of analysis of 
whatever a person observes; secondly, not a deductive logic so that a person can 
move from the universal to the particular; thirdly, not a skill in accumulating the 
relevant information pertaining to a subject; and finally, not an emotive reaction to 
a subject. Rather it "is a reading of what actually is the case at hand."" For 
Flauerwas, it is this other than rational aspect of selfhood that partially determines 
perspective, partially determines what is seen and accented, partially determines what 
is judged to be right and wrong, and thus what a person will do. However, a 
person’s vision reflects what his/her character is. Vision and character are 
interrelated. Hauerwas considers that "we can only act in the world we see, a seeing 
partially determined by the kind of beings we have become thiough the stories we 
have learned and embodied in our life plan.""
Unlike Murdoch, Hauerwas does not believe that a right vision of life would 
be fully gained by human effort because we cannot see the world rightly unless we
J.M.Gustafson, "Moral Discernment in the Christian Life." In: Norm and Context In 
Christian Ethics, ed. Gene Outka (London; SCM, 1969), pp. 17-36.
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Ibid., p.l8.
-a
Ibid., p.23.
S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, p.69.
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are changed, for as sinners we do not wish to see truthfully." In other words, 
"conversion" is the starting point of having a right vision. Besides, acquiring a right 
vision is not merely a matter of looking, but rather is to develop disciplined skills 
tlirough imitation within a community, the church, that attempts to live faithfully to 
the story of God. I will explicate this when 1 talk about the church in next section.
Before moving on Hauerwas’ final concept, virtue, it is important to note that 
in his later stage of writings (late 1970s onward) Hauerwas has gradually replaced 
the word vision by "narrative". This shift can be explained in this way. Vision itself 
is a concept to describe a reality how a person sees and interprets the world 
differently. But it does not have a capacity to explain how a person’s vision is 
formed. Ironically, the concept of narrative can achieve this task. Such a shift does 
not suggest that the concept of vision no longer plays a significant role in Hauerwas’ 
theology. Rather in the light of narrative, the concept of vision is better formulated 
and strengthened. This will be discussed in the chapter two of this thesis.
Hauerwas makes a very clear distinction between virtue and virtues.
According to him, virtue is understood in the sense of character which is the stance
of the self that co-ordinates or embodies the virtues in a manner that makes them
virtues. On the other hand, virtues are
specific depositions determined by the need to correct certain 
deficiencies, for the formation of the passions, as skills internal to 
activities or practices, or as necessary for the performances of certain 
roles or offices."
In this short and precise definition, Hauerwas suggests that virtues, firstly, are trained
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp.29-30.
S.Hauerwas, "Virtue." In: A New Dictionary o f Christian Ethics, ed. J.Macquarrie (London: 
SCM, 1986), p.649.
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skills of a person enabling him/her to act one way rather than other; secondly, virtues 
are trained interests and commitments for a way of life; and finally, virtues are 
habitual skill of behaviour that are under the control of the agent because they have 
been formed through the practical intelligence. Does Hauerwas’ view of virtue 
suggest the unity of virtues (the diversity in unity) or an independent virtue as a 
result of the exercise of practical reason? For Hauerwas, virtues are primarily 
directed by a person’s character. Although there will be differences among particular 
virtues, in fact the differences are not essential because all are reducible to the 
development of a person’s character. Therefore, virtue should be understood 
collectively and mutually. Otherwise, it separates itself from the concept of 
character. Nevertheless, this understanding should not be set against the emphasis on 
the cultivation of one particular virtue like hope. One important point 1 would like 
to make is that in Hauerwas’ later writings, we find that Hauerwas talks about virtues 
in more concrete terms, such as, hope, patience, friendship and peace. The reason 
is probably that he no longer needs to contend how an ethic of virtue is valid, but to 
illustrate what it involves.
In summary, virtue, vision and character aie closely related. Virtue(s) affects 
vision, and contributes to character which in turn affects vision. But it is also the 
case that vision affects character. Vision in this way moulds the further history of 
the self and thus affects the further development of character. Finally, virtue(s) takes 
its concrete form under the direction of vision and character. No matter how and to 
what extent each affects the other, they are concerned with a person’s growth into 
maturity because the moral life is not simply a matter of decision governed by 
publicly defensible principles and rules.
Now, it is time to evaluate in what ways an ethic of virtue or character can
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supplement the inadequacies of an ethic of principle. Firstly, according to Flauerwas,
an ethic of virtue considers the agent as a responsible person instead of a passive
person in doing what is good. He/she acts not tlirough conformity to some moral
norm or norms imposed upon him/her from outside, but through inward assent to
what he/she does, so that the whole person is involved. It is because the call to faith
is a call to make free, responsible decisions instead of blind obedience. Thus, the
foundation of Christian ethics is not a moral code based on the Sermon on the Mount
or the Decalogue, but a response to what God has done and is doing for all
humankind. In relation to this, FI.Richard Niebuhr rightly said that
deontology tries to answer the moral query by asking, first of all;
"What is the law and what is the first law of my life?" Responsibility, 
however, proceeds in every moment of decision and choice to inquire:
"What is going on?" If we use value term, then the differences among 
the tlu'ce approaches may be indicated by the terms, the good, the right 
and the fitting; for teleology is concerned always with the highest good 
to which it subordinates the right; consistent deontology is concerned 
with the right, no matter what may happen to our goods; but for the 
ethics of responsibility the fitting action, the one that fits into a total 
interaction as response and as anticipation of further response, is alone 
conducive to the good and alone is right.
Secondly, an ethic of virtue considers that if the agent is an actor, then his/her 
response is not a matter of always accepting the situation as it is and acting in it, but 
rather sometimes the situation can and has to be changed. This emphasis suggests 
that an event may evoke a response whereby on the one hand, the self is given a new 
direction, and on the other, a person may change the reality of the situation by 
interpreting it differently. This insight eliminates any tendency to reduce ethics 
simply to a matter of quandaries, for it involves a change of the agent and the 
situation. Finally and obviously, Flauerwas’ ethic of virtue is concerned with the 
personal, but personal is not identical with the private. That is to say, an ethic of 
virtue does not necessarily promote any tendency of the privatization of the Christian
H.Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p.20.
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faith. Rather it considers that the person whom God addresses becomes a person in 
his/her relation with others and with God. However, Hauerwas’ account deliberately 
leaves out the social dimension of an ethic of virtue which makes it difficult to find 
followers.^' What I mean is that if Hauerwas fui’ther develops the personal 
dimension of his account of an ethic of virtue, this enables us to talk about what 
hinders the growth of persons, what poisons human relations, and what fails to 
promote human and personal relationships. Then we shall talk about what social and 
political structures deny human freedom and inliibit our fulfilment as persons, what 
structures alienate us from our humanity and prevent the emergence of the new 
humanity.
John Macquarrie considers that "fundamentally spirituality has to do with 
becoming a person in the fullest s e n s e . T h i s  fullness of a person is not 
understood in the sense of the glorification of human greatness; on the contrary, it 
is understood in the light of attaining a being more nearly conformed to the image 
of God. To a large extent, Hauerwas’ concepts of character, vision and virtue are 
aiming at this. In the light of these concepts, the fullness of a person is to be a 
person of integrity; that is, unity between one’s being and one’s action. Also, the 
fullness of a person is characterized by his/her growing nature. This is what 
Hauerwas’ concepts of character, vision and virtue intend to explain. Finally, the 
fullness of a person points to something and someone going beyond oneself. This 
fullness is not achieved by self-determination, but rather by self-renunciation; and not 
for the sake of self-glorification, but for the glory of God. This is the idea of the
For Hauerwas, the Cliristian faith is never a privatized faith which will be clear later in 
this thesis. It seems to me that he does not explore the social dimension o f his ethic o f virtue because 
he confines himself to the philosophical clarification.
J.Macquarrie, Paths in Spiritualitv (London: SCM, 1972), p.40.
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imitation o f  Christ which I am going to develop in next section.
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b. The Imitation o f  Christ
In his book, The Peaceable Kingdom, Hauerwas points out that his emphases 
on the concepts of character, vision and virtue are to establish a framework that can 
help us understand the moral significance of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection.' 
That is to say, the moral significance of Jesus’ life regards any separation of Jesus’ 
person from his teaching as morally unwarranted because one’s doing camiot be 
separated from one’s being. Also, this emphasis considers that our character and 
vision are to be conformed to Jesus’ life as well as Jesus’ teaching. Hauerwas 
illustrates this relationship as follows:
there is a crucial difference between having our character formed to 
obey the law and in living accordance with God’s work in Jesus 
Cluist. We do not normally think of obeying the law as the central 
aspect of our character’s formation, whereas we have seen that to be 
sanctified is to have one’s most fundamental orientation determined by 
Jesus as Chiist. One does not feel the compulsion or need to bring 
every aspect of our experience under the idea of obeying the law, for 
we know that there simply are large area of our life which such a 
concern is inappropriate or it may even be necessary, for a morally 
significant reason, to disobey the law. To "obey the law" is not 
normally thought of as a description of a "way of life". Yet to be 
formed in Christ, to be sanctified, is to be committed to bringing every 
element of our character into relation with this dominant orientation.
This is our integrity, when everything that we believe, do or do not do, 
has been brought under the dominion of our primary loyalty to God.^
Therefore, in Chiistian terms, having character fundamentally relates to following 
Jesus. Nevertheless, for Hauerwas, following Jesus is not only concerned with its 
moral relevance to the agent, but is also the key to knowing who Jesus is.
Interestingly enough, Hauerwas imderstands following Jesus in terms of the 
imitation of Clirist. Tlirough an analogy of learning how to lay bricks, Hauerwas
 ^ S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (London: SCM, 1983), p.72. 
 ^ S.Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, pp.222-223.
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suggests tliat the relationship between Jesus and his disciples is a relationship between
af  
s
s
the master and apprentices. The apprentices need someone to follow, imitate and 
copy. Thus, Hauerwas says that
a person becomes just by imitating just persons. One way of teaching 
good habits is by watching good people, learning the moves, and 
imitating the way they related to the world.'*
Nevertheless, when Hauerwas considers that following Jesus is a matter of the Iimitation of Clrrist, it does not mean copying Jesus’ life point by point. Rather it 
means that we can only be virtuous by doing what virtuous people do in the manner 
that they do it. Therefore, in Hauerwas’ usage, an emphasis on the imitation of 
Clirist is not understood just in the minimal sense that Cluistians are to reproduce in 
themselves those values which Jesus realized, but in the stronger sense that it is only 
by reflection on the life of Jesus that they themselves are able to discern what the 
appropriate response to the moral demand is like. Moreover, the imitation of Christ 
is neither taking Christ to be essentially the teacher of a pious and good life, nor 
regarding the imitation of Clirist as instruction in the way in which a pious and good 
life is to be attained. Rather, to have one’s character determined by Christ is to have 
acquired an orientation that gives one direction in such a way that one is not 
dependent on the world’s set pattern and values, but in accordance with the 
Kingdom’s values. James Gustafson describes this as such:
See S.Hauerwas, After Christendom (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991), chapter 4.
Hauerwas writes that "to learn to lay bricks, it is not sufficient for you to be told how to do it, 
but you must learn a multitude o f  skills that are co-ordinated into the activity o f  laying brick- that is 
why before you lay brick you must learn to mix the mortar, build scaffolds, joint and so on.
Moreover, it is not enough to be told how to hold a trowel, how to spread mortar, or how to frog the
mortar, but in order to lay brick you must hour after hour, day after day, lay brick  All o f  this
indicates that to lay brick you must be initiated into the craft o f bricklaying by a master craftsman.....
When the moral life is viewed through the analogy o f the craft, we see why we need a teacher to
actualize our potential  I am not suggesting that we ought to think about becoming moral as an
analogy to learning how to be a bricklayer, potter, or teacher. Rather 1 am suggesting that learning 
to lay brick constitutes contexts in which we receive our most decisive moral training."
 ^ S.Hauewas and William H.Willimon, Resident Aliens (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), p. 110.
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I;,
5 J.M.Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life ('Chicaao: University o f  Chicago, 1968), pp.268-
269.
® S.Hauerwas & Willian H.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.55, 
 ^ S.Hauerwas, A Community o f Character, pp.41-42.
® Ibid., pp.36-44.
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Christ, as a norm brought to bear, does, can and ought to illuminate 
the options and deeply condition the choice of the Christian. The 
figure of Christ given in the New Testament with all of its descriptions 
and theological diversity and the tecahings attributed to him provide 
Cluistians with a source of illumination and a criterion of judgment, 
for in him there is an integrity of trust in, and loyalty to, God, and 
words and deeds directed towards men.^
■
For Hauerwas, the word "imitation" is particularly important because by
.learning to imitate Jesus, Clnistians learn how to imitate God and be heirs of the
Kingdom. What then is Jesus’ life? Or who is Jesus? Before embarking on this
subject, it is necessary to explicate Hauerwas’ working hypotheses. Firstly, he
considers that people caimot know Jesus without following Jesus. People follow
Jesus before they know Jesus.^ Hauerwas continues to say that
there is no "real Jesus" except as he is known through the kind of life
he demanded of his disciples The demands for "historical accuracy"
is ahistorical insofar as the Gospels exhibit why the story of this man 
[Jesus] is inseparable from how that story teaches us to follow him.
As the Gospels show, only because the disciples had first followed 
Jesus to Jerusalem were they able to understand the significance of the 
resurrection,*'
An emphasis on following Jesus as the key to know who Jesus is does not intend to 
ignore the modern historical criticism on the Gospels, but rather accepts a fact that, 
as the wi'iters of the Gospels were not trying to write an "objective history" of Jesus, 
what we need is to have an alternative hermeneutical principle- following Jesus- in 
order to establish Jesus’ nature and significance. Secondly, Hauerwas considers that 
the story of Jesus is a social ethic rather than that Jesus has a social ethic.* The
the Gospels portray Jesus not only offering the possibility of achieving 
what were heretofore thought to be impossible ethical ideals. He 
actually proclaims and embodies a way of life that God has made 
possible here and now.®
However, Hauerwas’ interpretation of Jesus primarily focuses on Jesus’ lifestyle of
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.83,
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difference between them is that the former suggests that any adequate Christology 
must be political in its begimiing, not just in the end, while the latter intends to 
deduce the social ethical implication from cliristology because it distinguishes 
between the Jesus of history and the Christ of dogma. To see that Jesus is a social 
ethic is to consider that there is no moral point or message that is separable from the 
story of Jesus because Jesus himself is an ethic. These two hypotheses are obviously 
interrelated. Following Jesus means to see that Jesus’ life is a social ethic, and to 
consider that Jesus as a social ethic demands his disciples to follow him.
Recent scholarship points out that Jesus’ teaching was not first of all focussed 
on his own status, but on the proclamation of the Kingdom of God. Thus, Jesus did 
not direct attention to himself, but tlirough his teaching, healings and miracles tried 
to indicate the nature and immediacy of God’s Kingdom. In other words, the 
Kingdom of God can be grasped only by recognizing how Jesus exemplified in his 
life the standards of that Kingdom. To follow Jesus then is not the end in itself, but 
rather it is to put one in the position of being part of the Kingdom.
For Hauerwas, the indivisble relationship between Jesus and the Kingdom 
signifies that the Kingdom of God is fulfilled in Jesus’ life eschatologically. That is 
to say, the proclamation of the coming Kingdom of God, its presence, and its future 
coming is fundamentally a claim about how God rules and the establishment of that 
rule through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Hauerwas writes that
non-violence, "peaceableness" and forgiveness instead of his denunciation of injustice. 
For Hauerwas, this does not mean that the latter is unimportant, but rather God’s 
Kingdom will not have peace through coercion. Besides, to understand Jesus’ life 
as non-violence, "peaceableness" and forgiveness does not necessarily mean that Jesus 
promotes a passive and inward-looking lifestyle, unless our understanding of social 
ethics determines whether or how Jesus is understood. On the contrary, Jesus’ 
openness to the "unclean" reveals that God’s kingship and power consists not in 
coercion, but in God’s willingness to forgive and have mercy on humans. It is true 
that Jesus’ non-violence and "peaceableness" do not necessarily bring great social 
effectiveness. It even cost his life. Nevertheless, Jesus’ death was not a mistake but 
was what was to be expected of a violent world which did not believe that this is 
God’s world. Thus, for Jesus’ disciples, to use violence with violence is not their 
option." The resurrection of Jesus affirms that the "Way" of Jesus is the "Way" of 
God. Thus, for Hauerwas, "the Sermon [on the Mount] is but the form of his 
[Jesus]’ life, and his life, death and resurrection is the prism through which the 
Sermon is to be interpreted."" Therefore, for Christians, if Jesus’ life is integral 
to the meaning, content and possibility of the Kingdom, then the possibility of living 
a life of forgiveness and peace with one’s enemies is based on the confidence that 
the Kingdom has become a reality through the life and work of Jesus. Christians are 
not to accept the world with its hatred and resentments as a given, but to recognize 
that they live in a new age which makes possible a new way of life. This is the 
eschatological dimension of the meaning of the imitation of Christ. In other words, 
the imitation of Cluist is not first of all an ethical issue, but is eschatologically 
oriented, that is, learning to be agents of God’s new creation. Thus, the imitation of
See my later discussion on pacifism in chapter three.
S.Hauerwas, "The Sermon on the Mount, Just War and the Quest for Peace. " In; 
Concilium, 1988, vol. 195, p.38.
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Clirist is marked by the transformation of a person’s life-orientation [character] and 
the recontextuaiization of his/her relationships [vision], Jesus’ call to discipleship 
recontextualizes persons into a new frame of meaning. It is not the provision of a 
new world but a new way of being in the old one, a transformation of the old world 
by giving it new meaning. In the consciousness of properly responding persons, the 
world is recontextualized in an overarching framework of relation to God. The world 
has remained objectively the same but is transformed in their subjectivities because 
it is no longer the same in the eyes o f believers. They have a new vision of life. 
They are the eschatological people. Therefore, the Sermon on the Mount does not 
appear impossible to a people who have been called to a life of discipleship that 
requires them to contemplate their death in the light of the cross.
Here, I consider that the Sermon on the Mount is Hauerwas’ point of 
departure to understand the life of Jesus and the meaning of the imitation of Christ. 
The relationship is that the Sermon is not first of all about what Cliristians are 
supposed to do rather than a picture of who God is, as revealed in the life of Jesus. 
Besides, the basis for the ethic of the Sermon is not what works, but rather the things 
are. Therefore, "cheek-turning" is not advocated as what works, but advocated 
because this is the way God is. Then, for instance, when Christians seek 
reconciliation with the neighbour, not because they will feel so much better 
afterward, but because reconciliation is what God is doing in the world in Clirist.
Apart from this, I have also pointed out that the Sermon is eschatological in 
nature. For Hauerwas, the Sermon marks the boundary between Christians and the 
world. It is not because Christians are those who need to be different, but because 
the Sermon makes them different. Flowever, Hauerwas emphasizes that the Sermon 
is not primarily addressed to individuals, but has to be understood in the context of
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a community.'^ His argument is that all ethics aiise out of a tradition that depicts 
the way the world works, what is real, what is worth having, worth believing. 
Tradition is a function and a product of a community. Therefore, according to 
Hauerwas, all ethics make sense only when embodied in sets of social practices that 
constitute a community. Such communities support a sense of right and wrong." 
In relation to the Sermon, the Sermon cannot be divorced from its ecclesial context. 
Otherwise, it turns the Sermon into a new law with endless legalistic variations. 
Rather in an ecclesial context, the Sermon does involve individual transformation, not 
as a subjective, imier, personal experience. Instead the work of a transformed people 
have adopted, disciplined and enabled us to be transformed. Thus, it is wrong to 
contend that the Sermon can only apply most directly to the individual or relations 
between two persons because it is not intended for individuals. It is concerned about 
the formation of a visible, practical, Christian community. Nevertheless, Hauerwas 
adds that
Christian community, life in the colony, is not primarily about 
togetherness. It is about the way of Jesus Clirist with those whom he 
calls to himself. It is about disciplining our wants and needs in 
congruence with a true story, which gives us the resources to lead 
faithful lives. In living out the story together, togetherness happens, 
but only as a by-product of the main project of trying to be faithful to 
Jesus."
Thus, there is nothing private in the demands of the Sermon. Rather it is very 
public, very political and very social in that Christians can witness to the world.
In summary, the imitation of Clirist involves the total re-orientation of a 
person’ s vision, life and character. At the same time, the concepts of character.
Ibid.
S.Hauerwas & William H.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.79. 
Ibid., p.78.
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vision and virtue need the idea of the imitation of Cluist to put them on the right
direction. Otherwise, these concepts are simply self-interest exercises in which
nothing would have to be given up for the sake of the Gospel because the cause of
the Gospel would be identified with the power of each individual believer to achieve
heaven on his/her own resources, and therefore for him/her. Thus, the concepts of
character, vision and virtue and the idea of the imitation of Cluist are mutually
supportive and informative. Hauerwas’ effort can be best summarised in his
following conviction:
For the Cluistian, morality is not chosen and then confirmed by the 
example of others; instead, we learn what the moral life entails by
imitating another The problem lies not in knowing what we must
do, but how we are to do it. And the how is learned by watching and 
following."
S.Hauerwas, A Community o f Character, pp. 130-131.
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C  An Appraisal
Basically, spirituality is not simply concerned with an emotional experience
of God’s mystery, but is concerned with the moral life of the agent in terms of how
he/she is to be faithful to God. Put differently, spirituality is more associated with
the idea of sanctification rather than mysticism. This understanding has no tendency
to neglect the transcendental dimension of human life. Nor does it have any
inclination to suggest that sanctification is a moderate or well-rounded development
of all human capacities. Rather sanctification is to begin wholly outside ordinaiy
human nature itself and from beyond a person’s general experience of moments of
self-realization. It can come only as a gift. Yet the Gospel is not only a gift but also
a task to be undertaken and worked out in and through every aspect of a person’s
life. In short, the relationship between justification and sanctification is that
justification is about the objective act of God for humankind, while sanctification is
about the subjective effect that it has for the believer. Despite their relatedness,
justification and sanctification cannot be confused because
justification is a necessary aspect of sanctification in order that "Clirist 
for us" is kept at the center of the Christian life. This emphasis 
always erects a permanent barrier to any attempt to interpret the 
Cluistian life in a moralistic fashion. Sanctification must be equally 
emphasized, however, to prevent understanding Chiist’s work in a way 
that separates it from the effect it has on the believer. This is what 
prevents the Chiistian life from being reduced to an intellectual 
adherence to certain beliefs..... The justified Christian must be the 
Christian that produces good works.'
Sanctification then is not a recommended ethical programme of good dispositions and 
actions but rather the effect of the conformation of the self to God’s act. In other 
words, the Chiistian life is not primarily a task to be accomplished or an ideal to be 
achieved, but rather is a fact to be lived out- the fact of God’s establislunent of his
S.Hauerwas, Chai'acter and the Christian Life, p. 188.
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considered that it was a career for an architect. That is to say, Hitler offered him 
hope, a vision, and a story of a country which would again ask its ai'chitects to raise 
up public buildings. What Hitler offered Speer is what every professional dreams of, 
the opportunity to make his wildest ambitions come true. Speer cared nothing for
Autobiography o f Malcolm X (New York: Groye Press, 1964).
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rule in Jesus Christ. It is about the necessity of continued growth in the Christian life.
Here, I find Hauerwas’ concepts of character, vision and virtue, and his account of
■ ?■the imitation of Christ relevant because these concepts are intended to display what 
sanctification is and involves. In the following, I will illustrate and evaluate how 
these concepts help us to understand spirituality in terms of sanctification.
Obviously, Hauerwas’ interest in the moral significance of Cliristian convictions 
relates to his theological tradition, Methodism.^
I:Firstly, Hauerwas’ concept of vision helps us to understand that sanctification
is not simply understood as a contrast with the past, but rather more positively is
.understood as an attainment of a right vision. This is about the re-orientation of
values. It means that the agent’s way of seeing and interpreting the world is
.transformed or reoriented around his/her construing belief in the redemptive work of 
Jesus Clirist. This can be considered as an ethical implication of justification by
faith. For Hauerwas, the most basic element of the moral life is to have a right 
vision to see things properly because vision relates to the whole direction and 
orientation of a person’s life. It chooses and interprets what he/she sees. Hauerwas 
uses the story of Albert Speer to illustrate the importance of vision in our moral 
life.^ In the 1930s, Speer accepted Hitler’s invitation to be the Minister of 
Armaments, not because he found himself dedicated to Nazism, but because he
 ^ S.Hauei-was, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.xx.
 ^ S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp.82-98. Also see Malcolm Little, The
politics. Even when he became Minister of Armaments, Speer continued to think of
himself primarily as an architect. The reorganisation of German industry to serve the
end of the war was a creative technological task with which he could readily identify.
This new position was a natural extension of the skills learned from his architectural
training. He never considered that this would bring disaster to human history.
Neither would he be convinced that he was working for war. Speer’s experience tells
us how a person’s vision may determine his/her interpretation of reality. Vision is
not a neutral way of seeing or describing something, but rather it itself carries its own
value and judgment. Therefore, what a person needs is a vision which can help
him/her to see and face the reality as it is, and orientate his/her life in the right
.direction. If we apply this understanding to the context of Christian experience of 
sanctification, then sanctification is to recapitulate and transform the basic orientation 
of a person who has been against God: once a sinner, he/she is now committing 
himself/herself totally to the love of God. Sanctification then not only relates to a
:matter of behaviour, but also relates to a matter of value.
.............................................Secondly, Hauer was’ concept of virtue helps us to distinguish the relationship
between justification and sanctification in terms of transformation and formation. By 
transformation, I mean that it is a total personal revolution. It begins with repentance 
and proceeds eventually to the desired dissolution of all that ordinary people 
ordinarily value in themselves or others. The result of this dissolution is the birth of 
the whole human being. It takes place in Clirist, and nowhere else. It is what we 
call being "born again". It is faith that saves, trust in Christ’s redeeming act that 
makes a Clnistian, and no human ethical achievements are relevant. Generally 
speaking, this is what justification by faith is about. By formation, I mean that it is 
a process to help people to understand themselves and each other and the world they 
share, to adjust themselves to both without either undue aggressiveness or frightened
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conformity, and so to form satisfying and stable emotional and social relationships. 
In order to achieve this, one has to have virtues which are the result of discipline. 
This is what sanctification is concerned. Although transformation and formation have 
different concerns and emphases, they cannot be separated, because transformation 
cannot be completed without formation, and formation cannot be possible without 
being transformed. Transformation affirms the grace of God and rejects any 
tendency of self-righteousness, while formation affirms the preciousness of the grace 
of God which cannot be taken for granted. Regarding formation itself, Hauerwas’ 
concept of virtue reminds us that sanctification has to be understood not only as a 
tendency but also as a capacity. That is to say, a transformed life is not only a life 
inclining to be good, but also it has the capacity to be good. This capacity is about 
moral competency which is learned, acquired and developed on the basis of 
performed skill. To acquire and maintain a competency is to exercise repeatedly a 
particular pattern of movement. In terms of virtue, this means that the agent must 
sometimes overcome slothful inertia in regard to his/her value orientation through 
his/her emotions. He/she must also often master the potentially disabling emotional 
conflicts he/she experiences with his/her own value orientation through his/her moral 
competencies. This is how virtue is formed and what it is about Besides, to see 
sanctification as a formation is to consider that sanctification is both a present reality 
and an unfulfilled promise. For believers, sanctification is an ongoing, continuous 
process begun but never completed in this life.
Finally, Hauerwas’ concept of character helps us to understand that 
sanctification is about the unification of the divided self. By the divided self, I mean 
a dissociated personality. It does not suggest that the dimension of the self in persons 
who have clinically definable mental illness in the strict medical use of this term. 
But ratlier these persons are caught between the poles of several dilemmas that pull
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them in different directions. In terms of character, Hauerwas points out that this is 
inconsistent; such as, one time acting to gain money and the other time to be fair. 
Such inconsistency does not mean that one does not have character, but it does mean 
that there are inconsistent elements in the character one has; or that one’s character 
is determined primarily in view of expedience and accommodation. For Hauerwas, 
sanctification has to link up something like integrity and consistency. Integrity and 
consistency are those qualities that allow the re-affirmation of the unity of the self 
across and through many different loyalties and actions. Therefore, sanctification is 
about a confrontation with a person’s dissociated personality in order that he/she can 
have character. There are so many aspects of a person’s dissociated personality that 
it is uni'ealistic to name them all. However, Jesus himself does highlight some areas 
of Christians’ dissociatedness. The first dilemma of the divided self is a dilemma of 
loyalties, that is, God or Mammon, God or the world. The second dilemma is the 
dilemma of authority in terms of dominion or servanthood, restriction or freedom. 
However, these examples of dissociatedness are only the symptoms of being 
inconsistent.
In the above discussion, we find that sanctification is a continuous experience 
of the Chiistian life. It aims at bringing a person into the fulfilment of life promised 
by Jesus, Put differently, sanctification closely relates to discipleship because it takes 
God’s grace seriously. In summary, sanctification refers to the re-orientation of the 
agent’s value. It confirms the development and deployment of moral competencies 
and the agent’s struggle to consent, with the assistance of grace. All of these have 
a common goal- to overcome habitual forms of evil. Sanctification is that gradual 
process whereby the agent strives by the grace of God to disentangle his/her moral 
life from the crippling power of sin.
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However, I have to point out that Hauerwas’ concepts of character, vision and 
virtue are rather individual-oriented. His deliberate overlooking of the social 
dimension of sanctification is because he is convinced that acquiring character is the 
primary task of Christians in a wider context- the church- in order to serve the world 
truthfully.'* But an emphasis on the personal dimension of sanctification affirms that 
even though an unjust social structure and system may have a tremendous impact on 
individuals, individuals can still be free agents to exercise and fulfil their freedom. 
Gregory Baum writes that
 ^ See my later discussion on Haueiwas’ ecciesiology.
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2. SOBRINO’S APPROACH TO SPIRITUALITY
a. Spirituality and Liberation
Liberation theology in Latin America' is an outcome of a deep and serious 
theological reflection on the meaning of being Jesus’ disciples in a context 
characterized by poverty, persecution and injustice. Liberation theology does not 
only spark off a new and radical approach to theological reflection, but also itself 
signifies an unshakeable stand beside the poor and a whole-hearted commitment to 
the struggle for justice which may cost one’s life [e.g. the assassination of 
Archbishop Oscai Romero in 1980]. It is undeniable that the socio-economic 
background gives birth to liberation theology. However, in the deepest sense, it is 
spirituality which marks the beginning of liberation theology. Put another way, it is 
not the agenda of the world which decides what the form of theology should be like, 
but rather the Spirit o f God inspires Cliristians to respond to the situation faithfully 
and creatively.^ It is this spirituality which challenges Chi’istians to see the reality 
as it is [from the perspective o f the poor], and empowers them to be engaged in the 
process of liberation.
At the earliest stage of the development of liberation theology, G. Gutierrez
has already stated clearly that liberation theology is not built solely on ' the
reformulation of theological categories. These are not enough. He said that
we need a vital attitude, all embracing and synthesizing, informing the 
totality as well as every detail of our lives; we need a "spirituality".^
 ^ In the following, I w ill simply use the term, liberation theology, to refer to the Latin 
American liberation theology.
 ^ Saying this way, I am not suggesting that theological reflection can be totally independent 
from its social context. Rather it itself can be an independent variable which has its social significance 
as well.
 ^ G.Gutierrez, A Theology o f Liberation (New York: Orb is, 1973), p.203.
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In fact, many liberation theologians have written a great deal about spirituality.'*
Their concern for spirituality in liberation theology is not because spirituality is a
means to make liberation complete, but rather because spirituality is the seed and
essence of liberation. Furthermore, their concern for liberation in spirituality is not
because liberation is a fashionable theme to define spirituality when everyone is
talking about political theologies, but rather because liberation is the most relevant
and concrete connotation of the meaning of spirituality. Sobrino explains their
relation in this way:
Negatively stated: spirituality today in the absence of the practice of 
liberation is purely generic, evangelically impossible, and historically 
alienating. Liberation practice without spirit is genetically good, but 
concretely tlrreatened with degeneration, diminution, and sin. 
Positively stated: spirituality has need of the practice of liberation in 
order to have the proper channel and appropriate material for its 
evangelical and relevant self-realization in current history. Practice has 
need of spirit in order to maintain itself precisely as a liberation of the 
poor, while becoming, ever more creatively and powerfully, a 
liberation that is truly comprehensive.^
In other words, spirituality is basic to the religious life, but it can be enriched by the 
contribution of liberation. And liberation is basic to the religious life, but it can be 
emiched by the contribution of spirituality. In the following, my aim is to unpack 
this paradoxical relationship between spirituality and liberation in the light of the 
work of Jon Sobrino.
Fundamentally, Sobrino considers that spirituality and liberation are not two 
separate domains; on the contraiy, one needs the other in order to illustrate the 
profound meaning of the Christian faith. According to Sobrino, spirituality can be
See G.Gutierrez, A Theology o f  Liberation, p.212, and J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation.
p.184.
 ^ J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation (New York: Orbis, 1990), p.29.
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emiched by liberation in the following ways. Firstly, spirituality must be
"théologal"*  ^ because the concern of theology must help individuals and groups to
have an encounter with God, a personal encounter that camiot be replaced by doctrine
or political involvement. However, this encounter is not primarily a transcendental
experience, but is identical with the Cliristian way of life. This way of life is nothing
other than to follow the crucified and risen Christ through his message transmitted
by the church. Sobrino writes that
spiritual life simply means life with a certain spirit, life lived in a 
particular spirit- especially, in the case of Christian spiritual life, life 
lived in the spirit of Jesus.^
Spirituality, therefore, is not purely concerned with transcendence and having a good 
intention. Rather in the light of liberation, such an encounter should bring a person 
to discipleship [following Jesus], and this results in his/her engagement in liberation 
of life. Secondly, spirituality must be "historical". Sobrino considers that without 
historical and real life, there can be no such thing as spiritual life. "It is impossible 
to live with spirit unless that spirit becomes flesh."® Flere, liberation enriches 
spirituality in two ways. It states that the Gospel is heard and understood today in 
the light of certain emphases and exigencies that are based on the way in which 
salvation in history takes shape today. Christian commitment to liberation is the 
result of faith and love; but it is also the result of having translated and incarnated 
that faith and love in the concrete history that a person must live. On the other hand, 
liberation suggests that the historical actualization of faith is one of the reliable 
approaches to God and as contact with God, Therefore, spirituality should be 
understood in Leonaido B off s expression, contemplativus in liberatione. Finally,
 ^ Sobrino distinguishes between "theological", teologico, and "théologal", ieologal. 
"Theological" refers to the study o f  theology; "théologal" means related to God,
 ^ J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation, p.2.
® Ibid., p.4.
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the Christian life, while intensely personal, is always communal The
privatization o f piety is not part of the Christian tradition and it
undermines the Christian life Christian spirituality is, therefore, the
spirituality of Christian community. But it is not Chr istian community 
lived in isolation from the world.^
spirituality must be "communal". This emphasis rejects any tendency which confines
■spirituality to personal perfection. It should be a community journey and the 
response of God’s people. Besides, a communal emphasis is not equivalent to the 
institutional church, but rather shifts the central concern of the human agent of that 
liberation from self to other. This is the church for others. John de Gruchy says that
These tliree contributions o f liberation are best described in terms of dialectic. The 
"théologal" reminds us that an encounter with God is not simply an emotional 
experience, but rather is a way of life, that is, to follow Jesus, The "historical" warns 
us that spirituality is never abstract and otherworldly, but pushes a person to take 
his/her social responsibility seriously. The "communal" suggests that spirituality is 
not individualistic, but located in the midst of world’s turmoil rather than in safe 
havens of disengagement. If  spirituality is enriched by the contribution of liberation 
in these ways, then in what ways, in turn, is liberation enriched by the contribution 
of spirituality?
■
In relation to liberation, spirituality provides a person with a vision to discern
."the signs of the time",, and a skill to sustain him/her to follow Jesus. This 
discernment is not simply an objective reading and analysis of the reality, but implies 
a certain way of seeing, commitment and dispositions. Also, this discernment is not 
simply about seeing, but acting. According to Sobrino, this discernment comprises 
three phases: that is, honesty about the real, fidelity to the real, and willingness to be
John de Gruchy, Civ Justice (Maryknoll; Orbis, 1984), p.25.
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J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f Liberation, pp. 14-20. 
Ibid, p .l7 .
swept along by the "more" of reality.*** Regarding the first phase, Sobrino explains 
that "honesty about the real" is concerned with having the right theological locus and 
a practice of love which results from this. Sobrino considers that
in Latin America we believe that we have this attitude, and that it is
the poor who have enabled us to have it, both objectively because the 
truth of things is better known from below and from the periphery than 
from above and from the centre, and subjectively because the poor has 
the gift of turning the gaze of others towards their world, and 
dislodging their interest from themselves so that now they "tune in" to 
the interests of reality instead. “
For Sobrino, the poor are the people who suffer under some kind of material and
social oppression, and are most deprived of life at its most basic level. They are the
peoples whose lives are denied.*^ To consider the poor as the theological locus is
to realize that the justice of God is presented as the right to have pity on the most
pitiable; and on the other hand, the future of the Kingdom of God begins among the
people who suffer most from acts of violence and injustice- and that is the poor. The
Gospel to the poor does not merely bring the Kingdom of God to the poor, but also
discovers the Kingdom of the poor, which is God’s Kingdom.*^ Accordingly, the
poor are not understood in the classical sense of a source for attaining the truth of
'
According to Sobrino, Jesus had two ways o f speaking about the poor. They are: "the poor 
are sinners, publicans, prostitutes, the simple and the little, the least, those who practise the despised
professions. They are the vilified, persons o f  low repute and esteem, the uncultured and ignorant.....
The poor are therefore society’s despised, those lesser than others, and for them the prevailing piety 
proclaims not hope, but condemnation. The poor are [also] those in need in the spirit o f Isaiali 61:1. 
The poor are those who suffer need, the hungry and thirsty, the naked, the foreigners, the sick and 
imprisoned, those who weep, those weighted down by a burden. The poor are therefore those who 
suffer some type o f real oppression." (Jesus in Latin America, pp.89-90) Besides, James D.G.Dunn 
says that there aie three dimensions o f  poverty, namely, material, social and spiritual. These three 
dimensions also direct us how to respond to poverty. That is to say, firstly, it is a responsibility of 
the non-poor to provide for the poor; secondly, it includes a condemnation o f oppression o f  the poor; 
and finally, it is the affirmation o f  God as the champion o f  the poor. (Jesus’ call to Discipleship. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, p.89.
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faith, but ill the dynamic sense of a place where there is manifested m a special way 
the presence of the God of Jesus Chiist. Apart from this, the theological locus of the 
poor demands Cliristians to show solidarity with the poor because the poor will be 
the eschatological judges o f their practices [Mt.25:31-46], Therefore, anyone who 
proclaims the Gospel to the poor belongs to the poor, and should become poor 
himself/lierself, in community with them.'' Sobrino notes that among the poor, "the 
experience of God, and life according to the Spirit, is lived.'"’ Nevertheless, God’s 
preferential option for the poor is not a denial of divine love for the whole of 
humanity. The poor are not assured a place in God’s Kingdom because of the 
historical accident of their belonging to a given social class under particular socio- 
hlstorical circumstances that made tliem disadvantaged and oppressed. Nor are the 
poor more virtuous in any morally and religious significant way. God chooses the 
poor just because they are poor. God does justice to tire poor solely because they are 
in need and calls upon God’s people to do the same.
Wlien we see the reality from the perspective of the poor, reality itself utters 
an unconditional "yes" and an unconditional "no".'^ In the Latin American context, 
the "no" of reality is no to its own negation, absenee, lack and annihilation of life, 
while the "yes" demanded by reality is yes to life. This unconditional "yes and no 
becomes a commitment to the restoration of life. This commitment does not stop at 
the cognitive level, but demands the whole person to work for this. Accordingly, 
honesty about the real is not simply to acknowledge the nature of reality, but rather 
is concerned with undertaking a pai’ticular act in order to respond to the reality.
14 J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp.l25t'f.
15 J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f Liberation, p.49.
1^  Ibid., p .16.
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However, the practice of justice and love is motivated neither by political interest nor
by sympathy, but by a deep conviction that "anti-life is anti-Cluist"'^ because Jesus
Clu'ist promises to bring a fullness of life to humankind. This conviction brings
conversion. Conversion is a change of mind which sees the poor with God’s eyes
and deals with them as God does.'® Conversion does not stop at the change of
attitude, but rather leads one into discipleship of Jesus. For Sobrino,
conversion consists in abandoning one’s own place, however good this 
may be, and meeting God "there" where God wishes to be met.'^
Gutierrez concretizes the meaning of conversion by saying that
our conversion to the Lord implies this conversion to the neighbour....
Conversion means a radical transformation of ourselves; it means 
thinking, feeling, and living as Christ- present in exploited and 
alienated man. To be converted is to commit oneself to the process of 
the liberation of the poor and oppressed, to commit oneself lucidly,
realistically and concretely  To be converted is to know and
experience the fact that, contrary to the laws of physics, we can stand 
straight, according to the Gospel, only when our center of gravity is 
outside ourselves.^**
The second phase of discernment is "fidelity to the real". Put bluntly, fidelity 
to the real is to be consistent with the result of the honesty about the real, and to 
commit oneself to it.^' In a situation characterized by persecutions and frustrations, 
it is easy for the agent to lose his/her hope and give up his/her commitment. Fle/she 
needs a profound spirituality. Its importance is not simply to keep the liberation 
going, but rather is to strengthen the agent not to fail in what God calls him/her to
J.Sobrino, "The Witness o f the Church in Latin America." p. 165.
J.Sobrino, "The Witness o f  the Church in Latin America." In: The Challenge o f Basic 
Christian Communities, ed. S.Torries (Maryknoll; Orbis, 1981), p.269.
J.Sobrino, Jesus, the Liberator, p. 148.
G.Gutierrez, A Theology o f Liberation (New York: Orbis, 1973), pp.204-205.
J.Sobrino, Spirituality of Liberation, pp.17-18.
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be. This spirituality may take various manifestations in terms of virtues. . And it is 
an all-embracing attitude, a force that bestows constancy and prevents a person being 
"tossed to and fro". It dominates a person’s character and orientation. Sobrino 
himself does not provide a systematic discussion of what specific manifestation of 
spirituality would be like in relation to liberation. However, he does point out some 
important manifestations of spirituality. They include follows: a spirit of fortitude, 
a spirit of holiness, a spirit of mercy, a spirit of peace, a spirit of forgiveness, a spirit 
of gratuity, a spirit of impoverisliment, a spirit of creativity, a spirit of solidarity, a 
spirit of joy, and a spirit of hope. Each manifestation of these is contextually 
bounded and mutually dependent. The sum of them is not equivalent to spirituality, 
but spirituality itself takes these concrete manifestations. Here I am not intending to 
discuss the whole list of the manifestations of spirituality, but I find that it is 
worthwhile to explore two of them, namely, a spirit of solidarity and of holiness 
because a spirit of solidarity is concerned about the profound meaning of being the 
church of the poor, and a spirit of holiness is the primary concern of spirituality.
A spirit of solidarity reminds the agent to consider deeply what kind of
attitude a person should have in order to work with the poor. Sobrino comments that
a spirit of solidarity is not mere humanitarian aid because
if solidarity were no more than material aid, it would not be anything 
more than a magnified kind of almsgiving where givers offer 
something they own without thereby feeling a deep-down personal 
commitment or without feeling any need to continue this aid. In 
authentic solidarity the first effort to give aid commits a person at a 
deeper level than that of mere giving and becomes an ongoing process, 
not a contribution.
This emphasis on solidarity is vital because it breaks down any sense of superiority.
J.Sobrino & Juan Hernandez Pico, Theoloev o f Christian Solidarity (New York; Orbis,
1985), p.3.
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Besides, a spirit of solidarity is to affirm that Chiistians are not called to offer charity
to the poor. Rather they are called to risk finding ways of involvement with them
in a common search for a wider human identity. It is not a question of their helping
them but of finding ways of action which will liberate and change the identity of
them all. Therefore, a spirit of solidarity is an empathy by means of which
Christians do not relativize the people’s pain and reduce it to a social cost. It is also
a conviction that they are unprofitable sinners, so that they do the work of liberation
with a grateful heart and as forgiven sinners. On the other hand, a spirit o f solidarity
comforts them that Christians do not go to God alone. They are saved as members
of a people. Perseeution does not necessaiily destroy their commitment, but
generates oneness among people and within churches. Sobrino writes that
persecution only manifests that spirit of solidarity in all its evidence. 
Persecution demands solidarity lest Christians falter, and persecution 
generates solidarity by instilling in Christians at a time of persecution 
a fixed attitude for all time thereafter: the knowledge that each of us 
lives our faith in reference to others, bestowing it on them and 
receiving it from them again.
Regarding a spirit of holiness, Sobrino defines holiness as the outstanding 
practice of faith, hope and love and the virtues generated by following Jesus. '^* This 
holiness is not confined to certain practices, places and profession, but rather is 
determined by a person’s practice of Jesus’ teaching. In Latin America, a spirit of 
holiness is urgently required in politics. It is not the politics itself that is holy, but 
holiness itself make politics holy. The relationship between politics and holiness can 
be understood dialectically. A spirit of holiness concretizes itself in the form of 
political love. According to Sobrino, the political love is concerned with honesty
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f Liberation, p. 100. 
Ibid., p.80.
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about the real and seeking a possibility of transforming the situation politically rather
than individually.^^ On the other hand, a spirit of holiness is required in every
political action in order not
to exchange the liberation of the poor for the triumph of what we have 
converted into our own personal or collective cause, the pain of the 
poor for the passion that politics generates, service for hegemony, truth 
for propaganda, humility for dominance, gratitude for moral 
superiority."^^
For Sobrino, the climax of a spirit of holiness is martyrdom. Therefore, a spirit of 
holiness is not an attempt at self-glorification and self-perfection, but is directed 
towards others.
Finally, the third phase of discernment is willingness to be swept along by the 
"more" of reality". Put theologically, this is about the eschatological dimension of 
the Chiistian faith. Although the reality seems to be fatal and hopeless, this is not 
the end of it. There is always a possibility that a new exodus, a new return from 
exile, a liberation from captivity, reappears again and again. This is the "more" of 
the reality. This is not a utopian optimism, but rather is profoundly rooted in the 
eschatological nature of the Kingdom, In order to see the "more" of reality, a person 
should have hope and love which are inspired by the Christian hope. This hope calls 
for an active impulse, not the passive hope of mere expectation. This hope is 
fulfilled by love which helps reality become what it seeks to be. Love is the practice 
of the hope. Authentic love tries to stai’t with the concrete needs of the other and not 
with the duty of practising love. However, the gratuitousness of the gift of the 
Kingdom does not do away with effective action but rather calls for it all the more. 
But Gutierrez reminds us that
Ibid., pp.81-83. 
Ibid., p.84.
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in the presence of this God who acts gratuitously we must show 
society a reign that is not reducible to energy expended in the service 
of human development, but that has its source in an encounter with a 
personal God with whom intimacy is bestowed as a gift and who, once 
given to us, neither suppresses nor competes with the human effort to 
build a better world.^^
These tlnee phases of discernment practically and concretely clarify how 
spirituality enriches liberation in different stages. However, these three phases cannot 
be considered as three independent phases because they interweave with one another. 
We cannot remain in any one of the phases without moving towards other phases. 
Furthermore, these three phases are not a blueprint of life, but are life itself. L.Boff 
describes the relationship between spirituality and liberation as follows: "Just as there 
can be no social revolution without a political mystique, so there can be no act of 
integral liberation without the provocation, inspiration, and encouragement of an 
ardent spirituality."^®
For Sobrino, spirituality and liberation are inter-related. Both of them are 
concerned with a matter of being honest to God and his creation. A commitment to 
liberation displays a radical but biblical approach to spirituality: that is, the historical 
actualization of faith. Encounter with God is no longer an internal affair, but takes 
place in a personal involvement in his/her particular social history. Seeing from the
perspective of the poor, the practice of justice and love, and protecting the life of the 
poor are no longer purely political activities, but are consistent with the Spirit of 
God. A spirituality of liberation is to defend the life of the poor. This may 
necessarily entail an element of political struggle and conflict. However, Sobrino
G.Gutierrez, We Drink from Our Own Wells (London: SCM, 1984), p .l09 . 
L.Boff, Faith on the Edge, p.65.
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reminds us that "the political is not everything, neither in the liberation project itself
nor in the means t h e r e t o . R a t h e r ,  liberation is a matter of having a profound
spirituality which brings the agent to commit himself/herself to the poor [the
privileged recipients of the Gospel]. This spirituality is not through personal effort,
but it lies beyond a person’s ability and reality. It is by the grace of God. But the
grace of God becomes concrete in the invitation to follow Jesus. A withdrawal from
this signifies a withdrawal from grace rather than from duty. Archbishop Oscar
Romero puts it into a more dynamic way:
We are not political persons; we do not put our trust in merely human 
powers. We are, above all, Christians, and we know that if the Lord 
does not build our civilization all labour in vain who build it. We 
know that our power conies from prayer and from our turning towards 
God."**
Accordingly, liberation is not simply a political concern, but rather an expression 
with a profound spirituality.
Besides, for Sobrino, the relationship between spirituality and liberation
should be christocentric because Cluist is not simply the mediator of God’s
redemptive address to humankind, but he actually is that address himself. For
humankind, Christ therefore is God’s address and the perfect human response to that
address. Clnistocentric spirituality is not simply a concern of having a correct
hermeneutical skill, but rather is a concern of discipleship. Sobrino writes that
we can gain access to the Christ of faith, the resurrected Lord, through 
some sort o f direct intentional act: e.g., a profession of faith, a 
doxology, a prayer, or cultic worship. However, we cannot access to 
the historical Jesus that way, as the Gospels make clear. We gain 
access to him only through a specific kind of praxis, which the
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation, p.29,
Oscar Romero, The Violence o f Love (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), p.223.
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Gospels describe as the "following of Jesus" or "discipleship".
With this I come to the next part of this study: that is, following the historical Jesus.
J.Sobrino, Christologv at the Crossroads (London: SCM, 1987), p.275. Note: Sobrino 
considers that the historical Jesus is the starting point o f  knowing the Christ o f  faith.
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b. Following The Historical Jesus
Liberation theologians claim that liberation theology is not built solely on the
exodus story, but rather is deeply rooted in clnistology. Although different liberation
theologians have different emphases on the image of Chiist', they share a common
conviction which is that clnistology cannot be understood apaii from a practice of
discipleship. Sobrino even goes further to say that
not only believers’ "image" of Christ, but their act of faith, their 
response to and correspondence in the reality of their lives with this 
image, help christology to penetrate the reality of Christ and 
understand the texts about him.^
This assertion does not have any tendency to reduce theology to ethics. Nor does it 
reduce truth to morality. Rather it has a christological status. Eduard Schweizer 
states that
only the disciple can know who Jesus really is. This is the meaning 
of Mark 8:27 ff. No formula merely taught, and learned and repeated 
by a disciple can adequately describe this. One cannot know who 
Jesus is until one shares his way with him. This is the meaning of the 
"Messianic Secret", this is the explanation of his reserve in connexion 
with the title of Christ, which is not wrong but which does not apply 
without qualification."
Moreover, chiistological knowledge is formed and handed on not primarily in the 
form of concepts but in accounts of following Jesus. It has a narrative and practical 
bent. Therefore, discipleship is not only the starting point of understanding 
christology, but also is the "end" of the study of christology.
For Sobrino, following the historical Jesus is not to copy every detail of Jesus’
 ^ See Jose Migues Bonino, ed., Faces o f Jesus (New York: Orbis, 1984), and David Batstone, 
From Conquest to Struggle (Albany: State University o f  New York Press, 1991).
 ^ J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, p.27.
 ^ Eduard Schweizer, Lordship and Discipleship (London: SCM, 1986), p.21
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life. It is instead, to follow the ethical values which Jesus proclaims and the "spirit"
which he represents instead of the result of his concretizing certain values. This
emphasis differentiates it from the view of the Imitatio Christi presented by Thomas
A Kempis. Following the historical Jesus is not mechanically understood as a
blueprint for the Christian life which he/she can draw a detailed moral map for
himself/herself and his/her society. Rather, Clirist is the pattern in the sense that his
life was the exhibition, expression and manifestation of his godliness, of God’s
disclosure through this man Jesus Christ. Following the historical Jesus is to partake
in this movement. However, this clarification should neither merely be interpreted
from a mystical dimension nor restricted to individual moral behaviour, but following
the historical Jesus should always have political significance. It is because Jesus’ life
was not confined to religious matters, but embraced socio-political matters. For
instance, his death was the result of his "political" activities instead of his "pure"
religious activities. Thus, following the historical Jesus implies that the Christian’s
life orientation is formed and inspired by Christ which brings him/her to discern and
fulfil God’s will in his/her given historical context as Jesus did. Sobrino writes that
the following of Jesus does not consist simply in being and doing what 
Jesus was and did; it consists in experiencing the same process that he 
experienced. It means learning through historical experience the 
reality of a God who is always greater and cannot be manipulated, the 
ways of God in creating his Kingdom, the power and the impotence 
of love, the necessity of suffering, the hope that does not die.'*
In the following, I do not intend to discuss how Sobrino interprets Jesus’ life, not 
only because I will discuss it in chapter two, but also because to discuss this issue 
here will inevitably distract our concern from the indispensible of following Jesus 
[although I realize that we cannot follow the historical Jesus without knowing who 
the historical Jesus is]. The focus in this section then is on discussing why Sobrino
 ^ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor (London: SCM, 1984), p.305.
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considers that discipleship is to follow the historical Jesus, and what following the 
historical Jesus means.
For Sobrino, the emphasis on the importance of the historical dimension of 
Jesus is based on a logical reflection that one arrives at the Christ of faith tlirough 
the Jesus of history. Sobrino says that "if the end of Christology is to profess that 
Jesus is the Christ, its starting point is the affirmation that this Chiist is the Jesus of 
history."^ However, such an emphasis is not in an attempt to provide a biography 
of Jesus or engage in an examination of the historicity of Jesus presented by 
theologians such as David Strauss and Albert Schweitzer.^ But rather it is for the 
sake of continuing Jesus’ history in the present.^ Therefore, the aim of studying the 
historical Jesus is not to increase one’s knowledge of Christ, but rather is to promote 
one’s discipleship. This task is carried out by paying attention to the historicity of 
Jesus: that is, his person, proclamation, activity, attitudes and death. Sobrino writes 
that
the most historical element in the historical Jesus is his practice, that 
is, his activity brought to beai' upon the reality around him in order to 
transform it in a determinate, selected direction, the direction of the
Kingdom of God  For us, then, the historical element in the
historical Jesus is first and foremost an invitation (and a demand) to 
continue his practice- or, in Jesus’ language, an invitation to his 
discipleship for a mission.®
 ^ J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p.xxi.
 ^ Sobrino states clearly that his interest in historical Jesus is not to make pretence o f a 
biographical focus on Jesus; not to define the historical primarily as that which is open to the future, 
as the sole criterion for deciding what is really historical; not to return to the historical Jesus in order 
to solve the general question o f  the New Testament- the relation between Christ who is preached and 
the Christ who preaches; and not to respond to historical criticism. See J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin 
America, pp.64-65.
‘ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor. pp,321ff.
® J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, p.66.
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In other words, the historical Jesus relates to the praxis of Jesus, provided that his 
praxis is not superficially interpreted as a detailed plan for one to follow, but rather 
is "the way" to the Father.^
Nevertheless, the Gospels are the theology about Jesus instead of a history of 
Jesus. How can Sobrino claim to know the historical Jesus? Sobrino recognizes that 
the Gospels are the products of faith. He also realizes that the history of theology 
has shown the difficulty of finding "the historical Jesus in him self. However, he 
contends that it is impossible to produce a theology about Jesus without writing a 
history of Jesus. Therefore, to a certain extent, the Gospels allow us to discern the 
historical Jesus. In order to discover and historically ensure the praxis of Jesus, 
Sobrino employs Edward Schillebeeckx’s criteria. "The appearance of one and the 
same theme on various levels of traditions" is the first criterion. The meaning of this 
point is self-evident. The second criterion, "what is specific to and distinctive of a 
theme by contrast with and even in opposition to theologies and practices that come 
after Jesus", is not obvious. In other words, reflection upon Jesus’ words and deeds, 
even in a hostile or negative environment, actually serves to keep attention focused 
upon his praxis. "The consistency of Jesus’ death with what is narrated of his life" 
is the final criterion and it is especially relevant to Latin American Christians. 
Thousands of Latin Americans have died attempting to follow Jesus’ praxis. 
Therefore, he must have lived a life like the one presented in the Gospels.'** On the 
basis of the intent of Latin American Chi'istology and the above criteria, the 
following aspects of Jesus’ life are accepted as historical by Sobrino:
on the level of facts we have Jesus’ baptism by John, the initial
 ^ J.Sobrino, Christologv at the Crossroads, pp.105-106.
J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, p.74. E.Schillebeeckx, An Experiment in Christologv 
(New York: Crossroad, 1981), pp.81~102.
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success (and perhaps also some conflicts) of his preaching, the 
choosing and sending out of some followers to preach, increasing 
tlueats and persecution, and the passion and death on the cross. On 
the level of conduct, we have activity involving miracles and 
exorcisms, preaching in parables, critical attitudes to the law and the 
Temple, the call to conversion, discipleship and faith in God. On the 
level of words, there are two authentic words of Jesus, "Kingdom" and 
"Abba", and the sayings that justified his condemnation."
Stated in this way, apparently, Sobrino’s picture of the historical Jesus does not differ
significantly from other views found in contemporary christology. But in fact, they
are different. Sobrino qoutes Gonzalez Fans saying that
in Europe the historical Jesus is an object of investigation, whereas in 
Latin America he is a criterion of discipleship. In Europe study of the 
historical Jesus seeks to establish the possibilities and the 
reasonableness of the act of believing or not believing. In Latin 
America the appeal to the historical Jesus seeks to confront people 
with the dilemma of being converted or not.'^
Before turning to discuss what following the historical Jesus means, one other aspect 
of the historical Jesus has to be clarified.
For Sobrino, the historical dimension of Jesus has to relate to its ecclesial and 
trinitarian relationship.'" In short, its ecclesial dimension suggests that, in analogy 
to the clu'istologies in the New Testament, where Chiist is thought of originally in 
terms of the situation and praxis of the first Christian communities, it is meant to 
reflect the life and praxis of the church communities in Latin America and overall 
to make possible and to give sense to this life and this praxis. Therefore, an ecclesial 
christology calls for rethinking the principle in the light of images from which it is 
abstracted and also the reinterpretation of the images themselves. The trinitarian 
dimension of Jesus is to stress that the Father is the ultimate horizon, the Son is the
J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, p.6L  
Ibid., p.50.
J.Sobrino, Christologv at the Crossroads, pp.xx-xxv.
62
definitive example of how to correspond to the Father, and the life in the Spirit of 
Jesus is the specific form of being Cliristian. For Jesus, God and God’s Kingdom are 
his ultimate reference points. With his activity of liberation Jesus puts himself at the 
service of the Kingdom and makes it present. Furthermore, christology is 
"pneumatological" in that Jesus and God are known only by living life in accordance 
with the Spirit of Jesus. Without this trinitarian foundation, Jesus’ praxis is 
incomprehensible, the work of the Spirit is vague, and God becomes abstract and 
manipulable.
In order to know the historical Jesus, Sobrino considers that the most
"historical" aspect of Jesus is his engagement with the spirit. By the meaning of
Jesus’ engagement, "this spirit was defined and so became real, through a practice,
because it was within that practice, and not in his pure inwardness, that Jesus was
empowered and challenged. On the other hand, this spirit was not merely the
necessary accompaniment of Jesus’ practice, but shaped it, gave it a direction and
even empowered it to be historically effective.'"'* What then are the spirit of Jesus’
praxis and Jesus’ praxis? According to Sobrino, these are summed up in Jesus’
jubilee proclamation:
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to 
preach good news to the poor. Fie has sent to me to proclaim release 
to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty 
those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord. 
[Lk.4:18-19]
The spirit of Jesus is to preach the good news to the poor, and his spirit is nothing 
other than the will of God. His praxis is to concretize what this good news means. 
Jesus’ praxis can be briefly summarized as follows: 
in relation to demonic oppression, conquest;
14 J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, p.52 i
in relation to misinterpretation of God’s rule, sharp rebuke;
in relation to selfish complacency, warning;
in relation to sin and failure, forgiveness and assurance of love;
in relation to sickness, healing;
in relation to material need, provision of daily bread;
in relation to exclusion, welcoming inclusion;
in relation to desire for power, an example of humble and loving 
service;
in relation to death, life; 
in relation to false peace, justice; 
in relation to enmity, reconciliation.
These general characteristics- not an exhaustive list- are gathered from the stories and 
the sayings in the Gospels, which are themselves the praxis of Jesus. These 
characteristics show that Jesus’ praxis is basically salvific and liberating.'^ At the 
same time, Jesus’ praxis also reveals the profound love of God. What then does 
Jesus’ praxis involve?
Firstly, Jesus’ praxis is a praxis of love. This praxis of love was first 
concretized in Jesus’ "partial" incarnation in history.'^ This paitiality means that 
Jesus chose a particular spot in history. This spot is nothing other than the poor and 
the oppressed. Jesus had taken flesh not just in any world, but in the world of poor. 
He had defended not just any cause, but the cause of the poor. This "partial" 
incarnation of Jesus reveals the "biased" character of God’s love. Is this "partial" 
incarnation of Jesus against the universal love of God? Jesus’ mission was to reach 
all with God’s loving solidarity and thereby create loving solidarity among all. But 
for this purpose, his special concern had to be the inclusion of those who were 
excluded from human solidarity. Those who excluded others from the solidarity of 
God’s people could properly learn of God’s solidarity with the people they excluded. 
Not only for the sake of the poor, but actually for the sake of the rich, Jesus
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.44. 
J.Sobrino, Jesiis in Latin America, p. 135.
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identified himself with the poor.
Secondly, Jesus’ praxis not only intended to change persons, but also to 
change the world and its relationships. It was a praxis of socio-political love. 
Sobrino considers that "the efficacy of love must be applied to the configuration of 
the whole society; and the Gospels, furthermore, show that in fact and historically, 
Jesus gave this type of love the first place in his own praxis."'^ Sobrino’s comment 
tells us that the praxis of Jesus was not only a praxis of psychological and spiritual 
liberation, but also his praxis was a praxis of political liberation. To a certain extent, 
this is true. However, I am puzzled as to what extent Sobrino can conclude that 
Jesus gave the socio-political love the first place. The eschatological dimension has 
many facets. It has its spiritual and religious dimensions as well as political and 
economic dimensions. Therefore, the liberation which Jesus’ praxis has to be 
concerned to bring an "all round liberation". If this is so, how can Sobrino justify 
his view that Jesus gave priority to the political transformation? It is undeniable that 
politics has a place in our discipleship of Jesus, but it is too far to conclude that this 
is the most important and uigent concern of Jesus’ praxis.
Besides, I am very suspicious as to what extent the efficacy of love can solely 
be understood in terms of its impact on society. It is right that the love of Jesus is 
never confined to the inter-personal relationship, but it is wrong to use its impact on 
society as a major criterion of the efficacy of that love. For instance, the history of 
Jesus showed us that he did not successfully transform the whole system of society, 
but rather transformed the fate of many people who themselves became a 
transformative community of power. In summary, I agree with Sobrino in that Jesus’
Ibid., p.136.
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praxis had a socio-political dimension and significance, but I have reservations about 
his view that the socio-political dimension was the dominant interest of Jesus’ praxis.
Finally, Jesus’ praxis brought him into conflict with those who had power. 
This conflict was unavoidable because it was the result of Jesus’ determination to 
proclaim and practise the truth- good news to the poor. He did not seek compromise, 
and the consequence of his preferential option for the poor led him into confrontation 
with those who wielded religious, economic and political powers. These conflicts 
eventually led him to be killed. Although Jesus was condemned for religious 
blasphemy, he was not put to death for this reason.’® He was actually executed as 
a political rebel because “he suffered the punishment imposed on political agitators 
(crucifixion) rather than the punishment dealt out to religious blasphemers 
(stoning)."’^  Jesus died as a victim of a political system. “Jesus was crucified by 
the Romans not only for tactical reasons and reasons based on the standard policy of 
calm and order in Jerusalem, but essentially in the name of the gods of the Roman 
state, that guaianteed the Pax Romana."^’’ Jesus did not seek death. It was imposed 
on him from without. He refused to strike a compromise in order to survive. 
Sobrino concludes that “the cross is not the result of some divine decision 
independent of history; it is the outcome of the basic option for incarnation in a given 
situation."^’
It is true that Jesus was accused by the religious people. But we should bear in mind that 
in the Jewish tradition, religion is not purely "inward", but rather it embraces all dimensions o f lives, 
including politics.
J.Sobrino, Christoloev at the Crossroads. p.211. Details o f  the socio-political meaning o f  
crucifixion can be found in Martin Hengel, Crucifixion (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), Chapter 7.
J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, p .120.
J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads. p.214.
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Jesus’ praxis is his compassion in action. He not only liberates humankind
from spiritual bondage, but also restores their humanity and dignity by breaking
down all socio-political chains. This liberation is not only an experience of
individuals, but also extends to society as a whole. Besides, a historical cluistology
reveals that Jesus is the "way to" the Father and the historical version of the eternal
Sonship of the Son. Through his history, with his faith and trust in the Father, with
obedience to his mission, in his death and resurrection, Jesus reveals to us the way
of the Son, the way one becomes Son of God.^^ Thus, discipleship is nothing other
than to follow the historical praxis of Jesus; that is, to proclaim the good news to the
poor, to be in solidarity with the poor, and to practise justice. Sobrino says that
to put it negatively, outside discipleship we cannot have sufficient 
affinity with the object of faith to know what we are talking about 
when we confess Jesus as the Clnist. Put positively, through the 
affinity produced by discipleship it can be meaningful to proclaim 
Jesus as Christ, as the revelation of true divinity and true humanity.’’^
Ibid., pp.47-48.
J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, p.55.
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C An Appraisal
In a context characterized by poverty, suffering and killing, Sobrino attempts 
to re-discover the meaning of spirituality in order not to reduce liberation to a "pure" 
political undertaking or to confine spirituality to a "pure" personal-religious matter. 
For Sobrino, spirituality is nothing other than following the historical Jesus. 
Following the historical Jesus emphasizes that spirituality should be both dynamic 
and public which requires Christians to defend the life of the poor, because Jesus’ 
praxis is a praxis of love. Sobrino’s account of spirituality illustrates a public 
approach to and a public dimension of spirituality. Appaiently, Sobrino’s account 
does not have any concern about the mystical tradition. But it is a mistake simply 
to criticize Sobrino for replacing piety by social commitment, mysticism by politics, 
spirituality by practical political concerns, and prayer by social action, or for treating 
Christology as a means for liberation, because, if spirituality is about experiencing 
God in one’s life, then for Sobrino the experience of God \s guided by Jesus’ God- 
experience. According to Sobrino, Jesus’ total availability and obedience to the will 
of God, his fidelity to God in the midst of attacks from the idols of death, his 
incomparable trust in God, his own "dark night" in the temptations, in the Galilean 
crisis, in the garden, and on the cross show or imply a specific experience of God, 
a specific union with God.’ This is the nucleus of Jesus’ experience of God. 
Sobrino says that
whether or not this experience of Jesus with such a God should be
called "mystical" does not seem to me to be important. What seems
important is that every experience of God have this structure.^
Therefore, for Sobrino, a commitment to the process of liberation is one of the 
possible and reliable means to encounter God. In the following, I will discuss how
 ^ Sobrino’s account o f the historical Jesus w ill be discussed in Chapter Two. 
 ^ J.Sobrino, "Review Symposium." In: Horizons, 1989, Vol. 16, p. 143.
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Sobrino’s account of spirituality and following the historical Jesus can inspire our 
practice and reflection of the spiritual life.
Firstly, Sobrino’s account of spirituality emphasizes the non-duality of God 
and history, of spirit and praxis. Here Sobrino shows his Catholic roots. Expanding 
and specifying the traditional Catholic affirmation of the interrelatedness of nature 
and grace and the essential sacramental mediation of the Spirit, Sobrino affirms a "bi­
polarity" or a "differentiated unity" between the historical element (the reign of God, 
justice and service) and the transcendent element (God, faith and grace)- or between 
the experience of transforming this world and the experience of God. The 
relationship between the two elements is non-dual. They are neither two nor are they 
one. Though distinguished, they can never be separated. Here Sobrino does not 
mince words: "There is no spiritual life without actual historical life. It is impossible 
to live with spirit unless the spirit becomes flesh." And yet he also holds an 
"irreducible duality" between the human and the divine, insofar as the relationship
"starts with God" and is dependent on human response, Sobrino is arguing that, 
although God/grace is prior ontologically, a commitment to transforming this world 
is prior epistemologically. We can know God’s priority only by first committing 
ourselves to others. We do not experience God and then serve others; it is in the 
service of others that God becomes real and prior for us. Therefore, to live in this 
non-duality is not a matter of first praying and then working, or of first one having 
on contemplation and only then having something to pass on. Rather Sobrino prefers 
"in actione contemplativus". His reasons are clear:
The moment of action is neither separated from, nor subordinate to,
nor consequent upon the moment of contemplation  action is the
locus of contemplation Contemplation and action are not moments
having distinct objects, as if contemplation were directed toward God
and action were directed toward the world God and world alike are
object both of contemplation and action/
Therefore, for Sobrino, the spiritual life is not primarily about the distinction between
sacred and profane, but rather about a recognition of God’s sovereignty over the
cosmos.
Secondly, Sobrino considers that, if spirituality is primarily about experiencing 
God, then only by doing justice can we experience God. To experience God relates 
to a matter of doing God’s will rather than a matter of emotion. To do God’s will 
is nothing other than to do justice because this is the way shown by Jesus. Regarding 
this matter, if Clnistian theology holds that God is to be discovered in the reality of 
history, then this means that Cliristians must be "honest with" and "faithful to" this 
reality. Such honesty and fidelity, however, are impossible unless one confronts the 
suffering and poverty and injustice that pervade contemporary reality. In confronting 
and struggling to overcome such injustice, therefore, one experiences and knows God. 
Sobrino draws conclusions that are bound to jostle Cliristians consciousness: apart 
from such liberating practice, ".... apart from being honest to current history.... one 
can no longer have an experience of God." He continues to say that "in current
history  a practice without a core of liberative love will hardly occasion the
formation of a person with spirit." Put differently, in confronting the reality of 
oppression and in feeling impelled to do something about it, one comes to a living, 
existential experience of the power of love, of truth, and of hope. It is an experience 
in which reality in depth is known to be personal- someone who issues a call to us 
and whose will we must follow and realize in this world. This is the personal God 
invading our hearts and demanding our hands. Therefore, for Sobrino, to experience 
God first relates to a matter of praxis, and then a matter of meditation.
 ^ Ibid., p.68.
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Thirdly, Sobrino helps us to realize that the object of spirituality is the totality 
of the reign of G od/ Thus, spirituality is not primarily concerned with personal 
experience and perfection, but rather is concerned with both the building up the 
Kingdom of God and having a right locus of understanding the Kingdom. Regarding 
the former, to live in the spirit means to be in opposition to, and to denoimce laws 
or economic practices or military policies that sustain oppression and poverty. This 
aspect has been previously discussed, and so I do not intend to add anything here. 
Regarding the latter, Sobrino suggests that the poor are the theological locus for 
experiencing God. It requires some form of identification with and learning from the 
poor and oppressed. Only in them and with them and through them can we truly 
know the living God. Sobrino holds that "the poor are not simply the beneficiaries 
of liberation. By the mere fact that they exist, for believers they are the historical 
locus of God, the place where God is found in history."^ In sharing in the faith and 
hope and struggle that informs the nothingness and the victimization of the poor, 
Sobrino believes that we feel, as perhaps nowhere else, the power and gratuity of 
God’s presence. Although it is not necessarily for us to agree with Sobrino’s 
interpretation completely, Sobrino is right that spirituality relates to the matter of 
having a right locus: that is, to learn to see from God’s perspective.
Finally, if there is no duality between God and history, if knowing God is
doing justice, if spirituality is about a right locus, then spirituality primarily relates
to the matter of reading "the signs of the times". Reinhold Niebuhr wrote that
to discern the signs of the times means to interpret historical events 
and values. The interpretation of history includes all judgements we 
make of the purpose of our own actions and those of others; it includes 
the assessment of the virtue of our own and other interests, both
® J.Sobrino, "Review Symposium." p. 146.
 ^ J.Sobrino, Soiritimlitv of Liberation, p.24.
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individual and collective; and finally, it includes our interpretation of 
the meaning of history itself/
Thus, to discern the signs of the times is more than a matter of having a 
comprehensive and objective knowledge. Rather it is concerned with the innermost 
self of the agent, because, in the knowledge of nature, the mind of an agent is at the 
centre of the process of knowing, while in the knowledge of a historical event, the 
self with all its emotions and desires is at the center of the enterprise. Therefore, we 
can say that in order to discern the signs of the times, we have to have a profound 
spirituality. It trains and steers us to interpret history, and respond to it, in 
accordance with God’s will. This is exactly what Sobrino means by spirituality. For 
Sobrino, the lack of discermnent is not only because of a defect of the mind which 
is inadequate to calculate the course of history, but also because of a corruption of 
the heart, which introduces the confusion of selfish pride into the estimate of 
historical events. However, reading the signs of the times cannot confine itself to the 
level of reading. It has to lead to praxis. So often, it involves political participation.
For Sobrino, spirituality has both a historical dimension and a transcendental 
dimension. It is about both carrying out God’s will and contemplating God. Put 
differently, it is concerned with that we should work for the coming of the Kingdom 
and to be patient to wait for its coming. Flowever, to carry out God’s will does not 
mean that we have a Christian political blueprint. Rather there is no dualism between 
the spiritual life and the historical life, between love of God and neighbour; nor can 
one be subordinated to the other. Spirituality is possible not only in silence and in 
contemplation, but also in prophetic struggle. These can merely be sustained by 
following the historical Jesus.
 ^ R.Niebuhr, Discerning the Signs o f the Times (London: SCM, 1946), p. 10
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3. DISCUSSION
The above discussion of Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s understanding of an 
individual Christian as an agent of the Kingdom in terms of spirituality appear s that 
Hauerwas and Sobrino hold contrasting positions. That is to say, Hauerwas’ concern 
and approach is rather "private-oriented", while Sobrino’s concern and approach is 
rather "public-oriented". We may be tempted to see their position as a matter of 
"either-or". However, I consider that there is no need to define one as right and the 
other as wrong, because they are seen to be different but complementary aspects of 
the truth. Before saying anything on how they may complement one another, I 
consider that it is important to explicate their dissimilarities and similarities, if there 
are any of the latter.
Firstly, I consider that it is a mistake to over-emphasize their different 
approaches to the issue of an individual Christian as an agent of the Kingdom 
because it easily turns the issue into a theoretical discussion. This does not mean that 
it is unnecessary to distinguish one thing from another, but rather what we do should 
not overlook the fundamental essence of the issue; that is, faithfulness and 
discipleship. For both Hauerwas and Sobrino, spirituality is about learning 
faithfulness and discipleship. Hauerwas considers that this takes place in the 
formation of character, while Sobrino sees this as taking place in social praxis. 
Nevertheless, Sobrino never says that the formation of character is unimportant. If 
that were the case, he would not need to talk about spirituality. Ironically he 
considers its indispensability because social praxis is not simply about doing, but 
about doing with the right attitude, which cannot be attained apart from having 
character.’ On the other hand, Hauerwas never says that Christian social praxis is
 ^ See my discussion on Sobrino’s understanding o f spirituality and liberation.
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negligible. Rather he considers that one’s moral act cannot be separated from the 
agent himself/herself. Otherwise, it distorts the moral life.^ Therefore, the 
difference between Hauerwas and Sobrino is not that they are opposed to one another 
ontologically because both of them endeavour to concretize what faithfulness and 
discipleship mean, but that they have different emphases which need one another to 
complement.
Secondly, what both Hauerwas and Sobrino would agree with is that the 
Christian life has to be christologically grounded. That is to say, tlirough Jesus, in 
him and by him, we learn to be the agents of the Kingdom. Nevertheless, this 
common point does not bring a unanimous interpretation of cluistology between 
Hauerwas and Sobrino. On the contrary, Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s interpretation are 
very diverse. For Hauerwas, Jesus’ life is primarily understood in the light of the 
Sermon on the Mount. Therefore, he emphasizes the distinctiveness and the possible 
impossibility of the Christian life. For Sobrino, Jesus’ life is principally understood 
in the light of Jesus’ jubilee proclamation. Therefore, the primacy of liberating and 
salvational activity of the Christian life is emphasized. The difference between 
Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s emphasis becomes obvious in their different usage of 
terminology to describe discipleship. That is to say, for Hauerwas, it is the imitation 
of Christ, while for Sobrino, it is following the historical Jesus. Here, we may be 
tempted to see one as right and the other as wrong. However, it must never be 
forgotten that Jesus’ story is a many-sided tale. We do not have jusf one story of 
Jesus, but four. To learn to tell and live the story truthfully does not mean that we 
must be able to reconstruct "what really happened" from the four. Rather it means 
that we must learn that understanding Jesus’ life is inseparable from learning how to
 ^ See my later dlscusssion on Hauerwas’ ecclesiology,
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live our own. And there are various ways to do this, as is clear by the diversity of 
the Gospels.
Thirdly, interestingly enough, both Hauerwas and Sobrino use more or less 
the same categories but apply them differently to their own theological reflection. 
For instance, Hauerwas’ concept of vision can be found to be parallel to Sobrino’s 
understanding of the poor as the theological locus. Flauerwas’ concept of virtue can 
be found parallel to Sobrino’s emphases on a spirit of solidarity, holiness, forgiveness 
and others. Flauerwas’ concept of character can be found to be parallel to Sobrino’s 
following the historical Jesus. These similarities suggest that both Hauerwas and 
Sobrino are more alike than different. However, this does not mean that their 
concerns are the same. For Hauerwas, in the light of the concepts of vision, virtue 
and character, spirituality is primarily understood in terms of sustaining Christians to 
live differently, not in the world’s values, but in the Kingdom’s values. For Sobrino, 
in the light of his emphases on the poor as the theological locus and a spirit of 
solidarity and holiness, spirituality is principally understood in terms of sustaining 
Christians to manifest the Kingdom’s values on earth by both denouncing injustice 
and proclaiming the good news. These different orientations cannot be simply 
labelled one as a sectarian option and one as a revolutionary option. Rather they are 
differnt ways to celebrate and recognize kingly rule of God in the here and now.
Now, I turn to discuss how these similarities and dissimilarities illuminate our 
understanding of the issue of an individual Christian as an agent of the Kingdom and 
its practice. Basically, the idea of an individual Christian as an agent of the Kingdom 
touches on two distinct but related areas: namely, the agent himself/herself and the 
agent’s responsibility. Put another way, the concern of the agent himself/herself is 
a matter of vita humana [one’s being] which pays attention to the importance of the
75
cultivation of his/her inner life in accordance with the Kingdom’s values, while a 
concern of the agent’s responsibility is a matter of actus humanus [one’s doing] 
which tries to respond to how he/she can fulfil his/her calling in accordance with the 
life of the Kingdom. Therefore, the issue of an individual Clnistian as an agent of 
the Kingdom is concerned with two questions: what ought the agent to be and what 
ought he/she to do? To be and to do are to suggest that the agent need to act from 
the right motive and to find the right content of actions in particular situations in 
terms of his/her fundamental belief and attitudes. In the following, I intend to 
discuss these issues in the light of the preceding discussion of Hauerwas’ and 
Sobrino’s approach to spirituality.
Firstly, vita humana is concerned with the fulfilment of the potentialities of 
being human. This fulfilment is not simply for the sake of the glorification of 
humankind, but rather to see humankind in the image of God. For Hauerwas, this 
is a matter related to sanctification which is concerned with the agent’s character, 
vision and virtue, while for Sobrino this a matter related to social praxis: that is to 
say, the agent’s life would be changed and transformed in the process of his/her 
commitment to liberation. Here, Hauerwas and Sobrino propose two interesting 
approaches to the understanding of vita humana: that is, the relationship between 
sanctification and praxis. On the one hand, sanctification is no longer understood in 
contrast to justification, but rather as a partner of it, and praxis is not simply regarded 
as the "good work", but rather as the "fruit" of the Spirit. On the other hand, to be 
sanctified is to perform justice, and to do justice leads one to be sanctified. A 
strange but compelling logic is at work here. We cannot talk significantly about any 
one of them until we have talked about both sanctification and praxis; and yet by the 
time we have talked about both of them, it is sufficient to talk about any one of 
them, since we now perceive that it includes the other. Therefore, the fulfilment of
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the potentialities of being human cannot be merely achieved by a cultivation of life 
in terms of inward-searching, but also through a practice of love. In other words, 
vita humana has to be concerned with both the private and public life of the agent.
Secondly, if vita humana is concerned with the fulfilment of the potentialities 
of being human, then we should not ignore the importance of actus humanus because 
in order to understand the agent morally, we cannot neglect his/her responsibility. 
In order to achieve this, actus humanus requires the agent to be involved in both the 
spiritual and the political liberation of a person. Both sides are equally important. 
Their importance lies in the fact that one cannot replace the other. They are 
independent but related. On the one hand, the spiritual liberation of a person tells 
us that liberation camiot be started from politics alone because a person camiot be 
dissolved in society, and politics is not everything. A society with justice and 
democracy does not necessarily bring a real liberation of a person because there is 
a deep and hidden reality of a person which cannot be understood politically. Put 
theologically, this is sin, which causes self-alienation. A transformation of society 
cannot remove this sin, while a conversion of a person’s heart can. This conversion 
brings a new life to him/her which is neither guaranteed nor eliminated by the 
structures of society. It gives him/her hope and joy even at the times of suffering, 
and patience and love at the times of persecution. This is the primary concern of 
Hauerwas. Although he seldom refers to sin in his discussion of character, vision and 
virtue, in fact, his discussion is oriented to this direction. On the other hand, an 
emphasis on the spiritual liberation of a person is not sufficient because a person is 
inevitably in relationship and relationships involve communities. This points to the 
demand of the political liberation of a person. Flowever, a belief in the importance 
of commitment to the political liberation of a person is not so naive to believe that 
the political liberation can solve all the problems. Nor does it intend to reduce the
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Christian faith to social theory and criticism. Rather, put theologically, incarnation 
demands that history and politics have to be taken absolutely seriously, as seriously, 
indeed, as is required by the presence of God in history. This is the concern of 
Sobrino. For Sobrino, a commitment to the political liberation of a person is to 
remove those dehumanizing obstacles which prevent him/lier having the opportunity 
to fulfil his/her potentialities of being human. Therefore, we may conclude that actus 
humanus has to entail two movements or elements, namely, the spiritual and political 
liberation of a person. From which aspect should then we begin? The answer is that 
it does not matter where we start, provided that we do not see one as independent of 
the other.
Our judgment of whether an individual Christian is a faithful agent of the
Kingdom cannot be totally separated from what he/she does, nor can good actions be
considered without reference to the person whose actions they are. Thus, Flauerwas’
and Sobrino’s approaches to spirituality complement one another, and display a
comprehensive picture of what an individual Christian as an agent of the Kingdom
is about. That is to say, the Kingdom of God not only demands of its people a life
that is faithful to God in terms of sanctification and praxis, but also demands their
truthful response to the Kingdom in terms of practising both political and spiritual
liberation. This is why W.Pannenberg writes that
if the point in conversion is to be wholly and perfectly with God, then 
most of us must begin differently, i.e. by reforming our thought in 
order to overcome the secularist emancipation of everyday life from 
God. And we must keep in mind that such conversion cannot be 
achieved by the isolated individual but involves a transformation of
society It is not just the moral strategy but the whole outlook of
life that must change, and this can be achieved only by recasting our 
interpretation of the world and of our place in it in terms of the 
sovereignty of God and his Kingdom.^
 ^ W.Pannenberg, Christian Spirituality (Philadelphia: Westminister, 1983), pp.25-26.
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c .  THK CHURCH AS THE AGENT
1. HAUERWAS’ ACCOUNT OF ECCLESIOLOGY
a. The Church as Alternative Society
Hauerwas reminds us that it is unthinkable to separate a person’s life from 
his/her story [history and/or tradition]. His remark not only suggests a fact that a 
person is constructed by his/her story, but also the story provides his/her identity and 
ability to form his/her future.* Therefore, if we want to understand how Hauerwas 
understands what the church is, it is important to refer to his own story. In this 
context, in terms of story, I mean the Christian traditions which Hauerwas has 
inherited. They are the Methodist and Mennonite tradition. Hauerwas himself makes 
the claim that he wi'ites as a deeply committed Wesleyan.^ For him, the most 
significant essence of the Wesleyan tradition is the "sanctificationist" structure of the 
Christian faith. In the preceding section, we have already discussed how this plays 
an important role in Hauerwas’ understanding of spirituality in terms of character, 
virtue and vision. However, Wesley’s view of sanctification is not confined to an 
individual dimension, but extends its influence on his view of ecclesiology as well. 
That is to say, a central theme running through Wesley’s writings is his 
encouragement of people to commit themselves to be a community capable of 
sustaining one another in the church’s struggle against the world.^ Emphases on
 ^ In an aiticle "A Tale o f Two Stories", Hauerwas explains how the importance o f story in 
one’s life is. He considers that "to a person to be free is to be capable o f  creating or choosing our 
identity. But all o f us are more fundamentally formed by stories we did not create than we have 
chosen." He elaborates it in the context o f  being a Texan. For him, being a Texan is a Texan in his 
voice, manner and even in his soul. He continues to say that "a Texan is not a man who has the 
presumption he is without a story; he has a story that he accepts as it locates him on a land and within 
a people without whom he would not be at all." See Christian Existence Today (Durham, N.Carolina: 
Labyrinth, 1988), pp.25-46, and also my discussion o f narrative in chapter two.
 ^ S.Hauerwas and W.Willimon, "Why Resident Aliens Struck a Chord." In; M issiolosv. 
Vol. 19, 1991, p.427.
 ^ See Stuart Andrews, Methodism and Society (London: Longman, 1970), pp.44f.
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mutual support, mutual responsibility, church discipline and profound fellowship are 
the distinctive marks of Methodism. We will see later how this communal dimension 
of the Christian faith is important in Hauerwas’ ecclesiology. But at the same time, 
I have to point out that Hauerwas does not say much about Wesley’s concern of 
"social holiness"'* in his theology of, for example, justice. Ironically he wi'ites an 
article "Why justice is a bad idea for Christians."^ How can his proposal of the 
church as alternative society ignore the practice of justice? In order not to distract 
our attention here, I will refer to this question in due course.
Apart from his Methodist tradition, Hauerwas also considers himself as a high
church Mennonite.^ Here, I consider that there are four main emphases of the
Mennonite’s tradition which mostly influence Hauerwas’ ecclesiology.^ First of all,
the Mennonite theology is an "ecclesiocentric theology" which is a relative term to
highlight its emphasis on the church life rather than as an exclusive term which
considers all theological reflections should be subject to it. This theology advocates
a strong sense of brotherhood/sisterhood and community. Scriven writes that
members of the community [anabaptist] were to look after the needs 
of one another. They were to see themselves not as lords of their 
possessions but as stewards and distributors. Beside concern with the 
physical well-being of the community, however, they were to show 
concern for its spiritual well-being.
 ^ Wesley believed that "the gospel o f Christ knows o f no religion, but social; no holiness, but 
social holiness." This conviction led to efforts to meet the needs and promote the welfare o f those 
surround him. Furthermore, Wesley was also a loyal Tory in politics, never wavering in his support 
for the crown and for the established church and he instructed his ministers not to preach on politics, 
except when they might express support for the government. See J.Macquarrie ed,, A New Dictionary 
o f Christian Ethics, p.659.
 ^ See S.Hauei'was, After Christendom (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991), pp.45-68.
 ^ S.Hauei'was, "The Testament o f  Friends." In: Christian Century. Feb. 28, 1990, p.214.
 ^ See Hans Georg Vom Berg ed., Mennonites and Reformed in Dialogue (Geneva: WARC, 
1986), Robert Friedmann, The Theoloav o f Anabaptism (Scottdale: Herald, 1973), and Charles 
Scriven, The Transformation o f Culture (Scottdale: Herald, 1988).
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Solidarity with Chiist’s body meant not only mutual aid but also
mutual discipline and forgiveness  The fundamental thing was
mutual support in Christian life and witness,®
For the Mennonites, the real church is the local congregation. The church must be 
visible, the body of believers together. Secondly, regarding the relationship between 
the church and society, Friedmann, a Mennonite theologian, makes a remark that 
according to E.Troeltsch’s distinction between absolute and the relative natural law 
in theology,
all the great church bodies in Christendom subscribe to the latter 
accepting compromises with the imperfections of this world and 
excusing themselves with Adam’s Fall, when the absolute natural law 
was lost. Anabaptists, however, separated themselves from the world 
exactly by reason of these compromises.^
However, it is important to say that this position is not unanimous among 
Mennonites. Some are very actively involved in the discussion of great international 
issues like war, peace, justice and hunger. But for the Mennonites, the boundary 
between the church and the world is sharply maintained. Thirdly, the Mennonite 
tradition employs two methodologies in its understanding of tlie Bible, namely, the 
"epistemology of obedience" and "hermeneutical community".*** The former suggests 
that Cliristians best understand God’s Word and will when they live in.accordance 
with what they already know of his will, and the latter implies that a text is best 
understood within the context of the congregation. Finally, the Mennonite tradition 
emphasizes the primacy of discipleship. For the Mennonites, discipleship is 
associated with having a new life and actual obedience of Christ, actually following 
his example. Thus, moral reformation is a requirement of Christ’s followers. In the 
following, when we discuss Hauerwas’ ecclesiology, we will easily perceive how
® C.Scriven, The Transformation o f Culture (Scottdale: Herald, 1988), p.25. 
 ^ R.Friedmann, The Theology o f Anabaptism, p. 118.
H.G.V.Berg ed., Mennonites and Reformed in Dialogue, p. 16.
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much his ecclesiology relates to the Mennonite tradition.
Before taking up the issue of Hauerwas’ account of ecclesiology, it may be
interesting to ask, firstly, whether Hauerwas is a Methodist by chance or whether he
is a Mennonite by will [perhaps, the word, "chance", is rather strong. But I just want
to highlight the contrast]; and secondly, whether the Methodist and the Mennonite
tradition have more in common rather than different. If we employ Hauerwas’
concept of story, we find that he does not choose to be a Methodist, but was raised
within the Methodist church. Being a Methodist is not a role that he has chosen, but
rather it is simply part and parcel of who he is. No matter how much he is
influenced by, or how much he identifies himself with, the Mennonite tradition, the
.Methodist influence cannot be removed from his theology. This is very obvious in
his writings. On the other hand, it is right to suggest that Hauerwas deliberately
identifies himself with the Mennonite approach. He confesses,
"At that time I moved to the University of Notre Dame. There for the 
first time I encountered and began to take seriously the work of Jolm
Howard Yoder  Siuprisingly, Yoder’s account of the Church fit
almost exactly the kind of community I was beginning to think was 
required by an ethics of virtue."**
This identification does not necessarily imply that Hauerwas gives up his Methodist 
tradition, because every Christian tradition has its own strengths and weaknesses. It 
is a tragedy when any Christian tradition refuses to be challenged and reformed 
through dialogue, but strictly keeps its denominational confession as absolute. 
Nevertheless, having a spirit of dialogue does not necessarily settle all the 
denominational differences. It, therefore, is not necessary to compromise two 
traditions. For Hauerwas, being a Methodist is his identity, but not the ultimate 
feature of his identity. To identify with the Mennonite tradition is not a rejection of
S.Hauei-was, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.xxiv.
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his denominational confession [Methodist], but rather this provides him with a 
vantage point to appreciate his tradition critically for the sake of being a truthful 
follower of Clnist.
Concerning the relationship between the church and the world, among his ten
theses of Clnistian social ethics, Hauerwas holds the belief that
the primary social task of the Church is to be itself- that is, a people 
who have been formed by a story that provides them with the skills for 
negotiating the danger of this existence, trusting in God’s promise of 
redemption;
the Church does not exist to provide an ethos for democracy or any 
other form of social organisation, but stands as a political alternative 
to every nation, witnessing to the kind of social life possible for those 
that have been formed by the story of Christ.*^
These two theses outline a basic framework of Hauerwas’ ecclesiology. However, 
we may be tempted to make a quick conclusion saying that Hauerwas is encouraging 
a form of sectarianism. In order to assess Hauerwas’ proposal fairly, I consider that 
it is essential to explore and clarify more about Hauerwas’ motivations and arguments 
behind these two theses.
S.Hauerwas, A Community of Character, pp.9-11.
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Primarily, extreme care must be taken to distinguish Hauerwas’ call for the 
church to be itself from any form of escapism. Flauerwas’ proposal is not the result 
of fear of the world, but rather the result of "repentance". In other words, Hauerwas’ 
call is a concern of faithfulness instead of self-righteousness, being responsible 
instead of irresponsible. The call to repentance is based on the fact that the churches 
are closely identified with the existing social order which eventually leads them into 
cultural captivity. Hauerwas finds that the churches consciously or unconsciously
accommodate themselves to the social values. For instance, the churches adopt the
structures and values of the large corporation in their organisational patterns. The 
ordinary social values are reproduced rather than reversed in the churches, and they 
have substituted a captive civil religion for the clear proclamation of the Word of 
God. As a result, this makes the gospel credible to the modern world at the cost of 
giving up the dynamic of the gospel. Thus, the fundamental concern of Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology is "to get the church accommodated to the gospel rather than the gospel 
adapted to the status quo in the w o r l d . T h i s  is the essence of Hauerwas’ proposal 
for the church to be itself.
In the American context, Hauerwas particularly refers to the problem that the 
churches accommodate themselves to the "American way of life": that is, liberal 
democracy. *'* By liberalism, Hauerwas means that it is an
impulse deriving from the Enlightenment project to free all people 
from the chains of their historical particularity in the name of the 
freedom. As an epistemological position liberalism is the attempt to 
defend a foundationalism in order to free reason from being 
determined by any particularistic tradition. Politically liberalism makes 
the individual supreme unit of society, thus making the political task 
the securing of co-operation between arbitrary units of desire.*^
It is necessary to attempt to explain Hauerwas’ critique of liberalism. Firstly, in the 
so-called liberal democratic state, individual freedom is upheld and protected. But 
this is not something to be enthusiastic about it because, according to Hauerwas, the 
greatest loss the people feel in such society is the loss of self. This loss can be
S.Hauerwas & W.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.28.
S.Hauei'was, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 12-13.
Bryant presents an interesting chapter describing how the different approaches to the 
understanding o f  millennium affect one’s view of politics. Particularly, he discusses this in the context 
of America. For instance, he points out that the postmillennium may allow people to believe that the 
American life is somehow better, and American political institution somehow more appropriate to the 
way o f God’s will is done on earth. See M.Darrol Biyant, "America as God’s Kingdom." In; Religion 
and Political Society (New York: tïarper & Row, 1974), pp.51-94.
S.Hauerwas, Against the Nations, p. 18.
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understood in two ways. On the one hand, liberalism embraces the mai'ket as the
dominant institution of society which involves a fundamental change in the concept
of human nature. The traditional view of a human being was that of a being whose
activity was an end in itself. With the rise of the market society the essence of
rational purpose was taken to be the pursuit of possessions; we are what we own.
Furthermore, it legitimatizes the idea that the governing law of human nature is the
"insatiable desire of every man for power to render the person and properties of
others subservient to his pleasures.",'^ Eventually, co-operation and community are
replaced by abundance and technology. More importantly, this system strips them
of all personal uniqueness in order to make them productive members of the
teclinological mass society. People tend to become their roles, and thus are alienated
from their true selves. On the other hand, the liberal democratic society promises its
citizens a society in which each citizen is free to create his/her own meaning, but it
has nothing to say about what an individual does with his/her freedom; it is not an
all-embracing ethic. Indeed, a major aim of the liberal is to leave the ethical problem
for the individual to wrestle with. Freedom of the individual or perhaps the family
becomes the ultimate goal in judging social arrangements. As a result, the liberal
democratic society makes
us strangers to one another as we go about detaching ourselves from 
long term commitments, protecting our rights, thinking alone. Our 
society is a vast supermai'ket of desire in which each of us is 
encouraged to stand alone and go out and get what the world owes 
us.*’
In comparison with the totalitarianism, Hauerwas finds that
the Russian lives in a social system that claims to achieve freedom by 
falsely investing all authority in the power of the Pai'ty; the American 
lives in a social system that tries to insure freedom by trying to insure
S.Hauerwas, A Community o f Character, p.82. 
Ibid., p.77.
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that each individual can be his or her own tyrant.*®
He reminds Cluistians that freedom is an abstraction that can easily direct their 
attention away from faithfully serving as the church in democratic social orders.
Secondly, there is a wide belief that people should use their democratic power 
in a responsible way to make the world a better place in which to live. In the 
interest of securing more equitable forms of justice possible in their society, 
Hauerwas makes the criticism that Christians have failed to challenge the moral 
presuppositions of their polity and society. That is to say, they simply accept the 
assumption that politics is about the distribution of desires, irrespective of the content 
of those desires, and any consideration of the development of virtuous people as a 
political issue seems an inexcusable intrusion into their personal liberty.*® The major 
defect of liberalism’s assumption is that a just polity is possible without the people 
being just. In the name of justice, the churches try to create a society in which faith 
in a living God is rendered irrelevant or private. Activist Cluistians who talk about 
justice promote a notion of justice that envisions a society in which faith in God is 
rendered quite unnecessary, since everybody already believes in peace and justice 
even when everybody does not believe in God.**® If so, what uniqueness can the 
church contribute to society? For Hauerwas, the greatest contribution to society of 
the church is to be the church. According to him, the making of community is a 
revolutionary act. It proposes to detach men and women from their dependence upon
S.Hauerwas, Against the Nations, p. 125.
S.Hauerwas, A Community o f  Character, p.73.
S.Hauerwas & W.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.37. Also see H.M.Kuitert, Everything is 
Politics, but Politics is not Everything (London: SCM, 1986). In this book, Kuitert tries to ai'gue that 
the Church should not be involved in politics. Although his whole framework is quite different from 
Hauerwas, he makes a similar point to Hauerwas. That is to say, the Church becomes secular because 
it just repeats what other people have said about justice and peace. It has nothing to contribute to the 
world.
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the dominant institutions of the world system and creates an alternative corporate 
reality based upon different social values. Repentance and redirection aie possible 
for people only when they aie presented with an alternative.
Thirdly, due to the tremendous impact of Reinhold Niebuln’*, the 
contemporary churches have often assumed that they must naturally favour 
democratic societies because, firstly, there is the faith in the potential dignity of all 
human being as children of God, which is as much a part of Chr istian doctrine as the 
recognition of the universality of sin; secondly, it is clear that constitutional 
protection for the individual and for minorities are absolutely necessary to prevent 
tyranny; thirdly, there is no group that is disinterested enough to have power over 
others without the check that is provided by universal suffrage; and finally, such 
societies have institutionalized the freedom of religion tlirough legal recognition of 
the freedom of c on s c i e nc e . Ho we ve r ,  for Hauerwas, these reasons do not 
automatically imply that the churches should support the liberal democracy whole­
heartedly. On the contrary, he realizes that it is naive to believe that democracies are 
always for and by the people. In fact, democracies after all can be just as tyrannical 
in their claims on the loyalties of their citizens as totalitarian alternatives. 
Democratic societies and states, no less than totalitarian ones, reserve the right to 
command their citizens’ conscience to take up arms and kill not only other human 
beings but other Christians in the name of relative moral goods. Hauerwas writes 
that
the very state to secure our rights is based on an irresolvable dilemma
R.Niebuhr writes that "man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s 
inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." The Children o f Light and the Children o f  
Darkness (London: Nisbet, 1945), p.vi. Besides, Niebuhr’s Christian realism has a tremendous impact 
on American Christian social ethics.
J.C.Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New York: Scribner, 1946), p.83.
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because it has to present itself in two prima facie incompatible ways.
On the one hand, the democratic state modestly claims to be a mere 
means toward an end. On the other hand, the same state needs to 
convince its citizens that it can give them a meaningful identity
because the state is the only means of achieving the common good....
And yet, to preserve themselves, all state, even democracies, must ask 
their citizens to die for them/^
In this respect, democracy does not have much difference from totalitarianism. More 
importantly, the danger of democracy is that because the churches assume that 
democracies protect their freedom as Christians they may well miss the ways the 
democratic state remains a state that continues to wear the head of the beast. 
Therefore, Hauerwas concludes that it is impossible to undertake American 
democracy as the American church’s primary social ethics when this democracy 
demands their citizens ultimate loyalty.
Hauerwas’ suspicion of liberal democracy is not a form of scepticism. This 
was true especially of the 1950s and 1960s, when the Cold War became hot, and 
Christians in the West one-sidedly regarded democracy as equivalent to the Cliristian 
faith and regarded communism as devil. Although many theologians may not 
completely agree with Hauerwas’ proposal [the primary task of the church is to be 
the church], many of them probably would share the concern of Hauerwas: that is, 
the idolatry of the liberal democracy and a tendency of returning to the constantinian 
era^ '*. For instance, Jolm C.Beimett has already pointed out the danger of liberal 
democracy, saying that a society that is perfectly organized as a democracy, with 
honest elections and with full freedom for minorities to express themselves, may
S.Hauerwas & W.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.35.
Constantinian era means the epoch o f powerful Christendom, o f  the political and cultural 
power o f Christianity, o f Christian civilization. In its form, it was the epoch o f concordats between 
state and church, an arrangement whereby the church was either patronized by the state or at least 
protected, and where the state was regarded by the church as defensor fidei and exalted by her.
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deliberately choose to be a society that encourages secular or pagan ways of life. It 
may vote to follow policies based upon a low and hedonistic standard of values or 
that are isolationist and irresponsible in relation to the needs of other communities.’  ^
J.Moltmann, with the insight of Marxism, endeavours to develop a critical theology 
which helps the church to get rid of its ideological captivity.’  ^ This theology is not 
concerned with conferring an aura of sanctity on politics as much as with questioning 
and demystifying the political sphere. Rather it resists the reduction of faith to the 
terms of a particular political ideology, while affirming a close and necessaiy 
relationship between faith and politics and the need to interpret theology in its social 
and political context: neither is liberal democracy closer to the Kingdom of God, nor 
should the church be used as an instrument to fortify the liberal democratic ideology.
However, for Hauerwas, the fruits of political liberalism are by no means all 
bad, but Christians must submit liberalism’s moral assumptions to radical critique. 
This critical questioning cannot be a matter of simply "qualifying some of the excess 
of liberalism" or proposing ways of fine-tuning the mechanisms of the liberal state 
for a more equitable distribution of goods, because Christians already have a primary, 
authoritative story, and they may not agree to the story of liberalism, which entices 
them "to believe that freedom and rationality are independent o f narrative- i.e. we are 
free to the extent we have no story." Too often, in Hauerwas’ opinion, the churches 
have surrendered to this conviction, and therefore have abandoned their duties. For 
Hauerwas,
25 J.C.Bennett, Christianity and Communism Today (New York; Association, 1961), p.l51
Moltmann’s theology o f hope is largely indebted to the Marxist’s philosopher Ernst Bloch’s 
work, The Principle o f Hope. Throughout his works, we find that on the one hand, Moltmann takes 
Marx’s critique on religion seriously. On the other hand, he attempt to construct a theology which 
is both political and personal relevant. See Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the 
Makinn (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987).
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the overriding conflicts of our time is not that between democracies 
and totalitarianism, not because those who are for human freedom and 
those that seek to repress it. Rather the overriding conflict of our time 
is the same as that from the beginning for it is the conflict between 
those that would remain loyal to God’s Kingdom and those that would 
side with the world.”
Now, we turn to see how the church and the world relate to one another in
Hauerwas’ theology. Generally speaking, there is a misunderstanding that Hauerwas’
emphasis on the distinctiveness of the church is to advocate an anti-world or other-
world mentality. This criticism always fails to see or appreciate that Hauerwas’
emphasis on the Christian distinctiveness is for the sake of helping the world
understand what it means to be the world. Hauerwas writes that
for the world has no way of knowing it is world without the church 
pointing to the reality of God’s Kingdom. How could the world ever 
recognize the arbitrariness of the divisions between people if it did not 
have a contrasting model in the unity of the church? Only against the 
church’s universality can the world have the means to recognize the 
irrationality of the divisions resulting in violence and war, as one 
arbitrary unit of people seek to protect themselves against the 
knowledge of their arbitrariness.’®
Thus, Hauerwas never excludes the world from his theological reflection. The world
is still God’s creation. The task of the church is to show the world what it means
to be God’s creation. Hauerwas continues to say that
church and world are thus relational concepts- neither is intelligible 
without the other. They are companions on a journey that makes it 
impossible for one to survive without the other, though each constantly 
to do so. They are thus more enemies than friends, an enmity 
tragically arising from the church’s attempt to deny its calling and 
service to the world- dismissing the world as irredeemable, or 
transforming its own servant status into triumphalist subordination of 
the world. But God has in fact redeemed the world, even if the world 
refuses to acknowledge its redemption. The church can never abandon
27 S.Hauerwas, Against the Nations, p. 129. 
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 100,
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the world to the hopelessness deriving from its rejection of God, but 
must be a people with a hope sufficiently fervid to sustain the world 
as well as itself/^
Here, it appears to us that Hauerwas suggests a kind of dualism, that is, the norm of 
Christ and the norm of the world. However, this should be careful to note that what 
Hauerwas said is simply that the Clnistian’s duties are not the same as those laid 
upon him/her by the state. Therefore, Hauerwas’ dualism is the difference of the 
agents rather than the duality of Kingdom, namely, the Kingdom of God and the 
kingdom of humankind. Thus, we can say that the call of the church to be itself is 
not a formula of withdrawal ethics, nor is it a self-righteous attempt to flee from the 
world’s problems. It is clear in Hauerwas’ mind that the existence of the church is 
for the world, not for itself. And the best contribution of the church is through its 
being a "contrast model". For Hauerwas, the world needs the church, not to help the 
world run smoothly or to make the world a better and safer place to live. Rather the 
world needs the church because, without the church, the world does not know who 
it is. The only way for the world to know that it is being redeemed is for the church 
to point to the Redeemer by being a redeemed people. The way for the world to 
know that it needs redeeming is for the church to enable the world to strike hard 
against something which is an alternative to what the world offers.^^ Therefore, for 
Hauerwas, the church’s service and mission in the world is absolutely dependent on 
its being different from the world, being in the world and not of the world.
Flauerwas’ account of the relationship between the church and the world may 
arouse some difficulties. For example, does Flauerwas’ strong emphasis on the 
centrality of the church suggest that there is no salvation outside the church? Is
Ibid., p .101.
S.Hauerwas & W.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.94.
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Hauerwas’ proposal a kind of idealism which takes no account of effectiveness?
Finally, is there no convergence between the church and the world? To emphasize
the centrality of the church does not mean that the church is the Kingdom of God.
Rather, as Hauerwas states,
it is my thesis that questions of the truth or falsity of Christian 
convictions cannot even be addressed until Christians recover the 
church as a political community necessary for our salvation. What 
Christian believes about the universe, the nature of human existence, 
or even God does not, cannot and should not save. Our beliefs or 
better our convictions, only make sense as they are embodied in a 
political community we call church.^‘
Besides, when Hauerwas considers that the church is necessary for the world to know 
that it is part of a story that it cannot know without the church, this is nothing to do 
with the affirmation of the superiority of the church or of the authority of a particular 
church. Rather it is a call to be faithful and truthful to God’s mission. It is a 
reminder that the church has no excuse not to be God’s witnesses. Therefore, 
Hauerwas’ emphasis is understood in terms of servanthood instead of authority.
Regarding the issue of whether or not Hauerwas’ proposal is idealistic, he 
contends that obedience to Chiist rather than effectiveness and calculated success is 
the criterion of faith. The New Testament ethic is based upon obedience and 
faithfulness, not upon expedieny and calculation. That is to say, the cross is the 
Cliristian’s example and pattern, the seeming defeat that was turned into the greatest 
victory in history tlu'ough the power of God in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Faith 
lives by the means of a cross and through the power of a resurrection. Thus, the 
Chi'istians’ part in God’s action in history is to be a servant people who live in 
radical obedience to Jesus Chiist in whom is revealed God’s will for human life and 
society. Faith is the willingness to pursue the seemingly ineffectual path of
S.Hauerwas, After Christendom, p.26,
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obedience and trust God for the results.
Although Hauerwas maintains a sharp difference between the church and the
world, it does not mean that the church cannot work with the world. Rather the
church should know that its story is not the same as the world’s. Therefore, when
the church and the world work together, such as, in the peace movements, the church
should know that its motivation and aim are not the same as the world, and on the
other hand, the world should know that the church is never its loyal comrade.
Concerning Christians’ practice of justice, Hauerwas is sceptical, not because to
practise justice is unnecessary, but because Clnistians allow their imagination to be
captured by concepts of justice determined by the presuppositions of liberal societies,
that is, rights and contractual agreements. Hauerwas considers that
the current emphasis on justice among Christians springs not so much 
from an effort to locate the Christian contribution to wider society as 
it does from Cliristians’ attempt to find a way to be societal actors 
without that action being colored by Chiistian presupposition. In 
short, the emphasis on justice functions as the contemporary equivalent 
of a natural law ethic.
However, like his concepts of character, vision and virtue, Hauerwas fails to 
concretize what his alternative proposal is.
Wlien Hauerwas talks about the marks of the church, he does not refer to any 
particular traditional marks of the church, namely, unity, holiness, catholicity and 
apostolicity. Instead he points to the sacraments of the church and the life of 
Christians.^^ For Hauerwas, sacraments- eucharist and baptism- are central for the 
church because the story of Jesus is not only to be told, but also enacted. Tlirough
Ibid., p.58.
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 106-111.
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the very performance of the sacraments, the community in whose center it stands
becomes shaped in a way that the story of Jesus can be rightly told and heard. Thus,
the remembering enactment of Jesus’ story is the root of Hauerwas’ interpretation of
baptism and eucharist. '^* He writes that
we call this new creation church. It is constituted by word and 
sacrament as the story we tell, the story we embody, must not only be 
told but enacted. In the telling we are challenged to be a people 
capable of hearing God’s good news such that we can be a witness to 
others. In the enactment, in Baptism and Eucharist, we are made part 
of a common history which requires continuous celebration to be 
rightly remembered. Tlnough this telling and enactment we, like 
Israel, become peculiarly a people who live by our remembering the 
history of God’s redemption of the world.
Only if the churches understand baptism and eucharist as concrete activities which 
determine and pattern the church as church by drawing Christians more and more 
into God’s story with all of humanity, and only if the sacraments are performed as 
the central witness to God’s story, do Cliristians understand them adequately as the 
crucial and central activity of the church.
The second mark of the church, according to Hauerwas, is the life of
Christians. He considers that the people of God are called to correspond to God’s
activity in a way which truthfully witnesses to that activity. He said
that story [Jesus] requires the formation of a corresponding community 
that has learned to live in ways appropriate to them.
A people formed in the likeness of God cannot be anything less than 
a community of character. That is, it is a community which takes as 
its task the initiation of people into the story in a manner that forms 
and shapes their lives in a desire and distinctive way.^^
In the framework o f Hauerwas’ theology, sacraments is important in terms o f his emphasis 
on the importance o f narrative. See my discussion o f narrative in chapter two.
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, p.53.
S.Hauerwas, "The Gesture o f a Truthful Stoiy." In: Theology Today. Vol.42, 1986, pp.l82-
183.
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Hauerwas considers that there is a distinctive form and pattern which makes the 
church’s witness to God’s activity truthful. While the church can never prove the 
truth of God’s activity in and tlii’ough Jesus Christ, it is part of the church’s 
responsibility to make a claim as strong as possible thiough its witness to that story, 
and this witness includes the form and pattern of the church, the shape of the life and 
coexistence of its members. Hope, patience, constancy and hospitality are some of 
the signs of a life of mutual edification and correction. However, Hauerwas makes 
sure that this should not be misunderstood in a moralistic and works-righteous 
manner by pointing out that the key for understanding this mai’k lies in the first mark, 
the performance of the sacraments. He said that
the kind of holiness that marks the church.... is not that of moral perfection, but 
the holiness of a people who have learned not to fear one another and thus are 
capable of love. We do not go aliead with our own meals, or our lives, but 
have learned to live in presence of others without fear and envy. We thus 
become a perfect people through the meals we share with our Lord. We learn 
that forgiveness of the enemy, even when the enemy is ourselves, is the way 
God would have his Kingdom accomplished.^^
"The truth demands truthfulness"^® is the core of the second mark of the church. 
Does Hauerwas suggest that tradition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
the determination of the truthfulness of Christian life and thought? What Hauerwas 
means relates to D.Bonhoeffer’s saying about cheap and costly grace. Thus, it is 
impossible and a mistake to isolate "external" evidence from "internal" evidence as 
the character of Clnistian belief which requires the transformation of the self, and 
vice versa. Obviously, Hauerwas concentrates on the internal evidence. However, 
he notes that
as Chi'istians, we are not after all called to be morally good, but rather
37 S.Hauemas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 110.
See the discussion between Hauerwas and Julian Hartt over this matter. Journal o f the 
American Academy o f Religion. Vol.LlI/I, 1984, pp. 116-156.
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to be faithful to the story that we claim is truthful to the very character 
of reality- which is that we are creatures of a gracious God who asks 
nothing less of us than faithful service to God’s Kingdom/^
These two marks of the church suggest that the Christian faith has to be 
understood in a communal c o n t e x t T h e  path of obedience to God is a communal 
pilgrimage rather than merely an individual trek. The church as alternative society 
can be possible only when a body of believers share their lives together, support one 
another, take liability and responsibility for one another, hold one another accountable 
to a common commitment, and reinforce a set of values that is radically different 
from the larger society.
In summary, in order to be an alternative society, Hauerwas considers, firstly, 
that the church has to be active in creating new awareness of the meaning of its faith. 
It is concerned with a new understanding of the nature and demands of the Cliristian 
calling and how it relates to participation in the world. Secondly, the church has to 
be a place for the creation of styles of life based upon this new awareness. These 
new possibilities begin to free people from the intense pressures and demands of the 
world’s forms and patterns. The community of believers becomes the first fruits of 
the Kingdom, a sort of pilot project for a whole new order of things. And finally, 
this can evoke creative responses to the world arising from new awareness and life­
style. These responses bear witness to the faith and life of the community and 
become signs of social change, confronting the idolatries of the world system. That 
confrontation can open up new possibilities for change and the construction of 
alternatives. Therefore, Hauerwas’ call for the church to be itself is not like the
S.Hauerwas, "The Gesture o f a Truthftil story." p. 182.
See S.Hauerwas, "The Sermon on the Mount, Just War, and the Quest for Peace." In: 
Concilium, pp.36-43.
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quietistic and the cynical understandings which both lead to a wrong passivity: the
former thinks that all outer things, the world of activity and politics are unimportant
as long as the soul is taken care of, while the latter despairs about a world which
supposedly remains the same whatever one does or does not do. Moreover,
Hauerwas’ call is not like the activist and the utopian understandings, which by
means of proxy usurp God’s activity and, if  necessary through force and violence,
create a world of peace and justice. Rather for Hauerwas, the chinch has to give a
truthful witness to justice and thereby calls society to join in. It is faithfulness that
matters, not social effectiveness. Hauerwas sums up his thought in such words;
The most creative social strategy we have to offer is the church. Here 
we show the world a manner of life the world can never achieve 
tlirough social coercion or governmental action. We serve the world 
by showing it something that it is not, namely, a place where God is 
forming a family out of strangers."*’
S.Hauerwas & W.Willimon, Resident Aliens, p.83.
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b. A Critique
Hauerwas’ account of ecclesiology is frequently accused of being a kind of 
sectai'ianism. In what way then do Hauerwas’ critics regard him as a sectarian? 
Here, I would particularly refer to Wilson D.Miscamble’s and James M.Gustafson’s 
critique simply because both of them have made a precise critique of Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology. According to Miscamble’, Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is sectarian because 
Hauerwas sees the mission of the church as one of standing apart from society and 
witnessing to it. He comments that to separate the church from the world in order 
to give witness does not remove its culpability for what takes place in the world. 
Miscamble accuses Hauerwas of running from responsibility because Hauerwas 
removes the church from the life and death policy issues of the human community. 
In comparison with the Latin American "ecclesial base communities", Miscamble’s 
criticism is that Hauerwas’ communities of character appear inwardly focused and 
self-absorbed. He concludes that Hauerwas’ ecclesiology stands "against culture", to 
borrow from H.Richard Niebuhr’s typology. Is Miscamble’s critique based on a fair 
evaluation of Hauerwas’ works? In the previous section, we have already noted that 
Hauerwas never separates the church from the world. Rather, he takes an unusual 
path to understand the relationship between the church and the world: that is, the 
church is to be itself. Miscamble’s critique itself does have some problematic 
presuppositions. Firstly, is it reasonable to label any standpoint apart from active 
involvement in politics sectarian? Does witnessing to the Kingdom necessarily 
require engagement in politics? Secondly, how can we understand the model, 
"Christ- the transformer of culture", to borrow from H.Richard Niebuhr’s typology, 
if it is the most appropriate model of the relationship between the chm'ch and the 
world, according to Miscamble? Can Hauerwas’ ecclesiology itself, the church as
 ^ See Wilson D.Miscamble, "Sectarian Passivism?" In: Theologv Today. Vol.XLlV, 1987, 
pp.69“77.
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alternative society, also be considered as a transformative power in society, albeit less
obvious and effective? And finally, is Hauerwas’ sectarianism dependent upon the
.kind of challenge that living in a liberal society presents, or is it in principle a 
sectarianism that regards every society and its correlative political form finally as a 
form of atheism? Before moving on, 1 would like to refer also to Gustafson’s 
critique.
/B ,
In an article entitled to "The Sectarian Temptation"^, Gustafson attempts to 
explain the sociological reasons behind the tendency and the attractiveness of being 
sectai'ian. In short, in the threat of cultural pluralism, the church is tempted to draw 
a line between true believers and others in order to ensure a clear identity which frees
■S
persons from ambiguity and uncertainty. Eventually, this prevents Chiistianity taking 
seriously the wider world of science and culture, and limits the participation of 
Christians in the ambiguities of moral and social life. In this manner, according to 
Gustafson, Hauerwas’ theology is a form of sectarianism which promotes a kind of 
self-referential mentality, and ignores the truth claims of theology, except in solar as 
they are subjectively true for persons socialized into the Chiistian culture and 
language. In other words, Chiistian beliefs become subjectively meaningful, and their 
truth is not challenged.^ Sharing with Miscamble, Gustafson considers Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology to be inclined towards withdrawal from society. For Gustafson, it is 
necessary that Christians must withdraw from participation in any structure which 
would presumably compromise their fidelity to Jesus. However, it is an irresponsible 
act if it demands withdrawal from participation in controversial moral and political 
situations, because it lets the destiny of life in the world be determined by secular
 ^ James M.Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation." In: Proceedings o f the Catholic 
Theological Society. Vol.40, 1985, pp.83-94.
 ^ 1 will refer to this issue again in chapter two when I discuss Hauerwas’ view o f narrative.
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centres of power. Finally, Gustafson criticizes Hauerwas’ theology for lacking a 
doctrine of creation. This lack makes Flauerwas fail to appreciate God’s work in the 
natural world, and this results in an antagonistic attitude to the world. Gustafson said 
that
sectarianism preserves the identity of Chiistianity but at great cost to 
its intelligibility and to its participation in universities, politics and 
cultural life."*
In the following, I take both Miscamble’s and Gustafson’s critique together to discuss 
in what way their critiques hit the point, how true their interpretations of Flauerwas’ 
standpoint are and to what extent their approaches are more valid than Hauerwas’.
In the preceding section, we have already discussed how Flauerwas 
understands the relationship between the church and the world. For Hauerwas, the 
church is never for itself, but for the world. The appropriate way for the church to 
serve the world is not tluough engaging in social transformation, but rather thiough 
being a contrasting example. Thus, the world is never dismissed from Hauerwas’ 
concern. Besides, from Hauerwas’ wiitings, we can detect that he deals with a wide 
range of the so-called social issues, such as war, nuclear disarmament, medicine and 
politics.^ However, these examples do not change Miscamble’s and Gustafson’s 
impression of Flauerwas. Why is this so? 1 do not believe that they fail to notice 
Hauerwas’ writings o n . social issues. Rather 1 consider that there are two 
presuppositions of Miscamble and Gustafson which make it haid further to take in 
what Hauerwas has said. Put bluntly, Hauerwas’ ecclesiology does not fit into their 
theological frameworks. Firstly, they consider that the only option for Clnistians is 
either "complete" involvement in culture or "complete" withdrawal. There is no other
Ibid., p.94.
 ^ See S.Hauerwas, Vision and Viitiie, Truthfulness and Tragedy and Against the Nations.
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alternative. Secondly, they understand Chiistian ethics relatively, as a theoretical 
discipline to mobilize the energy and power of the church for social renewal. 
Regarding the first presupposition, we find such a rigid distinction problematic 
because it fails to appreciate the pluralistic possibilities or models of the church’s 
involvement in culture. One may not agree that the church being an alternative
society is an "effective" model, but one should not automatically draw the conclusion
that this entails withdrawal from the world. This approach not only totally distorts 
other’s meaning, but also absolutizes one’s own preference. As 1 have indicated 
previously, Hauerwas never rejects the world. For him, the relationship between the 
church and the world is a matter of "how" rather than a matter of "whether". In 
other words, the church need not worry about whether to be in the world, but the 
church’s only concern is how to be in the world, in what form, for what purpose. 
Interestingly enough, Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is unusual but not without some support 
apart from the Mennonites. In an article entitled to "Chr istian Political Involvement 
in East and West; The Theological Ethics of Wolf Krotke"^, we find that Hauerwas’ 
vision is shared by a Lutheran theologian in the context of a new united Germany. 
According to the exploration of John P.Burgess, Krotke takes secularization seriously. 
He considers that "in a time in which the individual has no ethical orientation, the 
ability to make ethical judgments is also missing, the Cliristian community is the 
offer to train this ability."^ To do this, the church must first train people in its 
distinctive language. Its distinctive language thus shapes a distinctive community, 
an alternative community. It does not seek to exercise control over society’s power 
structures but to live out God’s love and forgiveness. It is a community characterized 
by new possibilities for witness and service to the world. Gustafson is right that the
® John B.Burgess, "Christian Political Involvement in East and West: The Theological Ethics 
o f W olf Krotke." In; Journal o f Religion, Vol.71, 1991, pp.202-216.
 ^ Ibid., p.206.
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attractiveness of the so-called "sectarianism" can be explained sociologically, but he 
is wrong to conclude that it intends to flee from engagement with reality. On the 
contrary, Krotke and Hauerwas show that the church to be itself is a responsible way 
of being witness in the world where people aie lost. Therefore, Hauerwas’ 
ecclesiology is not to retreat from the threat of uncertainty, but rather is a deliberate 
and active act to face the ambiguity of society by providing an example and a 
direction.
In relation to the second presupposition of Miscamble and Gustasfon, it is true 
that there is a strong link between God and the world. This relationship is best 
illustrated in the biblical prophetic traditions. In the Old Testament, the activities of 
the prophets show us that God is concerned with right life as much as true worship. 
God is not merely the private morality of the home, but also the public morality on 
which national life is founded. The pure heart for the individual is as important as 
the just institution for the nation. The Book of Amos is the typical example of this 
tradition. In the contemporary theologies, this emphasis is largely held by political 
and liberation theologians. However, Hauerwas reminds us that the activities of the 
prophets also have the pastoral dimension. That is to say, the prophets are those who 
interpret past, present and future in the light of God’s calling of Israel. It is the duty 
of the prophets to remind their community to discern and interpret events in the light 
of God’s past relation with them.® It is especially obvious in the post-exilic literature. 
The prophets not only proclaim a message of comfort and hope, but also remind the 
Jews that they would not be forgotten. Thus, the social and pastoral dimensions of 
the prophetic role should be evenly emphasized. The former is about the critical 
dimension of the prophetic task, while the latter is about the interpretative role of the
S.Hauei-was, Christian Existence Today, pp.75-80,
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prophets. Nevertheless, when the prophetic role is solely understood as a call for 
justice against the status quo, then it overlooks the presupposition that is necessary 
to sustain such an endeavour, for the question of what kind of community is 
necessary to sustain the task of so interpreting the world is ignored. At the same 
time, when the prophetic role is solely understood as a self-reflecting and an inward 
searching discipline, then it misses the profound meaning of this calls: that is, the 
church is not called to be self-interested, but for a wider community. I believe that 
Gustafson would not wish to ignore the importance of the pastoral dimension of the 
prophetic activity.^ At the same time, Hauerwas would not wish to neglect its social 
dimension. Their difference is simply a matter of emphasis. 1 consider that each of 
them challenges the other not to neglect the dialectical prophetic tradition.
In his answer to the question, can ethics be Christian?, Gustafson said that
Christian ethics and universal human ethics are convertible terms.
What is ethically justifiable to do is the Clnistian thing to do, and vice 
versa. This is given theological legitimacy by the doctrine of the 
Trinity in which Christ, the second person, is the one in and through 
whom all things are created. From this point of view, in principle 
there is no distinctive Christian morality, but all morality that is 
rationally justifiable is Clnistian.*®
® Two typical examples can be found in J.M.Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago, 1968), and "Moral Discernment in the Christian Life." In: Norm and Context 
in Christian Ethics (London: SCM, 1968), pp. 17-36.
J.M.Gustafson, "Can Ethics be Christian? Some Conclusions." In: Readings in Moral 
Theology N o.2, ed. Charles E.Curran (New York: Paulist, 1980), pp.147-148.
In this article, Gustafson goes on to say that the ethics o f the Christian must be Christian. On 
the one hand, the Christian community has a pai'ticular vocation to follow Jesus and the way o f life 
that he exemplified and taught; it is obliged to be fully obedient to his lordship, to be a distinctive 
people with a distinctive way o f life. On the other hand, while Christ is confessed to be the saviour 
o f the world, the sorts o f  philosophical speculations that give grounds for the convertibility o f the 
Christian and the rational are eschewed. The Christian community has its significant grounding in a 
historical event, and its history and conduct are to be determined by that historical determination. 
Therefore, the ethics o f the Christian is and must be Christian ethics; all o f their moral actions are 
under Jesus’ lordship; since he is Lord, the distinctive aspects o f his way o f life and teaching are as 
morally obligatory on those who confess him as Lord as are the ordinary aspect.
A full discussion o f this can be found in J.M.Gustafson, Can Ethics be Christian?
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Gustafson’s reasoning is based on his theological belief that God’s purposes are for
"the well being of man and creation", and thus on most occasions the reasons that
justify any moral act would justify the moral acts of Clnistians. This is what he
means by the place of the doctrine of creation in Christian ethics. From our
preceding study, we find that Hauerwas never denies the Clnistian affirmation of God
as creator. Flowever, Hauerwas is quite cautious to use the doctrine of creation to
justify the church’s involvement in politics and to underwrite an autonomous realm
of morality separate from Clnist’s lordship. Fie said that
what allows us to look expectantly for agreement among those who do 
not worship God is not that we have a common morality based on 
autonomous knowledge of autonomous nature, but that God’s Kingdom 
is wider than the church.*’
Here, both Gustafson and Hauerwas pose an interesting issue: that is, what the 
relationship is between an ethic of creation and an ethic of the Kingdom. For 
Gustafson, an ethic of creation is grounded in the fact that this world is God’s 
creation. Thus, there is no area of eaithly life which needs to be denied. Fluman life 
on earth is important to God. He has given it order and it matters that it should 
conform to the order he has given it. Therefore, the church’s involvement in culture 
is affirmed and necessary because this order requires of the church both a denial of 
all that tlireatens to become disordered and a progress toward a life which goes
beyond this order without negating it. For Hauerwas, an ethic of the Kingdom sets
■him to work differently. An ethic of the Kingdom is based on the "already, but not 
yet". Its "alreadiness" is the affirmation of the lordship of Clirist over the world, 
while its "not-yet ness" is to avoid the historicalization of the Kingdom in earthly 
maimer. For Flauerwas, the Kingdom of God is an eschatological event which serves 
as a challenge to the existing social order. But this challenge is represented by the 
church with its own communal life and institutional order as a model and a symbol
of the ultimate destiny of humankind in the Kingdom of God. Has then one to
choose either an ethic of creation or an ethic of the Kingdom? Regarding this, Oliver
O’Donovan makes a fair remark saying that
a Kingdom ethics which was set up in opposition to creation could not 
possibly be interested in the same eschatological Kingdom as that 
which the New Testament proclaims. At its root there would have to 
be a hidden dualism which interpreted the progress of history to its 
completion not as a fulfilment, but as a denial of its beginnings. A 
creation ethics, on the other hand, which was set up in opposition to 
the Kingdom, could not possibly be evangelical ethics, since it would 
fail to take note of the good news that God had acted to bring all that 
he had made to its fulfilment. In the resurrection of Clirist creation is 
restored and the Kingdom of God dawns. Ethics which starts from 
this point may sometimes emphasize the newness, sometimes the 
primitiveness of the order that is there affirmed. But it will not be 
tempted to overtlirow or deny either in the name of the order.
This account points to the fact that both an ethic of creation and an ethic of the 
Kingdom are mutually important and supportive. Thus, the difference between 
Gustafson and Hauerwas is not necessarily that they are talking of two different 
things, but rather they are representing two sides of a coin.
Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is very often misinterpreted as the model of "Christ 
against culture". This model suggests a kind of "sectarianism". Sectarianism often 
conjures up a sense of narrowness and provincialism. Following the governing 
definitions of Ernst Troeltsch'® (and derivatively, H.R.Niebuhr*'*), a sect is a 
community that does not share in or participate in the commonly accepted definition
Oliver O ’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order (Leicester: I VP, 1986), p. 15.
E.Troeltsch, The Social Teachings o f the Christian Churches (New York: Macmillan, 
1931). Troeltsch’s summaiy statement is: "The sect is a voluntary society, composed o f strict and 
definite Christian believers bound to each other by the fact that all have experienced the new birth. 
These believers live apart from the world, are limited to small groups, emphasize the law instead of 
grace, and in varying degrees within their own circle, set up the Christian order, based on love; all this 
is done in preparation for and expectation o f  the coming Kingdom o f God."
H.R.Niebuhr, The Social Sources o f Denominational ism (New York: Henry Holt, 1929),
pp.17-21.
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of reality. It operates out of a different practice of perception, epistemology and 
language. It holds to a set of alternative values which it regards as the truth. That 
is to say, it seeks to construct for its members an alternative life-world. Is then 
Hauerwas’ ecclesiology a form of sectai'ianism? In a sense, Hauerwas’ ecclesiology 
is a form of "sectarianism" because Hauerwas teaches that the primary task of the 
church is to be itself.’^  However, it is important to distinguish Hauerwas’ 
"sectarianism" from our general understanding of sectarianism because Hauerwas’ 
claim does not intend to retreat from responsibility and the world. On the contraiy, 
it intends to be a unique way to give witness to the world. Thus, Hauerwas’ 
"sectarianism" helps us see that an alternative perception of reality is not a defensive 
measure but may be an act of identity, energy and power. Besides, sect-truth as 
alternative need not be a protected and monopolized claim. It can be a proposal to 
the larger community, a proposal of an interpretation (a reading of reality) in which 
the larger community can share and which will bear that community’s structure. The 
sect does not accommodate its truth. But at the same time, it need not to monopolize 
its sense of truth. It may share it in unaccommodating ways, knowing that such an 
alternative truth inevitably has an impact on dominant truth. In this sense, Hauerwas’ 
"sectarianism" should not be one-sided negatively understood. On the contrary, his 
account can even be considered as a model of "Christ-the transformer of culture". 
Thus, the difference between "Christ against culture" and "Christ- the transformer of 
culture" depends on how we define what activities are "against culture" and 
"transformation of culture".
Even though one may agree with Hauerwas’ account of ecclesiology, one may 
find it very difficult to put into practice. Is Hauerwas talking about an ideal church?
Hauerwas emphasizes the distinctiveness o f  Christian ethics by highlighting the qualified 
term, "Christian." See The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 17-34.
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If not, how then is it put into practice? From the preceding study, we notice that
Hauerwas always emphasizes that he is concerned with the visible church, the
concrete community of faith, he clearly is not abandoning the so-called empirical
church as such.’^  Therefore, we may say that the strength of Hauerwas’ ethical
reflection upon the church is that he avoids the problematic distinction between an
ideal and an empirical church, between a theological concept which does not relate
to reality and a reality which is to be understood on primarily non-theological
ground. What he does instead is to take the concrete visible church commimities
theologically seriously by reminding them primarily of their call as church. What he
describes ecclesiologically is not an ideal church but rather is an exegesis of the
church’s call to be the church. In our terminology, Hauerwas is concerned more with
the congregation, the local church. In other words, he starts with the revival of the
congregation. This emphasis leads first of all to the right kind of ethical perception
of the congregation which is neither simply a social club nor simply some political
pressure group, but rather the local church is the people of God called to be the
people of God in all of their practices and activities. It makes a demand on the
congregation by calling it into its concrete responsibility to its call. That is to say,
ethics does not become relevant somewhere outside the congregation in the so-called
real world, but starts right in the middle of the congregation. That life, to which this
ethics refers, does not pass by the congregation, but takes place in the middle of it.
Flowever, an emphasis on the local church does not necessaiily discredit the
significance of apostolicity and catholicity of the church. As L.Newbigin writes that
the local congregation is not a branch of the universal Church, but it 
is the place where the universal Church is made visible. When the 
local congregation speaks and acts, its words and acts most claim to 
be the words and acts of the universal Church if they are to be
An obvious example can be found in his book Resident Aliens. In this book, he uses 
examples o f  his local congregation to demonstrate what it means for the church to be itself.
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authentic.*^
Interestingly enough, Hauerwas’ emphasis on the local church is becoming
increasingly widely accepted in contemporary theological reflection. For instance,
Newbigin shares Hauerwas’ view, suggesting that the Christian congregation itself is
a significant impact on public life. Furthermore, he proposes that the only
hermeneutic of the gospel is a congregation of men and women who believe it and
live by it. Fie considers that
if the gospel is to challenge the public life of our society it will not
be forming a Cliristian political party, or by aggressive propaganda
campaigns It will only be by movements that begin with the local
congregation in which the reality of the new creation is present, known 
and experienced, and from which men and women will go into every 
sector of public life to claim it for Christ, to unmask the illusions 
which have remained hidden and to expose all areas of public life to 
the illumination of the gospel. But that will only happen as and when 
local congregations renounce an introverted concern for their own life, 
and recognize that they exist for the sake of those who are not 
members, as sign, instrument and foretaste of God’s redeeming grace 
for the whole life of society.’®
The most important contribution which the church can make to a new social order 
is to be itself a new social order. The basic unit of that new society is the local 
congregation. The local congregation is the place where the truth of the gospel is 
tested and experienced in the most basic way. In this sense, Hauerwas’ account of 
ecclesiology proves important.
From the above discussion of Hauerwas’ ecclesiology, one important question 
arises concerning to what extent Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is effective. Nevertheless, 
Hauerwas always reminds us that it is wrong to measure any account of ecclesiology
L.Newbigin, Truth to Tell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p.88.
Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989),
pp.232-234.
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in terms of its social effectiveness, but only by the criterion of faithfulness to God. 
Otherwise, the church is trapped by the sociological understanding of functionalism. 
Hauerwas is correct in stating that what God requests Clnistians is to be faithful to 
him rather than to be socially effective in accordance with the standard of the world. 
This is fully revealed in the cross of Clnist. In the American context, Hauerwas’ 
account of ecclesiology may be found passive and conservative because Christian 
political involvement is allowed and even encouraged in America. However, in other 
social contexts, for instance, China where I come from, Hauerwas’ account may be 
proved influential and important. In China, the Christian church is a minority 
community, not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of cultural relevance. 
I consider that Hauerwas’ account reminds the chiu'ches in China as to what extent 
they accommodate the Chiistian faith to the communist ideology. On the other hand, 
Hauerwas’ account encourages Christians to live out their faith in accordance with 
the Kingdom’s values in all areas of life, even though they may be deprived of 
political activity. The history of the church in China affirms that no one can deny 
that this is not a powerful witness.
However, I have to point out that if faithfulness is the criterion of the church, 
according to Hauerwas, then faithfulness should be nothing less than justice. If so, 
I find that the weakness of Hauerwas’ account of ecclesiology is not concrete enough. 
I agree that the Chiistian community is the ultimate parallel institution, a group 
within a society constantly confronting all other groups with models of life and hope 
while demonstrating the possibility of human community, but I find it abstract to 
follow. In other words, if Hauerwas’ ecclesiology is concerned with a visible church, 
he need to describe how this church may live out the meaning of faithfulness. 
Otherwise, his account can only be confined to the epistemological level which is 
contrary to his intention to accommodate the church to the Gospel.
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2. SOBRINO’S ACCOUNT OF ECCLESIOLOGY
a. The Church o f  the Poor
Latin American liberation theology is born out of a situation marked by social 
injustice, oppression and poverty. Its task is to change the reality rather than to 
explain the reality.* Thus it demands a new way of doing theology and of practising 
the Clnistian faith. This demand is concretized in its ecclesiology. Sharing with 
other liberation theologians, Sobrino considers that "the church of the poor" is not 
only the most appropriate form of ecclesiology in Latin America, but also is "in its 
structure the true way of being a church in Jesus. Before going to discuss what 
the church of the poor is, and how it is the true way of being a church, I consider 
that it is necessary to say something about the history of the church in Latin America. 
The history here is confined to the Roman Catholic church simply because the 
Catholic faith is dominant in Latin America, and Sobrino primarily wiites as a 
Catholic.
Wlien we look at the history of the church in Latin America, despite scattered 
reforms and sporadic innovations, it is fair to say that until the late 1950s, the Latin 
American churches had a well-deserved reputation for stodgy conservatism. Long­
standing alliances with political and economic powers were rarely challenged, and for 
the most part the churches remained frozen in a defensive stance, suspicious of 
change, and strongly insistence on their guiding role in national culture. Their image 
of popular groups stressed the traditional view that the poor would be "always with 
us" and would require constant instruction and guidance to overcome a heritage of
 ^ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor (London: SCM, 1984), pp.7-38. 
2 Ibid., p. 124.
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ignorant superstition?
Since Vatican II, in social and political terms, the 1960s were on the whole 
an open and optimistic period for the churches. The 1968 conference of Latin 
American bishops at Medellin marked a high point in this process and shaped the 
outlines of a critical and prophetic stance for the churches, along with efforts to 
implement many liturgical, structural and pastoral innovations. But soon after 
Medellin, significant polarization appeared between those committed to a more 
thorough and radical promotion of change, and others content to modernize within 
the church as they looked toward gradual reform in society and politics. The tensions 
of this period came to a head at the 1979 Puebla meeting.'* At Puebla, a bitter and 
usually public struggle between progressives and conservatives ended in something 
of a standoff. No one was condemned, and each side continued its activities. 
However, since 1979, conflict on these issues has not declined. Conservative voices 
in the region’s Catholic churches have been amplified by the appointment of large 
numbers of relatively young and highly conservative bishops, by determined 
campaigns to rein in what are seen as dangerously independent and excessively 
politicized groups, by concerted efforts to purge seminaries and schools of the 
influence of liberation theology, and by related attempts to promote alternative and 
presiunably more malleable popular organisations linked to the church.^
 ^ See Daniel H.Levine, Populai* Voices in Latin American Catholicism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), Chapter Two.
 ^ See J.Sobrino, "The Significance o f  Puebla for the Catholic church in Latin America." In: 
Reflection on Puebla (London: CIIR, 1980), pp.22-43.
® An example o f this is the suppression o f the political activities o f the base Christian 
communities. See W.E.Hewitt, Base Christian Communities and Social Change in Brazil (Lincoln: 
University o f  Nebraska Press, 1991). Besides, the case o f  Leonardo B off is another example. See 
J.L.Segundo, Theoloev and the Church (Chicago: Winston, 1985).
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For Sobrino, to consider the church as the church of the poor is, on the one 
hand, to challenge the historical alliance between the church and the state, and on the 
other, to respond to the "signs of the times". The church of the poor is nothing other 
than an attempt to live faithfully to its call.
Primarily speaking, to see the church as the church of the poor relates to the 
concept of the Kingdom of God,^ Sobrino considers that "the church is entrusted 
with the tradition of the Kingdom and the requirement to make the Kingdom a 
reality."’ The church exists for the Kingdom, albeit that it is not identical with the 
Kingdom. How then does the Kingdom relate to the church of the poor, and vice 
versa? According to Sobrino, the Kingdom of God can be understood in three related 
ways: that is, the notional way which examines Jesus’ understanding of the Kingdom 
by comparing it with earlier notions in Israel, the way of the addressee which 
considers that the addressees will intrinsically clarify what is "good" in the news, and 
the way of the practice of Jesus on the basis that what Jesus said and did was in the 
service of proclaiming the Kingdom.® In the following, I intend to concentrate my 
attention to the way of addressee, because the notional way is not a unique 
contribution of liberation theology, while the way of the practice of Jesus will be 
examined in the chapter two of this thesis.
To consider the addressee of the good news as the way to know the Kingdom
® Generally speaking, this understanding should meet with little disagreement among 
theologians, no matter how this may proceed to different views on the relationship between the world 
and the Church. For example, W.Pannenberg writes that "the central concern o f the Church, and the 
primary point o f  reference for understanding the Church, must be the Kingdom o f God. That is, the 
Kingdom must be the central concern o f the Church if  the Church is to remain faithful to the message
o f Jesus." (Theology and the Kingdom o f God. Philadephia; Westminster, 1974), p.73.
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor. pp.200f 
® See J.Sobrino, Jesus, The Liberator, pp.67-104.
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is based on the view that "if the Kingdom is good news, its recipients will help
fundamentally in clarifying its content, since good news is something essentially
relational, not all good news being so in equal measure for everyone."® Briefly
speaking, Jesus’ ministry is to restore the gospel to its rightful place- to the place
from where it ought to be read, and to the place where it becomes transparent for us
all. This is the place where the poor are. For Jesus, poor and gospel are correlated
terms. The poor are those whom the gospel is primarily intended to address, while
the gospel is the good news only If it proclaims to the poor.*® The poor are the true
representatives of God on earth. Sobrino considers that
the poor are those who are at the bottom of the heap in history and 
those who are oppressed by society and cast out from it; they are not, 
therefore, all human beings, but those at the bottom, and being at the 
bottom in this sense means being oppressed by those on top. Both 
economic poverty and lack of moral dignity can express this being at 
the bottom.*'
In Latin America, according to Sobrino, the poor are not only those who are 
economically, socially and politically deprived, but also those whose lives are 
deprived.*’ Their life is a type of life which is daily threatened by death and comes
® Ibid., p.79.
Jesus did not wait to be asked for whom was his message intended. He gave the answer 
without being asked. He said, "The Spirit o f the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to
preach good news to the poor " (Lk.4:17-21) However, in the light o f the biblical criticism, the
question arises whether Lucan record is a fair elaboration o f  what Jesus might well have said on that 
occasion, or a work o f  sheer imagination. James D.G.Dunn insists that the former is much likely. 
The reasons are that the same emphasis appears in at least two other traditions o f Jesus’ teaching 
preserved in the first three gospels. More importantly, Jesus lived it out in his own ministi'y. See 
James Dunn, Jesus’ Call to Discipleship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.32-36.
J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator. p,81.
L .Boff makes a clear distinction between the human rights in terms o f  the dignity o f the 
oppressed and o f the powerful. He provides a theological foundation o f  the rights o f  the impoverish 
masses and concludes that the promotion and defense o f human rights means primarily the promotion 
and defense o f the "rights o f the poor" which are concentrated in the basic right to a human existence 
with a minimum o f dignity. See When Theolosv Listen to the Poor (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1988), pp.50-64.
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close to death. They are the victims of the privileged class and of the excuse of 
"national security" which are the historical decisions made by human beings, that is, 
unjust structures. Their poverty is not simply their misfortune of being poor, but 
rather is the consequence of a tragedy of race, class and culture. In short, poverty 
means the denial of life, peace and justice. It is against God’s creation.*® Sobrino 
calls the poor "the crucified peoples"*'*, a term borrowed from Ignacio Ellacuria. 
Although Sobrino is aware of the fact that the term, "the crucified peoples", need 
further analysis, he unreservedly recommends that it is the most appropriate 
expression to describe the poor because in a real sense, to be crucified means death, 
and in a historical-ethical sense, crucified is concerned with a type of death inflicted 
rather than simply to die. These are the exact experiences of the Latin American. 
More importantly, at a religious level, God makes himself present in these crosses, 
and the crucified peoples become the principal sign of the times.*® Sobrino 
considers that they are the "historical continuation of the servant of Yahweh", and 
"the actualization of Christ crucified, the true servant of Yahweh". Therefore, the 
crucified peoples and Christ refer to and explain each other. He elaborates this as 
follows:
Suffer ing  Servant The Crucif ied Peoples
1. a man o f sorrows acquainted with grief hunger, sickness, slums, lack o f education, health
(Isa.53:3) and employment
Sobrino makes a very close connection between anti-life and anti-Christ. See J.Sobrino, 
"The Epiphany o f  the God o f Life in Jesus o f  Nazareth." In: The Idols o f  Death and the God o f Life. 
Maryknoll: Orbis, 1983.
See J.Sobrino, The Crucified Peoples (London: CIIR, 1989), "The Crucified Peoples: 
Yahweh's Suffering Servant Today," In: Concilium. 1990, pp.119-129 and "A Crucified People’s Faith 
in the Son o f  God." in: Jesus. Son o f  God. In his most recent book, Jesus. The Liberator (p.270), 
Sobrino also considers the crucified peoples as "martyred people" because he believes that faith has 
something to say to these passively crucified people and they have something important to say to the 
faith. Nevertheless, Sobrino does not further clarify his point.
See J.Moltmann, The Crucified God and also Kazoh Kitamori, Theology o f  the Pain o f  
God (London: SCM, 1966).
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2. no form or comeliness.... no beauty disfiguring bloodshed, the terror of tortures and
(Isa.53:2) mutilations
3. despised and rejected (Isa.53;3) basic human right is deprived, no human dignity
4. he was oppressed and he was afflicted millions died in silence, their names and even the
yet he opened not his mouth (lsa.53:7) number o f death are not known
6. lie had done no violence and there was innocent people who loves justice and peace
no deceit in his mouth (Isa.53:9)
7. bearers o f salvation, light o f  nations has evangelizing and humanizing potential; that is,
(Isa.42:6, 49:6) hope, love, faith, solidarity, and forgiveness
Sobrino considers this analogy in such a paradox: "Through looking at Christ
crucified, they [the poor or the crucified peoples] come to know themselves better,
and tlirough looking at themselves, they come to know Clirist crucified better."*®
The idea of the crucified peoples is appropriate in the Latin American context
because the killing is no longer a matter of an individual’s tragedy, but is rather a
matter of the fate of class, race and culture. For the poor, the term "the crucified
peoples" is meaningful because they realize that God shares their suffering and they
also share God’s suffering. This strengthens their hope and faith. For the oppressors,
this term is a powerful accusation because they are not simply killing men and
women but God’s servants. If they do not repent, God’s wrath comes upon them.
For the church, this term is an existential challenge because it demands the church
make a clear stand on this matter: that is, to defend and protect the crucified peoples
or to ignore them. Nevertheless, many of us would be in doubt to what extent
Sobrino’s use of the metaphor of the Suffering Servant is in accordance with the
biblical hermeneutical principles.
Generally speaking, historical-critical scholarship tries to distance the reader
J.Sobrino, "A Crucified People’s Faith in the Son of God." p.25.
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5. he was taken away defenceless and without sudden arrest, assassination, massacre 
judgment (Isa.53:8)
j:
3
from the text, making it possible to find an original and valid witness in the scripture 
that becomes authoritative. But this distancing of reader from the text has the effect 
of devaluing later interpretations and making assimilation of text to experience 
difficult. Recent hermeneutical theory therefore rejects the dichotomy between text 
and experience and sees interpretation as a dialogue between text and reader. 
However, it moves too quickly to surrender of the reader’s experience to the text. 
For Sobrino, scripture and situation are the two "texts" upon which theology is built. 
The "re-reading" of scripture suggests that the original meaning of the text is not 
exhausted by the original intention of the author. There is a "reservoir of meaning", 
a richer dimension of the text, for each changing situation. This is not a new 
meaning since there is always continuity with the past. The meaning of the text is 
enriched by its distance from its initial appearance through accumulated 
interpretations. But above all its significance is free to be applied in a new way in 
each changing situation.
If the poor are those to whom the Kingdom is addressed, then the life and
dignity of the poor are to be protected. In order to proclaim the good news to the
poor, the church has to consider beginning from the transformation or even revolution
of the present existing social structures rather than merely promoting individual
charity. Besides, the poor are not only the beneficiaries, but also have evangelizing
potential. That is to say,
the poor become good news for the church, both because their very 
condition of poor moves it to conversion and by incarnating in their 
lives the evangelical values of solidarity, service, simplicity and 
openness to accepting the gift of God.*^
Before examining the issue of how the church can be evangelized by the poor and 
what it looks like, I consider that it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the poor
J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, p. 128.
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further.
Among critics, I consider Jacques Ellul’s comments comprehensive although
his comments do not particularly refer to liberation theology. He is critical that
the poor are looked at from an economic point of view exclusively.
The poor are those who have no money, who are exploited in their 
work and deprived of the fruit of their labours. When modern 
theologians speak of the humble, they speak in terms of financial 
poverty. This goes directly against the biblical image of the poor, as 
we have shown. Jesus spends time with rich men who are poor 
socially. He spends time with Roman officers who are poor because 
they are sorrowful. All this is forgotten in order to keep nothing but 
deprivation of economic means.
Collectivization is the second result of modern theology’s adoption of 
socio-political ideas. It is no longer the poor individual but the poor 
class that is important. Similarly, I am not told to respond to the 
direct, immediate, personal need of the poor person I meet, but to go 
back to the causes, that is, to the economic and political regime which
produced this situation We totally lost contact with the poor that we
know personally. We work in the abstract toward the liberation of a 
social category that we never meet. We know the political leaders of 
this class, who ai*e no longer poor themselves.
Regarding the first point, it cannot be denied that Sobrino understands the poor 
primarily from the economic point of view. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that he distorts the biblical image of the poor because the Bible does 
understand the poor materially. Furthermore, his emphasis is a counter response to 
the institutional church which often spiritualizes the poor. To highlight the necessity 
of the economic interpretation of the poor has no intention of eliminating other 
interpretations of the poor, but rather it sees that the God of the Bible is not merely 
a God who acted in history: God is the one who continues to act in history. 
Therefore, an emphasis on the economic interpretation of the poor is a "theology of 
the Word made flesh". But at the same time I have to point out that Sobrino’s
J.Ellul, Money and Power (London; Marshall Pickering, 1986), pp.171-172.
117
interpretation may run the risk of historical reductionism. Ellul’s remaik is right that 
the meaning of human existence is not exclusively found in relation to the historical 
process, but also in the ultimate destiny of the individual. Thus, what we need is to 
relate the public and private, the social and personal, life shared with others and the 
inner life of the individual person rather than the way suggested either by an 
ahistorical theology or by a theology bent towards historical reductionism.
Regarding the second critique, it cannot be denied that Sobrino considers that 
the poor are not simply individuals, but a class. He also emphasizes that personal 
charity is not enough because the unjust reality is a structural violence. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that Sobrino ignores the personal need of the poor 
person, not only because his emphasis on spirituality and his constant contact with 
the base Christian communities keep his heart "pure", but also because to see the poor 
as individual and as class are not contradictory. I consider that an emphasis on the 
poor as a class is important, not in terms of the Mai'xist theory’s class struggle, but 
in terms of unmasking the myth of the poor; that is to say, their poverty is their 
misfortune.
Now, I turn to see what the ehurch is when it is evangelized by the poor, if
the poor are the addressees of the Kingdom, Firstly, this is a church not simply
concerned about the poor, but rather being of the poor, a transition from a church
present for the poor to a church of the poor. Sobrino comments that
historically a Church that is simply for the poor without being of the 
poor could not succeed in the long run even in being for the poor.'^
The church of the poor then is the "people’s church". In Spanish, it is called Iglesia 
Popular, However, it should be very careful not to be confused with the
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.92.
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understanding of the "people’s church" [Volkskirche] in the West. Generally 
speaking, the people’s church used in the West is understood in a sense of a "national 
church" or an "official church", for instance, the Church of Scotland and the Church 
of England. Clearly, this is not what Sobrino means by "Iglesia Popular 
Edward Schillebeeckx makes a very useful distinction to clarify this term. He writes 
that
1. it has much more the sense of a collective reality, as an actor in 
history;
2. it means especially the poor majority: the poor are the purest form 
of the people.^’
L.Boff explains that "Iglesia Popular" is a mass of people without consciousness of 
their situation, who without their own historical purpose and lacking adequate means, 
under the influence of a number of factors, began to organise themselves into 
communities. In process terms, the mass become a people, that is, an organized 
entity taking stock of itself and working out social practice with a view to their 
participation in society and the transformation of that society. When the institutional 
church supports this process and made itself part of the progress of the people, the 
church becomes a people’s church (a Igreja se faz p o p u la r ) .T h u s ,  the meaning 
of the "people’s church" is primarily determined by who the people are and where 
the people are. In fact, this understanding of the "people’s church" becomes both an 
ecumenical and a crucial issue in the contemporary churches’ agenda/^ For 
instance, "Minjung" theology (in Korea) takes up this issue seriously and reflects
Ibid., pp.84-124. The Spanish title o f  this chapter is "Resurreccion de una Iglesia popular".
E.Schillebeeckx, "Offices in the Church o f the Poor." In: Concilium. 176, P. 105.
L.Boff, "A Theological Examination o f  the Terms People o f God and Popular Church." 
In: Concilium. 176, p. 89.
If one is aware o f the recent theological trend, one can easily discover that many 
theologians more or less take account o f this issue in their works. Besides, Christian organisations like 
WCC, LWF and WARC make a clear stand on this matter as well.
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what it means in its pai’ticulai context. In short, "Minjung" is not simply the people, 
but rather the mass of the poor.
Theo Witvliet, A Place in the Sun (London: SCM; 1985), p .l63. Also see Miniung 
Theology (Maryknoll: Orb is, 1983).
Rosino Gibellini, The Liberation Theology Debate (London; SCM, 1987), p.33.
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The minjung is present where there is talk of social and cultural 
alienation, economic exploitation and political oppression. So a 
woman is minjung when she is dominated by her husband, her family 
or social and cultural structures and factors. An ethnic group is 
minjung when it is discriminated against politically and economically 
by another group. A race is minjung when it is dominated by the 
power of another race, as is the case in the colonial situation. When 
intellectuals are oppressed because they use their creative and critical 
capacities against rulers on behalf of the oppressed, they belong to the 
minjung. Workers and peasants are minjung when they are exploited, 
when their needs and desires are ignored, and they are crushed by the 
ruling powers." '^*
Although it is a mistake just simply to consider the Iglesia Popular equivalent to 
Minjung, there is no doubt that they are taking a same path; that is, from option for 
the poor to commitment to the cause of the poor. In the light of Iglesia Populai' and 
the church of Minjung, the people’s church is "from a church linked to the ruling 
class to a church linked to the people and the lower class; from a church which acts 
in a biassed way as a factor of conservation and legitimation to a church which has 
opted for liberation; from a colonial church for the poor to a church with the poor 
and of the poor; from a hierarchical church in which all the power is concentrated 
in the hierarchy to a pneumatological church according to which every Christian has 
or is a bearer of his or her charisma. In the history of the church, we find that 
the church runs away from the "people", and eventually becomes the church of the 
power and even, against the "people". The importance of the church of the poor is 
a call to repentance, a repentance from the church of the power and the intellectual 
to the church of the people.
In Latin American context, this church is concretized in the form of the
"ecciesial base communities". A common working definition takes off from the tliree
elements of the name "ecciesial base communities": striving for community, an
emphasis on the ecciesial, and a sense in which the group constitutes a base.
Gutierrez defines that
"base" means the poor, oppressed, believing people: marginalized 
races, exploited classes, despised cultures, and so forth. It is from 
them that these Cliristian communities are arising. From these poor, 
oppressed sectors the Spirit is bringing to birth a church rooted in the 
milieu of exploitation and the struggle for liberation. These Cliristian 
communities are not parallel organisations operating alongside those 
of the people’s movement. Rather, they are communities and a church 
made up of persons involved in that movement who seek to live their 
faith and break bread together in such communities.
The base, then, refers to persons from the common classes who have 
made, and are making, an option to join in solidarity with their 
brothers and sisters of the same class, culture, and race, and who 
proclaim their faith in the Lord. It also refers to all those, whatever 
their ecciesial responsibility might be, who make their own life, the 
interest, and the aspirations of the poor and oppressed.^^
The ecciesial base communities function variously according to a range of social 
cond i t io n s .G en e ra l ly  speaking, they embrace the following characteristics.^^ 
They emphasize personal and interpersonal relationship. Members of the community 
have a very strong sense of solidarity with one another, and they emphasize lay 
leadership and a search for consensus in decision-making, and the traditional 
emphasis on authority turns to autonomy. For instance, the role of the priests is no 
longer regarded as the mere authorised source of truth, but rather they bring a
G.Gutierrez, The Poor and the Church in Latin America (London: CIIR, 1984), p .l7 .
A more detailed and contextual study o f the ecciesial base communities can be found in 
W.E.Hewitt, Base Christian Communities and Social Change in Brazil (Lincoln: University of  
Nebraska, 1991) and also Pablo Galdmez, Faith o f a People: The Story o f a Christian Community in 
El Salvador (London: CIIR, 1986).
See Sergio Torries ed., The Challenge o f the Basic Christian Communities (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 1982) and also L.Boff, Ecclesio-genesis (London: Collins, 1986).
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knowledge of the Scripture, while the people bring their experience of life: It is not 
simply a division of labour, but rather they work together to make new insights from 
the Bible. Furthermore, it is a community marked by a profound spirituality. Their 
worship is informal and open. The practice of prayer, joy, hope and love are found 
here. Finally, they are involved in the popular movement for liberation. Flowever, 
is the ecciesial base community a form of church or a kind of movement? I do not 
intend to make a judgment here because it involves an unnecessary epistemological 
process. But no matter whether it is a church or a movement, the ecciesial base 
community is a model of the church in terms of its familial, missionary and liberating 
nature. That is to say, it is familial because it enables people to live the reality of 
the church as the family of God in an intense way; it is missionary because it is 
committed to the transformation of the world; and it is liberating because it is the 
expression of the church’s preferential love for the common people.
Secondly, a church which is evangelized by the poor is a church which exists 
in the here and now. It is not intended simply to reflect a general principle or 
approach appropriate to a secular world come of age, but rather to be in a specific 
time and space, namely, the unjust social conditions of Latin America. Because of 
this, the church of the poor would never reduce salvation to the supernatural sphere 
and purely otherly character, but rather considers it taking place in the here and now. 
Flowever, it understands that the Kingdom of God cannot be confused with the 
Marxist utopia. For Gutierrez, the church is the sacrament of God in history 
That is to say, the church manifests the salvific activity of God in the world. The 
church of the poor understands God’s salvation historically, not because it has a 
theology of history, but rather it is a result of a deep consideration of the mystery of
Rebecaa S.Chopp, The Praxis o f Suffering (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1986), pp.55-57.
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incarnation. Incarnation means that God comes into human history and identifies
himself with humankind. Jesus enters eai’thly life to the full: he therefore caimot be
related only to religious life beyond history, he must be sought in the middle and in
the depth of the reality of history. If history is the place where Jesus accepts the
human lot in complete solidarity, in which he becomes contemporary in history, and
dwells among us, then it must be taken with great seriousness. If Christ acts in this
way, then history is not a matter of chance, not a matter of indifference and not a
side-show imposing no responsibility upon humankind, which they can change in an
arbitrary manner. It calls for the church’s responsibility. The church has always
been a company of real men and women standing on the earth, breathing the air of
the time, and yielding avowedly or imavowedly to the impact of the moral, religious,
social, economic, and political atmosphere surrounding them. It is an irresponsible
act not to give attention to history or to claim that Christians have nothing to do with
it. However, taking history seriously does not necessarily imply that the church has
no standpoint but rather goes to and fro. J.M.Lochman rightly makes the point that
if we mean by this slogan [the world provides our agenda] that 
theology and the Church must be prepared to accept themes and 
criteria dictated by views prevalent in the "market" at any given time, 
then the countenancing of such directives whether from "right" Or 
"left"-with flirtatiods side gla'hces'either.àf the cohsefvative market or 
the progressive one- would encourage an illegitimate "affiliation" and 
shortlived "alliance", a deliberate or unconscious sell out of the very 
substance of the faith.
But another way is also open to us, one which shows genuine 
theological respect for "the world’s agenda": theologians and Cliristians 
will examine the actual social and cultural situation at a given moment 
and develop theology and its themes not in isolation from that situation 
but in dialogue with their contemporaries.
A relevant theology- one which is related to and measured by the 
gospel- is practised within a particular temporal horizon. For the 
gospel, because it is witness to the Incarnate Word, made flesh in the 
concrete historical person and life of Jesus of Nazai’eth, is itself a
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concrete historical truth with contemporary relevance^^
Thus, the church takes history seriously, not because history can provide the profound 
meaning to the church, but rather the church finds its meaning of existence through 
a precise understanding of human history. In other words, taking history seriously 
concretizes the mission of the church because it is no longer an isolated community 
which just cares about its own survival and existence. Rather it exists as both means 
and sign of God’s gratuitous activity in the commitment of not ignoring humankind’s 
history, but the liberating history of the world. Because of the fact that the church 
of the poor exists in the here and now, it has to take history seriously and 
responsibly. In order to do this, the church has to have a sharp discernment which 
can only be given by the Spirit, This discernment is from the people by the power 
of the Spirit. It is the people in whom the church is called to serve, and it is the 
Spirit in whom the church finds its meaning of existence and strength to fulfil its 
mission.
Finally, a church which is evangelized by the poor has to be an ecumenical 
church. At first glance, this description may seem inappropriate because the church 
of the poor reflects a particular understanding of the church, namely, of the poor. 
More importantly, the church of the poor is criticized as a para-church, fundamentally 
opposed to the institutional church and showing heretical and sectarian tendencies by 
the official institution. It caimot be denied that the church of the poor may generate 
conflict and tension within the churches. An example of this is the conflict in the 
Puebla Conference.^' But conflict is not necessarily tragic. Ironically, according
J.M.Lochman, Reconciliation and Liberation (Belfast: Christian Journal, 1980), pp. 120-121.
Some stressed the spiritual side o f  the Church’s mission and resented active efforts at the 
improvement o f  society, while they were provoked by people who wanted to make the Church’s 
mission nothing more than an effort at human betterment. See J.Sobrino, "The Significance o f Puebla 
for the Catholic Church in Latin America." In: Reflections on Puebla (London: CIIR, 1980), pp.22-44.
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ii32to Sobrino, it is a "necessary, historical path to a higher form of church unity. 
Also, conflict is a danger only if we let conflict direct the churches to see the 
limitation and sin in others. In other words, conflict does not pursue the quest of 
truth, but rather seeks to defend one’s own truth. Conflict is a danger only if it 
renounces love but exaggerates mistrust and hastens further conflict. In other words, 
it is the absolutization of one’s neighbour as one’s enemy. On the contrary, if the 
churches positively and humbly face the challenges brought by the church of the 
poor, such as, to their capitalist ideology and their lack of love, then, the church of 
the poor becomes an important signpost for Cliristian unity. In the light of the 
Reformation, this internal conflict can be positively considered as "Ecclesia semper 
reformanda". That is to say, constant reform is needed because Christ is the living 
lord who is restlessly moving on and working within the changing shapes of human 
hope and need. Yesterday’s structures of obedience may become today’s barriers to 
new obedience. Obedience is an ever-new event, not a changeless order of 
continuity. Clearly, internal conflict within the church not only may bring one to 
further unity, but also may bring one to be more truthful to God.
Regarding the matter of how the church of the poor contributes to ecumenism, 
Sobrino refers to the traditional marks of the understanding of the church, namely, 
the unity, catholicity, holiness and apostolicity.^^ Regarding the mark of unity, 
Sobrino considers that the church of the poor does not describe a correct principle 
of unity but rather the concrete way in which the principle unifies. That is to say, 
this basic unity is achieved when the church truly decides to understand its total faith 
as a faith-process in which Chistians bear one another’s burderns. J.Moltmann said
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f Liberation, p. 141.
Details o f  this presentation can be found in The True Church and the Poor, pp.98-121.
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that "the church is not one for itself; it is one for the peace of divided mankind in the 
coming Kingdom of God."^"' Thus, the unity of the church does not primarily relate 
to its institutional structure, and so it allows a diversified participation in the church 
for the building of Clirisf s body in history. In other words, new ecciesial ministries 
and new forms of ecciesial organization are acceptable and necessary.
Concerning the mark of holiness, Sobrino considers that, for the church of the 
poor, holiness is ultimately identified with God. God’s holiness does not mean a 
separation from the profane, but rather God’s holiness separates what belongs to 
grace and what belongs to sin.^  ^ This is expressed in the unconditional character 
of God’s "Yes" and "No". Therefore, Sobrino considers that the basic sin of the 
church is to participate in the sin of the world and to make this sin possible and 
effective, while the holiness of the church is the church’s liberating mission, its 
promotion of justice. Thus the church of the poor offers a model of the meaning of 
holiness.
Regarding the mark of catholicity, Sobrino emphasizes the dialectical 
relationship between the local congregation and the universal church. At the level 
of the local church, it is obvious that the church of the poor has made possible the 
discovery of the originality and specificity of the Latin American church. It develops 
its own type of theology. At the level of the universal church, the church of the poor 
displays the profund meaning of catholicity in terms of solidaiity. It is about co­
responsibility of churches for one another in all areas of life. This embraces the gift 
of faith to faith, of churches sharing with one another the diversity of our faith.
J.Moltmann, The Church in the Power o f the Spirit, p.345. 
Ibid., p. 107
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Therefore, catholicity is not simply universalism or the concrete application of 
universal principles, but rather mutual responsibility within the church. It is the 
mutual bearing of burdens within the church and the active co-operation of each as 
it gives what it has to offer to the building of the universal church.
Finally, regarding the mark of apostolicity, Sobrino explains that if this is 
concerned with the origin of the faith, then the church of the poor concretizes what 
it means by its continuation of the apostolic mission. The church of the poor is an 
authentically missionary church dedicated to evangelization.^^ The church of the 
poor is a church which restores the Good News in a rightful place: that is, among the 
poor as the addressees of the Kingdom.
For Sobrino, ecumenism (the fundamental unity of the church) is its solidarity
with the poor, its faith in favour of life for human beings. There can be no hope for
any other type of inter-confessional unity than this fundamental unity. Besides, to
contend that the church of the poor is "more" true to the church of Christ does not
idealize the church of the poor. Rather it suggests that
no one should feel excluded from a Church that has made such an 
option [for the poor]; but by the same token no one can presume to be 
included in that Church without such an option.
For Sobrino, the option for the poor is neither an ethical alternative nor a 
form of missionary strategy, but rather is an existential reality of ecclesiology. That 
is to say, the role of the poor is both important and determinative in any 
interpretation of ecclesiology. Sobrino said that
36 See my discussion on Sobrino’s understanding o f spirituality and liberation.
J.Sobrino, "The Significance o f  Puebla for the Catholic Church in Latin America.; In: 
Reflections on Puebla (London: CIIR, 1980), p.42.
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the Church of the poor is not a Church for the poor but a Church that 
must be formed on the basis of the poor and that must find in them the 
principle of its structure, organisation and mission. For the same 
reason I maintain that this Church does not conceive of the poor as 
part of itself, even a privileged part, but thinks of them as the "center" 
of the whole.^®
The poor are the centre of the church because objectively they are the concern of the 
church and subjectively they are the criterion of the church. Then, the question ai'ises 
whether "the poor" is an ideal or an evil. In order to answer this question, one has 
to distinguish the poor or poverty in two levels: namely, a reality caused by injustice 
and a reality caused by love or charity. The former implies that the church aims at 
overcoming injustice in the possession of material goods which causes poverty, while 
the latter means that the church follows .Tesus in the solidarity with the poor. 
Therefore, the church evangelized by the poor entails these two levels; that is to say, 
tiirough being in solidarity with the poor the church learns to be poor, and vice versa.
Ibid., p.93.
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b. A Critique
For some people, Sobrino’s account of ecclesiology mixes up the Christian 
faith with politics, theology with social theory, the church with the political party. 
To borrow H.Richard Niebulir’s terminology, Sobrino’s ecclesiology is a form of 
"Christ in culture" because it accommodates the Gospel to the world. However, for 
some people, Sobrino’s ecclesiology is an example of "Christ-the transformer of 
culture" because it does not leave the world alone, but participates in the historical 
process in order to transform society in the direction of the Kingdom of God. Does 
then Sobrino’s account of ecclesiology belong to the category of "Christ in culture" 
or Christ-the transformer of culture"? As indicated previously, Niebuhr ’s typology 
is problematic because it depends on the presupposition of how we consider what 
kind of activity is to transform culture, and what is not. Then, the difference 
between those who consider Sobrino’s ecclesiology as "Christ in culture" and those 
who consider it as "Christ- the transformer of culture" is their different understanding 
of the relationship between church and state, the Cluistian faith and politics. In the 
following, I intend to explore the presupposition of those who consider that Sobrino’s 
ecclesiology is a model of "Christ in culture", with reference to H.M.Kuitert and 
Donald Bloesch, and to assess to what extent their understanding is biblical and 
evangelical. Then, I will evaluate in what ways Sobrino’s ecclesiology, the church 
of the poor, is faithful to its call.
In his book, Evervthing is Politics but Politics is not Evervthing*. Kuitert 
contends that the validity of the church’s involvement in politics depends on what 
politics is. For Kuitert, politics is concerned with principles, an analysis of the 
situation in which these principles must be implemented, an estimate of the
 ^ H.M.Kuitert, Everything is Politics but Politics is not Everything (London: SCM, !986).
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consequences of decision. Only if people have gone through all these, are they in a
position to give specific directives for political action.^ Thus, the Christian faith has
nothing to do with politics because it cannot provide any blueprint of what the
political principles are or what decision is the best. Besides, theology has no social
theory which can provide any criterion for making political decision. Rather it is
primarily an examination and criticism of the outline proclamation of the church.
Therefore, political theologies and liberation theologies are nothing other than
betrayal of the Christian faith. For him, the task of the church is to proclaim the
Good News to the world with a clear distinction of the two Kingdoms. This cannot
be confused. Kuitert says that
the Christian church has more arrows to its bow. It has its own 
diaconal care which is irreplaceable, and is all the more so the more 
it can help people outside the political struggle. It has its preaching 
of God’s commands and promises. It also has its intercessions. All 
that cannot be got anywhere else, but only in the church, and only in 
the church do people know- or should people know- what that is 
worth. Living people share the life of their world and they can make 
that contribution to it. That means arousing emotions: perplexity, 
anger, bewilderment, disappointment, sorrow. And arousing political 
and social emotions. Christian living in two kingdoms bring these 
emotions into the church and there they are given a special place. In 
its prayers the Christian world open up the world to God. It does not 
ask him for any solutions, but it commends itself and the world to 
him. That is how politics is done in the church’s way in the church.^
According to Kuitert, if the church does not do politics in such a way, it brings the 
church into contradiction with its interpretation of itself, saddles the church with a 
role for which it is not equipped, brings politics in political style into the church and 
finally, the church becomes a social organization. However, Kuitert’s position should 
not be mistaken. He is not talking about that the works of love are unimportant, but 
rather this caimot be applied at all to politics. For him, the diaconal service of the
2 Ibid., pp.l28ff.
 ^ Ibid, pp.152-153.
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church is one o f its most distinctive features.
Kuitert’s comment is important because he does not confuse the church with
the world. He acknowledges that the church and the world are two different realms
which have different ways of life and doing things. The church should not pretend
that it knows everything better than others do, and then consider itself as a "prophet".
But so often the political statements made by the church are just repeating what other
socio-political parties have said. Nevertheless, he holds that in case of emergency,
the church must try to be involved in politics.
By emergency I [Kuitert] mean a situation in which the gaining of 
power through political parties is forbidden or political parties do not 
exist. South Africa is a good example: who is to give a voice and 
support to the oppressed blacks and coloureds if they themselves may 
not gain power tiirough party and parliament? In such situations the 
churches may and indeed must try to give a voice to those who have 
none.''
Therefore, for Kuitert, a distinction between the two kingdoms is not absolute. This 
also marks the contradiction of his tliesis which will be discussed later.
Before moving to the explication of the viewpoint of Donald Bloesch, it may 
be interesting to explore whether Kuitert and Hauerwas are occuping the same 
position. Apparently, they agree that the church should be involved in politics in its 
own way. Also, they agree that the value of faith is not determined by its social or 
political significance, no matter what further importance this may have. Rather, it 
is faithfulness that matters. But their main differences are that, firstly, for Kuitert, 
the church should not involve itself in politics because politics is concerned with 
principles which eventually leads to the struggle for power, while for Hauerwas, the 
church is already a polity which intends to be an alternative model for the world.
Ibid., p.151.
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In other words, for Kuitert, it is the politics that matter, while for Hauerwas, it is the 
church as the polity that matters. Secondly, for Kuitert, the church should not 
involve in politics because the church and the world are two different Kingdoms, 
while for Hauerwas, it is the two different agents in the sense that the Christian’s 
duties are not the same as those laid upon him/her by the state. Therefore, although 
Kuitert and Hauerwas may seem to be holding the same view, they are different.
Like Kuitert, D.Bloesch also defends the position that the church has nothing 
to do with politics^ but he pursues a different argument. Primarily speaking, he 
considers that the basic mission of the church is "spiritual", not political. The 
backing for this, he says, is Jesus himself. Regarding the Sermon on the Mount, 
Jesus concentrated upon spiritual matters. He offered deliverance from sin and death, 
not from political and economic bondage. Besides, Jesus refused to be the political 
messiah the Jews expected. It showed that he was primarily interested in the 
salvation of individuals. He called his followers to a ministry of proclamation, not 
building a new social order.^ Since Jesus is the "final and complete" revelation of 
God’s will and purpose, the church must concentrate upon the same things. 
Therefore, it must seek conversions and prepare individuals for life with God in 
eternity. The church should consider this as its primary task. It is a task that 
consists in helping sinners to have faith in God and thus enter into a salvation that 
endures beyond this world in an eternal, heavenly world. In short, Bloesch believes 
that the Christian faith is eschatological both in spiritual and individualistic terms.
 ^ D.Bloesch is a professor at the theological seminary o f the University o f Dubuque. His 
major works are Essential o f Evangelical Theology (San Fransico: Harper & Row, 1978-79), The 
Invaded Church (Waco: Words, 1975), and Centers o f Christian Renewal (Philadelphia: United Church 
Press, 1974).
® D.Bloesch, Essentials o f  Evangelical Theology. Vol.2, pp. 156-157.
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Even though Kuitert and Bloesch have different reasons for arguing against 
the church’s involvement in politics, they would agree that the church of the poor is 
an example of the model of "Christ in culture" because the church of the poor does 
not fit into their understanding of the relationship between church and politics. 
Nevertheless, in order to assess their views fairly, we should first pay attention to 
what they intend to say to us. Firstly, their concern reminds us that when the church 
is involved in politics, there is always a danger of its identifying the Christian faith 
with secular ideologies. In the West, it is liberalism, while in the Latin America, it 
is Marxism. Regaining the latter, I myself find the resources of the Marxist analysis 
of society a legitimate possibility, but it is far from being the only one possible or 
even the best. To confuse or identify the Christian faith with political commitment 
or to derive it from that is to lose its own identity. Therefore, the church of the poor 
should make a clear distinction between "Marxism as the worldview" and "Marxism 
as a tool for understanding social conflict and social change." When the church of 
the poor finds in Marxism a political strategy to build up the Kingdom of God, it has 
clearly fallen prey to a humanist illusion that is not in agreement with either the 
historical facts or biblical revelation. It amounts to a sociological co-option of 
theology.
Secondly, they remind us that the church of the poor should be very careful 
not to confuse social liberation with spiritual liberation. There is always a temptation 
to believe that when unjust social structures have gone, there will be prosperity and 
freedom. It is only an illusion. The church of the poor should remind itself and the 
poor that, no matter how just and affluent society may be, it caimot provide them 
freedom because the deepest alienation of humankind can only be reconciled by God. 
The fact is that if the life of the individual person has meaning only in relation to the 
world of public, historical events, then it has no meaning beyond death. According
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to biblical teaching, however, the meaning of human existence is not exclusively 
found in relation to the historical process, but also in the ultimate destiny of the 
individual.
Finally, the church of the poor should learn from both Kuitert’s and Bloesch’s 
critique about the danger of its reducing the Gospel to an ideology. When the church 
of the poor intends to free the church from ideological captivity, it also has to be 
aware that no theology is free from ideological entanglements. Therefore, the church 
of the poor should be critical of its partiality. Otherwise, it can result in to another 
captivity like the one it is meant to replace. A far better alternative is theology that 
reads the Bible on its own terms and refuses to force it into an ideological 
straitjacket, consequently imposing its own limitations on the word of God.
Bearing these remarks in mind, we turn to see in what ways Kuitert’s and 
Bloesch’s arguments fail to communicate the full gospel. Firstly, they consider that 
a separation from politics is the best way to preserve the uniqueness of the Chiistian 
faith, but in fact they pay the price of becoming less human for the sake of becoming 
more "Cluistian". P.Hinchliff attacks this view: "[the church which] does not care 
about what actually happen in the political sphere, [which] does not lift a finger to 
do anything practically about it, is not really [the church] at all."^ The church of the 
poor takes the world seriously not because it wants to extend its influence on the 
world. Nor does it want to maintain the Constantinian era. Rather, it knows that the 
essence of its existence depends on its servanthood to the world. It finds that its 
holiness lies not in its separation from politics, but rather in its involvement in 
politics by means of denouncing the anti-Kingdom’s values. Hinchliff explains that
 ^ P.Hinchliff, Holiness and Politics (London: DLT, 1982), p. 182.
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"those who participate in Christ are the church and therefore share in his work. It
is that purpose, too, which makes the church holy."® He uses an analogy saying that
the sentence, "the church is holy and therefore ought not to soil its 
hands with politics which is a dirty game," ought really to read, "the
body of Clirist is holy and therefore " But can the ideal church
interfere in politics and get its hand dirty? A child, hearing that the 
Prime Minister was calling a general election and " was going to the 
country", might ask, "What is she doing in London, then?" The legal 
style of my college is "The master and scholars of Balliol College,
Oxford," does not mean that the masters and scholars are closed to 
visitors. With one proviso, a statement that the holy church ought not 
to soil itself with politics, is making a confusion of a similar kind.''
If  the holiness of the church comes from Christ himself, then the church has to 
follow Jesus in order to be holy. If following Jesus, according to Sobrino, is to 
partake Jesus’ ministry of proclaiming Good News to the poor, then the church has 
no option but to be involved in politics.
Secondly, if politics is understood in a broader meaning like structuring of 
human relations, then the nature and the duty of the Cliristian faith and thus of the 
church is to further truth and justice in the world in the way of a spiritual power, 
critical, and ethical, because the chuich is a power. Its power does not lie in its 
social relevancy and recognition, but rather lies in its vision and gifts given by God. 
Therefore, its mission is to keep alive the heart of humanity to form human society 
into a city in which it is good for everyone to live, something for which it is good 
to live. Besides, since politics aie not so precise all the time, the church can raise 
issues like "what kind of society are you opting for?" This is clearly the case with 
legislation about biotechnology, the arms race, peace and so on. It is true that the 
church has no political theory and principles, but it has a vision and the responsibility
® Ibid., p .119.
 ^ Ibid., p.123.
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Duncan B.Forrester, Theology and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p.50.
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to ask critical question about the nature of society. Kuitert fails to appreciate this
contribution of the church because his arguments are sociological rather than 
theological, related to the nature and function of religion rather than to the distinctive 
emphases of the Christian faith.
I
Thirdly, Kuitert believes that in the case of emergency the church has to try 
to make a political stand. How can we define emergency? Emergency not only 
happens in South Africa, but also in Latin America and the West. For instance in 
the West, in a world system where economic and often also military interests have 
priority, this political reason is often manipulated and begins to function 
ideologically. Therefore, the political emergency is to be found even in the smallest 
details of the most democratic political decision-making in the West. The pressure 
of economic processes arising out of what is de facto the universal dominance of the 
economy can make a democratic majority decision a purely ideological decision 
against which the churches must protest if they still want to be the church of Chiist.
If politics is practised in a totalitarian way or is imposed through violence in areas 
ill which it is not subjected to the laws of what can be established and controlled, or 
if the historical contingency of political structures is distorted ideologically or if 
politics becomes everything, then the church should provide a reminder that the state 
is transgressing its limits or not living up to its task.
Finally, it is a distorted view to understand Jesus’ ministry exclusively in 
terms of individual concern. We must acknowledge that Jesus does address 
individual persons, but the address to individual persons is itself a political act. This
has been fairly discussed previously." Jesus was not proclaiming himself, but the 
Kingdom of God. Because of the fact that the Kingdom embraces both personal and 
cosmic dimensions, it is a mistake to confine the Kingdom to personal and 
transcendental interests. Furthermore, it is important to note that Jesus was 
condemned on a political charge; the Romans would not have been interested in any 
other. The fact that he was executed by crucifixion is important, because crucifixion 
was the punishment reserved for slaves but also for rebels amongst subject races. 
The title over the cross in all four gospels describes him as "the king of the Jews". 
The mockery of the Roman soldiers likewise attests the ground of his accusation: 
Jesus died as a messianic pretender. Therefore, we can conclude that Jesus’ ministry 
relates to both individual and society.
However, to consider that the church has something to do with politics does 
not mean recognizing the church as only a social institution. For Sobrino, the 
political involvement of the church of the poor is never due to an interest in politics, 
but rather is a matter of faith; it is not basically about struggle for power, but about 
faithfulness to God; it is not primaiily about society, but about the Kingdom of God; 
and it is not principally about fighting against unjust structures, but about against the 
"spiritual principalities and powers" of social demonology. This is not to 
"cliristianize" the political activities of the church of the poor, but rather to make 
clear that the commitment of the church of the poor flows from its profound 
spirituality rather than from a political ideology. In the following, I intend to clarify 
the convictions of the church of the poor.
Primarily, the church of the poor seems to politicize the personal life. It gives
See my discussion on Sobrino’s understanding o f following the historical Jesus.
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less attention to personal development and inter-personal relationship, but rather 
relates human relationship to the socio-political structure. However, politicizing 
private life does not necessaiily mean threatening its precious inner core of personal 
intensity, but making it conscious of its true historical character. That is to say, 
every human act, even the most private, possesses not only a social content [because 
it transcends the individual], but a political content [because that transcending of the 
individual is always related to change or stability in society]. Political consciousness 
means awareness of the basic fact that all human actions have a political dimension, 
and of the implications of this fact in the light of human’s ethical responsibilities, in 
a particular situation at a certain time and space in history. Political action means 
acting in accordance with the responsibilities revealed by political consciousness, 
which takes account of particular implications of the essential political dimension of 
all human acts. In other words, political action is an effective acceptance of the 
historical character of human existence. The church cannot avoid this, not because 
sociologically it is a social institution, but because it lives in the here and now, and 
so it has to exercise its responsibility.
Wlien talking of the political dimension of faith, it is important to remember 
that it is not something added to the normal content of faith, but the very act of faith 
in a particular historical context. It is ambiguous simply to speak of the political 
consequences of faith, since this gives a false impression that it is possible to live a 
life of faith in isolation from daily life, but with the bonus of occasional political 
applications. From the perspective of historical theology, we can easily recognize 
that the acknowledgement of the sole lordship of Christ always plunges the church 
into political conflicts. For instance, the early church which confessed Jesus as the 
only lord met persecution from society. Recently, the Confessing Church in 
Germany also put the church in conflict with society even though the Barmen
138
Declaration was not a political statement. Clearly, their faith does not have any 
political interest, but rather is a religious concern. But their religious concern cannot 
guarantee them not falling into the political conflict because faith itself is a political 
act.
According to Sobrino, if the church is sent to the world in the service of the
Kingdom for the world, then the church has to proclaim the dialectical nature of the
Kingdom of God; that is, its "YES" and "NO". In other words, proclamation has to
be understood in relation to denunciation, and vice versa. The dialectical "NO" of
the Kingdom is no to sin, the anti-Kingdom’s values. Sin is a personal reality: that
is, one’s refusal to give up his/her own security, and to accept the future of God who
is approaching in grace. In the time of Jesus, this is typified by the Pharisees and the
persons with power. But at the same time, sin is also a public, social and structural
reality: that is, certain features of social life that are inconsistent with the definite
Kingdom of God. Sobrino considers that
[Jesus] could not proclaim the ideal state of the Kingdom and the 
eschatological banquet without simultaneously denouncing any form 
of sin that made human reconciliation impossible in the brief interim 
that would remain, so he expected, between the breaking in of the 
Kingdom and its transcendent fulfilment.'^
Put concretely, the dialectical "NO" is expressed in a situation where life is neglected, 
thi'eatened and damaged.. This is a historical product of human wills, crystallized in 
structures that produce injustice. On the other hand, the dialectical "YES" of the 
Kingdom is yes to the victims. It is not purely a transcendental affirmation, but 
rather it has its historical implications. The concrete meaning of this is the 
preferential option for the poor. Thus, the church of the poor is nothing other than 
to take the dialectical "YES" and "NO" of the Kingdom seriously and faithfully.
J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p.52.
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Now, it is clear that Sobrino’s account of ecclesiology has nothing to do with
politicizing and socializing the Christian faith, but rather it tries to understand the
political dimension of the Christian faith in a different historical framework. That
is to say, the question is not how to speak of God in an adult world, but how to
proclaim him as a Father in a world that is not human. However, regarding the
dilemma between church and politics, J.Ellul summarizes his view as follows:
Cluistianity has become a religion of conformity, of integration into 
social body. It has to come to be regarded as useful for social 
cohesion. Alternatively a flight into spiritual world, into the 
cultivation of the inner life, into mysticism, and hence as evasion of 
the present world. The two perversions are complementary. 
Theologically they negate the incarnation by separating the physical 
and the Spirit. Sociologically they are the result of political action 
regarding the church and the church’s acceptance of it.'^
The church of the poor is against these two temptations. On the one hand, it tries 
to terminate the Constantinian relationship between church and state, and become a 
church of the "people". On the other hand, it tries not to fall into the trap of 
dualism, but rather to be engaged in history as Jesus did. Is then Sobrino’s account 
of ecclesiology an example of "Clirist, the transformer of culture"? As said 
previously, Niebuhr’s typology is problematic because it confines the witness of the 
church to its relationship to culture. Therefore, it is not "Chiist, the transformer of 
culture" that matters, but rather whether the church of the poor is a church which 
faithfully confesses Jesus as Clirist and the Lord of history. The preceding account 
has shown that the church of the poor does.
J.Ellul, The Subversion o f Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), pp. 133-134.
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3. DISCUSSION
From the previous discussion of Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s account of 
ecclesiology, on the surface it appears that they do not have much in common. For 
instance, Hauerwas emphasizes that the church is to be itself, while Sobrino stresses 
the concept of the church of the poor. Hauerwas is very suspicious of the church’s 
involvement in politics, while Sobrino is very doubtful how the church can become 
itself without unmasking the idolatry of politics. In short, Hauerwas seems to 
propose a "sectarian" option for the church, while Sobrino seems to propose a 
"revolutionary" option for the church. Their difference leads us to the temptation of 
seeing them as "either-or". Nevertheless, I do not think that this is necessaiy. 
Although both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that their accounts of ecclesiology are 
better to equip Cliristians to be God’s witnesses, they never absolutize their claims. 
The danger of holding a homogeneous view on everything is that we are no longer 
led by the truth, but rather by our prejudice. In other words, we are not talking 
about truth, but rather our partiality. Furthermore, ecumenism always reminds us 
of the importance of diversity in unity. This is not to give way to the fashionable 
idea of pluralism, but rather is a reality of itself. Therefore, the differences between 
Hauerwas and Sobrino do not necessarily become a threat to our existence [or faith], 
but rather a challenge to our tendency of absolutization [or becoming tribalism]. This 
then marks the importance of dialogue. Tlirough dialogue, we are not only working 
together to look for the truth, but also confessing our imperfection. If the church is 
not the Kingdom, how can we say that the church should follow a particular model? 
What God requires of the church is its faithfulness and truthfulness. This can only 
be done through a continuous process of repentance and dialogue. The former re­
orientates the vision of the church, while the latter prepares for the former by 
opening the vision of the church. Therefore, I do not see any tlireat caused by the 
differences between Hauerwas and Sobrino. Furthermore, I do not see any
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impossibility of accepting both of their accounts. On the contrary, their differences 
can help us to appreciate the distinctiveness and the diversities of what our Cliristian 
faith means to us. Hauerwas and Sobrino complement one another. Thus it is not 
my purpose here to make a choice between Hauerwas and Sobrino, not because it is 
safer to sit on the wall than to make a stand, but because it is umiecessary. What 
really concerns us is how their efforts stimulate us to find our own way of being the 
true church of Christ. In the following, I will illustrate their similarities and 
differences, and suggest in what ways the church can learn from them.
Firstly, both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s ecclesiology is a clrristological 
ecclesiology. Christology gives and defines the meaning of the church. In return, 
the church produces its own form of christology as a reflection of its concrete life 
and reality. As said in the previous section', Flauerwas and Sobrino hold a different 
point of departure to understand Jesus’ ministry. In short, for Flauerwas Jesus’ life 
is better understood in the light of his Sermon on the Mount, while for Sobrino 
Jesus’ life is better understood in the light of his JubileepProclamation. It is 
understandable that these different points of departure eventually bring different 
understandings of the church. That is to say, Hauerwas considers that the church is 
a sign of God’s salvation. If the church is a sign of God’s salvation to the particular 
society in which it exists, attention is often given to the quality of the church life.
For Sobrino, the church is the continuation of Jesus’ history. Then, the church is the 
servant of God in service for human existence and its ministry to human existence
is a ministry of human freedom. These two emphases are mutually inter-dependent
%
because Jesus promises to be present in the apostolate, the sacrament and the 
fellowship of Cliristians, and also he promises to be found in the least of the
 ^ See my discussion on Hauei-was’ view o f  the imitation o f  Christ and Sobrino’s view o f  
following the historical Jesus.
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brethren.
Secondly, both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s ecclesiology is an eschatological 
ecclesiology. They look forward to the Kingdom of God on earth. The 
eschatological foundation is determined by the tension in the relationship between the 
church and the world, and between the Kingdom of God and human history. For 
Hauerwas, the eschatological present manifestation is in the gathered community of 
disciple-believers, the new community created by God tlirough the work of Christ. 
In this community, Christians can live to the norm of the coming Kingdom. For 
Sobrino, to hope is to grasp the future as a gift, opposing injustice and struggling for 
the establishment of peace and brotherhood/sisterhood, for the future begins now. 
Eschatology, for Sobrino, relates to the transformation of society and the 
establishment of God’s Kingdom on earth. Obviously, both Hauerwas and Sobrino 
lean toward realized eschatology, but at different levels. Hauerwas’ eschatology is 
a "sacramental eschatology", while Sobrino’s eschatology is a "prophetic 
eschatology". The former affirms the presence and power of God in the world 
through the church, while the latter emphasizes the biblical narrative as a critical, 
motivating and sustaining force within the world and the church. These two levels 
of the realized eschatology should be understood dialectically for the reason stated 
before.
Thirdly, their different emphases on realized eschatology also lead them to 
have a different understanding of history. For Sobrino, the boundary between the 
church and the world is not obvious. He rejects all dualism. The relation between 
the sacred and the profane, or between the spiritual and the physical is dialectical: 
two dimensions of one reality. Therefore, the church should not limit its effort to the 
life and influence of a small community of Christians. Rather, the church as God’s
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faithful people is responsible for announcing the good news of the Kingdom of God. 
It is in the true church that the euchaiist is celebrated in memory of love and 
faithfulness of Jesus and in the ministry to the poor with whom Christians share both 
their sorrow and their resurrected joy. Hauerwas demands a more sectarian view of 
the church as a body of believers that maintains its own identity yet is responsible 
for ministry in the world. The distinction between the church and the world is 
maintained sharply. As said, this is not the matter of two kingdoms, but two agents. 
This difference becomes obvious when they discuss the marks of the church. Sobrino 
discusses the traditional marks of the church in terms of the all-embracing 
Kingdom^, while Hauerwas discusses the marks of the church in terms of the 
Christian life.^ As said previously, the difference betv/een Hauerwas and Sobrino 
primarily relates to their different points of departure in terms of an ethic of 
redemption and an ethic of creation respectively. They are not in contrast, but 
complement one another.''
Fourthly, both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s ecclesiology cannot be understood 
apart from concrete congregational lives. They do not have an interest in developing 
a doctrine of ecclesiology, but rather they find the meaning of ecclesiology in the 
lives of the visible church. Hauerwas calls this "a community of character", while 
Sobrino calls this "ecclesial base communities". Despite the different orientations of 
their visible church, they would agree that discipleship has a prior claim to 
ecclesiology.
 ^ See pp.129-133. 
 ^ See pp.97-100.
 ^ See pp. 106-107.
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Negatively put, the above comparative account of Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s 
ecclesiology may give us an impression that Hauerwas proposes a "conversionist" 
church which contends that no amount of tinkering with the structures of society will 
counter the effects of human sin. Therefore, the promises of secular optimism are 
false because they attempt to bypass the biblical call to admit personal guilt and to 
experience reconciliation to God and neighbour. On the other hand, Sobrino 
proposes an "activist" church which is concerned with the building of a better society. 
Through the humanization of social structures, it glories God. It calls on its members 
to see God at work behind the movements for social change so that Christians will 
join in movements for justice wherever they find them. This understanding of 
Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s ecclesiology makes the same mistake as those who regard 
Hauerwas as proposing a sectarian option for the church, and Sobrino as proposing 
a revolutionary option for the church. It is because their accounts of ecclesiology 
suggest that on the one hand, Hauerwas seeks to live a Kingdom life in the present, 
but not at a distance from the world, rather within the world and with a view to 
making the world aware of God’s rule. On the other hand, Sobrino recognizes the 
importance of human action in the present with a view to the Kingdom, but not as 
a means to bringing in the Kingdom, rather as a celebration of the kingly rule of God 
in the here and now. In short, they suggest that the church lives wholly within this 
world by the Kingdom’s values and enablings. Thus, their ecclesiology is primarily 
that of a "confessing" church. It finds its main political task to lie, not in the 
personal transformation of individual hearts or the modification of society, but rather 
in the congregation’s determination to worship Clnist in all things. For Hauerwas, 
a "confessing" church seeks to influence the world by being the church which is 
something that the world is not and can never be. For Sobrino, a "confessing" church 
seeks to influence the world by denouncing its anti-Kingdom’s values and 
proclaiming the good news to the poor. These are two different approaches, but they
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aie one. Not all the Cliristians in the "Confessing church" in Germany at the time 
of Hitler took up arms like D.Bonhoeffer. Many of them were "silent", and kept 
their loyalty to God. Therefore, I consider that both Hauerwas and Sobrino are 
united under the cross of Clirist. Cluist’s cross is the place where the churches are 
assembled and made more deeply one than they could have conceived. Hence, no 
dialogue about the cross is possible without standing together under the cross. The 
nearer the churehes come to the cross of Clnist, the nearer they come to each other.
Now, I turn to explore in what ways we can learn from their similarities and 
differences. Firstly, both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that the church has to be 
a community of radical commitment. This is expressed in their emphases on the fact 
that ecclesiology is about the visible church. This radical commitment affirms that 
the meaning of the church finds its meaning only in Jesus. This demands it 
committing itself to Jesus unreservedly: that is, to confess Jesus as the lord. The 
martyrdom of Oscar Romero, and countless thousands of Christians less well known, 
all resulted from refusing the shift of this fundamental homage. Suffering is not the 
mark of the Christian community, but rather it is a community whose commitment 
makes them aliens, with no fixed address, in teiTitory under the control of the secular 
powers.
Secondly, they consider that the church has to be a community oriented to the 
Kingdom. Our attention should not only focus on the differences between Hauerwas 
and Sobrino, but rather on their attempt to live in accordance with the Kingdom’s 
values. The Kingdom is not an excuse that they use for the sake of promoting their 
convictions, but rather their attitudes and practice are oriented to the Kingdom. This 
is the community in which God’s transvaluation of values is apprehended and 
cherished as the clue to his redemptive purpose.
146
Thirdly, they consider that the church has to be a servant community. The 
existence of the church is not for itself, but the church is sent to the world in the 
service for the Kingdom of the world. The relationship between the church and the 
world is never a matter of dualism. The church should never leave the world free 
for the "principalities and powers" of social demonology. However, there are many 
options to be a servant community. Being an alternative society is nothing less 
responsible than being the church of the poor, and being the church of the poor is 
nothing less faithful than being alternative society.
Fourthly, they consider that the church has to be a community of friends
where people relate to each other in a brotherly and sisterly way, as amongst equals.
Hauerwas said that
friendship is not only a possibility but a necessity for Christians 
because we are an eschatological people that live by hope. That life 
is a journey which is something that Aristotle sensed in his account of 
the life of happiness, virtue and friendship. But for Christians, life is 
not just a journey, but a journey of a very particular kind in which we 
are invited to be participants in a community of friends formed by the 
life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. Such friends do not just love one 
another as mirror images of their own virtue, but rather they love one 
another in God. Friendship is a manifestation of hope, therefore, as 
hope but names the kind of journey to which Christians have been 
called that makes possible the risk of friendship.^
For Sobrino, this is understood in terms of solidarity.^ Solidarity is not an alliance 
to defend the common interest of the churches. Rather it is a matter of co­
responsibility. It entails two dimensions. That is to say, it is about solidarity with 
the poor, and about catholicity in terms of giving and receiving the best they have, 
teaching and learning their most valid insights, bearing with one another.
 ^ S.Hauerwas, "Happiness, the Life o f Virtue and Friendship." In: The Asburv Theological 
Journal. 1990, Vol.45, p.45.
® See J.Sobrino & Juan Hernandez Pico, A Theoloav o f Christian Solidarity (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 1987).
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Finally, they consider that the church has to acknowledge its minority 
position. The church has little influence on the world. This is more obvious in 
Hauerwas’ ecclesiology than Sobrino’s. But we should not ignore a basic fact that 
Sobrino’s ecclesiology is also a feeble voice in Latin America because the churches 
in Latin American are dominated by pentecostalism.^ To acknowledge the church’s 
minority position is important not only because it ends the Constantinian era, but also 
because the churches no longer act as those who know everything better or who 
know all the truth, but as those who help to find truth, as mid-wives. This is a 
humble service, but a promising and meaningful one.
These five points serve as the indicators for any consideration of ecclesiology. 
They do not define any particular model for the church, but rather they provide the 
foundation for the church to reflect how it can be faithful to God’s mission at its 
particular time and in its particular place.
 ^ See Tom Barry, El Salvador (Albuquerque: The Inter-Hemisphere Education Resource 
Centre, 1990).
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D. CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections, I have discussed the agent of the Kingdom in terms 
of both an individual Cliristian and the church. On the level of an individual 
Christian, the agent of the Kingdom is concerned with spirituality, and spirituality is 
about discipleship. The call to discipleship begins with a recognition of God, that 
God is the ultimate, the hidden reality behind all reality, the power beside which our 
power slirinks to infinitesimal insignificance. This recognition inevitably requires 
repentance. Such repentance is a response which goes beyond mere words or feelings 
or individual actions. It is a response which turns the whole of life thinugh 180 
degrees and points that life in a new direction. For Hauerwas, this is characterized 
by having character, vision and virtue. For Sobrino, this brings a person to have a 
new understanding of and a commitment to the poor. Both Hauerwas and Sobrino 
realize that it is Jesus who issues the call to discipleship. Included here is the 
recognition that in him, in his message and actions, the kingly rule of God has 
already begun to come to expression. The uigency is because the character of God’s 
kingly rule has so vividly and compellingly manifested itself in his life and ministry. 
Jesus’ own teaching and life-style show what living in the light and in the power of 
the Kingdom should mean in the lives of those who repent and believe. Therefore, 
the call to discipleship is to follow him.
On the level of the church, the agent can never escape from the world. The 
church has a very specific mission in the world. As an eschatological community, 
the church is the light of the world by showing the world what the Kingdom of God 
is and demands. It does not imply that the church is the Kingdom, but rather the 
church is a place where grace is realized and lived even here on earth. For 
Hauerwas, in order to be a witness to the Kingdom, the primary task of the church
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is to be itself because through being an alternative example, the world knows what 
it is and should be. In order to do this, the church has to help its own members work 
out their salvation by giving them guidance, admonition, comfort and every kind of 
pastoral and sacramental assistance. For Sobrino, the church has the task of 
introducing the values of the Kingdom into the whole of human society, and thus of 
preparing the world (insofar as human effort can) for the final transformation when 
God will establish the new heaven and the new earth. This emphasis does not 
necessarily politicize the church, but rather the church cannot be silent in the face of
social injustice, because the Kingdom of God kindles the church.
The church has a very special role in the Kingdom of God because it is called 
to be the agent of the Kingdom. This is its privilege, not in terms of power and 
superiority, but rather in terms of mission and servanthood. Put bluntly, it is the 
grace of God. However, in order to be a faithful agent of the Kingdom, the church 
has to be truthful to its calling. This calling relates to its internal nature and external 
relationships. If the church fails to take these seriously, it betrays its own nature. 
Nevertheless, this betrayal would not delay the final coming of the Kingdom because, 
I believe, it will be the work of God, dependent on his initiative, On the contrary,
this betrayal is rather a self-denial of its existence.
In this chapter, I only pay attention to the role of the agent in the Kingdom 
of God. However, the role of the agent primarily relates to the understanding of 
what the Kingdom of God is. That is to say, what the Kingdom is defines what the 
role of the agent is, or what the role of the agent is illustrates what the Kingdom is. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the models of the Kingdom in Hauerwas’ and 
Sobrino’s theology based on the findings of this chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MODELS OF THE KINGDOM
A. METHODOLOGY
The Kingdom of God plays a significant role in contemporary studies on 
Clu’istian ethical thought. Sallie McFague calls the Kingdom of God the "root- 
metaphor" of Christianity.' This is because on the one hand, Jesus is both the 
proclaimer of the Kingdom and the way to the Kingdom, and on the other, Christians 
are called to a way of being in the world under the rule of God. In the previous 
chapter, we have already discussed how an individual Cluistian and the church can 
be the agents of the Kingdom by following Jesus and witnessing to the Kingdom in 
the world. However, Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s accounts show us two possible 
interpretations of what following Jesus and witnessing to the Kingdom are. Their 
differences, I consider, lie in their different understandings of what the Kingdom is."^  
What then is the Kingdom of God? In the New Testament, no definition of the 
Kingdom is given; what we have are models or exemplifications of it, none of which 
specifies what it is, but each of which shows us the way to the Kingdom. No one 
of the parables is adequate alone, and even all together they do not add up to a
 ^ S.McFague said that a root metaphor is the most basic assumption about the nature o f the 
world or experience that we can make when we tiy to give a description o f it. Each root metaphor 
is a way o f  seeing all that is through a particular key concept. It is also about thinking by models and 
even the phrase root metaphor is itself a metaphor. See Metaphorical Theoloev (London: SCM, 1983),
pp.108-111.
 ^ In his book The Kingdom o f God in the Teaching o f  Jesus (London: Oliver and Boyd, 
1963), Gosta Lundstrom displays how one interprets the conditions for entry into and life in the 
Kingdom o f  God, and so the whole ethic o f  Jesus obviously largely determines the image we form o f  
the Kingdom o f God, and also the question o f the relation between the Kingdom o f God and the 
Church.
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definition of the Kingdom. Therefore, in this chapter, I do not intend to sum up a 
precise definition of what the Kingdom is, but rather intend to see how Hauerwas and 
Sobrino understand the Kingdom in relation to their theological reflections and 
orientations, to what extent their accounts are theologically valid, and to suggest a 
possible resolution of their differences, if any.
In this chapter, the methodology I employ is the notion of the model. Model 
is often understood in terms of metaphor, symbol, image and paradigm. Although 
there are differences among thenf, there is one common feature; that is, they are not 
the entity itself but rather they point to it, albeit imperfectly. Comparatively 
speaking, the notion of the model is widely used in the natural sciences, while 
concepts like metaphor, image and symbol are employed in the  area of the  
human sciences  (anthropology, r e l ig io u s  s tud ies ,  sociology, e t c ) .  
However, theologians like Frederick Ferre*' and Ian T.Ramsey^ find that the notion 
of the model in the scientific understanding should be recognized as of central 
importance to theologians and philosophers of religion. In the following, I intend to 
discuss such themes as: what the model means in scientific usage; how this is 
relevant to our theological reflection; what the criteria for theological models are; and 
finally how our study of the notion of model is related to models of the Kingdom.
According to Thomas S.Kuhn, the model
 ^ For Instance, S.McFague considers that when some metaphors gain wide appeal and become 
major ways o f structuring and ordering experience, they are models (Metaphorical Theology, p.23). 
R.P.Scharlemann suggests that a symbol results from the impress o f  reality upon mind. It arises as 
a subject’s response to the imposition o f reality upon him, whereas a model arises out o f the free play 
of a subject’s imagination (Theological Models and Their Construction, p.70). Both T.Kuhn and 
H.Kung use the terms models and paradigm interchangeably.
 ^ F.Ferre, "Mapping the Logic o f  Models in Science and Theology." In: New Essays on 
Religious Language, Dallas M.High ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp.54-96.
 ^ See Ian T.Ramsey, Models and Mystery (London:SCM, 1964), Chapter III.
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stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so 
on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it 
denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle- 
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit 
rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal
science.^
In the field of science, the first usage of model particularly refers to a scientific 
revolution when a sweeping change takes place in a whole network of assumptions 
and concepts, such as the Copernican theory. Its second usage primarily refers to a 
particular scientific task. However, their relationship is not simply a difference 
between macro-model and micro-model, but rather the fulfilment of the macro-model 
largely depends on the successful findings of the micro-model. It does not 
necessarily mean that a successful finding of the micro-model will naturally bring a 
scientific revolution. Rather, without the emphasis on the micro-usage of model, we 
cannot talk about the macro-usage of model. Because of this, my following study 
will concentrate solely on the micro usage of model; that is to say, a model is an 
instrument epitomizing a particular phenomenon or a particular concept. Before 
turning to this, I would like to say a few words about how the above understanding 
of model is related to theological reflection. In the conference "The New Paradigm 
for Theology", Stephen Pfurtner presented a paper entitled "The Paradigms of 
Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther; Did Luther’s Message of Justification mean a 
Paradigm Change?".^ He shows that it is illuminating to consider Luther’s idea of 
justification by faith as a new paradigm because it led to the reconstruction of prior 
beliefs and the reinterpretation of previous data in a new framework of thought.
 ^Thomas S.Kuhn. The Structure o f  Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 
1970), p .l75 . In his book, Kuhn himself does not distinguish model from paiadigm. On the contrary, 
he uses them interchangeably.
This conference was held in Germany in 1983. The papers presented in this conference are 
collected in a book entitled Paradigm Change in Theology, ed. Hans Kung (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1989).
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Justification by faith affected almost all other doctrines. This parallels Kulm’s 
definition of the model as "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, tecliniques and 
so on shared by members of a given community."* At the same time, the notion of 
justification by faith can also be understood in the second usage of model because 
it primarily refers to one particulai' issue, namely, salvation.
There are various kinds of models in science, such as, experimental models, 
logical models, mathematical models and theoretical models, which serve a diversity 
of functions.'^ For the sake of theological use, in this study 1 will emphasize 
theoretical models because experimental models are constructed in the laboratory, 
while mathematical and logical models are abstract and purely formal relationships. 
Theoretical models find the essential question not in the issue of "picturability" or 
"non-picturability" but in the capacity of a model to focus language drawn from one 
domain of discourse to another and less familiar domain.
Ian G.Barbour suggests that the fundamental components of modern science 
are particular observations and experimental data, and general concepts and 
theories. However, theories involve concepts and hypotheses not found in the 
data, and they often refer to entities and relationships that are not directly observable. 
In order to bridge these two sets of components, one then has to employ the notion 
of the model. Its role can be visualized in the following diagram;
® Thomas S.Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolution, p. 175.
® See Max Black, Models and Metaphors (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 
pp.219-243, F.Ferre, "Mapping the Logic o f Models in Science and Theology." pp.56-59; and Ian 
G.Barbour, Myths. Models and Paradigm (London: SCM, 1974), pp.29-30.
Ian G.Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (London: SCM, 1990), pp.3 Iff.
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Concepts
Theories
Imagination
Analogies
Models
Theories
influence
observation
Observation
Data
This diagram can be illustrated as such: the billiard ball model of a gas postulated 
invisible gas particles that were imagined to collide and bounce off each other like 
billiard balls. From the model, the kinetic theory of gases was developed. Thus, a 
theoretical model "is a mechanism or process, postulated by analogy with familiar 
mechanisms or processes and used to construct a theory to correlate a set of 
observations."'*
From the above brief explanation of what a model is, we can draw some 
observations. Firstly, models provide intelligibility for the non-intelligible. They 
simplify and offer suggestive, concrete detail for expansion and exploration. Like the 
billiard ball model of a gas, it successfully concretizes the abstract idea of kinetic 
force. Furthermore, it also provides a fertile ground for a better understanding of the 
use of kinetic force, such as, how the kinetic theory of gases might be applied to gas 
diffusion, viscosity and heat conduction. Secondly, models are not pictures of 
entities, but networks or structures of relationships. This is what Barbour calls model 
as analogue.'^ Wliether we take the example of a chess game for war, or waves and 
particles for the atom, they are not the entities themselves. Rather, in each case we 
are dealing with a set of relationships that serve as an explanation of the way an 
unfamiliar phenomenon works in terms of the structure of a more familiar area. 
Thirdly, models may provide an ever widening panorama of explanation, allowing
Ian G.Batbour, Myths. Models and Paradigms. p.30. 
Ian G.Barbour, Religion in an Age o f Science, p.41.
155
s
1
,!
■
• V ;
1!
phenomena within a field and at times across fields to be linked in connecting 
networks. Hence, systems are constructed that provide intelligibility, not just to this 
or that phenomenon, but to reality as a whole. Therefore Kulm says that a "model 
stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by 
the members of a given community."'* Finally, models are created as well as 
discovered by persons working within a set of assumptions. Thus, they are always 
partial, even when deemed appropriate, necessitating both alternative and 
complementary models as well as eternal vigilance against their literaiization. 
Furthermore, a good model is not a dispensable temporary expedient but a fruitful 
and open-ended source of continuing ideas for possible extensions and modifications. 
For instance, in the sixteenth century, Ptolemaic astronomy was unable to cope with 
increasing clearly recognized discrepancies; that is, a persistent incapacity of normal 
science to solve the puzzles imposed on it, especially that of long-range forecast of 
the positions of the planets. It not only needed further rectification of itself, but also 
gave way to the new model, namely, Copernicus’ theory.'*'
Now, we come to see how the scientific usage of theoretical models can be 
used in theological reflection. However, this attempt is not a blind transplantation. 
We have to be aware of the differences between the scientific and the theological use 
of models. Accordingly, we have to modify the scientific use of models in order that 
they serve their purposes here.'^ Otherwise, theological reflection turns out nothing
Thomas S.Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolution. p .l75.
See Hans Kung ed., Paradigm Change In Theology, pp.l 1-31.
For instance, S.McFague considers that the function o f theological models is 
comprehensiye ordering rather than discovery; they are a necessity for meaning and explanation in 
theology in a more pronounced way than in science; models are ubiquitous in theology and related 
hierarchically as they are not in science; theological models affect feelings and actions in ways 
scientific models do not (See Metaphorical Theology, pp. 103-108).
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theological. Meanwhile, let us see what theological models are in tlie light of 
scientific models. Barbour primarily suggests that the structure of religion looks like 
the structure of science. Therefore, he adopts the same diagram to describe the 
structure of religion, but he changes its substance considerably.'*
Imagination
Analogies
Models
Concepts 
Beliefs ■
Religious experience 
Story and Ritual —<
Beliefs influence 
experience and 
interpretation
The data for a religious community consists of the distinctive experiences of
individuals and the stories and rituals of a religious tradition. Let us start by
considering religious experience, which is always interpreted by a set of concepts and
beliefs. These concepts and beliefs are not the products of logical reasoning from the
data, but rather they result from acts of creative imagination in which analogies and
models are prominent. Models aie also drawn from the stories of a tradition and
express the structural elements that recur in dynamic form in narratives. Models, in
turn, lead to abstract concepts and articulated beliefs that are systematically
formalized as theological doctrines. These can be illustrated by the creeds. For
instance, the Apostles’ Creed is very metaphorical. It employs metaphorical language
like "the Father Almighty" and "descended into hell". Are then the creeds models
or dogmas? McFague rightly says that
the models provide explanation for doctrine, or, more accurately, the 
theory emerging from the creeds of the relationships involved is 
exemplified in terms of models. The theory is not illustrated by the 
models but the models are exemplars of it: one does not have doctrine
Ian T.Barbour, Religion in the Age of Science, p.36.
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and models in the creeds, but doctrine in models.'^
Thus, a model gives epistemological vividness to a theory by offering as an 
interpretation of the abstract or unfamiliar’ theory-structure something that fits the 
logical form of the theory.'* Besides, it is a construction that provides us with a 
methodical way of dealing with an object being investigated. If so, what are the 
theological significances of theological models?
Firstly, according to Ian T.Ramsey, the purpose of models is to achieve
"cosmic disclosures".'^ It means that models are analogical knowledge which result
in existential insight and not cognitive knowledge only. In other words, the whole
purpose of models is to cause a disclosure of truth; that is, to facilitate spiritual
discernment. This insight is not necessarily knowledge of new facts, but rather it is
primarily awareness of knowledge already present but not relevant or existentially
meaningful. He writes that
when we appeal to "cosmic disclosures", we are not just talking about 
ourselves, nor merely of our own experience, we are not just appealing 
to our private way of looking at the world. If that were so, then the 
appeal to cosmic disclosures would be a scarcely-veiled form of
atheism On the contrary, a cosmic disclosure reveals something of
whose existence we are aware precisely because we are aware of being 
confronted. Indeed, we speak of a disclosure precisely when we 
acknowledge such a confrontation, something declaring itself to us, 
something relatively active when we are relatively passive.^"
Ramsey’s suggestion is best understood in terms of the parables of Jesus. When 
Jesus talks about the Kingdom of God he uses parables to describe it; such as
S.McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp.l 13-114.
F.Ferre, "Mapping the Logic o f  Models." p,75.
See Ian T.Ranisey, Models and Mystery (Oxford University Press, 1964) and Models for 
Divine Activity (London: SCM, 1973).
Ian T.Ramsey, "Talking about God: Models, Ancient and Modern." In: Myth and Symbol. 
ed. F.W.Dillstone (London: SPCK, 1970), p.87.
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mustard seed, lost coin, buried treasure and wayward children. These parables do not 
tell outright, but they hint, suggest and puzzle. They do not yield their meaning to 
a mathematical-type analysis, but go straight from one intuitive centre to another. 
Therefore, a parable is a conceptual instrument designed to evoke spiritual insight by 
the interest it elicits and the analogue design of the model. However, for Ramsey, 
theological models are rather naturally given when the mystery is disclosed. He says 
that
we may remark that some cosmic disclosures "just happened". This is 
the case of what used to be called "religious experience"- when a 
model would be self-selected- being some kind of focal point- with 
regard to each particular situation of this type. In other words, a 
cosmic disclosure will in the one way or in the other supply a model 
as that which alone enables us to be articulate about what has disclosed 
itself to us. A cosmic disclosure will supply a model either because 
it has been generated by the use of the model, or because the situation 
itself highlights a particular feature within it.^‘
Because of this, Ramsey does not offer a systematic study of models, but rather 
simply describes different phenomena of models. Thus, his approach is defective in 
that, on the one hand, he seems to turn theological insight into merely a 
psychological event; and on the other hand, he seems to imply that theological 
models are nothing more than tools for mediating insight or cosmic disclosure which 
have nothing to do with organizing our knowledge and information, and 
communicating our thoughts.^^ With this, we come to the second theological 
significance of theological models.
Generally speaking, Avery Dulles follows Ramsey’s understanding of models 
as a means for "cosmic disclosures". However, Dulles goes further to describe what
Ian T.Ramsey, "Talking about God." p.88.
Robert P.Schai’lemann, "Theological Models and Their Construction." In: Journal o f 
Religion. Vol.53 (1973), p.68.
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23 Avery Dulles, Models o f the Church (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1976), p.22.
' " Ï
"cosmic disclosures" are involved. He suggests that the use of models in theology 
can be understood in two ways, namely, explanatory and exploratory.^* On the 
explanatory level, models serve to synthesize what we have already known or at least VÏ
are inclined to believe. For instance, Hauerwas’ account of character, vision, and 
virtue has this purpose. These concepts summarize what the Christian life is about, 
namely, justification and sanctification. On the exploratory level, models serve as the 
capacity to lead to new theological insights. For instance, Sobrino’s account of the 
church of the poor is a relatively new model. It shows us that Jesus does not simply 
call the church to be the church for the poor, but rather radically he calls the church 
to be the church of the poor. This brings a new insight for us to consider what the 
church is and how it should be. Here, we find that Dulles’ account is more 
comprehensive than Ramsey’s because Dulles points out the explanatory significance
...I-
of models. However, this differs from a descriptive function. What I mean is that
.the content of a model is not intended to be a replica of how an object appears or 
really is. But, at the same time, it does intend to provide a way of cognitively 
dealing with that object. Even if the model contains no description of the object it 
refers to, it does allow one to come to terms with the object. This is the "is and is 
not" characteristic of models
■a
Thirdly, apart from the explanatory and exploratory significance of theological 
models, Ian Barbour considers that one of the theological significance of theological 
models is its expression of attitudes.^*' This is because religion is a way of life and 
its main interest is practical rather then theoretical. Therefore, theological models
In his book Myths. Models and Paradigms, Barbour describes the function o f  theological 
models as follows: 1]. the interpretation o f experience, 2]. the expression o f attitudes, 3]. the evocation 
o f  disclosures, and 4]. the construction o f  metaphysical systems. However, I only highlight the 
expression o f attitudes here because other aspects have been already discussed.
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ought to have the capacity to inspire devotion, serenity, and a new pattern of living. 
From both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s accounts of spirituality and ecclesiology, we find 
that Barbour’s remark is right and important. That is to say, Flauerwas’ account of 
the concepts of character, vision and virtue and Sobrino’s account of the historical 
Jesus are not intended to promote our intellectual interest, but rather to arouse our 
discipleship. Therefore, it is inadeqeuate to consider that theological models are 
merely concerned about God himself. More importantly, they should provide 
analogies for our attitudes towards God. For instance, I am to look on God as 
Father; I am to have the kind of respect and trust I ought to have towards a father, 
even though I cannot say in what respects God resembles a father since he is not 
describable. Flowever, an emphasis on the expression of attitudes does not reduce 
the significance of "cosmic disclosure" of theological models. In Scripture, attitudes 
are often justified as a response to what is understood to be the case; for example, 
"We love because God first loved us." [IJohn 4:19] Therefore, theological models 
not only purport to tell us something about God, humans and the world, but also 
encourage distinctive attitudes.
From the above study of models, we can conclude that a theological model 
is seeing one thing as something else, pretending "this" is "that" as a way of saying 
something about it. Using models means spotting a thread of similarity between two 
dissimilar objects, events or whatever, one of which is better known than the other, 
and using the better-known one as a way of speaking about the lesser known. 
Flowever, the model itself "is and is not" the object itself. This dialectical nature of 
models should be maintained all the time. The "is not-ness" of models is against the 
tendency of idolatry. It is very easy to be tempted to understand models literally. 
Wlien a model becomes an idol, the hypothetical character of the model is forgotten 
and what ought to be seen as "one" way to understand the object [God] has become
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identified as "the" way. In fact, when a model becomes an idol, the distance between 
image and reality is collapsed: "father" becomes God’s name. Therefore, this "is not- 
ness" reminds us that there is no one model which can embrace the total truth of 
God, but rather different models work mutually in order to understand the truth 
better.
Because of the basic fact that models are constructed rather than naturally 
given, models are testable. We must have means for determining the reliability with 
which a model allows us to understand the object. However, theological models are 
different from scientific models because their objects and concerns are different. For 
instance, Christians believe that God is the "Absolute", and we cannot know who God 
is, except as he reveals himself, while scientists do not share this belief or 
assumption. Therefore, we cannot blindly use the criteria of scientific models in 
theology, but rather we have to develop our own set of criteria for theological 
models. Thus, the criteria for theological models aie concerned with two issues. 
First, how shall we decide which existing biblical model to use? It is a concern of 
preference. Secondly, how can we be sure that if a non-biblical model is used 
instead of a biblical model, that the contemporary model will neither distort nor lose 
entirely the essence of revelation recorded in Scripture? It is a concern of 
reference.^*
Regarding the criteria for preference in model selection, first, a preferential 
model should correlate a high proportion of the related biblical materials. For 
instance, Walter Rauschenbusch is right to use the notion of the Kingdom of God as
See Ian T.Ranisey, "Talking about God." pp.86-97.
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the core of Christian ethical thought/* But his interpretation has been criticized for 
being one-sided because he wants to find general principles for his social programme 
in the life and teaching of Jesus which he could apply to the economic system and 
social policy of the present-day world. For him, the Kingdom of God tends to mean 
that humanity organizes itself according to the principles of love and solidarity. 
However, this interpretation loses sight of the eschatological nature of the Kingdom 
of God, in the sense that the Kingdom of God is something different in quality from 
. all human institutions and cultural values.
Secondly, a preferential model should communicate the clearest and deepest 
understanding of the truth. For instance, facing the challenge of the modern sciences 
and the unfruitful discussion of the critique of the historical Jesus, R.Bultmann 
proposed a theory of dem ythologization.Bultm ann is right that the gospels were 
written as Gospels and not as simple historical chi’onicles. Furthermore, he is correct 
to say that faith is an event in which we meet Jesus and encounter his challenge. 
However, these do not mean that the Christian faith can be understood 
"unhistorically" because "incarnation" is a historical event [Historié, not simply 
Geschichte]. Without the factual, historical element, and the theological 
interpretation, the Christian faith is dissolved. His model of demythologization gives 
in to the "scientific" habit of life, and finally, gives up the truth of the Gospel.
Thirdly, a preferential model should make the truth of the Bible relevant to 
our lives. This relevance is concerned more about correspondence with the religious 
experience of humankind today than practicability. In other words, it is related to
See Robert T.Handy, ed., The Social Gospel in America 1870-1920 (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1966), pp.253ff.
See David Fergusson, Bultmann (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), pp.107-125.
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issues such as how we can communicate the Gospel to contemporary people. 
Theology is based on changeless Truth, but not a timeless interpretation of this Truth. 
Therefore, if models are to interpret experience, then interpretation has to have a deep 
knowledge of real people as they live, struggle, rejoice, and lament.
Fourthly, a preferential model should help us to meditate on Christ, his love, 
forgiveness, power and truth. This is to sustain our faith and renew it with the very 
life of Christ. Besides, it should lead us to have a fresh commitment to Christ for 
work to be done in his name and for his Kingdom’s sake; that is, in sincere 
obedience to Clirist and his will. As said before, the Christian faith is never a theory, 
but rather is a way of life.
Obviously, these four criteria are the extension and further implications of the 
functions of theological models as cosmic disclosure, explanatory significance and 
discipleship which I have already discussed. However, these criteria should reflect 
the flexibility of the use of models rather than be an exclusive statement saying 
which models cannot be used. No matter whether we can successfully select a model 
in accordance with these criteria, it is not a replica of the entity. The limitations of 
models do not necessarily discredit their degree of usefulness, but rather they are to 
indicate the "regulations" of how to use them. In other words, they help us to use 
models properly.
Concerning the criteria for reference in model construction, Bernard Lonergan 
proposes two useful and related concepts in our theological reflection, namely, the 
"categories intending" and the "transcendence in tending".A ccording to Lonergan,
Bernard J.F.Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: DTL, 1971), p. 10.
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the "categories intending" is finite and has a limited denotation. It varies with 
cultural variations. He writes that
the derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the 
Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this 
heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in 
doing theology and, as well, as an a priori whence he can understand 
other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their 
rituals, their destiny.^^
In other words, this means the cultural biblical truth. It is a mode of expressing 
something that is intended as true, but the way it is stated is limited lai'gely to a 
particular period of time and culture. On the contrary, the "transcendence intending" 
is comprehensive in comiotation, unrestricted in denotation, and unvarying tluough 
cultural change. I consider that this means the transcultural biblical truth (although 
I realize that nothing is purely transcultural). It is truth that is not unique to the 
cultural patterns of any one particulai' period in history, but rather is a factual 
knowledge in every generation, such as, humans are sinners. However, the 
relationship between the "categories intending" and the "transcendence intending" is 
dialectic. That is to say, the "categories intending" is the foundation of 
"transcendence intending", while the "transcendence intending" widens and deepens 
the scope of "categories intending".
Now, we turn to see how these two concepts can help us to assess a non- 
biblical model. The concept of "categories intending" reminds us that models cannot 
be culture free. Therefore, they need to be interpreted into contemporary models so 
that the insight of the "transcendence intending" of the truth can be communicated. 
At the same time, the "transcendence intending" allows us a great degree of flexibility 
in the construction of models. In order to construct a contemporary model which can
Ibid., p.292.
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better communicate the truth. Max Black sets out criteria as follows:
1. There is an original object of investigation in which some facts and 
regulaiities have been established.
2. There is the need better to understand and explain the facts of the 
original.
3. We describe features of some object belonging to our familiar 
domain.
4. There exists a basis of correlation between these second domain 
featmes and the features of the original we are seeking better to 
understand.
5. We check our basis of correlation between the original and 
secondary features to see if it yields insights.^^
Let us use the doctrine of God as an illustration, with reference to S.McFague’s 
suggestion of "God the friend".^* McFague considers that the parental models alone 
are insufficient because they screen out certain critical aspects o f divine-human 
relationship. For instance, by their elevation and absolutizing of divine compassion, 
guidance and security for the individual, they neglect the public and political 
dimensions of that relationship. Therefore, she suggests that the model of friend for 
God is relatively appropriate to describe the divine-human relationship because first, 
this model has biblical foundation; secondly, in the western society, when parent- 
child relationships are not as central as they have been in former times, the model of 
friendship has a greater capacity to describe divine-human relationship; and thirdly, 
the model of friend can express mutuality, maturity, cooperation, responsibility which 
the parental images fail to provide. In short, this model shows us at least, that God’s 
transcendence is not necessarily hierarchical, but also, alongside, a horizontal rather 
than a vertical relationship; and emphasizes sacrifice, support, and solidarity with
M.Black, Models and Metaphors. p.230.
S.McFague, Metaphorical Theology, pp. 177-192.
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others and the world. The model of friendship provides us with a deeper 
interpretation of the biblical data that is also consonant with our total knowledge of 
reality. However, this does not mean that there is no weakness in this model.
Both the criteria for preference and reference are inter-related. Although the 
concern of reference is different from the concern of preference, it also has to meet 
criteria such as promoting discipleship and yielding insight. So does the concern of 
preference. Nevertheless, no matter whether our aim is to select or construct a 
model, a model should be in dialogue with the experience of its audiences, but not 
absorbed in it. Thus, the task of models is not to create completed, doctrinal 
systems, but to interpret the multi-dimensional, rich, ambiguous metaphors arising 
from the symbolic base of a tradition so that those symbols will once again speak to 
our existential situation.
After this long discussion of the use of model in theology, it is time for us to 
see what the relationship between the Kingdom of God and models is. McFague 
suggests that the Kingdom of God is a root-metaphor, on the one hand, and a 
relational model, on the other.^^ It is a root-metaphor because it is the most basic 
assumption about the nature of the world or experience that we can make when we 
try to give a description of it. It is a relational model because its distinctive note is 
not a new view of God or a new image of human being, but a new quality of 
relationship, a way of being in the world under the rule of God. Therefore, in order 
to understand what the Kingdom is, we need to have "subordinate" models. These 
subordinate models bring new insights and challenges to us. However, because of 
the fact that the Kingdom is a relational model, the subordinate models cannot remain
S.McFague, Metaphorical Theology. p .l09.
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on the purely cognitive level of description, but should have the power of 
transformation in terms of the attitudinal and behaviourial influence. In other words, 
the subordinate models should interpret our relationships to the Kingdom rather than 
picture what the Kingdom is. Thus, the relationship between the Kingdom of God 
and models is a concern of discipleship.
For Hauerwas and Sobrino, the Kingdom of God cannot be understood apart 
from Jesus himself because he is the way to the Kingdom. At the same time, 
Christology is not simply a matter of knowledge, but rather is a call to discipleship. 
We have already discussed this in chapter one. Nevertheless, Hauerwas also employs 
the concept of narrative as a model to understand the Christian life and the Kingdom. 
Although he refuses to admit that he is doing a "narrative theology", it cannot be 
denied that narrative plays a central role in Hauerwas’ theology. For Sobrino, it is 
obvious that he uses the concept of justice as a model to understand the Christian life 
and the Kingdom. Unlike G.Gutierrez, Sobrino uses the concept of justice more 
extensively in his works than the concept of liberation. But liberation and justice are 
not two totally different concepts because both of them are describing the same 
particular activity of God; that is, the preferential option for the poor. Their 
difference is that liberation is an all-embracing concept^^, while justice is primarily 
confined to the socio-historical level of human experience. To consider that the 
concept of justice is primary in Sobrino’s theology does not mean that Sobrino 
reduces the Cluistian faith to social theory, but rather the historical experience of the 
people considers the concept of justice both relevant and existential. It widens and 
deepens their faith in God. In the following, I will discuss how the concepts of
For instance, Gutierrez considers that there are three levels o f  liberation, namely, liberation 
from unjust social structures, liberation from the power o f  fate and liberation from personal sin and 
guilt. See G.Gutierrez, A Theology o f Liberation, pp.36-37 & 176-181.
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narrative and justice work in Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s theological reflection 
respectively, assess to what extent these two concepts can be considered as 
theological models and compare their difference, if there is any. However, I have 
to admit that both Hauerwas and Sobrino do not refer explicitly to the concept of 
model. This is my contention that their use of narrative and justice is better 
understood in terms of model.
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B. NARRATIVE
1. NARRATIVE AND THE MORAL LIFE
In chapter one, I have illustrated the basic argument of Hauerwas’
understanding of the moral life. In short, for Hauerwas,
the moral life is not simply a matter of decision governed by publicly 
defensible principles and rules, but rather we can only act in the world 
we see, a seeing partially determined by the kind of beings we have 
become through the stories we have learned and embodied in our life 
plan.'
At the same time, I pointed out that Hauerwas gradually replaces vision by narrative 
in his writings. This shift does not necessarily imply that the concept of vision itself 
is deficient, but rather that it does not have a capacity to provide us with a 
comprehensive understanding of a moral self. That is to say, the concept of vision 
is primarily employed to suggest that the agent’s moral life is largely determined by 
his/her way of "seeing", while the concept of narrative is fundamentally employed as 
an attempt to explain how the agent’s vision [seeing] is related to his/her personal 
and social experience. Thus, both the concepts of vision and narrative should always 
be understood complementai'ily because it is narrative that focuses vision and forms 
character, and it is vision which needs narrative to concretize its meaning.
In this section, my primary concern is to explore how Hauerwas understands 
and uses the concept of narrative as a theological category. And I would like to 
discuss this matter under three sub-topics. They are: first, according to Hauerwas, 
to what extent the concept o f narrative comprehensively reveals the character of the 
moral agent; secondly, according to Hauerwas, how the Christian convictions and the 
Cliristian life are understood in terms of the concept of narrative; and finally, in what
 ^ S.Hauei-was, Vision and Virtue, p.69.
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way and to what extent the concept of narrative can be used as a theological model. 
In this part, the first sub-topic, I will discuss themes such as what a narrative is, how 
human experience is understood in terms o f narrative, and what its ethical 
significance is. It is obvious that my concentration is chiefly on the ethical use of 
narrative^ because this is Hauerwas’ main concern. Before turning to these, I would 
like to point out that Hauerwas does not differentiate between story and narrative. 
For him, they are synonymous.
What is a narrative? According to Robert Schoies and Robert Kellogg, a
narrative primarily needs a story and a story teller.^ Narrative is thus separated both
from drama which lacks a teller and from lyric which lacks a tale. Besides, by
narrative, Scholes and Kellogg mean the interaction between character and action;
that is, plot.'* Hauerwas also considers that
stories themselves attempt to probe that source and discover its inner 
structure by trying to display how human actions and passions connect 
with one another to develop a character.^
A narrative, therefore, may be differentiated from clii’onicles, diaries and the like 
which lack two elements essential to the narrative art: selectivity and movement. 
Concerning the way of reading narrative, Hauerwas considers that what follows in 
the course of a narrative does not necessarily follow along the lines of a well- 
constructed syllogism but instead follows from the way the narrative builds up, takes 
shape, and then unfolds. Thus, a narrative must at least elicit the question, "What
 ^ Other usages o f  narrative can be seen from S.Hauerwas ed., Why Narrative? Readings in 
Narrative Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989).
 ^ Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature o f  Narrative (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), p.4.
 ^ Ibid., chapter 6.
 ^ S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p.29.
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happens next?", because narrative is a connection between non-necessary, contingent 
events.^ Furthermore, Hauerwas points out that there is a difference between 
narratives which are told to make a point or to produce a certain effect, and 
narratives which embody the meaning in themselves/ In Hauerwas, as we will see 
later, the latter usage is dominant. This is a literary perspective of what a narrative 
is.
Nevertheless, Michael Goldberg remarks that the skills for understanding the 
meaning of a narrative are dependent on certain linguistic and communal conventions. 
For example,
there are certain cultural conventions which ensure that images in a 
painting will be read one way rather than another, so, too, there are 
communally dependent style-guides for the story-teller in every 
society.*
Therefore, narratives are manifestations of both languages and peoples, and stand 
within a whole narrative tradition. Goldberg’s remark directs our attention to 
understand narrative from a socio-historical perspective. In the following, we will 
see how these two perspectives, literaiy and socio-historical, interweave with 
Hauerwas’ antlnopological use of nairative in relation to human experience.
In common with other narrative advocates^, Hauerwas is committed to the 
general thesis regarding, the narrative quality of human experience because he
 ^ Ibid., p.75.
Ibid., p.77.
 ^ Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narrative (Nashville: Abingdon, 1982), p.203.
 ^ For instance, Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality o f Experience." In: Journal o f  
American Academy o f Religion, vol.39 (1971), pp.291-331; Harald Weinrich, "Narratiye Theology." 
In: Concilium, Vol.9 (1973), pp.46-56; J.B.Metz, "A Short Apology o f  Narratiye." In: Concilium. 
Vol.9 (1973), pp.84-96; James Wm.McClendon. Biography as Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 1974); 
and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame, 1984),
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considers that "the moral life must be grounded in the nature of man. However, that 
nature is not rationality itself, but the necessity of having a narrative to give our life 
coherence."'® Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish the fact that Hauerwas 
takes narrative as a crucial category for understanding the continuity of the self, from 
the assertion that theology is primarily reflection about the significance of the 
narrative quality of human experience. In other words, for Hauerwas, the notion of 
narrative is a necessary "means" for reflection and enquiry about the moral life. 
Regarding the narrative quality of human experience, Hauerwas does not develop a 
full systematic account of what it is. Rather his account is relatively fragmentary. 
But, especially from his two related articles entitled to A Tale of Two Stories" and 
Self-Deception and Autobiographv' .^ we can still discern some basic features of what 
he says is involved in the narrative quality of human experience.
From Hauerwas’ articles, we can perceive that the first anthiopological use 
of narrative signifies human beings as "historical" beings. That is to say, humans’ 
characters and identities are more or less formed by their societies and communities, 
and therefore, they cannot understand who they are unless they understand themselves 
within a given historical context. The term historical context does not only mean the 
history of a particular community, but also the traditions, cultures, and languages 
attached to it.
Concerning the claim that the agent’s moral life is historically derived, 
Hauerwas demonstrates it in his experience of being a Texan. For him, being a
S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p.27. 
S.Hauei-was, Christian Existence Today, pp.25-45. 
S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp.82-98.
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Texan means that the unique cultural experience of Texas places its stamp on him
forever. It does not simply mean biologically where one happened to be born, but
also represents for many Texans a story that has, for good or ill, determined who
they are.'^ Hauerwas summarizes that "a Texan is not a man who has the
presumption he is without a story; he has a story that he accepts as it locates him on
a land and within a people without whom he could not be at all."'"' The story of
being a Texan then provides a Texan with the skills to find the boundaries between
himself/herself and other stories that would claim his/her life. However, Hauerwas’
illustration o f being a Texan not only plainly demonstrates how humans are defined
by stories, as when Alasdair MacIntyre says that
man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially 
a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his 
history, a teller o f stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for 
men is not about their own authorship: I can only answer the question,
"Wlrat am I to do?" if I can answer the prior question, "Of what story 
or stories do I find myself a part?"'^
but also acknowledges the power of story on the formation of humans’ identities as 
when Don Cupitt considers that
stories actually produce desires and patterns of behaviour. They teach 
us and equip us with selves to be, feelings to have, actions to perform,
people to meet, games to play and a world to inhibit  Stories
provide us internally with a functioning economics of selfliood, and 
externally with a theatrics of the life world and the various parts that 
we are going to be playing in it. The self as a self-regulating system 
is made by stories, and the dramas of everyday life in which it plays 
its various roles are also scripted by stories.''’
These two different but related roles of narrative in the understanding of ourselves
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, p.31.
Ibid., p.34.
A.MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.216.
D.Cupitt, What is a Stoiv? (London: SCM, 1991), p.48.
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can be clearly illustrated by Stephen Crites’ categories of stories: mundane stories and 
sacred stories.'^ In short, mundane stories are stories which are set within a 
determined world and frame of consciousness and by which people explain where 
they have been, why things are as they ai'e and so on, while sacred stories are stories 
which are not directly told, but they themselves create a world of consciousness and 
the self that is oriented to them. Crites considers the relationship between these two 
types of stories as follow: "All people’s mundane stories are implicit in its sacred 
story, and every mundane story takes soundings in the sacred story."'® For Crites, 
mundane stories are static, while sacred stories are dynamic. It is true that people 
cannot change their mundane stories, but this does not necessarily suggest any form 
of determinism because I believe to a certain extent people can choose their own 
sacred stories which will change the subjectivities of mundanes stories, at least 
[although I realize that this freedom, to a certain extent, is determined by the 
mundane stories].
The second anthropological use of the notion of narrative, according to 
Hauerwas, suggests that personal identity is best understood in terms of narrative 
form because narrative is required by those matters that we can only describe 
analogically, for instance, the self and God. Hauerwas borrows Hannah Arendt’s 
saying: "The moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads 
us astray into saying what he is, [and] we can know who somebody is or was only 
by knowing the story of which he is."'® In addition to this, Hauerwas also considers 
that narrative "binds events and agents together in an intelligible pattern" and it is this
S.Crites, "The Narrative Quality o f Experience." In: Journal o f American Academy o f  
Religion. Vol.39 (1971), p.305.
Ibid., p.296.
S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p.79.
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pattern which provides the form and meaning for personal identity because "to tell 
a story often involves our attempt to make intelligible the muddles of things we have 
done in order to become a self."^ ®
The narrative form of personal identity involves therefore two processes: 
memory and interpretation. The process of memory takes a narrative form because 
it embraces chronicle, while the process of interpretation is a story of the ordering 
of a process. In relation to his story of being an Texan, the process of memory is 
something related to 1] the official story of Texas; 2] the story of his family in 
Texas; 3] his story of being a Texan; and 4] his story of a Texan who no longer lives 
in Texas^', while the process o f interpretation is concerned with which parts of these 
stories are adopted and how these stories are understood. George W. Stroup notes that 
"without the use of human memory we could not talk about personal identity in any 
sense as persistence through time or as a quality of personliood."^^ At the same 
time, without the process of interpretation, personal identity camiot be formulated. 
Thus, the relationship between these two processes is that on the one hand, a person’s 
memory is restricted to his/her interpretation, and on the other, a person’s 
interpretation is restricted to his/her story [it may be part of his/her memory] because 
every interpretive act relates to the tradition and community within which the 
interpretation takes place. Therefore, these two processes are indeed circular. For
Hauerwas, their relationship is best expressed in the form of autobiography.^* The 
autobiographer cannot simply recount the events of his/lier life. Fle/she must wiite
Ibid., p.76.
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, p.6.
G.W.Stroup, The Promise o f  Narrative Theology (London; SCM, 1984), p. 102. 
S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy. p.96f.
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from the dominant perspective and image of his/her present time. In other words, 
autobiography is not simply an activity of memory and the sum of those events and 
experiences which constitute an autobiographer’s personal history; but also a matter 
of interpretation, which brings order out of the wi'iter’s unstructured past and in so 
doing imbues it with a particular significance.
Continuing the above explication of the interpreting role of narrative, 
Hauerwas’ third anthropological use of narrative relates to its moral significance. As 
previously noted, narrative intends to explain and interpret a person’s chronicle 
because chronicle is simply the sum of those events and experiences which constitute 
an individual’s personal history, but "only when the chronicle is interpreted does it 
begin to have plot and become history." '^* Therefore, the interpreting role of story 
has an incredible impact on the formation of personal identity. As Hauerwas states: 
"It is just such a power that at once is the significance and danger of stories, for if 
our stories are false or limited then so will be our world and lives."** Negatively 
stated, a "false" story may cause alienation which brings self-deception. In Albert 
Speer’s autobiography**^, Hauerwas points out that self-deception is not simply 
engaging in contradictory beliefs and actions, but doing so without being fully aware 
of doing so, so that one is helpless to extricate oneself from this condition. 
Furthermore, self-deception is compounded not only by our avoiding becoming 
conscious of our actions but also "avoid[ing] becoming explicitly conscious that we 
are avoiding it To bring certain things to consciousness requires the moral stamina
G.W.Stroup, The Promise o f  Narrative Theology. p .ll3 .  
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today. p.31.
A.Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmiian, 1970).
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to endure pain that such explicit knowledge cannot help but bring."** Hauerwas 
argues that the very nature of self-deception requires that it be practised as a 
consistent policy, as an expression of one’s character, for to let up for even one 
moment would be to come face-to-face with precisely that which cannot be faced. 
The cynic has no need for self-deception. Self-deception feeds the illusions which 
need to keep us "sane", that is, to sustain the sense of identity we cling to as sincere, 
decent, and responsible individuals. Thus, self-deception is "systematically [to] 
delude ourselves in order to maintain the story that has hitherto assured our 
identity."** Self-deception is not a single act, but a pattern of life. On the contrary, 
positively stated, a "true" story may initiate conversion which means that a person’s 
self-understanding or personal identity comes into question and his/her personal 
history must be reworked, reinterpreted and reappropriated. For Hauerwas, a "true" 
story could only be one powerful force to check the endemic tendency toward self- 
deception.*® The Christian story, Hauerwas holds, can provide the skills for people 
to make their lives their own and to be free from their self-imposed fears.*®
These thi’ee anthiopological uses of narrative in relation to the quality of 
human experience are mutually related and defined. In short, the narrative quality 
of human experience is primarily concerned with personal identity, while personal
S.Hauerwas, Truthfiilness and Tragedy, p.85.
Ibid., p.87.
Ibid., p.95.
*° This Is the remark o f  his discussion o f being a Texan. It comes out o f a context that "we 
Texans have little ability to know how to admit our failures, and cruelty, and our tragedies. We thus 
make a virtue out o f  some o f  our worst sins- like the sign that hung over the main street o f  Greenville 
for years: "Welcome to Greenville; The Blackest Land, the Wliitest People." The way we hide our 
sins is to turn them into a banner. Our inability to know how to integrate into our lives some o f our 
less noble practices means that our souls are not capable o f facing the full reality o f  this existence." 
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, p.37.
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identity relates to the possession of the capacity of having a history and this history 
takes the form of narrative displaying its impact on the formation of personal 
identity. This is why Hauerwas insists that "ethical objectivity cannot be secured by 
retreating from narrative, but only by being anchored in those narratives that best 
direct us toward the good."*' Moreover, narratives have the power to seduce us into 
a new way of seeing the world. Unlike purely rational arguments, narratives unite 
reason and emotion so as to move not only the mind but the heart. When they are 
successful, their seductiveness can bring about a conversion in our understanding of 
ourselves, our world, and our destiny. The seductive power of the narrative reaches 
down into the unconscious and transforms our way of seeing and our willingness to 
act on our new insights. The kinds of narratives that have this power are not those 
allegorical stories whose meaning can be summarized "in other words". Rather, they 
are those mythic stories (political, social, religious) that have no point beyond 
themselves but give meaning and intelligibility to everything else.
We may find difficulty in understanding what narrative is about, not only 
because Hauerwas has a different use of narrative, but also because narrative itself 
is a complex concept on which it is hard to achieve an uniform agreement. As 
previously stated, I will concentrate on Hauerwas’ use of narrative in a socio-ethical 
sense. Then, let us try to reflect and summarize Hauerwas’ socio-ethical use of 
narrative which we have discussed so far. First, narrative is used to describe the 
narrative of the self as constituted in the person’s historical particularity. That is to 
say, human actions are intelligible only when placed in contexts. Secondly, narrative 
means the context of historical communities. In other words, narrative functions as 
a description of the community’s story and history. Thirdly, narrative explanation
S.Hauerwas, Truthfiilness and Tragedy, p. 17.
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is fundamental for the understanding of human action because it displays the 
interaction between intentions and behaviour. Fourthly, Hauerwas uses narrative as 
a description of the constitution of a tradition. Tradition determines what ought to 
be considered the proper understanding of its sacred stories by its selective use of 
them in preaching, ritual and liturgy. In conclusion, we can discern that these four 
uses of narrative come together in a core argument; that is to say, traditions and 
individual human lives are fundamentally narrative in form.
We now turn to see the ethical significance of the notion of narrative in the 
moral life. The first issue that immediately appears in my mind is the relationship 
between freedom and agency. Put bluntly, does the nature of narrative, according to 
Hauerwas, suggest that the freedom of an agent is restricted? In order to discuss this 
matter, we have to also refer to Flauerwas’ concept of character. In short, the 
concept of character relates to the concept of personhood, in the sense that the agent 
has the capacity to shape his/her character.** If we put Hauerwas’ understanding 
of character and narrative together, we can discern that, on the one hand, Hauerwas 
emphasizes the importance and the possibility of self-determination [i.e. having 
character] and, on the other, he makes a strong claim for the essential sociality of 
human nature [i.e. narrative]. The question for Flauerwas, then, is whether he 
considers that the agent has self-determination or is socially formed. Gene Outka
puts Flauerwas’ dilemma in this way:
On the one side, [there is Hauerwas’] insistence that the self is never 
just the product of social forces, the distinction between agent and 
observer and the privileged position of the former, the gulf between
what I do and what happens to me On the other, he appropriates as
much of the Meadian legacy in social psychology as he can What
Hauerwas neglects to ask is whether his nearly unqualified 
appropriation may not effectively jeopardize his distinction claims
See iny discussion on Hauerwas’ concepts of character, vision and virtue in chapter 1.
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about character. Even if he wishes to keep room for the agent "I", it 
is in effect a kind of reed on the intersubjective field. That reed may 
be too slender to bear all of the presuppositions about agency which 
he elsewhere adopts.**
Fundamentally, Hauerwas acknowledges this tension, and admits that he is unsure 
how it might be solved. He simply wants to emphasize character while allowing for 
the social construction of the agent’s perspective. Without pretending to solve this 
problem, Hauerwas suggests that his claim of the self-determination and the social 
formation of the agent might be better formulated as: "Our agency is actually our 
ability to be able to interpret and understand our dependency and tlirough 
understanding integrate our dependency into a more determinate character."*'* Let 
us explore this in the light of sociology.
Here I find that Hauerwas’ claim is more or less parallel to sociological
theories of socialization.** According to these theories, Hauerwas is right that a
human being is fundamentally "historical". Sociologically stated, personal identities
are socially bestowed. Identity is not something "given", but is rather bestowed in
acts of social recognition. Peter Berger illustrates the relationship between agent and
society in such a way:
Society is external to ourselves. It surrounds us, encompasses our life 
on all sides. We are in society, located in specific sectors of the social 
system. This location predetermines and predefines almost everything 
we do, from language to etiquette, from the religious beliefs we hold
to the probability that we will commit sucidie  We are located in
society not only in space but in time. Our society is an historical 
entity that extends temporally beyond any individual biography.
** 0 .Outka, "Character, Vision and Narrative." In: Religious Studies Review. Vol.6 (1980),
p. 112.
S.Hauerwas, A Community o f Character, p.257.
*^  Anthony Giddens defines socialization as "the process whereby, through contact with other 
human beings, the helpless infant gradually becomes a self-aware, knowledgeable human being, skilled 
in the ways o f the given culture and environment." Sociology (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), p.87.
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Society antedates us and it will survive us. It was there before we 
were born and it will be there after we aie dead. Our lives are but 
episodes in its majestic march through time. In sum, society is the 
walls of our imprisonment in history.*^
He continues to say that:
Society not only determines what we do but also what we are. In 
other words, social location involves our being as well as our conduct.
Society not only controls our movements, but shapes our identity, our 
thought and our emotions. The structures of society become the 
structures of our own consciousness. Society does not stop at the 
surface of our skins. Society penetrates us as much as it envelops 
us.**
Berger’s remark seems to suggest and affirm that the agent is fundamentally passive. 
The agent has no self-autonomy at all. Nevertheless, Berger is not pessimistic. He 
considers that
for a moment we see ourselves as puppets indeed. But when we grasp 
a decisive difference between the puppet theatre and our own drama, 
unlike the puppets, we have the possibility of stopping our movements, 
looking up and perceiving the machinery by which we have been 
moved. In this fact lies the first step toward freedom.*®
Translating the metaphor from drama to narrative, it could be said that however much 
our stories shape our dispositions and our vision, it is possible for us to be conscious 
of that influence. Once it is perceived, it may be affirmed or resisted. ' Although 
some proponents of story seem to be of mixed mind about our potential for self- 
awareness and change, it seems to me that this capacity is essential to a conception 
of freedom strong enough to bear the weight of a notion of moral responsibility.
In the light of Berger’s remark, we begin to understand Hauerwas’ dilemma 
positively. That is to say, the relationship between the freedom and the sociality of
P.Berger, Invitation to Sociology, pp. 108-9.
** Ibid., p. 140.
Ibid., p. 176.
182
the agent is dialectical in nature. On the one hand, it is right that most of the stories 
or convictions "charge us morally like the air we breathe- we never notice them"*®, 
and on the other, we can adopt stories or allow them to adopt us on the basis of an 
evaluative process.'*® In the course of this development, Hauerwas turns our 
attention from the problem of whether or not we have freedom to the issue of 
whether we are formed by a "true" story. Therefore, for Hauerwas, the issue is never 
whether we should try to become free from all stories, except those we have freely 
chosen; but whether we are formed by a truthful narrative that helps us to appreciate 
the limits and possibilities of those stories we have not chosen but are part and parcel 
of who we are. Summing up Hauerwas’ view, a human person is involved in the 
interdependent, material and communal world. Hauerwas believes that the agent is 
responsible for his/her movement. But it is also the case that the agent has limits 
which are set on that agency by human creatureliness. However, the concepts of 
character and narrative are a way of emphasizing the necessity of the concept of 
agency for a description of human personhood while maintaining the contingency and 
particularity of that agency. Agency is not freedom from all determination, but 
agency that is based in a well-informed character is indeed free. This is the basic 
thesis concerning narrative. However, it is important to maintain a balance that 
narratives are passively received and also actively claimed.
The second important ethical issue that arises from narrative is related to 
relativism. Because of the fact that each person is formulated by their particular 
story and interpretation, it is suggested that there is no agreement and unity among 
them. Besides, talk about traditions, practices, stories and narratives seems to suggest
*® S.Hauei-was, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 19. 
ibid., p.35.
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that there aie many moralities. Does Hauerwas suggest ethical relativism? Hauerwas 
admits that his position involves a certain kind of relativism.'* ‘ But it does not 
necessarily mean that the moral use of narrative is ethically unsustainable? For 
instance, among the critics, Wesley J.Robbins poses a case showing the failure of 
narrative ethic.'** His example involves a "Mansonseque" group of killers. 
Captured, convicted and imprisoned, they maintain that, although their vision of life 
includes a category of action called "murder" and considers such action to be wrong, 
the killings in question do not fall within that category. On the basis of their 
particular vision, their actions were not wi’ong. Regardless of the outcome of the 
legal proceedings, Robbins thinks that, given Hauerwas’ concept of morality, one 
would be "forced to admit, however reluctantly, that morally speaking, i.e. in terms 
of what their vision calls for them, their actions are appropriate; they have done 
nothing wrong."'** In Robbins’ view, Hauerwas’ only recourse would be to claim 
that there is an objectively correct vision for which all persons are accountable 
regardless of whatever particular visions they may hold.
In order to respond to a critique like that of Robbins’, we have to clarify 
Flauerwas’ position. First, throughout his works, Hauerwas never suggests 
abandoning the so-called "standard account of morality"; rather he says that this is 
not a sufficient condition to reveal the reality of the moral life.'*'* Moreover, 
Flauerwas admits that "the universalizability principle expresses the fundamental 
commitment to regard all men as constituting a basic moral community. This should
S.Hauerwas, A Community o f Character, p. 101.
Wesley Robbins, "On the Role o f  Vision in Morality." In: Journal o f American Academy 
o f Religion XLV (1977).
Ibid., p.635.
S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, p.87.
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not be understood as an ideal that is to be achieved in some far off future; rather it
is a condition without which moral argument and judgment are not possible."'**
Secondly, Hauerwas’ relativism does not advocate a belief that we can do what we
like because we have different narratives, but rather he emphasizes the importance
of one’s integrity within one’s narrative. In other words, Hauerwas insists that "we
must have a form of thought not relativized to our own existing system of beliefs."'*®
Therefore, within one’s narrative, Hauerwas demands a matter of consistency and
integrity. Thirdly, Hauerwas’ relativism is a confessional relativism. Put
theologically, he says that
[this] does not mean Cliristian convictions are of significance only for 
the church, for Cliristians claim that by learning to find our lives 
within the story of God we learn to see the world truthfully. 
Christians must attempt to be nothing less than a people whose ethics 
shine as a beacon to others illuminating how life should be lived 
well.'**
I will refer again to this confession relativism in the next section when I discuss the 
relationship between narrative and theology.
However, does a universal rational ethic provide an objectifiable and
rationalistic ethic? Here, I find Alasdair MacIntyre’s comment provoking. He
presents our situation most vividly by telling the following story or parable:
Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of 
catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the 
general public on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories 
are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments aie 
destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power 
and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, 
imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is
Ibid., p.85.
S.Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 104.
S.Hauei-was, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.34.
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a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people 
seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it 
was. But all that they possess are fragments: a knowwledge of 
experiments detached from any knowledge of the theoretical context
which gave them significance None the less all these fragments are
reembodied in a set of practices which go under the revived names of 
physics, chemistry and biology. Adults argue with each other about 
the respective merits of relativity theory, evolutionary theory and 
phlogiston theory, although they possess only a very partial knowledge
of each  Nobody, or almost nobody, realizes that what they are
doing is not natural science in any proper sense at all. For everything 
that they do and say conforms to certain canons of consistency and 
coherence and those contexts which would be needed to make sense 
of what they are doing have been lost, perhaps irretrievably.
In such a culture  what would appear to be rival and competing
premises for which no further argument could be given would 
abound/®
The world MacIntyre is describing is produced by what B.Lonergan calls the "longer 
cycle of decline", in which knowledge is reduced to common sense, hence no further 
questions need be raised.'*® In such a world, by default, the way things are is 
viewed as the way things ought to be, since no one seems able to imagine otherwise. 
The point MacIntyre is making, of course, is not about science but about ethics. 
"The language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of 
natural science in the imaginary world which I described."*®
According to MacIntyre, the quest for a universal rational ethic that 
philosophers have been pursuing has been a dismal failure. This is because such a 
quest is historically naive in that it fails to recognize the socio-historical and narrative 
context of every ethic. As a result, ethicists have tried to construct an ethic by 
stripping the narratives from different ethical traditions and by lifting various
A.MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp.1-2.
B.Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972). 
A.Maclntyre, After Virtue, p.2.
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theoretical components out of their diverse socio-historical and narrative contexts in 
order to fit them together, as if they were all from the same jigsaw puzzle. This 
results in our living in a world of ethical quandaries in which our best philosophical 
minds cannot come to agreement because they are arguing from arbitrary and 
incommensurate first principles with no coherent nairative to make sense of them. 
Faced with such story less first principles, we have no rational way of adjudicating 
on their rival and contrary claims. Thus, unintentionally, ethical theories that argue 
from duty, utility, etc., are reduced to diverse expressions of ethical emotivism or 
relativism. Therefore, if Robbins accuses narrative ethic of ethical relativism, we do 
not see the universal ethic that can solve the ethical dilemma.
In summary, whatever universal, narrative-independent features of morality
there may be, they ought not to be assumed to generate a comprehensive account of
moral rationality that would make the narrative-dependent features irrelevant or even
secondary. What they may not do is to assume a priori a substantive description of
these categories. Indeed, they must look and see. Narrative-dependence would be
indispensable. An important aspect of morality is that it is epistemologically
dependent upon nairative. Hauerwas states that
even though moral principles are not sufficient in themselves for our 
moral existence, neither are stories sufficient if they do not generate 
principles that are morally significant. Principles without stories are 
subject to perverse interpretation (i.e., they can be used in immoral 
stories), but stories without principles will have no way of concretely 
specifying the actions and practices consistent with the general 
orientation expressed by the story.*'
Finally, regarding narratives themselves, Flauerwas points out that we have to 
have a narrative which can sustain us to get rid o f self-deception. Does this then
S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, p.89.
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mean that there is a distinction between narrative in which no provision is made for 
critical reflection, distancing and self-determination and narrative which encourages 
self-determination? If so, what are the criteria? On the basic belief that the test of 
a good narrative is the sort of person it shapes, Hauerwas formulates a list of working 
crtieria by which stories may be evaluated. According to him, any good narrative 
should meet these criteria:
1. power to release us from destructive alternatives;
2. ways of seeing through current distortions;
3. room to keep us from having to resort to violence;
4. a sense for the tragic: how meaning transcends power.**
In other words, we should look for these effects in the lives of those shaped by a 
particular narrative. Narratives whose effects meet these criteria are considered to 
be good.
However, Hauerwas’ criteria do not provide anything resembling an 
"objective" evaluation of various narratives because in each criterion, the key words, 
destructive, distortion, violence and tragic, are narrative-dependent. In his own 
example, a P.L.O. leader might describe a proposal for creating a Palestinian 
homeland as "constructive", while the prime minister of Israel might well describe 
it as "destructive".** Nor is it likely that one could find agreement in their use of 
the word "violence". For one of them, it would refer to acts of terrorism, and for the 
other, to political decisions that are responsible for the creation of refugee camps. 
Therefore, if Hauerwas’ criteria are not entirely narrative-dependent, then one must 
conclude that there is in Hauerwas’ position a submerged theory of something like 
natural law. And if this is true, then Hauerwas ought to communicate more clearly
S.Hauei-was, Truthfiilness and Tragedy, p.35. 
Ibid., p.22.
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and in more detail than he has to date what sort of a thing it is. This is unlikely to 
be Hauerwas’ position however, because tliroughout his works he always emphasizes 
the distinctiveness of the Christian faith against the suggestion (from natural 
theology) that we can use our human reason to arrive at a proper understanding of 
God’s will for us. On the other hand, if Hauerwas’ criteria are mainly narrative- 
dependent, then they work within the framework of a confessional relativism. It 
seems to me that this is more likely to be Hauerwas’ position for the reasons stated 
previously. But this does not solve the fundamental problem, because even under the 
"same" story, there may be more than one interpretation.^'* Although the practical 
consequences [the life shaped by the story] can be used to test our interpretation, this 
is also narrative-dependent. Therefore, the narrative understood within the context 
of a confessional relativism should also receive the test of truthfulness because the 
history of Christianity testifies that so often Christianity cut itself off from the 
covenant story into which it had been grafted. This test is about the non-narrative 
independent form of rationality. Reasons are appropriate though they are not 
sufficient. However, this does not necessarily reject the fundamental presuppositions 
of the Cluistian story. Truthful lives do not always follow from truthful stories. But 
a truthful story has the utopian capacity to bring about judgment and the possibility 
of renewal so that we can begin again.
In conclusion, for Hauerwas, the ethical importance of narrative is because the 
nature of human experience requires narrative display, and human life is 
fundamentally narrative in form. Hauerwas’ account does successfully associate ethic 
with the formation of a moral self. Ethics, according to him, is never only a matter 
of decision-making, but rather is a concern of the formation of character which is
A stimulating discussion o f this matter can be found in Paul Lauritzen, "Is Narrative Really 
a Panacea?" In: The Journal o f Religion. Vol.67 (1987), pp.322-339.
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acquired through the narrative we have come to possess. Nevertheless, Hauerwas’ 
narrative-dependent ethics is for the purpose of illustrating his "confessional" 
narrative, namely, Cliristian. That is to say, narrative is a category to explain the 
behaviour within a particular community rather than to sustain the reality of our 
dissimilarities. With this we turn to the relation between narrative and the Cluistian 
faith.
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2. NARRATIVE AND THEOLOGY
According to the remark made by Paul Nelson, Hauerwas is the preeminent
champion of narrative in Christian ethics.* Does Nelson’s comment exaggerate
Hauerwas’ contribution? Before saying anything on this, I consider that the basic
issue, perhaps, is to discern what role the concept of narrative plays in Hauerwas’
theological reflection. Hauerwas states explicitly that his interest in narrative is
simply because it relates his concepts of character, vision and virtue in an appropriate
way rather than because he hopes to re-formulate the major doctrines of the Christian
faith by means of narrative. He unreservedly says that
it has never been, nor is it now, my intention to develop a narrative 
theology or a theology of narrative. Theology itself does not tell 
stories; rather it is critical reflection on a story; or perhaps better, it is 
a tradition embodied by a living community that reaches back into the 
past, is present, and looks to the future. Hence, it is a mistake to 
assume that my emphasis on narrative is the central focus of my 
position- insofar as 1 can be said even to have a position. Narrative is 
but a concept that helps clarify the interrelation between the various 
themes 1 have sought to develop in the attempt to give a constructive 
account of the Christian moral life.^
Therefore, it is a mistake to over-empliasize and to under-estimate the importance of 
narrative in Hauerwas’ thought. In other words, the concept of narrative in 
Hauerwas’ thought is neither dominant nor negligible. My task here is to provide a 
clear explication and assessment of Hauerwas’ use of narrative in relation to the 
Christian faith, especially, theological ethics. However, it is important to note that 
this section is built on the discussion of the previous section, namely, narrative and 
the moral life; because if  narrative plays an important role in shaping our 
understanding of ourselves, our communities, our histories, and our moralities, then
 ^Paul Nelson, Narrative and Morality (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1989),
p.7.
 ^S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom. p.xxv. Besides, in his other book Christian Existence 
Today (p.25), Hauerwas also makes the same remaik.
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we would expect narrative to be vital to theological reflection. In the words of 
Stroup,
if narrative does have an almost primordial location in human 
experience, then every philosophical anthropology, Chiistian or not, 
which claims to offer a full description of human being must come to 
terms with the narrative structure of human identity. Any theological 
description of Christian identity that does not take into account this 
narrative structure ignores an essential dimension of human experience 
in the interpretation of faith.^
In the following, 1 will discuss Hauerwas’ use of narrative as a hermeneutical process 
in three related ways, namely, the description, explanation and justification of the 
Cluistian faith.
By "description" of a tradition we mean the linguistic representation of 
its temporal web of beliefs and practices. By "explanation" we mean 
the act of comparing it to other- religious or non-religious- conceptual 
schemes, and the interpretation of its rituals and doctrines in light of 
moral general categories. By "justification" we refer to the act of 
giving reasons that it is not irrational to think the tradition’s beliefs 
true and its rituals effective.'*
In order to discuss these three aspects, I will especially refer to H.Richard Niebulu’s 
work, The meaning of Revelation. George Lindbeck’s category of religion mentioned 
in his work, The Nature of Doctrine, and finally, Hauerwas’ use of the Bible in the 
light of the work of Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. Before puisuing 
these themes, let us see why Hauerwas finds the notion of narrative relevant to 
theological reflection.
For Hauerwas, the appropriateness of nairative in theology is mainly because 
first, he considers that the only way to know God, the world, or the self is through
G.Stroup, The Promise o f Narrative Theology, pp.87-88.
 ^ Gary Comstock, "Two Types o f Narrative Theology." In: The Journal o f American 
Academy o f Religion 55 (1987), p.690.
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their histories^ which require narrative to display them; and secondly, the Christian 
faith is primarily concerned with how one’s life is formed in a particular way rather 
than a knowledge about Christianity^, and therefore, narrative proves itself to be 
appropriate. Regarding Hauerwas’ first reason for using the notion of narrative in 
theology, 1 have previously illustrated it in the discussion of the necessity of the 
historicity of the agent. In relation to God, Hauerwas simply applies the analogy of 
the narrative nature of the self to our knowledge of God. He holds the fact that we 
come to know God through the recounting of the story of Israel and the life of Jesus 
because God has revealed himself historically and, therefore, narratively in them. 
Besides, these stories themselves are the points. Hauerwas says that "[they] are not 
substitute explanations we can someday hope to supplant with more straightforward 
accounts. Precisely to the contrary, narratives are necessary to our understanding of 
those aspects of our existence which admit of no further explanation."^ Thus, the 
Cliristian faith, according to Hauerwas, is not a set of doctrines. Nor can the 
doctrines summarize the essence of the Cliristian faith. But rather "[doctrines] are 
tools, meant to help us to tell the story better."® This does not mean that doctrines 
are unimportant, but rather they should be seen as an explanation of the Christian 
faith which take a narrative form, not vice versa.^ Nevertheless, Hauerwas never 
intends to replace doctrines by narrative, or to reformulate doctrines in a narrative 
way.
 ^ S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.26.
® See my discussion on Hauerwas’ view o f the imitation o f Christ.
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.26.
® Ibid., p.26.
® An interesting and stimulating account o f  the historical development and importance o f  the 
notion o f doctrine can be found in J.Sobrino, Christoloev at the Crossroads. pp.311-345.
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Hauerwas’ second reason for using the notion of narrative in theology relates
to his concepts of character, vision and virtue, which we have discussed. For him,
the Christian faith is not simply concerned with a philosophical enquiry, but rather
it demands of its believers that they should learn how to feel, act and think in
conformity with their tradition, namely, the Christian one. Theologically stated,
discipleship is the key to understanding the Christian faith. Hauerwas insists that we
cannot know who Jesus is unless we follow him. But how then does discipleship
relate to narrative? Because of the fact that discipleship is not a theory, but rather
a way of living, then it involves the matter of seeing. According to Hauerwas, our
vision does not arise sid generis^ rather, we view the world in accordance with story-
related metaphors and symbols. Our vision is formed and given content by the
narrative context in which we live, by "the stories through which we have learned to
form the story of our lives."*** In the words of M.Goldberg,
by allowing a particular story to direct our attention to the world in 
some specific way, we let it direct our activity in a certain manner. * '
Thus, Christian narrative not only describes the world in the present, but also 
indicates how it ought to be changed. It also challenges our own self-deceptions and 
mediates to us the courage "appropriate to human existence."*^ ' Therefore, 
discipleship requires one’s life being conformed to a particular story, namely, the 
Christian one.
Now, I turn to Hauerwas’ use of narrative in theology. First, I will look at 
its "descriptive" dimension. According to Niebuhi*, the Cluistian faith cannot be 
separated from history because the symbols and texts of the Cluistian community
S.Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, p.74.
Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narrative, p. 176, 
S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p.80.
194
refer to people and events in history and make claims about the meaning and goal of 
history. Furthermore, he contended that theology is implicitly historical, and the 
revelation of God comes through the medium of history.*^ He exemplified his view 
by saying that
we are in history as the fish is in water and what we mean by 
revelation of God can be indicated only as we point tlirough the 
medium in which we live.*'*
History itself takes the form of story. Nevertheless, Niebular makes a distinction 
between outer history and inner history, or external and internal history,'^ 
According to him, external history objectifies the succession of past events and 
records them in an impersonal and disinterested manner; while internal history 
apprehends past events "from within, as items in the destiny of persons and 
communities," and interprets them "in a context of persons with their resolutions and 
devotions." Internal history is deeply personal, but not individual, because it is 
mediated through "a commimity of selves." Within this community, selves aie 
internally related and members of each other. To become a member o f a community 
of selves is to "adopt its past as our own" and thereby to be "changed in our present 
existence." Internal history "can be communicated and persons can refresh as well 
as criticize each other’s memories of what has happened to them in the common life; 
on the basis of a common past they can think together about the common future."'^ 
Thus, for Niebulir, to speak of revelation in the Christian church is to refer to the 
history of selves within the community and to history as it is lived and apprehended 
from within. However, this does not mean that external history should be dismissed
H.Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning o f  Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp.21-22. 
Ibid., p.48.
Ibid., pp.59-90.
Ibid., p.47, 52 & 53.
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or absorbed into internal history. Rather they are in a dialectical relationship. On
the one hand, external history provides a basis for self-criticism. Because of the fact
that our view of God is finite and limited, the Cliristian community should closely
examine its external history as it hears it recounted by others in order to determine
whether it bears any similarity to its internal interpretation of that history. If it does
not, then the commimity must at least raise the question of whether it is engaged in
some form of collective self-deception. On the other hand, without the support of
internal history, external history has no significance at all because faith has to relate
to the intensely personal I-Thou encounter. Niebuhr considered that
a faithful external history is not interested in faith but in the ways of 
God, and the more faithful it is the less it may need to mention his 
name or refer to the revelation in which he was first apprehended, or 
rather in which he first apprehended the believer. In this sense an 
external history finds its starting point or impulsion in an internal 
history,'^
It is clear that Niebuhr gives preference for internal history because in internal history 
our concern is with subjects. But a preference for internal history has nothing to do 
with individualism and experientialism because "the history of the inner life can only 
be confessed by selves who speak of what happened to them in the community of 
other selves."’®
Like his typology of the church”*, Niebuhr’s account of internal and external 
history may suffer the same limitation of rigidity. Nonetheless, it still provides us 
with a simple clarification of the complexity of the Christian faith. In relation to 
Hauerwas’ emphasis on narrative, I would suggest that Hauerwas has attempted to
Ibid., p.88 
Ibid., p.73.
See H.Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (London: Faber & Faber),
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work out the implications of Niebuhr’s internal history [although I realize that this 
claim oversimplifies his work] because his concept of narrative particularly relates 
to the self within a community and the story of a community. In chapter one, we 
have already seen Hauerwas’ view of ecclesiology. In short, for him, the church is 
a group of people who have a common narrative. This common corporate memory 
expressed in living traditions is the glue that holds the members of a community 
together, for to belong to the group means to share the community narratives, to 
recite the same stories and to allow them to shape one’s identity.^** We will return 
to this in more detail in due course. On the other hand, we have already seen that 
throughout his works, Hauerwas endeavours to spell out the importance of the 
concepts of character, vision and virtue in the moral life. For him, story and life 
cannot be understood separately, not only because story forms life, but also because 
life testifies to the truthfulness of a story. If we take external history as a matter of 
asking about truth, then internal history is a matter of asking about truthfulness. For 
Flauerwas, the truth of Cliristian stories is not primarily to do with beliefs and 
metaphysics, but rather it has to do with practices and ethics. For instance, he says 
that we identify a true story, not by consulting past history or ontological principles, 
but by examining the lives of those people who live by it.^’ Thus, Hauerwas argues 
that we should assess the truth of Cliristian stories [i.e. external history] by looking 
to see whether they shape lives of courage, patience, and virtue in those who take 
them to be sacred [i.e. internal history]. We should not speak of the truth or falsity 
of some biblical tale, but of the truthfulness of the lives it shapes. However, this 
does not mean that Hauerwas fails to realize the difference between truth and
A good example o f this can be found in Hauerwas’ usage o f the story o f Watership Down 
(A Community o f  Character, pp.9-35). Hauerwas uses the story o f  tlie rabbit to display and contend 
the importance o f narrative for a community.
See pp. 182-183.
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truthfulness. But for him, questions of truth camiot be separated from questions of 
the good [truthfulness]. Thus, it is clear that Hauerwas’ view is consistent with 
Niebuhr’s tradition of internal history.
Now, I turn to examine Hauerwas’ use of the notion of narrative in terms of 
its "explanatory" dimension, with reference to Lindbeck’s typology of religion. 
Interestingly enough, Lindbeck’s account is quite similar to Niebuhr’s account. That 
is to say, Lindbeck also draws the distinction between the "objective" approach and 
the "subjective" approach to the understanding of the Cliristian faith. However, 
unlike Niebuhr’s account which is set within the Cluistian context, Lindbeck’s 
account is set on a wider perspective, namely, religion in general.
In his book entitled The Nature of Doctrine. Lindbeck suggests that there are 
tluee models for understanding religion, namely, the cogiiitivist model, the 
experiential-expressive model and the cultural-linguistic model. Due to the fact that 
my interest here is their relation to the concept of narrative, I will confine my 
discussion to the last two models. According to Lindbeck, the experiential-expressive 
model understands a religion to be a system of "non-informative and non-discursive 
symbols" that objectifies and evokes fundamental "inner feelings, attitudes or 
existential orientations."^^ Put bluntly, this model assumes that there is some 
universal experience that all people have that can be characterized as religious. 
Therefore, the particular religions and their doctrines are manifestations of that 
experience giving it expression in a range of ways. The experience, however, 
always transcends particular religions so that it can be called on as a basis for critique 
of their expression. In relation to the concept of narrative, this model of religion
G.Lindbeck, The Nature o f Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984), p. 16.
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adheres to the general antliropological thesis regarding the narrative quality of human
experience. For instance, Stephen Crites is one of the proponents. He says that
the inner form of any possible experience is determined by the union 
of these tln*ee modalities (past, present, and future) in every moment
of experience The tensed unity of these modalities requires narrative
forms both for its expression (mundane stories) and for its own sense 
of the meaning of its internal coherence (sacred stories). For this 
tensed quality is already an incipient narrative form.^^
The second relevant model is the cultural-linguistic model. It sees religion "as a kind 
of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and 
thought.... [as an] idiom that makes possible the description o f realities, the 
formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings and 
sentiments."^'* According to Lindbeck, this model denies that there is an experiential 
core to religion because
the experiences that religions evoke and mold are as varied as the 
interpretive schemes they embody. Adherents of different religions do 
not diversely thematize the same experience; rather they have different
experiences. Buddhist compassion, Cluistian love and ....  French
revolutionary fraternité are not diverse modifications of a single 
fundamental human awareness, emotional, attitude or sentiment, but 
are radically (i.e. from the root) distinct ways of experiencing and 
being oriented toward self, neighbour, and cosmos.^^
In relation to narrative, this model is supported by people like Hans Frei who 
considers that
if there is a "narrative theology", the meaning of that term in the 
context of the self-description of the Christian community is that we 
are specified by relation to its particular narrative and by our 
conceptual redescription of it in belief and life, not by a quality of 
"narrativity" inherent in our picture of self and world at large.
S.Crites, "The Narrative Quality o f  Experience." pp.301-302. 
G.Lindbeck, The Nature o f  Doctrine, p.33.
Ibid., p.40.
Hans Frei, "Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative." In: p.28.
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Among these models, Lindbeck gives preference to the cultural-linguistic model/^
Like all kinds of typology, Lindbeck’s may suffer the limitation of rigidity. 
But, at the same time, typology can also help us to elucidate certain complexities of 
a problem. Therefore, my interest here is to clarify Hauerwas’ use of narrative in 
theology in the light of Lindbeck’s typology.
Obviously, from time to time, Hauerwas seems to employ both the 
experiential-expressive and the cultural-linguistic models. He accepts the general 
thesis of the narrative quality of human experience and, at the same time, he upholds 
the distinctiveness of the Cliristian faith. Does this mean that Hauerwas is 
inconsistent with his theological reflection? If not, how then can Hauerwas’ 
ambiguity be solved? First, it is obvious that Hauerwas insists upon the
distinctiveness of the Christian faith [i.e. the cultural-linguistic model]. This can be 
discerned from his view of ecclesiology and Christian ethics. For him, the social 
ethic of the church is to be the church, and Cluistian ethics is a "qualified" ethics 
which reflects a particular people’s history. Therefore, we have reason to believe that 
for him, the proper object of theology is neither stories nor the narrative quality of 
human experience, but God. His task is not to show how stories save but rather how
Lindbeck argues that religions are "idioms for dealing with whatever is most iniportant- 
with ultimate questions o f life and death, right and wrong, chaos and order, meaning and 
meaninglessness. These are the problems they treat in their stories, myths, and doctrines. They 
imprint their answers through rites, instructions, and other socializing processes, not only on the 
conscious mind but in the individual and cultural subconscious. Thus a Balinese, molded by a 
ceremonial system in which is embedded a partly Hindu and partly animist world view, will fall into 
a catatonic trance when confronted by types o f  stimulus that might plunge a Westerner, influenced by 
a long tradition o f biblical monotheism, into strenuous activity. Centuries o f ritual reiteration o f  
certain definitions o f what is ultimately good and true have so shaped these two cultural types that 
their basic attltudinal reflexes are different even in the absence o f  belief or o f much explicit knowledge 
o f  their religious traditions. In the face o f  such examples, it seems implausible to claim that religions 
are diverse objectifications o f  the same basic experience. On the contrary, different religions seem 
in many cases to produce fundamentally divergent depth experiences o f what it is to be human. The 
empirically available data seem to support a cultural-linguistic rather an experiential-expressive 
understanding o f the relation o f  religion and experience." (The Nature o f Doctrine, pp.40-41)
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God saves.**® Secondly, although Hauerwas accepts the anthropological thesis of the 
narrative quality of experience, his purpose is to simply state the fact that we are 
narrative beings and therefore, Cliristian ethics should not neglect it. Furthermore, 
Hauerwas never stops at the thesis of the narrative quality of human experience, but 
rather he takes a step further to illustrate the truthfulness of Christian narrative among 
other narratives. This illustration is not a result of comparison, but rather a 
confession. Thus, for Hauerwas, his use of the experiential-expressive model is 
simply as a "stepping-stone", albeit indispensable, for further proposals. At the same 
time, his use of the cultural-linguistic model is not an end in itself because he 
considers that "it is our conviction that we must attend to the distinctiveness of our 
language, and to the corresponding distinctiveness of the community formed by that 
language, because it is true."**^  For Hauerwas, an appropriate explanation of 
Clu'istianity should come, not in terms of external philosophical theories or social- 
scientific laws, but in terms of the internal rules and procedures of its own language 
game. This is the cultural-linguistic model.
Both Niebuhr’s and Lindbeck’s typologies help us to clarify the role of 
narrative in Hauerwas’ theology. That is to say, Hauerwas’ use of narrative is both 
historical in terms of internal history and confessional in terms of the cultural- 
linguistic model. I turn now to Hauerwas’ final use o f narrative in terms of the 
dimension of "justification". I propose to discuss this matter in terms of the use of 
the Bible because on the one hand, any discussion of the use of narrative in theology 
is insufficient if it does not refer to the Bible, for it is primary literature [i.e. the 
literary use of narrative], and on the other, the Bible is the testimony and tradition
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, p.26. 
S.Hauerwas, Against the Nations, p.5.
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[i.e. the socio-historical use o f  narrative] o f the church.
Regarding how the Bible is interpreted, in his influential work on the
hermeneutics of biblical narrative, namely, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative****. Hans
Frei observes that interpretation of the Bible underwent a drastic change in the
eighteenth century with the advent of historical criticism. Prior to that time,
Western Cluistian reading of the Bible  was usually strongly
realistic, i.e. at once literal and historical, and not only doctrinal or 
edifying. The words and sentences meant what they said, and because 
they did so they accurately described real events and real truths that 
were rightly put only in those terms and no others. Other ways of 
reading portions of the Bible, for example, in a spiritual or allegorical 
sense, were permissible, but they must not offend against a literal 
reading of those parts which seemed most obviously to demand it.
Most eminent among them were all those stories or historical
sequences  Christian preachers and theological commentators.....
envisioned the real world as formed by the sequence told by the 
biblical stories.'*’
Since the emergence of the historical-critical method in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the "realistic" reading of the Bible gradually diminished in the theological 
world. Under the historical-critical method, understanding the text means looking 
behind or outside of the text at its development or formation, historical setting, the 
theological intentions of author, and at parallels in other religious or cultural 
traditions. Consequently, the categories of meaning and truth are no longer 
understood to cohere in any "realistic" text. The meaning of a narrative could be 
uncovered by grammatical study, but the determination of the meaning of the text 
was no longer understood to be the resolution of the question of its truth. Meaning 
and truth became distinct categories, and the question of meaning no longer cohered 
with the question of truth. A literal or grammatical reading of a text may disclose
Hans Frei, The Eclipse o f  Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
Ibid., p.I.
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its meaning, but if the reader wants to know whether the narrative is true then it must 
be determined whether the claim of the text coheres with some referent external to 
the text, such as, historical fact. Frei finds this result disastrous because it distorts 
the Bible. He proposes an alternative option of reading the Bible, namely, realistic 
narrative. In short, "realistic narrative" is not history but "history-like". It renders 
a world or the identity of an agent which cannot be separated from the narrative 
itself. The subject of the narrative cannot be divorced from the narrative because it 
is the narrative that renders the subject, and precisely because biblical narrative is 
realistic, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways of reading it.^ ** Frei’s view 
is concretized also in another work The Identity of Jesus Christ^^ . Frei suggests that 
the Gospels must be read as realistic narrative. He defends his claim that much of 
the Bible falls into a literary genie which requires an appropriate and specifiable 
method of interpretation. But this gem-e is not restricted to Christian Scripture. 
Therefore, the danger is that as the literary theory goes, so does the chi'istological 
assertion. He insists that it must be the community’s rules for interpreting these texts 
which are used rather than a general theory of texts and reading. In other words, the 
christological assertion of the community of faith must control the method of 
interpretation by which the Bible is read, not vice versa.
Generally speaking, Hauerwas’ position is similar to Frei’s.^ '* However, 
because of the fact that Hauerwas is not a biblical scholar, he does not take the 
enquiry about theories of reading further. On the contraiy, his focus is on the 
implications of the biblical narrative for the identity of Christians and Christian
Ibid., pp.12-16.
Hans Frei, The Identity o f Jesus Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975).
See S.Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture (Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), pp. 15-46.
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community. Hauerwas shares with Frei a view that the theological use of the Bible 
must be understood within the context of the Christian community. Hauerwas 
comments that
part of the difficulty with the rediscovery of the significance of 
narrative for theological reflection has been too concentrated attention 
on texts qua texts. It is no doubt significant to rediscover the literary 
and narrative character of the texts of the Bible. That is particularly 
the case if one is interested in redirecting the attention and method of 
those engaged in the scholarly study of the Bible. But the emphasis 
on narrative can only result in scholarly narcissism if narrative texts 
are abstracted from the concrete people who acknowledge the authority 
of the Bible.^^
Therefore, for Hauerwas, the mistake of fundamentalism and biblical criticism is that 
they "seek to depoliticize the interpretation of scripture on the grounds that the text 
has an objective m e a n i n g . A n  emphasis on the ecclesial context of the Bible 
poses an important direction for "narrative theology" to go. That is to say, "narrative 
theology" should be contented with its emphasis on narrative neither as a 
transcendental category of experience nor as a literally form illuminative for the 
Bible, but rather should display the proper and practical relationship between the 
Bible and the church.
According to Hauerwas, the Bible is basically the church’s book. It means 
that, on the one hand, the Bible is a record of the history of the chui'ch which gives 
the church’s existence rheaning. Therefore, Hauerwas suggests that the most 
appropriate way to understand the Bible is to regard it as a narrative. It is a 
narrative, not only because it has a narrative literary genre, but also because it 
embodies the shared memory and communal history which binds individuals together 
into a community. On the other hand, the authority of the Bible is confirmed by the
S.Hauei-was, Christian Existence Today, p.55. 
S.Hauemas, Unleashing the Bible, p. 18.
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Clil’istian community which is governed by its confession of Jesus Clnist, because it
considers that the Bible has authority in its witness to the identity of Jesus Christ.
The question then, is whether the church "controls" the Bible or vice versa.
Hauerwas answers that
of course the church creates the meaning of Scripture, but that does 
not invite an orgy of subjectivistic arbitrariness. Rather the church 
must continue to return to the Scripture because they are so interesting, 
given the church’s task to live as a people of memory in a world 
withour memory. The church returns time and time again to Scripture 
not because it is trying to find the Scripture’s true meaning, but 
because Christians believe that God has promised to speak through 
Scripture so that the church will remain capable of living faithfully by 
remembering well. The more interesting the challenges facing the 
church, the more readings we will need. It is for this reason that the 
church, through the guidance of the Holy Spirit, tests contemporary 
readings of Scripture against the tradition, knowing that such readings 
help us to see the limits of the present.'***
Besides, the authority o f the Bible requires community because "it derives its
intelligibility from the existence of a community that knows its life depends on
faithful remembering of God’s care of his creation thiough the calling of Israel and
the life of Jesus"^®, and community must have authority because "authority is the
means tlnough which a community is able to journey from where it is to where it
ought to be."^ ** Therefore, the church and the Bible are in a dialectical relationship.
Hauerwas clarifies his view of the authority of the Bible by saying that it is not to
claim the infallibility of its content, but rather to claim it as
the testimony of the church that this book provides the resources 
necessary for the church to be a community sufficiently truthful so that 
our conversation with one another and God can continue across 
generation.'”*
Ibid., pp.36-37.
S.Hauei-was, A Community o f  Character, p.53. 
Ibid., p.63.
Ibid., p.64.
205
Accordingly, one may expect any critical approach to the text to be concerned at least 
in part with the question of what it means to interpret that text in the context of the 
community that uses it to understand and interpret reality.
The above account of the "ecclesial" context of the Bible proposes that the
Bible is primarily concerned with the ethical lives of the community because truth
in general (and particularly the truth of the Chiistian faith) cannot be known without
initiation into a community that requires transformation of the self. Put bluntly, this
is concerned with Cliristian ethics. Hauerwas says that
[the] scripture functions as an authority for Cliristians precisely 
because by trying to live, think, and feel faithful to its witness they 
find they are more nearly able to live faithful to the truth. For the 
scripture forms a society and sets an agenda for its life that requires 
nothing less than trusting its existence to the God found tlirough the 
stories of Israel and Jesus. The moral use of scripture, therefore, lies 
precisely in its power to help us remember the stories of God for the 
continual guidance of our community and individual lives.'"
Thus, he considers that the Bible helps to nurture and reform the community’s self- 
identity as well as the personal character of its members. Put differently, the Bible 
requires a corresponding community which is capable of remembering and for whom 
active reinterpreting remains the key to continuing a distinctive way of life. 
Hauerwas considers that "the narrative of scripture not only renders a character, but 
renders a community capable o f ordering its existence appropriate to such stories.
In this sense, questions about how to remember the stories are not just questions 
about fact or accuracy, but about what kind of community we must be to be faithful 
to God and his purposes for us. Furthermore, a biblically informed ethics will not 
ultimately prize accurate historical knowledge of the text or sophisticated
Ibid., p.66. 
Ibid., p,69.
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hermeneutical schemes for getting at its meaning. Rather, it will require first and
foremost that we form ourselves into a people who can understand and carry forward
the memories and expectations narrated there. However, Hauerwas does not think
that the Bible lays down rules for Christians. It rather provides us with a story into
which they must fit their lives. The ecclesial use o f the Bible rejects any inclination
to see the Bible as the "revealed morality" and the "revealed reality" because they see
the Bible independent from the community. Hauerwas’ ecclesial use of the Bible is
shared by other theologians, like Jolniannes Baptist Metz, who comments that
Clnistianity as a community of those who believe in Jesus Chr ist has, 
from the very beginning, not been primarily a community interpreting 
and arguing, but a community remembering and narrating with a 
practical intention- a narrative and evocative memory of the passion, 
death and resurrection of Jesus. The logos of the cross and 
resurrection has a narrative structure. Faith in the redemption of 
history and in the new man can, because of the history of human 
suffering, be translated into dangerously liberating stories, the hearer 
who is affected by them becoming not simply a hearer, but a doer of 
the word.'*^
Hauerwas’ ecclesial interpretation of the Bible is in line with his 
understanding of narrative in terms of cultural-linguistic model and internal history. 
That is to say, themes like truthfulness and particularity appear here once again. 
Taking Gabriel Fackre’s typology of narrative theology'*'*, I would suggest that 
Hauerwas’ so-called "narrative theology" is a form of community story because the 
narrator, in this case, is neither a specific textmaker nor a personal storyteller, but a 
faith community. This can be supported from Hauerwas: "the narrative of the Bible
J.B.Metz, Faith in History and Society (London: Burns & Oates, 1980), p.212.
According to Fackre, there are three kinds o f stoiy, namely, canonical story, life story and 
community story. Canonical story makes extensive use o f literal y analysis o f  biblical material, life 
story draws heavily on psycho-social resources in the exploration o f  personal experience, and 
community story is shaped by communal lore and the sedimentations o f tradition. For details see 
"Narrative Theology: An Overview." In: Interprétation 37 (1983), pp.340-352.
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is to concern where the story is told, namely, in the church; how the story is told, 
namely, in faithfulness to Scripture; and who tells the story, namely, the whole 
church through the office of the preacher."'*^
In summary, Hauerwas’ use o f narrative in theology can be recapitulated in 
three related perspectives, namely, the description, explanation and justification of the 
Cliristian faith. For him, an adequate description of Chr istianity should not come in 
terms of imported categories but in terms of the Bible’s own narrative and Cliristians’ 
own autobiographies [i.e. the internal history]. An appropriate explanation of 
Clnistianity should not come in terms of external philosophical theories or social- 
scientific laws but in terms of the internal rules and procedures of its own language 
game [i.e. the cultural-Iingusitic model]. Finally, the justification of Clnistianity 
should not come in the form of a logical proof that God exists, or Jesus rose from 
the dead, or that the church serves ends all rational persons ought to desire. Rather 
it should come in the form of a pragmatic demonstration that this tradition entails a 
liberating, authentic, and a way of life without self-deception, an appropriate response 
to God’s will towards us [i.e. the moral use of the Bible].
Hauerwas’ use of narrative in Clnistian theology is stimulating, and probably 
opens a new way of doing theology, but his critics find his approach problematic. 
Before taking up this critique, it is important to say something about the differences 
between Flauerwas’s theological use of narrative and general use of narrative. First, 
Hauerwas acknowledges that there is a narrative quality of human experience that is 
morally significant.'*® But for Hauerwas, this is not the primary claim that
S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today. p.61. 
See pp.168-169.
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Christians are concerned to make. Rather the biblical narrative seeks to incorporate 
all people into God’s narrative. Secondly, Hauerwas is not satisfied with the general 
description of the importance of tradition in the formation of the moral self***, but 
rather he considers that the moral self has to be incorporated into the church, a 
community of character, so that it is possible to develop the virtues necessary to live 
truthfully and morally. These differences mark Hauerwas’ departure from "natural" 
and "liberal" theology. Now, let us turn to look at the critique of Hauerwas’ usage 
of narrative in theology.
First, Hauerwas’ use of nairative is criticized for the confusion between the
matters of truth and truthfulness. Flis critics would agree, I believe, that Flauerwas’
emphasis on internal history is an important direction for theological ethics to take
because sacred stories have more to do with human temporality, morality and piety
than with the transcendental principles. When we ask whether stories aie true or not,
we largely mean "are they true to human experience?" and "are they likely to
encourage human behaviour?" So it is appropriate to take the pragmatist [and
Methodist] route of first turning our attention to the question of the truthfulness of
the Christian lives who read the biblical stories. This is what Hauerwas believes that
Christian convictions constitute a narrative, a language, that requires 
a transformation o f  the self [italics mine] if we are to see, as well as 
be, truthful.'*®
Flowever, the emphasis on the truthfulness of lives shaped by the Chiistian story does 
not solve the problem of truth, Paul Lauritzen, in his article "Is Nai'rative Really a 
Panacea?"'*^, clearly illustrates this dilemma. In his study of the use of narrative in
See pp.l74ff.
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kinedom, p.30.
P.Lauritzen, "Is Narrative Really a Panacea?" In: The Journal o f  Religion 67 (1987),
pp.322-339.
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the work of J.B.Metz and S.Hauerwas, he points out that both Metz and Hauerwas 
consider the concept of narrative important in theological enquiry, and both claim 
that the intelligibility and truthfulness of Christian convictions resides in their 
practical force, but they diverge from their ways of practice; that is, Metz’s position 
is rather "revolutionary", while Hauerwas’ position is rather "sectarian". Lauritzen 
concludes that although there is merit to the suggestion of using narrative in theology, 
the root problem always is the truth which has to require metaphysical enquiry.^®
Lauritzen’s comment sharply points out the insufficiency of the category of 
narrative in theology. Nevertheless, we should be aware of the fact that like his use 
of the concept of character, Hauerwas’ stress on the importance o f truthfulness is 
rather a matter of emphasis. He never intends to avoid truth claims, although it is 
a fact that he refuses to engage in metaphysics qua metaphysics.^' Rather he adopts 
a different point of departure to tackle the question of truth; that is to say, truth 
demands truthfulness. For Hauerwas, both external and internal evidence are 
important, but an emphasis on narrative is simply "to note the kind of actuality we 
believe has grasped us in Jesus of Nazareth."®^ Besides, we have to admit that 
despite the importance of metaphysical enquiry in theological reflection, it does not 
necessarily solve the problem of plurality of interpretation because fundamentally any 
metaphysical enquiry involves narrative. Ronald Thiemann recognizes that
Ibid., p.339.
See S.Hauerwas, "Why the Truth Demands Truthfulness: An Imperious Engagement with 
Hartt." In: Journal o f the American Academy o f  Religion. Vol.LII (1984), pp.141-147. In his reply 
to J.Hartt, Hauerwas admits that the Gospels involve "foundational metaphysical beliefs. He agrees 
that the Gospels require certain facts be true. However, he states that "the kind o f  truth entailed by 
the Gospels cannot be separated from the way the story o f  God we claim as revealed in Jesus’ life 
forces a repositioning o f  the self vis-a vis reality." For Hauerwas, Christian theology would and 
should not free from classical metaphysical concerns, but the matter is to know how the truth and 
truthfulness are to be distinguished without being separated.
Ibid., p .l45.
210
the interpretations and proposals will differ, but that is to be expected 
within any living tradition. No single interpretation can ever claim to 
have discerned the Cluistian nanative, but all strive to be faithful 
expressions of it. The Cliristian narrative is a story that can never be 
fully told, for it is the story of a community that has not yet reached 
that telos for which God intended us.^^
Therefore, what we need is not simply a return to the metaphysical approach, but 
rather a virtue which can endure our differences. Brevard Childs recognizes that
Christians may disagree radically with one another on a particular 
course of action, and yet both positions may rightly appeal to some 
biblical warrant.... It is the primary task of the church to hold together 
the dissenting factions in Cluistian love.®'*
Therefore, individual Cliristians ought to be modest about the status of their 
discernment and to recognize that all human well-doing stands under God’s judgment 
and ultimately must appeal to God’s mercy. However, Hauerwas rightly notes that 
"these interpretations may be quite diverse and controversial even within the 
community, but are sufficient to provide the individual members with the sense that 
they are more alike than unlike."®®
Secondly, Hauerwas’ use of narrative is a form of confessional ism which is 
accused of converting theology into a ghetto language unintelligible to outsiders.®® 
As a result, this not only restricts the missionary task of the church, but also is a 
great obstacle for ecumenism. Is this critique fair? Fundamentally, I consider the 
presuppositions of this critique problematic; that is, whether the success of missionary 
work is mainly dependent on the comprehensibility of the Christian faith, and
R.Thlemann, Constrnctlngi: a Public Theology (Louisville: W/JKP, 1991), p .139. 
B.Chllds, Biblical Theoloev in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), pp.137. 
S.Hauerwas, A Community o f  Character, p.60.
See J.Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation." In: Proceedings o f  the Catholic Theological 
Society 4 0 (1985), pp.83-94, and see my discussion in pp.lOOff.
211
whether the purpose of theology is to make the Christian faith understandable to the
outsiders. Concerning the first presupposition, it seems to suggest that if  we skilfully
display Cliristianity, it increases the chance of success in evangelism. It is beyond
my ability to assess how true this is, but I know that it is wi'ong to assume that
evangelism basically relates to the matter of reasoning and knowledge. It is
unfortunate when theology seeks to offer a universal theoretical justification for the
Chiistian faith because, when theology accepts this role, it inevitably embarks upon
a "transcendental" exploration. But Lindbeck tells us that
pagan converts to the catholic mainstream did not for the most part, 
first understand the faith and then decide to become Christian; rather, 
the process was reversed: they were first attracted to the Christian 
community and form of life. They submitted themselves to prolonged 
catechetical instruction in which they practised new modes of 
behaviour and learned the stories of Israel and their fulfilment in 
Clu'ist. Only after they had acquired proficiency in the alien Cliristian 
language and form of life were they deemed able intelligently and 
responsibly to profess the faith, to be baptized,®*'
Therefore, an emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Cliristian faith is not necessary
a form of sectarianism, but rather it unmasks the myth of universalism. Universalism
not only results in cultural and social imperialism, but it also distorts
the nature of faith itself. For  in order to sustain the presumed
universality of our convictions, the convictions are transformed into 
general truths about "being human" for which "Christ" becomes a 
handy symbol. Our universalism is not based on assumed 
commonalities about mankind; rather it is based on the belief that the 
God who has made us his own through Jesus Chiist is the God of all
people  Wlien the universality of humanity is substituted for our
faith in the God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob, the eschatological 
dimension of our faith is lost. Christian social ethics then becomes the 
attempt to do ethics for all people rather than being first of all an ethic 
for God’s eschatological people.®®
Hauerwas finds the true ethical power of Cliristianity in its diaspora status as a holy
G.Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 132.
S.HaueiAvas, Against the Nations, pp.71-72, 73, 76-77.
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community. This may erect a boundary between the Christian community and the 
outside world, but this boundary is simply to state the fact that the church is an 
eschatological people which gives witness to the Kingdom on earth.
Besides, an emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Christian faith is nothing 
to do with its superiority over other religions or ideologies. Rather, it is a matter 
concerned with one’s identity. A true dialogue is possible only when each tradition 
knows and holds its distinctiveness seriously rather than selling out its identity for the 
sake of dialogue. The danger always is that when theology attempts to express and 
reinterpret Christianity in appropriate terms to the times for the sake of not being 
ignored, it pays the price of losing its identity. Therefore, the most urgent 
theological issue is not whether there is some common ground between the Christian 
faith and other religious traditions, theistic or secular, or the question of whether 
Christianity is superior to other religious traditions. At the same time, the crucial 
theological issue is not whether the Christian community can find acceptance and 
understanding in other religious communities. On the contrary, the question is 
whether the church can rediscover the sense in which it stands in and lives out o f a 
tradition, reinterpret that tradition so that it is intelligible in the contemporary world, 
and offer a clear description of the Christian faith which makes it relevant to the 
urgent questions and issues of modern society. This is, I believe, what Hauerwas 
intends to do.
Finally, Hauerwas’ confessionalism is also criticized as a form of relativism, 
as has been previously discussed. Here, I would like to explore Hauerwas’ 
confessionalism from a different perspective, that is, its relation to pluralism. If 
Flauerwas’ confessionalism is a form of relativism, it also acknowledges pluralism. 
What kind of pluralism does then Flauerwas’ confessionalism signify? According to
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Richard Mouw and Sander Griffioen, there are two main categories of pluralism, 
namely, normative and descriptive/^ In short, the normative pluralism advocates 
diversity, while the descriptive pluralism acknowledges the existence of diversity as 
a fact that is worth noting. Mouw and Griffioen go on to suggest that each of these 
two categories has at least three general types, namely, directional, associational and 
contextual. Directional pluralism refers to the diversity of visions of the good life 
that give direction to people’s lives. Associational pluralism means the diversity of 
groups’ pattern, and contextual pluralism refers to the diversity which draws upon 
different racial, ethnic, gender, geographical and class experiences. Obviously, our 
concern of Hauerwas’ confessionalism relates to whether it is a form of "descriptive 
directional pluralism" which highlights the fact of a plurality of directional 
perspectives, or a form of "normative directional pluralism" which advocates 
directional plurality as a good state of affairs. From the preceding discussion of 
Hauerwas’ antlu'opological and theological use of narrative, we observe that 
Hauerwas does not contend that it does not matter what the truth is because everyone 
has his/her story. Rather he argues that Christians have their own story, and they 
have to be consistent with it. Although Hauerwas rejects the idea of universalism, 
it does not necessarily mean that he advocates "normative directional pluralism". I 
consider that his use of narrative is a form of "descriptive directional pluralism" 
because he simply states a fact that Christians do not have the same story as non- 
Christians. Therefore, Hauerwas’ emphasis on narrative is indeed a form of 
relativism, but not ultimate relativism. It acknowledges that any notion of rationality, 
knowledge, reality, goodness or rightness must be seen as itself relative to a specific 
conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society or culture. 
This acknowledgement is not to propose that truth does not matter. But truth cannot
Richard Mouw & Sander Griffioen, Pîuralism and Horizons (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1993), pp.1-19,
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be obtained through objective and rational enquiry. Rather truth can be detected 
through one’s moral life being faithful to and transformed by the s t o r y T h u s ,  I 
do not see any threat caused by Hauerwas’ emphasis on narrative.
For Hauerwas, his interest in narrative in Clnistian theology is primarily a 
concern of Christian identity. On the one hand, he suggests that any search for 
Cliristian identity should not be divorced from a community and its tradition. On the 
other hand, any concern of Chi istian identity should not escape the process of being 
transformed. On the contrary, metaphysical enquiry itself is insufficient to provide 
such a requirement because it strives to be methodologically self-conscious, objective 
in evaluation and abstracted from the confusing ebb of everyday life. As a result, 
this brings alienation to the moral self from its tradition. Flowever, this does not 
necessarily mean that theological assertions should take narrative form, but 
theologians need to use narrative analysis in order to interpret the stories that form 
the basis for theological assertions.
See pp.182-183.
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3. NARRATIVE AS A MODEL OF THE KINGDOM
The use of narrative is not a new phenomenon in biblical studies. In the early
1970’s, James Barr has noted that biblical scholarship was moving from an older
paradigm based upon history towards a newer paradigm based upon literature.'
Although there are still some reservations about the role of narrative, apart from its
literary use, the use of narrative in theology gradually becomes prevalent. George
Stroup explains the interest in narrative as a result of
a deep and profound confusion concerning not only what it means to 
be Christian, but also what it means to be male or female, husband or 
wife, father or mother. In the midst of this massive confusion about 
identity and the absence of what were at one time compelling narrative 
and living traditions, it is hardly surprising that there is both a 
fascination with and a longing for narrative that recreate an ordered 
world and provide meaning and direction to personal and communal 
experience.^
However, he also points out that
narrative theology has no obvious conversation partner in philosophy 
which can provide it with an epistemology and a methodology. The 
result has been that the literature on narrative theology continues to 
grow by leaps and bounds but without direction, or saying precisely, 
in every conceivable direction.^
No matter how immature the use of narrative in theology may be at the present, no 
one can ignore its possible impact on future theological development. However, it 
is not my intention here to assess the use of narrative in theology in general. Rather, 
I will limit my scope to Hauerwas’ use of nairative in relation to the Kingdom of 
God in the light of the previous section, that is, to see narrative as a model. I hope 
that thi'ough this limited and specific assessment, we can grasp the significance of
p.43I.
 ^ J.Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1990).
 ^ G.Stroup, "Theology o f Narrative or Narrative Theology?" In: Theology Todav 47 (1991), 
 ^ Ibid., pp.424-432.
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narrative in theological reflection, and further the exploration of its use.
In order to discuss the use o f narrative as a model of the Kingdom, we have 
to clarify the two "ambiguities" of Hauerwas’ use of narrative; that is, what Hauerwas 
means by narrative, and whether narrative is a bridge to systematic theology or it 
properly has some role within theology itself, according to Hauerwas. Regarding the 
first ambiguity of Hauerwas’ use of narrative, we have noticed that narrative can 
refer to either a literary genre, such as what Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg 
define, or a socio-historical description of human existence, as in Stephen Crites. 
Apart from these two uses, Hauerwas himself also uses narrative in vaiious ways. 
For instance, narrative is employed to describe the narrative of the self as constituted 
in the person’s historical particularity, the context of historical communities, the 
constitution of a tradition and the certain events in the communal history of Israel 
and the personal history of Jesus of Nazareth.'* These different uses complicate, and 
even may reduce the possible use o f narrative as a model of the Kingdom because 
different uses of narrative may have different degrees of intelligibility towards our 
understanding of the Kingdom. That is to say, some can function well but some 
cannot. For instance, if narrative is primarily understood as a quality of human 
experience, it not only fails to provide existential insight into the Kingdom, but also 
distorts the truth of the Christian faith because theology then turns to reflect human 
existence rather than God. Therefore, it is crucial to identify Hauerwas’ use of 
narrative. Flowever, Hauerwas does not explicitly define this. Rather he uses 
narrative differently in different contexts. Despite this, the purpose of Hauerwas’ 
different uses of narrative is consistent. That is to say, Hauerwas is not primarily 
interested in nai’rative as literary genre or a transcendental quality of experience, but
 ^ See my previous discussion on Hauei-v/as’ use o f narrative in relation the moral life and 
theology.
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considers that the importance o f narrative is its capacity to investigate, analyze, and 
criticize a way of life, a morality, that is itself story-formed. Thus, for Hauerwas, 
the meaning of narrative lies on its ethical significance; that is, its descriptive and 
interpretive functions. In other words, narrative describes the identity of persons and 
communities which are inseparable from their histories, on the one hand, and explains 
that life is always a matter of seeing from a particular perspective, on the other. 
Hauerwas’ underlying purpose unifies his different uses of narrative, and at the same 
time, allows for great flexibility.
Concerning the second ambiguity of Hauerwas’ use of narrative, Hauerwas’ 
position seems to be unclear. For instance, he says that narrative is "a concept that 
helps to clarify the interrelation between the various themes [i.e. character, virtue and 
vision], he has sought to develop."^ In this sense, the function of narrative is like 
a bridge. However, on another occasion, he writes that "Christian convictions take 
the form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of stories that constitutes a tradition...." 
He continues: "too often we assume [that] the narrative chaiacter of Clnistian 
convictions is incidental to those convictions."® For Hauerwas, the narrative mode 
is neither incidental nor accidental to Chiistian belief, but rather there is no more 
fundamental way to talk of God than in a story. In this sense, Hauerwas suggests 
that narrative properly has some role within theology itself. However, Hauerwas’ 
two different understandings of the role of narrative does not necessarily discredit my 
proposal of the concept of nairative as a model because, as I have said in section one, 
tiauerwas’ ambiguity reflects the "is and is not" characteristic of models. That is to 
say, the content of a model is not intended to be a replica of how an object appears
 ^ S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p.xxv. 
® Ibid., pp.24-25.
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or really is, but does intend to provide a way of cognitively dealing with that object/ 
The notion of narrative provides a way to understand the Kingdom, but at the same 
time, it reflects the nature of the Kingdom. This is not contradictory, but dialectical.
Having clarified the above two ambiguities, I now turn to see the use of 
nairative as a model of the Kingdom. Primarily speaking, to use narrative as a model 
suggests that it is a theoretical model rather than an analogue model, because, 
although both models involve a change of medium and are guided by the more 
abstract aim of reproducing the structure of the original by a different material and/or 
conceptual object, unlike an analogue model, the model of narrative does not share 
an identical set o f features with its original.® Besides, as said in the first section of 
this chapter, I consider that any consideration of the use of model has to relate to one 
o f two questions, either a question of preference or of reference. In short, a matter 
of preference is concerned with how we decide which existing biblical model to use, 
while a matter of reference is concerned with how we can be sure that, if a non- 
biblical model is used, it is true to the essence of the original revelation recorded in 
the Bible.^ Obviously, the concept of narrative relates to a matter of reference 
simply because, despite the narrative form of the Bible, the Bible does not explicitly 
provide the model of narrative for our understanding of the Kingdom. With regard 
to the criteria for reference in model construction, as against from the criteria for 
preference in model selection, it should communicate the clearest and deepest
 ^ See my discussion on the methodology o f the use o f model.
® In short, an analogue model is characterized by its high degree o f  isomorphic correlation 
in order to explain some aspects o f the object, while a theoretical model is to use as much knowledge 
and information as possible, and organize them in a comprehensive way in order to communicate the 
nature o f  the object to contemporary man. Details see Max Black, Models and Metaphors, pp.222-223, 
226-243.
 ^ See p p .l60-162.
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understanding of the truth, make the truth of the Bible relevant to our lives, and help 
us to be more committed to Christ; it also has to illustrate and contend with what 
ways this non-biblical model, namely, narrative, yields better insight than the existing 
biblical models.
The primary reason why Hauerwas prefers narrative as a model basically 
relates to his vision of the moral life. In short, Hauerwas considers that the moral 
life not simply relates to principles and decision making, but is rather concerned with 
the whole vision of the agent in terms of growth and goodness. But he finds that 
most of the existing models of the Kingdom which are characterized by either 
principles or values fail to reveal the appropriate relationship between the Kingdom 
and the Clnistian life. That is to say, the Kingdom is always interpreted as normative 
guidelines to inform a social ethic. But such norms fail to do justice to the 
eschatological character of the Kingdom.'* However, this does not mean that the 
practice of the expression or enactment of the Kingdom within the historical context 
is umiecessary and unimportant. Rather only within the context of naiTative is any 
discussion of norms or value meaningful. For instance, the notion of narrative draws 
our attention to the story of Jesus without making any attempt to abstract some 
principles and values from Jesus’ history and isolate them from Jesus’ history. 
Furthermore, the notion of narrative demands us to share the whole of Jesus’ story 
rather than one or two characteristics of Jesus’ story, and to participate in the reality 
of God’s rule. Such rule is more than a claim that God is lord of this world, but it 
is the creation of a world through a story that teaches us how such a rule is
See pp.l65ff.
S.Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p.44.
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constituted.'^
To consider the replacement of the primacy of norms to understand the 
Kingdom, the notion of narrative first retrieves the importance of the experience of 
individual and the community as the source for theological reflection. It means that 
it is not enough to understand the Kingdom solely by an exegesis of biblical data 
about Jesus’ story and a study of its historical development. Nor is it sufficient to 
understand the Kingdom by metaphysical enquiry. Rather it should also rest on the 
learned ability of the individual and the comimmity to identify the reality of the 
Kingdom in the life of the Cliristian community, in the lives of others and in one’s 
own personal life. Hauerwas says that "the only way we learn of Jesus [and the 
Kingdom] is through his story as we find it in the Gospel and as we see it lived in 
the lives o f  others [italics mine]."'^ However, by no means does an emphasis on 
the importance of the individual’s and community’s experience detract from the 
important task of exegesis, historical study and other doctrines of the faith, but rather 
it does suggest that an equally important systematic question is that of the relation 
between theology, the church’s scripture, and the raw data of experience. I consider 
that this is an important re-discovery because when, nowadays, theology claims to be 
more academic, rational and philosophical, it takes the experience of the people of 
faith less seriously, for this experience is considered as subjective and personal. As 
a result, the Chiistian faith becomes abstract and tedious. An emphasis on the 
importance of the experience of the community of faith reminds us that the task of 
theology is to convey the message of how God works in our contemporary world, 
especially his work among his people, and this requires a continuous dialogue with
See my discussion of Hauerwas’ ecclesioiogy.
S.Haueiwas, A Community of Character, p.44.
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the community o f  faith.
Secondly, the notion of narrative suggests that any enquiry into the character 
of the Kingdom should not be understood apart from the transformation of identity. 
It means that it is not enough to know what the Kingdom is, for the Kingdom has to 
interpret and interpret our personal and social existence. Therefore, in the light of 
the notion of narrative, the Kingdom is never a law-code to be applied casuisticaliy, 
but rather gives meaning to and new orientation of our existence, not by principles, 
but tlii'ough relationship. This is Hauerwas’ emphasis, in saying that "we do not need 
to be freed from narrative, but rather we need to have a narrative which can sustain 
us to face the reality without distortions."*'* However, the transformative power of 
the Kingdom is associated with its demand for truthfulness from those who are 
transformed. This demand is neither a matter of legalism nor a matter of work; 
rather, we have no way to know the Kingdom, unless we are conformed to the 
Kingdom, just as we cannot know who Jesus is, except by following him. The 
significance of the notion of narrative is that it does not, like the fundamentalist view, 
consider that the Kingdom is understood in terms of principles and values; nor does 
it give in to any form of idealism by saying that the Kingdom has nothing to do with 
human life because it is an impossible ideal. Rather the notion of narrative illustrates 
an appropriate relationship between the Kingdom and our identities. Any attempt to 
re-interpret the Christian faith should not solely promote better comprehensibility, but 
also discipleship.
Thirdly, the notion of narrative eliminates any tendency to syncretism. At the 
time of the advance of technology and of the process of secularization, in order not
S.Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p.35.
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to be isolated and disdained, theologians consciously or unconsciously look for a
relatively "social-understandable and acceptable" way, in the standard of the
contemporary world, to display the truth of the Clnistian faith. So many times,
however, this attempt does not reveal the truth of the Clnistian faith, but
accommodates the Christian faith to the standard of the world.'® To cite one
prominent case: in his book God Has Manv Names. John Hick expresses the
confident expectation that we will someday achieve not merely a synthetic Clnistian
theology, but an even broader "world theology":
[Such] a global theology would consist of theories or hypothese 
designed to interpret the religious experience of mankind, as it ocuues 
not only within Christianity, but also within the other great streams of 
religious life, and indeed in the great non-religious faiths also, 
Marxism and Maoism and perhaps- according to one’s defintion of 
"religion"- Confucianism and certain forms of Buddhism. The project 
of a global theology is obviously vast, requiring the co-operative 
labours of many individuals and groups over a period of several 
generations.'®
Hauerwas’ claim of the importance o f the notion of narrative is simple, but urgent; 
that is, to acknowledge the fundamental difference between the Christian faith and 
secular faith. This difference is a difference of story.
However, I have to admit that to consider the notion of narrative as a model
This does not mean that any attempt to re-interpret the Christian faith is a matter of 
accommodation. Rather, according to Hauerwas, Christians are too ready to give in to and follow the 
world’s agenda. For instance, "Tillich thought that it was not so much that Christianity was inherently 
unbelievable, it was that Christianity was burden with too many false intellectual impediments. Who 
cares, modern theologians asked, whether or not Jesus walked on water, or Moses split the Red Sea, 
or Christ bodily rose from the dead? The important matter is not these pre-scientific thought forms 
but the existential reality beneath them. Everything must be translated into existentialism in order to 
be believed. Today, when existentialism has fallen out o f fashion, the modern theologian is more 
likely to translate everything into Whiteheadian process theology, the latest psychoanalytic account, 
or Marxist analysis in order to make it believable." For Hauerwas, the theologian’s job is not to make 
the gospel credible to the modern world, but to make the world credible to the gospel. Details see 
S.Hauerwas, Resident Aliens, chapter 1 and 2.
J.Hick, God Flas Manv Names (London: Macmillan, 1980), p.8.
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is not without difficulty. Although Hauerwas acknowledges that he is not developing 
a "narrative theology" and his use of narrative is confined to the moral life, his use 
o f narrative primarily relates to the "macro" dimension of the use of model. In other 
words, the notion of narrative intends to change the whole network of assumptions 
and concepts of theology rather than confine itself to a particular issue. Therefore, 
it is no longer a matter whether or not Hauerwas intends to develop a "narrative 
theology", but rather whether or not his use of narrative provides sufficient 
epistemologicai foundation for this theological task of nairative.
Here, I have to admit that I am not equipped to formulate a narrative 
theology, but rather I just want to highlight what kind of issues narrative theology 
has to consider in order to display the validity of the use of nairative in theology. 
According to Michael Goldberg, there are three critical issues which any narrative 
theology must face:
1. the relationship between stories and experience- the question of 
truth;
2. the hermeneutic involved for understanding stories rightly- the 
question of meaning;
3. the chai’ge of moral relativism- the question of rationality.'^
Put differently, the first issue is concerned with the need for theologians wishing to 
employ narrative with the cultural-linguistic model of religion to rise to the challenge 
o f their critics that they are weak on truth claims. They need to show, not only that 
their conception of theology allows for strong truth claims, but how truth claims 
might be defended. The second and the third issues are concerned with the need for 
narrative theological ethics to show more clearly how and on what basis we are able 
to choose among the various stories that claim our allegiance or compete for our 
attention. It needs to deal more forthrightly with the charge that it yields a vicious
M.Goldberg, Theology and Narrative, p. 192.
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relativism. And it needs to demonstrate how an ethic of virtue and character shaped 
by nairative can be applied to very specific questions in social ethics. Apart from 
these, narrative theology has to clarify the relationship between narrative and the 
"sub-narratives". What I mean is that the "sub-narratives" may represent a distinctive 
reading of the larger narrative or even a kind of counter-narrative. The examples of 
the "sub-narrative" are liberation theology, black theology, feminist theology and etc. 
They argue that the stories of their groups qualify their interpretation of the Chiistian 
tradition as a whole. Thus, it seems that narrative analysis has to take this diversity 
and particularity into account. Obviously, these issues are beyond the scope of this 
study. Before making any judgment on whether the notion of narrative can be 
employed as a model, let us turn to see whether it meets the criteria of relevance.
The criteria of relevance can be understood socially and personally. On the 
social level, I find that the mode of narrative provides us with a significant point of 
departure to search for communal identity, that is, the meaning of the church. On 
the personal level, I find that the notion of narrative furthers and deepens the 
practice of pastoral care. In the following, I will solely emphasize the relevance of 
the notion of narrative in the personal context because its social relevance has been 
more or less touched upon in previous sections.
There are many definitions of, and approaches to, pastoral caie, but no matter 
which we may take, pastoral care is basically related to persons’ stories. In the 
following, I try to illustrate how the anthropological and theological use of narrative 
may be found useful in pastoral care with reference to a particular setting; that is, 
where patients have AIDS.
Generally speaking, assumptions are made that AIDS always results in death,
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and that death is always tortuously painful. When patients learn that they are HIV 
positive, "why me?" is the impassioned expression of many. This phrase, "why me?", 
can be an expression of anger, a prelude to confession, and/or a lament about a belief 
system crumbling.'® In this situation, narrative provides a suitable vehicle to capture 
those tragie dimensions of existence because most of the time struggle cannot be 
reduced to emotions and/or logic, for they do not sufficiently address the felt sense 
of tragedy. At an earlier stage, their stories may seem discontinuous with the 
historic sense of self because the patients cannot accept the diagnosis as a reality. 
But in the telling and retelling the images which convey meaning for them begin to 
emerge with more clarity and integration. As Hauerwas argues, "What we require 
is.... a narrative that will provide a direction for our character that is appropriate to 
the tragic aspect of our existence."^"
For the carer or counsellor, listening is important as is how we listen. 
Hauerwas says, ".... stories do not illustrate a meaning, they do not symbolize a 
meaning, but rather the meaning is embodied in the forms of the story itself."^' 
Therefore, the interest is not solely to get to the meaning behind the story, but also 
to the story behind the meaning. However, this does not mean that the skills of 
summary and clarification are unimportant in listening, but rather we are no longer 
driven to elicit or distil some abstractions from a narrative. For those who are carers, 
it is their ministry to request and allow the patients to construct and retell their
If the patient is able to see his/her disease as a consequence o f his/her lifestyle, it is rather 
easy to cope with because it at least helps make sense o f  his/her suffering. On the contrary, if  the 
patient is not "responsible" for the disease, he/she finds it hard to cope with because he/she cannot see 
the "point" o f suffering.
See S.Hauerwas, Naming the Silences (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), pp. 1-38.
S.Hauerwas, Truthfiilness and Tragedy, p.5.
Ibid., p.77.
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narratives.
Nevertheless, if  the patients identify themselves with the Clnistian stories, then 
the stories form an important part of the symbolic foundation from which they draw 
identity. The patients may feel a nurturing or a fundamental conflict with some or 
all of these. Thus, the Chiistian carer is the one who engages with the patients in the 
question of the adequacy of the narrative by which they Uve.^  ^ Besides, he/she 
symbolizes a community that has taken its primary identification from a set of sacred 
stories. In addition, he/she seeks to embody the hopeful belief that the God who was 
active in the formative sacred stories is still alive in the current stories of individuals 
and community.
Persons who have received the news of a diagnosis of HIV positive have had 
a dramatic change in the direction of their history. The spiritual task ahead of them 
is to make sense of it. That does not mean they must be able to explain it 
scientifically, or to have a neat answer to the mysteries of illness and death. It does 
mean that they have the task of examining the themes, characters and direction of 
their living stories, and o f weaving this unexpected event into their ongoing story in 
a meaningful way. It is a moral and religious task no less than a psychological one. 
Thus, the concept of narrative proves to be relevant here also. It provides a way of 
expression, challenges existing stories and helps to re-construct an individual’s 
identity.
In summary, I consider that Hauerwas’ use of narrative as a model of the
Hauerwas says that "the so-called problem o f evil Is not and cannot be a single problem, 
for it makes all the difference which god one worships as well as how one thinks that god is known." 
(Naming the Silences, p.51)
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Kingdom is possible and promising because if the Kingdom is always a matter of 
divine-human relationship, according to Sallie McFague,^^ the notion of narrative 
successfully displays this character. That is to say, in the light of narrative, the 
Kingdom is no longer to be considered as a static ideal, but rather is a matter of a 
claim of God’s lordship over all creation, particularly his people. On the other hand, 
if the Kingdom always has a power of transformation in terms of attitude and 
behaviour, then the notion of narrative competently demonstrates the proper 
understanding of the moral life. That is to say, the moral life is a matter of "seeing", 
and this "seeing" relates to one’s mundane and sacred stories. However, 
incorporating narrative elements does not mean that appeals to a common Cluistian 
story will settle every theoretical question. The conclusion of my inquiry is that 
narrative is necessary but insufficient for us to understand the Kingdom. To describe 
the Kingdom as an interweaving nai'rative-dependent and narrative-independent 
features does not nullify the distinctive contribution of narrative to the texture of the 
Christian moral life. Therefore, the notion of narrative as a model cannot be isolated 
from other models, not because theoretically, no model is self-sufficient, but because 
practically, narrative has a role within theology itself which requires "sub-models". 
Thus, to advocate the notion of nairative as a model is simply to understand the 
Kingdom from an appropriate point of departure rather than to consider it as the 
definitive model.
See p. 162.
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C. JUSTICE
1. INJUSTICE AS AN EXPERIENCE OF THE PEOPLE
Sobrino is one of the leading Latin American liberation theologians. While 
it is apparently assumed that he, like other liberation theologians, uses the notion of 
liberation as a model of the Kingdom, in this study, I propose that Sobrino’s main 
concern is the notion of justice, not only because he uses it fairly extensively in his 
works, but also because the notion of justice is in accordance with his emphasis on 
the primacy of the historicity. What then is the relationship between liberation and 
justice? The main difference between them, I consider, is that the notion of 
liberation is an all-embracing concept. For instance, according to Gutierrez, there are 
three levels of liberation- political liberation, the liberation of humans tlrroughout 
history, liberation from sin and admission to communion with God'. On the other 
hand, the notion of justice is mainly concentrated on the socio-political domain, and 
is concerned about the inter-human relationship in terms of responsibility and 
solidarity. But the difference between the notions of liberation and justice is not 
"unbridgable" because the latter is inspired by love in accordance with the grace of 
God which is expressed in God’s liberating act. In the following, I will discuss 
Sobrino’s notion of justice in this sequence. First, I will give a short history of El 
Salvador where Sobrino develops his theology. A brief survey of this historical 
context is necessary because without knowing this, we cannot fully understand what 
the significance of Sobrino’s notion of justice is. I will explain this later. Secondly, 
I will discuss justice as a basic theme in theology with reference to Sobrino's 
understanding of Jesus as the liberator, and how this understanding inspires his 
theological reflection of justice in his social context. Finally, I will suggest to what
 ^ G.Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, pp. 176-177.
229
extent Sobrino’s notion of justice can be used as a theological model.
Basically, I consider that in order to discuss how Sobrino uses the concept of 
justice in his theological framework, we have to be aware of the socio-political 
situation of El Salvador. This is not only because the socio-political context may 
provide us with a glimpse of what justice [injustice] is, but also because a 
philosophical approach to justice which fails to take the account of the experience of 
the victims is abstract and formal. Thus, without having a basic knowledge of what 
is going on in El Salvador, we cannot rightly comprehend why Sobrino interprets 
justice in this or that way. The emphasis on the importance of context suggests that 
justice primarily relates to both "present" and "praxis". Justice relates to "present" 
because it is a response to the injustice experienced by the people in a particular 
place and at a particular time. It is always a matter of "death and life" to those 
people rather than a philosophical theme pursed by philosophers. Without taking 
one’s historical context seriously, we cannot know what justice really is. Besides, 
justice relates to "praxis" because justice is the cry from and the response to the 
victims who suffer from injustice. These two characteristics of justice bring us new 
insights into what justice involves. In the following, I do not attempt to give a 
precise history of El Salvador; rather, in relation to the theme of this section, I limit 
my scope to two main spheres, namely economic and political.^
El Salvador is the smallest country in Central America (8260 square miles) 
with a population o f nearly 5.5 million people (1988). Since her independence from 
Spain in 1838 she has experienced external interventions from Honduras and
 ^ I do admit that my following description is both selective and subjective. That is to say, 
I have already assumed what justice is and should be. However, my subjective description cannot be 
considered as one-sided because the El Salvadorean government never denies the following 
interpretation but simply covers up the facts.
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Guatemala, and has suffered internally from inter-party conflicts, assassinations and 
revolutions. All of these more or less have contributed to the banki'uptcy of the 
economy. It is not easy to say whether the root of the Salvadorean revolution [the 
civil war in the 1980s] lies in the failure of the Salvadorean economy to provide the 
majority of the country’s people with a means of survival or in political instability. 
But one thing is clear; the Salvadorean economy today creates misery rather than a 
means to life. Before turning to see the contemporary economic situation of El 
Salvador, I consider that it is important to look at briefly its historical background 
because poverty in El Salvador is a continuous historical-social phenomenon.
Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century a series of changes in El
Salvador led to the gradual destruction of the peasant economy and therefore of the
ability of the people to meet their basic needs from the land. That is to say, more
peasants had lost access to land altogether and became totally dependent on wage
labour. This was the result of the fact that in the 1880s the wealthiest landowners
took the opportunity of confused legislation and procedures dealing with the land to
seize a lot of common lands as their own. Furthermore, the result of the First World
War and the consequent dislocation in world trade severely depressed coffee prices.
(For instance, in 1901, coffee made up 76% of exports.) This partieularly affected
the small coffee producers, and, as a result, they had to transfer their lands to the
larger landowners. The gap between the rich and the poor gradually became obvious
and unmeasurable. A U.S. Army officer visiting El Salvador in 1931 described the
country this way:
There appears to be nothing between these high-priced cars and the 
oxcart with its barefoot attendant. There is practically no middle
class Thirty or forty families own nearly everything in the country.
They live in almost regal style. The rest of the population has almost
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nothing/
This gap between rich and poor finally led to a revolt. This was a peasant revolt.'*
The immediate cause of this revolt was the world economic crisis which made the
lives of the peasants harder and harder. For instance, when the value of El
Salvador’s coffee exports fell by 70%, the planters tried to shift their losses onto their
workers, by cutting food rations and wages. The result was catastrophic for an
already impoverished sector of the population. This brought deep resentment among
the peasants. The U.S. military attached in Central America, A.R.FIai'ris, reported:
I imagine that the situation in El Salvador today is similar to France 
before the revolution, Russia before her revolution and Mexico before 
hers. The situation is ripe for communism and the communists seem
to have taken notice of that fact It is possible to retar d a socialist
or communist revolution in this country for a number of years, let’s 
say ten or twenty years, but when it happens it is going to be bloody.®
Apart from this immediate cause, the living memory of the expansion of coffee 
which had dispossessed the peasants of their communal lands and forced them into 
wage labour, the urban labour movement and the contemporary organized 
Salvadorean Communist Party also accounted for this revolt. On January 18, 1932, 
a few days before the proposed date of the armed insurrection by the Communist 
Party, the government discovered the plan and arrested the leaders. Although the 
revolt did take place, it had no leader and was quickly crushed by the government. 
Under the direction of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, about 30000 people 
were killed,® out of a population of 1 million at that time. Even now, this event is
 ^ Kenneth J.Grieb, "The United States and the Rise o f General Maximiliano Hernandez 
Martinez." In: Journal o f  Latin American Studies. November 1971, p. 152.
 ^ See Jenny Pearce, Promised Land (London: Latin America Bureau, 1986), pp. 82-86.
5 Ibid., p.83.
® According to the government official report, it said that there was only 1000 people killed 
in this incident.
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still referred to simply as "matanza". It means massacre.
After the massacre, the people in El Salvador were under a military-controlled 
political system for 50 years. Neither General Hernandez Martinez nor any of the 
generals or colonels that later ruled the country did anything to alter the desperate 
circumstances of the rural poor. Within these 50 years, corruption, bribery and 
inefficiency became the characteristics of the government. As a result, the gap 
between the rich and the poor became unbelievably wide. In the late 1970s, it 
seemed that this gap between the rich and the poor could only be handled by a 
radical social transformation. This finally sparked off a decade of civil war 
[officially, it ended in February, 1992].
The dimension of the poverty of the people in El Salvador can be grasped by 
considering the following figures: In 1975, 41% of the rural population had no land, 
an increase from 11.8% in 1950.^ The average amiual income per landless family 
(of 6 members) was US$317. If  families with plots of less than 1 to 5 hectares are 
included, income for 96.13% of rural families was US$576 per year. The poor in 
the cities fared little better. The poorest 10% of families in San Salvador had an 
average amiual income of US$330, the poorest 40%, US$618. Income distribution 
was unequally skew. The average income of the wealthiest 10% in the capital in 
1975 was greater than the combined average income of the lowest 90%. According 
to official sources in 1975 a family of six needed an income of US$704 in order to 
provide life’s basic necessities. But almost 80% of Salvadorean families did not earn 
that much. Furthermore, about 60% did not earn enough (US$533) to provide even 
a minimum diet. In the countryside, 73% of the children suffer from malnutrition;
See Jenny Pearce, Promised Land. p.26ff.
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60 of every 1000 infants dies; more than a quaiter million families (39% of the rural
population) live in one-room dwellings and only 37% of families have access to
potable water.® The most recent report (Ministry of Planning, 1988) place
unemployment in urban areas as at least 50% and in rural areas at 71%. But even
those with jobs generally cannot afford basic necessities. Since 1980 per capita
national income has dropped by 25%, while inflation had raised the cost of living by
360%.^ At the other end of the economic scale, in 1961, 6 families (0.0023% of all
landowners) in El Salvador held 71923 hectares, or 4.6% of all the land under
cultivation. In 1979, the Salvadorean Ministry of Agriculture reported that 0.7% of
all property owners held 40% of the land. Even though we may have different
interpretations of the above figures, it is an undeniable fact that the land of El
Salvador was for many years concentrated in the hands of a minuscule number of
owners, while the number of landless people grew; and the incomes of the poorest
Salvadoreans stagnated while those of the wealthiest multiplied. Besides, the
emphasis on growing crops for export, rather than for domestic consumption, has
resulted in extreme poverty for the majority of the people. Perhaps, it is a good idea
to use a story to show what poverty actually is. It is a story of Dona Francisca.
I was born in 1950. When I was a little girl, my mother worked as a 
servant. She had a room in the house where she worked and I lived 
there with her. I had to stay in the room all day.
My first child, Elvin, was born when I was 15. I made a little money 
selling food in a jail. That’s where I met the father of my last three 
children- Maria, Yanira and Rigoberto. I’ve suffered a lot trying to 
raise them. Maria is sick and lives with me. Yanira goes out with me 
to sell in order to feed her children. Elvin can’t work, but he makes 
little things to sell. He doesn’t like just sitting around doing nothing.
Life is difficult these days. Money hardly buys anything. If I don’t
® Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador (Boulder: Westview, 1982), pp,27ff.
® Tom Barry, El Salvador (Albuquerque: The Inter-Hemisphere Education Resource Center, 
1990), p.75ff.
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sell anything, I end up in debt. I owe 150 colones [about US$30] 
now. How am I ever going to repay that amount? How will I ever 
get out of debt? I sell mangoes and toasted yucca outside the schools, 
but I haven’t sold anything today or yesterday. I ’m desperate. I sell 
so that we can eat. No sales, no food. There is no other way to 
survive. So we keep trying to sell toasted yucca; that’s our whole life.
When there is no food, like now, we don’t know what to do. 
Sometimes we help the cooks at the market, rumiing errands for them.
When that doesn’t work, we wash clothes at the river. Somehow we 
keep going. Often I feel like crying because I know that my 
grandchildren Carlitos, Chon, Maria and Paquita are hungry. Poor 
things. Every morning they ask for bread, but we don’t always have 
any. I ask God to give us food to eat.
I never went to school. With a lot of sacrifice my children completed 
third grade. It’s hard for a mother to see her children suffer. I 
wonder what my grandchildren would be like if they could go to 
school. Wliat would it be like if one of them was educated or 
somehow prepared to make his way in this life?"*
This story is not an extreme example, but is rather a typical experience of many 
Salvadoreans. This disastrous situation in El Salvador can never be simply explained 
by the misfortune of the people, for it is a result of the "structural violence" carried 
out by the govermnent against the poor. That is to say, put negatively, the 
government does not want to anger the rich so that it does not whole-heartedly 
implement its economic policies, such as, the tax system. Put positively, the 
government needs the support of the rich in order to survive so that its policies are 
favoured to the rich. An example can show this ambiguity. In 1988, one of the first 
acts of the new mayor, Armanda Calderon Sol, was to write to the city’s wealthiest 
residents begging them to pay their property tax bills, which are traditionally 
discarded. One Salvadorean observer told the New York Times, "To say that his 
request was ignored is putting it politely."" Consequently, the poor shoulder the
Scott Wright ed., Ei Salvador: A Spring Whose Water Never Run D iv (Washington: 
EPIC A, 1990), pp.28-29.
Ibid., p.73.
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tax burden while many businesses avoid their full tax obligations. Therefore, the
government has to be heavily dependent on indirect or consumption taxes, which fall
most heavily on the poor. Since the civil war, the stake of the economy has become
even disastrous because on the one hand, the war* itself destroys both agricultures and
industries, and on the other hand, for instance, in 1988, the government spent 45%
of current government spending budget for defense and security. Is then the FMLN
[the guerrillas] solely responsible for the further deterioration of the country’s
economy? There is no absolute answer to it. But we can say that the civil war is
not simply a power struggle such as had happened in the history of El Salvador, but
rather is a result of the poor who organize themselves "justly and legally" to escape
from poverty. In order to minimize the gap between the rich and the poor, a honest
land reform should be introduced.*^ Jeimy Pearce rightly makes that point:
only an agrarian reform carried out within a broad process of radical 
social transformation can possibly pave the way for lasting peace and 
development in El Salvador. Compromise solutions based on alliances 
with sectors of the existing ruling class camiot solve the problems 
which first led to the Salvadorean civil war. Privilege and the 
repressive force which sustains it can have no place if  genuine 
solutions are sought to the problems of El Salvador’s poor majority.
A far-reaching agrarian reform will have to tackle ownership of wealth 
and production throughout Salvadorean society, and the poor majority 
must participate in its design and implementation in order to guaiantee 
that it meets their needs."’®
In order to implement the land reform, conflicts between the oppressed and the 
oppressors are unavoidable. However, conflicts sometimes are necessary for any 
social transformation.
Now we turn to the political situation in El Salvador. Since the peasant revolt
The government has already noticed the importance o f  land reform. For instance, in 
1980,land reform had been introduced but was completely failure. See Anjali Sundaram, A Decade 
o f War (London: CIIR, 1991), pp.38-57.
Jenny Pearce, Promised Land. p.303.
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in 1932 El Salvador was a military regime until 1984. However, there is no great 
difference between the military and the civilian governments in their use of force. 
Violence, assassination, massacre and illegal arrest are not strange to the 
Salvadoreans: they are part of their daily experiences. Repression against the popular 
movement began with the ran-sacking of offices of unions, churches and human 
rights organisations, as well as mass detentions, disappearances and the increasing 
report of torture. Almost all of these were carried out by the military in order to 
suppress anyone who sought justice. A report said that since 1980 there are an 
estimated 50000 civilians who have been killed or "disappeared" by the country’s 
security forces. Amnesty International describes El Salvador as a country where the 
"ordinary citizen has no protection when thieatened with anonymous violence.... as 
the police or the military themselves carry out death-squad killings."*'* In Sobrino’s 
term, they are the crucified people because they are killed innocently. No one knows 
the names and even the numbers of those being killed.
Among the most notorious killings were those of the outspoken. For instance, 
the Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero, was gunned down while saying mass 
in March 1980; four North American churchwomen abducted, raped and killed in 
December 1980; six Jesuits, a woman and her daughter were killed in November 
1989. A characteristic feature of human-rights violations in El Salvador is the cover- 
ups and obstructions of justice that take place when there is any serious attempt to 
make use of the legal system to punish the perpetrators of abuses. In most of the 
accusations against the military officers, witnesses are often intimidated, and judges 
are co-opted. Uncooperative judges are killed, as are human rights workers. 
Nevertheless, not only the government, but also the FMLN are responsible for the
Tom Barry, El Salvador, p.42.
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violence. In October 1987, an amnesty was passed which not only freed most
political prisoners accused of FMLN ties, but also extended to any military officers
against whom charges of human rights violation were pending. But it is undeniable
that fundamentally the government cannot escape the blame for violence. I consider
that it is worthwhile to give an account of one of the many massacres carried out by
the military. On December 12, 1981, more than 1000 men, women and children
were killed at Mozote, in the department of Morazan. The massacre was committed
by the Atlacati Battalion, an elite Army unit trained in counter-insurgency by the
U.S. government. The following is the testimony of a 41 year-old woman, the only
witness to the massacre.
I believe I am the only survivor of the Mozote massacre. The village 
was filled with children because the people in the surrounding area had 
fled their homes to take refuge there. That is why the Army was able 
to kill so many people.
The soldiers from the Atlacati Battalion came at seven in the morning.
They said that they had orders to kill everyone. Nobody was to 
remain alive. They locked the women in the houses and the men in 
the church. There were 1100 of us in all. The children were with the 
women. They kept us locked up all morning.
At ten o’clock the soldiers began to kill the men who were in the 
church. First they machine-guimed them and then they slit their 
tlnoats.
By two o’clock the soldiers had finished killing the men and they 
came for the women. They left the children locked up. They 
separated me from, my eight months old daughter and my oldest son.
They took us away to kill us.
"My God!" I prayed, "Almighty God, do not let us die here! You 
know that we have committed no sin."
As we came to the place where they were going to kill us, I was able 
to slip away and hid under a small bush, covering myself with the 
branches. I watched the soldiers line up twenty women and machine- 
gun them. Then they brought another group. Another rain of bullets.
Then another group. And another.
The women screamed and pleaded: "Don’t kill us!" "We haven’t done
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anything!" "Why are you killing us?"
The soldiers replied, "Stop crying! Don’t scream, or the devil will 
come and take you away!" They continued to kill. I was right there 
at their feet, hiding.
When the soldiers finished killing the people, they sat down and 
talked. I heard them saying that they had been sent to kill us because 
we were guerrillas. I watched as they burned all the bodies. When a 
baby cried out from the midst of the flames, one of the soldiers said 
to another, "You didn’t finish killing him." So the other soldier shot 
the baby and the crying stopped. When the flames died down, another 
soldier said, "They’re all dead now. Let’s go and kill the children."
They killed four of my children: my nine years old, my six years old, 
my three years old and my eight months old daughter. My husband 
was killed, too. Only my parents and two of my daughters who lived 
further away are alive.
I spent seven days and nights alone in the hills with nothing to eat or 
drink. I couldn’t find anyone else; the soldiers had killed everyone.
Such violence in El Salvador has produced a steady stream of refugees across the 
border into neighbouring Honduras, where the United Nations estimates that there are 
more than 25000 refugees living on the charity of international relief agencies and 
the hospitality of Honduran peasants who are desperately poor themselves. The
political situation in El Salvador can be described as the rule of lawlessness. That
is to say, the military appears to decide what is legal and what is not. It clearly feels 
that it has authority to take whatever actions it pleases whether or not this is 
judicially sanctioned- and no court ever rules that it has exceeded its authority.
Finally, we turn to see the foreign influence on El Salvador. I do not attempt 
to discuss this matter in terms of the theory of dependence proposed by some of the
Scott Wright ed., El Salvador: A Spring Whose Waters Never Run Di-y (Washington: 
EPICA, 1990), pp.20-21. See also Narvin E.Gettleman ed., El Salvador: Central America in the New  
Cold War (New York: Grove, 1982), pp.128-151. Joe Fish. El Salvador: Testament o f Terror (London: 
Zed, 1988), and Pablo Galdamez, Faith o f a People (London: ClIR, 1986).
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Latin American economists/^ but rather I will simply portray the extent to which 
El Salvador is largely dependent on foreign influence. Tom Barry rightly said that 
the authority of the El Salvadorean govermnent has been severely limited by the 
nongovermnental forces, namely, the armed forces, the U.S. embassy, and the FMLN 
guerrillas.'^ From the economic figures, it is undeniable that the El Salvador 
government is largely dependent on the aid of U.S. For instance, in 1983, El 
Salvador received aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) 
equivalent to almost a third of the country’s export income. In 1987, the foreign aid 
from the U.S. government represented 105% of the El Salvador govermnent’s own 
revenues. However, this large amount of aid does not change the banki’uptcy 
economy of El Salvador because on the one hand, much of the aid is lost to 
corruption, and on the other hand, nearly 75% of the U.S. aid program is for war- 
related expenditures. Besides, the U.S. government does not have a long-term or a 
precise plan to help to recover the economy of El Salvador. Its philosophy is simply 
to stabilize the country for the sake of discouraging the leftists rather than of building 
up a sound economy. As a result, this stabilization assistance has not provided the
Generally speaking, the theory o f  dependence is to set against developmentallsm. Modern 
theories o f  development are concerned with self-sustained and rapid economic growth. This is what 
ultimately w ill enable a country to maximize production, broaden the distribution o f wealth and 
services, democratize the political realm, distribute power more equitably, integrate different sectors 
o f society, and affirm and develop the nation’s heritage. Thus, development is seen as entailing a 
process o f continuous transformation within a haimonious movement o f  social differentiation and 
reintegration o f  functions. On the contrary, radical social change is seen as both economically and 
politically inefficient and costly. On the other hand, dependence theory is the Latin American 
contribution toward an understanding o f  the reality o f  the underdevelopment which these nations 
experience. According to the theory, in order to understand the phenomenon o f  underdevelopment we 
must place it in the context o f the emergence, growth and consolidation o f the capitalist world 
economic system. Dependence is defined as a situation in which the economy o f  a given country is 
conditioned by the development and expansion o f the economy of another country to which it is 
subjected. What is unique to the Latin American experience is that these nations were born as 
dependent nations. Thus their internal structure has been formed as that o f  dependent capitalist 
nations. A good summary details be found in Ismael Garcia, Justice in Latin American Theology of 
Liberation (Atlanta: John Knox, 1987), pp.32-77, and also Robert V.Andelson, From Wasteland to 
Proniised Land (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1992), pp.42-48.
Tom Barry, El Salvador, p. l l .
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foundation for economic progress. Instead, the country has grown increasingly 
dependent on the injections of stabilization funds. More importantly, the U.S. 
government does not object to the aid being used for the building up of an army.
From the above very brief survey of El Salvador, we can conclude that
Salvadoreans are not simply born as poor, but are the victims of "structural
violence".'® By "structural violence" I mean a social order that by necessity allows
the few to appropriate the fruits of the many, thus forming the basis for political
instability and powerlessness for most of the people that live within the system. Such
a social order makes use of overt violence as a necessary means for preserving, but
not transforming the status quo. A social structure is intrinsically violent when it
generates and perpetuates extreme inequalities. Jose Miranda notes that
no one would say that the workers freely accept the national system of 
contracts and transactions in virtue of which they are kept in a state of 
perpetual disempowerment and the capitalists in a perpetual situation 
o f privilege. What forces them to capitulate before the system is the 
prevailing institutional violence which encircles them with hunger.'^
Nelson Mandela has made a very powerful point, saying that "the white man makes 
all the laws, he drags us before his courts and accuses us, and he sits in judgment 
over us."^''
This "structural violence" is sin. The moral dimension of sin, according to 
Reinliold Niebuhr, is an unwillingness to value the claims of the other’s or to see 
one’s own claims as equal but not superior to the other’s. The root of injustice is
See Medellin Conference, in Between Christ and Ceaser. ed. Charles Villa-Vicenclo (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), pp.137-143,
Jose Miranda, Marx and the Bible (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1974), p .7 & ll.
Karen Lebacqz, Justice in an Unjust World (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1987), p.24.
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exploitation: "exploiting, enslaving, or taking advantage of other lives."^' Therefore, 
"structural violence" needs structural conversion. However, this structural conversion 
does not mean that it itself can become the Kingdom of God, but rather it needs 
constantly to be challenged and directed in the light of the Kingdom of God.
R.Niebuhr, An Interpretation o f  Christian Ethics (New York: Seabury, 1935), p.90.
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2. JUSTICE AS A BASIC THEME IN THEOLOGY
a. Jesus Christ, The Way o f  the Son
In chapter one, I have already discussed how Sobrino interprets christology, 
namely, as historical, ecclesial and trinitarian. However, my previous study mainly 
emphasized "following" the historical Jesus. In this section, I will concentrate on 
Sobrino’s interpretation of christology. Apart from the historical, ecclesial and 
trinitarian hypotheses, Sobrino’s interpretation of cliristology is also restricted to two 
other related working hypotheses, namely, contextual and revelational. First, for 
Sobrino, the New Testament presents a variety of christologies, each developed by 
a community trying to explain Jesus in terms of its experience; the community 
likewise draws its meaning from its experience of Jesus. Cliristology has always 
been done from the culture-bound perspective of specific individual communities. 
Some of these have come to be viewed by the church as normative and others have 
been rejected. Without denying the validity of such normative understandings, 
Sobrino aims at presenting a new and different christology relevant to the Latin 
American scene and to the situation of oppressed people elsewhere.' L.Newbigin 
agrees that
neither at the beginning, nor at any subsequent time, is there or can be 
a gospel that is not embodied in a culturally conditioned form of 
word.... Every statement of the gospel in words is conditioned by the 
culture of which those words are a part, and every style of life that 
claims to embody the truth of the gospel is a culturally conditioned 
style of life. There can never be a culture-free gospel.^
J.Moltmann further affirms that
theology cannot be timeless and without location. It must often forgo 
correctness in order to be concrete. It cannot afford balance, but must 
take sides and speak one-sidedly. Its intention is not to satisfy itself, 
but to make a contribution to the healing of everything in church,
 ^ J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p.xv. 
 ^ L.Newbigin, Foolishness to the Greeks, p.4.
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culture and creation.®
Various different christologies reflect the varieties of experience of different Cliristian 
communities, but amid this plurality a unifying factor must be found. For Sobrino, 
this is the historical Jesus. The context in which Sobrino develops his cliristology 
is characterized by injustice, poverty and persecution.'* This is also the context in 
which his christology is primarily intended to address.
Sobrino’s revelational hypothesis considers that if Jesus is the way of the Son 
to the Father [God], then Christians have to follow Jesus’ way in order to become 
sons and daughters of the Father. For Sobrino, Jesus is both "Son" and "brother". 
Jesus is the "Son" because he becomes the Son of God rather than he simply is the 
Son of God. He is a "brother" because he opens the pathway of faith for others to 
traverse.^ Thus, for Sobrino, the difference between Jesus and his sisters and 
brothers is historical rather than ontological. This hypothesis has at least two 
important implications on the interpretation of christology. That is to say, it allows 
Jesus to define "divinity" rather than vice versa, and discipleship, following the 
historical Jesus, acknowledges that Jesus has revealed himself as the Son of God, and 
this revelation is the revelation of the way to God, of the way to become a child of 
God. Obviously, the emphasis on Jesus as the way of the Son relates closely to 
Sobrino’s emphasis on the primacy of the "historical" Jesus.
In the following, 1 will examine how Sobrino’s interpretation of christology 
is under the above working hypotheses. Themes like the Kingdom of God, Jesus’
 ^ R.Bauckhain, Moltmann (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1987), p.viii. 
 ^ See my disucssion on the section o f  the injustice in El Salvador,
® J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, pp.105-108.
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faith, Jesus’ death and resurrection, and their implications on the meaning of the 
proclamation of Jesus as Messiah and Lord will be discussed.
Sobrino agrees with modern New Testament scholarship that Jesus’ own 
preaching focused on the Kingdom of God. On the one hand, Jesus did not preach 
about himself. On the other hand, he did not simply talk about God: he talked about 
the Kingdom of God.^ In chapter one, I have already discussed how we can know 
the Kingdom through its addressee, that is, the poor. In the following, I will examine 
how we can understand the Kingdom from the notion itself and Jesus’ practice. 
Regarding the notion of the Kingdom, Israel recognized God’s lordship over history 
because of God’s liberating acts toward Israel. Thus, the Kingdom of God has two 
key connotations. First, God rules history through dynamic acts, and secondly, the 
purpose of God’s rule is to modify the present order of things and to establish a 
determinate o r d e r T h i s  dynamic element becomes more important when viewed in 
the light of Israel’s history from the destruction of the two kingdoms. This history 
caused a crisis of faith because it was incompatible with Israel’s experience of God. 
It gave rise to the eschatological hope for a change in Israel’s situation. Israel began 
to look for the Messiah and authentic liberation. Apart from this, apocalypticism 
played a role in the development of Israel’s perception of the Kingdom. Not only 
did it evoke hope for a new creation. It also signalled the end of history. For 
Sobrino, the political history and apocalyptic hope suggest that the Kingdom, first of 
all, is a historical reality. It corresponds to a hope in history. Besides, the Kingdom 
is that God’s action impinges directly on the transformation of the whole of society. 
There is no separation between personal and social transformation. More
® J.Sobrlno, Jesus. The Liberator, pp.67-70, 
 ^ J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, p.86.
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importantly, the Kingdom appears as good news in the midst of bad things, in the 
midst of the anti-Kingdom.®
We now turn to Jesus’ praxis in terms of how his view of the Kingdom is 
informed by the Israelites’ view of the Kingdom, on the one hand, and how his 
praxis "revolutionizes" the notion of the Kingdom, on the other. For Jesus, the 
Kingdom relates not only to a reality, but also to praxis. It is because a hope for the 
Kingdom could not be mere expectation of the coming of the Kingdom without doing 
anything practical about it. Therefore, we can primarily discern the meaning of the 
Kingdom from Jesus’ particular praxis in relation to the Kingdom. According to 
Sobrino, they are; Jesus’ miracles, casting out devils, welcoming sinners, speaking 
about parables of the Kingdom and celebration of the Kingdom.® For Sobrino, 
Jesus’ miracles are "signs" of the closeness of the Kingdom. In order to establish this 
thesis, Sobrino contends that in the biblical usage, miracles are not primarily 
important for any supranatural element but for their share in the powerful saving 
action of God. This is why in the Gospel accounts they are never described by the 
Greek word terns, which denotes the extraordinary aspect of an incomprehensible 
event, nor by thauma, which would be the Greek word of miracle. Rather the 
Gospels use semeia (signs, by which the happening attributed to God), dynameis (acts 
of power), and erga (Works, those carried out by J e s u s ) . B y  "signs" Sobrino 
means that miracles do not make the Kingdom real as structural transformation of 
reality, but they are like calls for it, pointing in the direction of what the Kingdom
® This is the characteristic o f Sobrino. That is to say, he always understand the "YES" o f  
God dialectically in terms o f its "NO". Therefore, if  the Kingdom is good news, then it has to be 
against the anti-Kingdom.
 ^ J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, pp.87-104.
Ibid., p.88.
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will be when it comes. Therefore, miracles aie not only "beneficent" signs, but also 
"liberating" signs. Put differently, Jesus’ miracles not only stress on their beneficent 
aspect for someone, but also their liberating aspect against someone or from 
something. If miracles are "liberating" signs, then Jesus’ miracles should not only 
be understood from the Kingdom, but also from the anti-Kingdom, Thus, Jesus’ 
miracles not only generates joy, but also hope, because they show that oppressive 
forces can be routed.
Apart from this, Jesus’ miracles reveal his basic motivation; that is, his pity. 
The miracles not only demonstrate Jesus’ powers as healer whatever they may have 
been, but rather his reaction to the sorrows of the poor and weak, Jesus appears as 
someone deeply moved by the suffering of others, reacting to this in a saving way 
and making this reaction something first and last for him. Jesus sees the suffering 
o f others as something final that can only be reacted to adequately with finality. 
Jesus’ pity was not just a feeling, but a reaction to the suffering of others. Pity is 
therefore not just another virtue in Jesus, but a basic attitude and practice. For Jesus, 
pity has to do with the ultimate, and therefore with God. Then, Jesus’ miracles are 
the consequences of his praxis of love."
In accordance with Sobrino’s revelational hypothesis, Jesus’ miracles reveals 
the way to the Father instead of the divinity of Jesus from human being. Jesus’ 
miracles are not just works of mercy, beneficent aid, but they are at the same time 
works that arouse hope in the possibility of liberation. Thus, this means that present- 
day miracles have to be performed in the presence of and against some oppressive 
power. Sobrino says that "if miracles do not arouse hope that is possible for the
See my discussion on Sobrino’s understanding o f following the historical Jesus.
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Kingdom of God to come- not just that individual wants will be alleviated- and if 
they produce no sort of conflict, then they cannot be compared to the miracles of 
Jesus.
Jesus’ praxis is also characterized by his casting out devils. Sobrino considers 
that the evil at work is not the isolated actions of individual devils, but something 
that permeates everything. It is the negative power of creation, which destroys it and 
makes it capable of destroying, the power that was expressed in history and society 
as the anti-Kingdom." Evil has great power and makes that people feel helpless and 
impotent in the face of it. Jesus transforms the demonological world-view by stating 
that these powers, stronger than human beings, are not higher than God, but the 
reverse. Jesus’ casting out devils signifies that slavery to the Evil One is not the 
final human destiny; liberation is possible. However, Sobrino contends that Jesus is 
not a great exorcist, but rather his casting out devils is an expression of the approach 
of the Kingdom because God cannot be tolerant evil. If the Kingdom of God 
represents God, then the anti-Kingdom represents evil. They are exclusive, and 
antagonistic realities. This implies that the Kingdom has to actively struggle against 
the anti-Kingdom.
Jesus’ praxis shows that he welcomes sinners. According to Sobrino, sinners 
can be categorized into two groups, namely, oppressors and the oppressed." For the 
oppressors, their basic sin consist in oppressing, placing intolerable burdens on others, 
acting unjustly and so on. On the other hand, there are those who sin from weakness
J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, p.92. 
Ibid., p.93.
Ibid., p.96.
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or those legally considered as sinners according to the dominant religious view. Jesus 
takes a vast different approach to each group. He offers salvation to all, and makes 
demands of all, but in a very different way. He directly demands a radical 
conversion of the first group, an active cessation from oppressing. For them, the 
coming of the Kingdom is above all a radical need to stop being oppressors, although 
Jesus also offers them the possibility of being saved. Jesus requires a different type 
of conversion from the second group: acceptance of the fact that God is not like the 
image they have introjected from their oppressors, and the ruling religious culture,,, 
but true love. The God’s coming is a loving God who seeks to welcome all those 
who think themselves unworthy to approach because of their sinfulness.
Sobrino explains that Jesus’ act of welcome expresses liberation of sinners 
from their own inner principle of enslavement. It is grace because this love is what 
achieves that neither pure moral demands, nor tlireat, nor social stigma can achieve. 
It is liberating because it gives those despised and cast out by society back their 
dignity. But Jesus’ welcome to sinners is offered against the criteria sanctioned by 
religion because Jesus has not come to seek out the just, but sinners. More 
importantly, his welcome of sinners unmasks what lies behind who are true sinners 
and who are not. Jesus’ act reveals the partiality and gratituitousness of God to 
sinners."
Apart from Jesus’ deeds, his parables intend to say something about what the
Kingdom is. For Sobrino, the central passage is that the Kingdom of God is for the
poor. He contends that
Jesus often introduces and contrasts two types of person (two brothers, 
a Pharisee and a publican, a rich man and a poor man, ) and his
Ibid., p.98.
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adversaries tend to identify with one of them: the orthodox one, the 
just one.... Jesus then works a reversal that is also a strong criticism of 
his audience: the one whom you take to be "just" is not just, and 
therefore you are not just either. You, he tells them, are like the son 
who said he would go and work, but did not go (Mt.21:28-31). Jesus 
ends the parable with these terrible words: "I tell you the tax collectors 
and prostitutes are going into the Kingdom ahead of you."
Jesus unmasks the hypocrisy of his adversaries and so, his parables are strongly 
critical. Jesus’ parables not only intend to illustrate what the Kingdom is, but also 
demand an appropriate response. That is to say, in the face of the coming Kingdom, 
Christians must be merciful to the needy and do things for them. On the other hand, 
the parables generate hope because the Kingdom is already active, and so, we must 
put our trust in it.
Finally, for Jesus, the Kingdom is not an utopian, because the Kingdom has 
already arrived. Jesus not only hopes for the Kingdom of God, but he affirms that 
it is at hand, that its arrival is imminent, that the Kingdom should not be only an 
object of hope, but of certainty. Jesus’ celebration of the Kingdom is particularly 
illustrated in his common table. In regaid to the people in Latin American, Sobrino 
notes that the poor are experts in sufferings without end, but many of them do not 
give way to sadness. They have the capacity to celebrate what beneficent and 
liberating signs there are. And they celebrate it in community, like Jesus, around a 
table. The shared table is still the great sign of the Kingdom of God.
The close relationship between the Kingdom and Jesus’ praxis shows that if 
the God of Jesus is actively involved in the liberation and reconciliation of human 
being, then access to God is possible only if one’s praxis is based upon following 
Jesus’ own praxis. If God, the Kingdom of God, and Jesus’ own person cannot be
Ibid., p .lO l.
250
known solely through orthodoxy; knowledge must be coupled with action. Jesus is 
the way to the Father and others have access to that way by self-denial and 
discipleship.
We now turn to Sobrino’s interpretation of "the faith of Jesus". Jesus’ own 
faith is not usually a part of christology, probably due to the influence of a 
cliristology "from above". The Christ-event begins with the Incarnation, with God’s 
becoming human. Jesus’ words and deeds are a call to repent and accept God’s 
salvation. Jesus himself does not exhibit faith in God because he is the object of 
faith. Thus, the emphasis is upon Jesus’ divinity rather than his humanity. In order 
to establish the thesis of that the historical Jesus is the key to christology, Sobrino 
posits tliree guidelines to aid in interpreting and understanding the faith of Jesus:
1. Every human action in history.... is guided by certain values as 
basically good at the start.... Hence the historical course of a person 
must entail the concretion of those values which triggered that course.
2. Change and conflict are part of every movement in history. 
Historical concretion, then, is a dialectical process carried out in the 
presence of opposing, negative factors that must be overcome....
3. In the historical process we find a dialectical interplay between 
fashioning reality and fashioning oneself as an active subject."
To be sure, these points are self-evident in a general way; everyone wrestle with 
individuation in the maturation process. Sobrino intends to paint a picture of Jesus’ 
faith based upon the embodiment of his relationship to the Kingdom of God and to 
the God of the Kingdom.
Sobrino divided the history of Jesus’ faith into two stages, before and after 
the so-called Galilean crisis. In the first stage, Jesus did not differ significantly from
J.Sobrino, Christologv at the Crossroads, p.85.
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other rabbis. His teachings are grounded in Jewish orthodoxy. He is not against "the 
Law and the Prophets". He does, however, bring a new slant to them via his 
relationship to God’s Kingdom. The Kingdom represents the possibility of human 
"filiation with the Father."'® Therefore, Jesus advocates doing deeds that effect 
human reconciliation, which is the ultimate goal of the Kingdom.
The transition between the two stages occurs in several interdependent ways. 
The religious leaders do not accept Jesus or his message. The people reject his 
radicalization of the Kingdom as the reference point for living a life faithful to God. 
These two rejections reveal that God and God’s Kingdom are not getting any closer. 
Jesus had failed in his mission as he first conceived it.'®
The second stage begins when Jesus leaves Galilee for Caesarea Philippi and 
the town of the Decapolis. The geographical break is the outward expression of an 
internal re-evaluation of his faith and mission. Jesus now begins to talk about his 
death. He begins to concentrate upon his disciples. Discipleship is re-defined in 
terms of self-sacrifice. God’s Kingdom remains Jesus’ historical point, but he no 
longer sees the Kingdom as imminent. Serving the Kingdom means placing his life 
on the line, even to the point of accepting his death as part of that service. The 
power he now wields is the power of love in suffering. But Jesus’ faith in God 
becomes a "trust against trust"; he cannot base his trust upon historical circumstances. 
Faithfulness to God’s mission is viewed in the light of the possibility of Jesus’ 
imminent death rather than the imminent establishment of God’s Kingdom. Jesus’ 
attitude toward sin also changes in the light of the different relationships that he now
Ibid., pp.91-92.
Ibid., p.93.
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has with God and the Kingdom. Instead of prophetic denunciation, Jesus must bear 
the burden of sin itself; he must feel its power and be led to the cross. Discipleship 
is not only the proclamation of the Kingdom by words and deeds, but also an 
invitation to take up one’s cross as did Jesus. In other words, the elements of Jesus’ 
faith, God, the Kingdom of God and discipleship remain the same in both stages, but 
what has changed is Jesus’ relationship to, and understanding of, those elements.^**
Sobrino continues to explain that faith is a process, an ongoing search for God 
and God’s Kingdom. Since the process is historical, it entails temptation and 
ignorance. These two possibilities form what Sobrino calls the "human condition of 
Jesus’ faith", for this is the environment in which human beings live. For Jesus, 
temptation was a constant companion. He was faced continually with the option of 
defining his person by surrendering to God or by rejecting God; to live for himself 
or to live for others. The Gospel writers telescoped this aspect of Jesus’ life into his 
wilderness temptations. Their placement is important because it sets between Jesus’ 
baptism and his starting on this mission.^*
Sobrino argues that ignorance as an antluopological dimension in Jesus does 
not present too great an obstacle. He bases this conclusion on Luke 2:52. Growth 
and maturation involve learning, which implies that one lacks knowledge. Therefore, 
Jesus had to learn, to speak, to work and to relate to others and so on. In the light 
of this, ignorance is not opposed to the perfection, or maturation, of one’s being- not 
even for Jesus. Sobrino explains that "it is not that Jesus did not know about God,
20 Ibid., pp.94-95.
2^  J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator, pp.148-150.
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but that his human understanding could not embrace everything in God."^^ An 
example of this is Jesus ignorant vis-a-vis, the Kingdom of God [Matt. 16:28, 
Lk.9:27). He does not know when it will arrive, but says some of his followers will 
see it. This shows Jesus not merely not knowing, but making a mistake. From a 
Greek perspective, this is the height of imperfection. How could Jesus, God 
incarnate, be mistaken about the timing of God’s Kingdom? Sobrino contends that 
this is not a problem for biblical faith; in fact, it is the essence of faith because it lets 
God be God. By trusting in God, in spite of his ignorance concerning the Kingdom, 
Jesus reveals his true humanity and his sonship as the firstborn of faith.
The significance of Jesus’ faith for cliristology is evident in three ways. First, 
the faith of Jesus reformulates the concept of his divinity. For Sobrino, Jesus’ 
divinity derives from his relationship to the Father rather than to be Logos. The 
relational character of Jesus’ divinity entails a dynamic conception of "divine nature" 
because it is dependent upon Jesus’ fidelity to his mission to proclaim and actualize 
God’s Kingdom. Secondly, Jesus’ faith means that he is the revelation of the Son 
of God and of the way one becomes a child of God; thus, Jesus is the firstborn of 
faith. Sobrino revives this concept because it signifies Jesus’ relationship to both 
God and humanity; Jesus is both "Son" and "brother". If "brotherliness" is not a part 
of Jesus’ divinity, then Jesus is not the Son". Thirdly, faith is a dialectic between 
actively participating in actualizing the Kingdom and passively being defined by it. 
However, my difficulty of Sobrino’s interpretation of Jesus’ faith is not whether Jesus 
has faith or not, but rather in what ways the Gospels can provide Sobrino sufficient 
material to establish his thesis of Jesus’ faith because if the Gospels are not the 
historical account of Jesus, then how Sobrino can heavily rely on them as an
22 Ibid.. p,153,
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interpretation o f the historical development of Jesus’ faith. More impoiJantly, in 
order to establish the thesis of the faith of Jesus, I consider that Sobrino needs to 
provide a more solid anthropological and psychological foundation.
I now turn to Sobrino’s interpretation of the death of Jesus. The cross has 
always been central to the Cluistian understanding of Jesus and his mission, Sobrino 
recognizes the soteriological statements of the New Testament as valid and true, but 
objects that they tell us God loves us without saying "how" he does so. The "how" 
explains God’s solidarity with humans. Sobrino considers that Christians must go 
beyond church dogma about Jesus’ death because it has tended to privatize salvation. 
That is to say, the church offers pardon for sin, but this deals only with the relation 
between God and the individual, ignoring the root cause. The cross must be 
explained it in terms of society, social injustice and oppression. Otherwise, once the 
cross was dehistorized, worship replaced the actual following of Jesus.
The cross is the historical consequence of Jesus’ life. Jesus proclaimed God’s 
coming Kingdom in a historical situation pervaded by sin. This sinfulness was not 
merely internal or individualistic, but also had an external embodiment that gave 
structure to personal sin. Thus, Jesus’ proclamation brought him into conflict with 
the political and religious leaders of his day because he challenged their conception 
of God. That is to say, God was not found in "privileged locales", but among the 
poor and the oppressed. The religious leaders of his day realized that Jesus was 
offering the people a choice: the God of Jesus or the God of the scribes and 
Pharisees.^® There was also a political aspect to Jesus’ death, for he was crucified 
as a political agitator. Sobrino notes that both Jesus and the Zealots wanted to
22 J.Sobrino, Christologv at the Crossroads, pp.204-209.
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establish God’s Kingdom; both felt that the Kingdom was imminent. Jesus did not, 
however, espouse Zealot orthodoxy uncritically, for his conception of God differed 
from theirs: God would come in grace, not via armed revolution. This means love 
is political; it must take sides. Since God’s love is being incarnated in a world 
pervaded by sin, "it can unfold and develop only by confronting the oppressive 
weight of p o w e r . S i n c e  love is political, it must desacralize political power by 
taking the side of the oppressed.
The cross as the historical consequence of Jesus’ life affects his call to 
discipleship. First, those answering his call must embody in their lives of Jesus’ own 
defense of the poor and prophetic denunciation of oppressive power structures. 
Second, by doing so, they will be enduring Christian suffering, for only the suffering 
that comes from following Jesus is Christian suffering. The cross reveals God’s 
unconditional love within the bounds o f history. The follower of Jesus is extended 
the invitation to be a co-actor with God in history by mediating God’s love in a 
sinful situation. To be saved by the cross means to participate in God’s history of 
concretizing suffering love in history. This is not an explanation of how the cross 
effects salvation; rather, it is an invitation to "experience history as salvation".®^ 
Salvation is meaningless if it is not historicized.
The raising of Jesus out of death is not, strictly speaking, a historical event, 
for no one witnessed it. Nor can one appeal to the empty tomb and "apparitions" of 
Jesus, for then historicity is based upon inference. Sobrino concludes this that the 
resurrection is an "eschatological event" narrated as a "historical event". The
2'^  Ib id ., p.214.
2^  Ibid., pp.226-227.
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resurrection is an eschatological event because
the revelation of God effected in Clnist’s resurrection is a promise....
because it is not a possibility in the world and in history but a 
possibility for the world and for history/^
As a promise, the resurrection is not something to be historically verified, but a 
mission to be carried out. Therefore, the resurrection is not something to be proven, 
but an event to be understood and lived.
Sobrino posits three basic requisites for understanding the resurrection. They 
are a radical hope in the future, a historical consciousness that grasps the meaning of 
history as a promise, and a specific praxis which is nothing else but following of 
J e s u s . T h e  first point is based upon the Jewish apocalyptic expectation of the end 
of time and of the re-creation of reality. This ultimate hope was expressed in the 
hope for the resurrection of the dead, for resurrection implied a radically new 
situation that would superior to the old one. Its core was not merely concerned with 
the end of time or with hope; it also included God’s coming in grace. The 
hermeneutic for understanding the resurrection is not only hope, but also the search 
for justice. The difficulty in understanding the resurrection does not lie in how it 
occurred, but in whether or not God and the Kingdom of God are like Jesus said they 
were. In other words, will justice triumph over injustice?
The second point follows from the first. If  hope is evoked by the resurrection 
of the crucified Jesus, the future must be seen as a promise; more specifically, it is 
the definitive promise p f  God. It is more than the recognition of the open-endedness 
of history; it is a promise that the destiny of Jesus is the destiny of history and of all
2^  Ibid., p.252.
22 Ibid., p.256.
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creation. As such, the resurrection is unfinished in regard to its saving efficacy. This 
means that the hope evoked by God’s promise in Jesus’ resurrection entails a mission.
The third point is the explication of that mission. Sobrino explains that "the 
resurrection sets in motion a life of service designed to implement in reality the 
eschatological ideals of justice, peace and human solidarity."^® This life must be 
concretized in the lives of the crucified peoples of history. That is to say, Christians 
are to proclaim, by word and deed, the good news of God’s Kingdom to the 
oppressed. When this is done, the resurrection will be a revelation of God’s response 
to injustice. Thus, the resurrection symbolizes indirectly the ultimate triumph of 
justice.
In the light of Sobrino’s interpretation of christology, we turn to see how this 
effects his understanding of Jesus as "Messiali" and as Lord. In the Gospels, Jesus 
never clearly proclaimed himself as the "Messiah". Rather, until his resurrection, in 
the light of the Easter experience and in expectation of the approaching of the end, 
his disciples elevated the expression- "Jesus is the Messiah"- to a confession. 
However, this early church’s confession had nothing to do with its contemporary 
Jewish understanding of Messiah as a political figure. But rather it is as Eduaid 
Schweizer says
when members of the early church confessed "Jesus-Christ" it did not 
mean that they knew in advance what the term "Christ" meant and then 
attached to it to Jesus because he fulfilled all the qualifications of that 
title. It means rather that in the ministry of Jesus, most of all in his 
death and his resurrection, they had come to understand for the first 
time what this term "Christ" really means.^®
Ibid., p.255.
2^  Eduard Schweizer, Jesus Christ (London: SCM, 1989), p.52.
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Sobrino admits that the new meaning of Messiah given by the early church does 
successfully remove the narrowness of the Jewish idea of a political Messiah-king.®° 
Nevertheless, he criticizes that this contributes to the "de-messianization" of the 
Messiah.®*
The major consequence of "de-messianization" is, according to Sobrino, that 
salvation is being privatized.®^ First, it is privatized in the sense that the hope of 
salvation in history is being replaced by transcendent salvation. That is to say, 
salvation is concentrated on the forgiveness of personal sins and inner salvation, and 
the socio-political dimension of salvation has been given up. However, this does not 
mean that the New Testament no longer gives any importance to earthly realities- its 
moral demands, with their call to charity, care for the weak- but all these are now 
seen more as ethical requirements than as the central fact of Jesus by virtue of his 
messiahship. Secondly, salvation is reduced to an individual and personal level. The 
correlative of messianic hopes is no longer the people with their collective hopes, but 
the individual. This does not mean that the idea of collectivity has disappeared from 
the New Testament, since what develops out of faith in Clnist is precisely a 
community. But on the other hand, it is true that the concrete hopes of the people 
have disappeared- what we call their social and political hopes. And finally, a 
privatisation of salvation overlooks the fact that the Messiah within the prophetic
The Jewish conception o f  Messiah can be summarized as follows: 1]. The Messiah fulfils 
his task in a purely earthly setting. 2]. No matter whether he introduces his Kingdom in the end time 
or an interim period, he appears is no longer the present one. 3]. Whether it is o f peaceflil or warlike 
character, the work o f the Jewish Messiah is that o f  a political king o f  Israel, He is the national king 
of the Jews. 4]. The Jewish Messiah is o f royal lineage, a descendant o f  David. Details see Oscar 
Cullmann, The Christologv o f  the New Testament (London: SCM, 1963), pp. 113-117.
2  ^J.Sobrino, "Messialis and Messianisms: Reflections from El Salvador." In: Concilium. 1993,
p .l l5 .
22 Ibid., pp.116f.
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tradition o f the Old Testament is the direct correlative of messianic hopes: the poor 
within the people. It is they who hope for the Messiah who will bring justice to the 
orphans and widows and who will be pai’tial on their side. Sobrino comments that 
under the "de-messianization",
the mediator becomes understood more in his relation to the person of 
God than in his relation to the Kingdom of God, as implied in the title 
Messiah.
The New Testament rejects the concept of Messiah as political and 
warrior king, but it would be tragic to convert Christ into the Messiah 
of a purely spiritual Kingdom without incarnation, into a universal 
Messiah without preference for the poor, without mercy towards the 
sufferings, without demands for justice from their oppressors.®®
Therefore, Sobrino calls for the "re-messianization" of Christ; that is, to place him 
in relation to the hopes o f the poor. Nevertheless, Sobrino holds that this "re- 
messianization" is not to "politicize" the Christian faith, for it intends to recover the 
socio-political meaning of the messianic idea. This recovery is to hold a balance 
between the fact that, on the one hand, Jesus did not seek to be a political Messiah 
and, on the other, Jesus’ refusal does not mean that he did not seek to shape society. 
Even though his power was not military, his power of truth (proclamation of the 
utopia of the Kingdom, denunciation and exposme o f the anti-Kingdom), his power 
o f love (with its concrete expressions in mercy and justice) and his power of witness 
(his faithfulness even to the cross) testified that the meaning of Messiah cannot be 
understood purely spiritually or inwardly. Because of this, Sobrino notes critically 
that the mistake of the denial of the political aspect of the Messiali ascribed to Jesus 
by the early church is not its rejection of the idea of a nationalistic warrior king and 
his spurning of a theocratic kingdom, but is its removing the concept of Messiah 
from the oppressions and hopes of human beings in society.®'*
22 Ibid., p . l l 8.
2^  Ibid., p.120.
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Sobrino insists that Jesus expresses the central concerns of the messianic 
hopes of the poor in the Old Testament, but he profoundly changes its theocratic, 
nationalistic, exclusive and military connotations. For Sobrino, the messianic 
character of Jesus is best understood in relation to the Kingdom of God, which we 
have already discussed. This is because the messianic hope was not directed, in the 
first place, towards a specific and particular figure, but rather toward the coming of 
the Kingdom of God.®^  Nevertheless, Sobrino’s emphasis on the socio-political 
messianic idea of Jesus does not reduce Jesus as a mediator [that is, Jesus himself is 
reconciliation] to Jesus as a mediation [that is, Jesus is a bringer of reconciliation]. 
Sobrino himself always maintains that "the mediator is not just Messiah but Son also, 
that Jesus has a basic relationship not only with the Kingdom of God, but also with 
the Father."®  ^ Therefore, the "re-messianization" of Cluist is not to return to 
something like a nationalistic, theocratic and warrior king, but rather is to emphasize 
that the one who was sent by God will have his eyes fixed on the poor of this world, 
with their slaveries and their hopes. Thus, the messianic hope is best to be described 
as a hope of liberation and deliverance, and then Jesus is best to be understood as 
liberator.
Personally, I find that Sobrino’s emphasis on the necessity of the "re- 
messianization" is convincing and illuminating. Sobrino is right that Jesus did not 
identify himself with the Jewish idea of Messiah, but it is wrong to eliminate the 
socio-political dimension of Jesus’ messianship. An example is that when John the 
Baptist questioned Jesus’ messianic identity, Jesus answered his question by pointing 
to this liberating praxis on behalf of the poor: "The blind see, the lame walk, the
22 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p.122.
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lepers are cleaned, the deaf hear, the dead are raised and the poor have the gospel 
preached to them." (Mt. 11:4; Lk.7:22) It is right that we should not reduce Jesus and 
his significance to "purely" political domain; at the same time, we should not reduce 
Jesus by means of excluding the political dimension of his life and fate.
When Sobrino talks about Jesus as Lord, he refers not as much to the exalted
status of a person as to the superiority of a person’s service to the Kingdom of God.
He claims that the title "lord" refers not only to Jesus’ divinity but to his glorified
humanity in light of the resurrection:
The New Testament proclaims Jesus as the eschatological Lord. This 
poses a double question, what is meant by lordship, and how does one 
come to the Lord? The New Testament asserts that it is in virtue of 
his glorified humanity, and not only his divinity, that Clirist is now the 
one to whom God has subjected all things and that he has been 
constituted Lord because of his abasement even to the cross.®^
In analyzing the biblical concept of lordship, Sobrino emphasizes the inter­
relationship of the historical Jesus and the Chiist of faith. The latter must not 
overwhelm the former so that the Lord becomes an ahistorical being, a construct of 
faith.
The main category through which Sobrino understands Jesus as Lord is power. 
Jesus’ lordship is grasped in terms of the power that "mediates God and helps to 
construct a better society."®® The power of Jesus involves prophetic praxis that 
communicates God’s love for the poor; this power is love expressed in the historical 
Jesus’ self-surrender and service in the transformation of social reality into the 
Kingdom of God. Jesus’ power is truth spoken in prophecy, and love communicated
2"^ J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin American, pp.37-38.
2 2 J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p.297.
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■îIin the praxis in responding to the cries of society’s oppressed. The power possessed 
by the Lord Jesus is not an arbitrary power that dominates and enslaves people but
;
"a power embodied in truth and love, in proclamation and denunciation."®® The
kind of power Jesus wields is service, not imposition. Jesus’ lordship is expressed |
in his kingly service of the lowly. In his service, Jesus mediates the God of life. |
i
Sobrino discusses the cosmic aspect of Jesus’ lordship in terms of the biblical 
image of the Kingdom of God. The cosmic lordship of Jesus receives its direction 
and content from the concrete renewal brought about by Jesus in the human 
condition. It refers mainly to the liberation of the cosmos from false divinities.
Jesus’ lordship empowers the progressive coming-to-be the Kingdom of God in Social 
reality. Lordship is liberation from the gods of oppression tliroughout the cosmos.
Jesus’ cosmic lordship unfolds concretely in the exercise of political power for the 
transformation of social structuies and patterns of behaviour that enslave the poor.
His lordship entails the liberating transformation of a bad situation, the overcoming 
of an oppressive situation and regeneration of the world for the sake of the poor 
whom the historical Jesus served and sought to liberate.'*® By restructuring social 
reality for the benefit of the poor, Jesus uses political power to realize the reign of 
God in history and to effect an eschatological transformation of the cosmos into a 
new heaven and a new earth. In his use of power to transmute social reality, Jesus 
is eschatological Lord of the cosmos.
The human dimension of Jesus’ lordship focus on the renewal of the 
believer’s personal freedom. Jesus’ lordship frees the believer for an encounter with
25 Ibid., p.383.
'^ 2 J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, pp.38-39.
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him in discipleship. His lordship is not exercised simply in the acknowledgment of 
his dominion by believers, but is exercised through the liberating praxis of believers. 
The following of Jesus takes the form of a constant humanization in a specific way. 
The meaning of Jesus’ supreme authority cannot be restricted to personal and 
prayerful acknowledgement of his lordship over the cosmos and the church. By 
insisting on praxis as an epistemological source for understanding Jesus’ lordship, 
Sobrino focuses attention on the socio-political ramifications of Jesus’ saving activity. 
The nature of the lordship of Christ can be understood fully only when it is grasped 
in connection with the praxis of the historical Jesus and the praxis of disciples. 
Through his praxis, Jesus mediates God’s liberating love, which occasions the 
renewal of the believer’s personal freedom and ultimately the transformation of social 
realities. Jesus’ lordship entails more than his dominion over individuals and their 
personal salvation. Furthermore, Jesus creates a community that follows him in 
trying to make the Kingdom of God a reality within history. In short, the church 
actualize the political power of its Lord by building the Kingdom that Jesus 
proclaimed in word and deed. It involves conflict because sin holds a destructive 
power in history and takes the form of oppression. The church of the poor is a 
community that struggles against the divinities of death that prevent establishment of 
a kingdom of justice and peace for everyone.
In summary, Sobrino’s concept of Jesus’ lordship is functional; it is 
understood in terms of the superiority of Jesus’ action in realizing God’s reign in 
history.
Sobrino has much to offer to the study of chi’istology. In short, first, Jesus’ 
whole life is a revelation. It cannot be cut into pieces and still have the same 
meaning. This is a corrective to the traditional emphasis upon Jesus’ death and
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resurrection as the revelation of God. For Sobrino, this two-sided event is 
meaningless, if it is separated from the life that preceded it. Secondly, the distinction 
between doxological statements and historical statements is another contribution 
Sobrino makes. Too often faith is defined as belief. But if  the traditional 
understanding of "faith in Jesus" as a call to discipleship is true, then this world and 
its history are important. Thus, doxological statements, such as, "God is love" and 
"Jesus is the Son of God" must be lived out and made credible within history. 
Thirdly, in his revelation as the Son, Jesus concretized the process of filiation, that 
is, the way in which one becomes a child of God. This process not only involves the 
traditional belief in Jesus, but it involves also living life as he lived it by offering 
oneself in service to the Kingdom. Situating God’s love in a sinful world results in 
crucifixion of some sort; but if  one wishes to be a Cliristian, a child of God, there 
is no other way. Fourthly, for Sobrino, God is acting in history in order to transform 
it into a community o f brothers and sisters. The essence of the Kingdom is grace; 
it is based upon God’s initiative for the betterment of himiankind. This dynamic 
view broadens the concept o f sin to include both the vertical and horizontal natures 
of human being. If one sins against God, one sins against people. Likewise, if one 
sins against another person, one sins against God. Finally, Jesus defines what 
divinity is rather than being defined by an abstract, a prior conception of divinity. 
Therefore, Jesus’ suffering and death must be seen as essential to God’s nature. For 
the belief that "God is love" to be credible to humanity, God’s love must be situated 
in a world pervaded by sin. The cross reveals the final consequence of this action. 
God’s power in the resurrection inspires the hope that justice will triumph over 
injustice.
However, as previously stated, Sobrino’s interpretation is not without problem. 
For instance, Sobrino uses the Scripture selectively to support his conclusions, almost
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as if he formulated his christology and then sought out texts to support it. Apart
from his methodological difficulty in using the Scripture, he over-emphasizes the
external reality of sin. Nowhere does he say, "I am part of the problem because I’m
a simier in bondage to my own sinful nature." If sin is merely external bondage, then
a political-economic liberator suffices. If  sin infects the very heart of human
existence, more powerful and radical measures are needed. I consider that the
strength and weakness of Sobrino’s christology is his working hypothesis of
contextuality. That is to say, Sobrino is right that christology has to be relevant to
a specific historical situation before it can be applied to other situations, but he fails
to control his use of contextuality which as a result easily leads to accommodate the
gospel to the world. Despite it, I agree with L.Boff s words
the real question is not whether a particular kind of cliristology is 
partisan or engaged, but to whom and to what this particular kind of 
cluistology is committed and engaged.'’*
L.Boff, Faith on the Edge, p. 120.
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b, A Theological Reflection o f Justice
In this section, I will examine how Sobrino uses the concept of justice in his 
theological reflection in the light of the previous study of the historical context of El 
Salvador and christology. For Sobrino, the Cliristian understanding of justice is not 
primarily dependent upon philosophical reasoning. But rather it must be constructed 
in the light of one’s socio-political context.' Accordingly, social sciences are 
considered as necessary tools to analyze what is happening and to locate the present 
injustices.^ This does not mean that philosophical reasoning has nothing to 
contribute, but rather it is secondary in helping to locate the nature of injustice. 
However, no matter how objective it may be, the result which is obtained from the 
analysis by social sciences itself is inadequate for us to understand what justice is 
because it may be interpreted that the rich have to pity those who are unlucky, and 
this demands no change of the status quo. Therefore, Sobrino considers that this 
analysis should be seen from a partisan perspective, that is, the history o f Jesus which 
signifies a perspective from below, from the standpoint of wretchedness and 
oppression. In this way, injustice is revealed, and the poverty of the people is no 
longer considered as their misfortune, but rather they are the victims of structural 
injustice. Flere we find that Sobrino’s point of departure- historical realities and the 
preferential option for the poor- parallels Elisabeth 8chussler-Fiorenza’ s approach to 
justice, that is, a combination of historical consciousness and biblical remembrance.^
 ^ See J.Sobrino, The True Churcli and the Poor. p.50.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 18-19. Sobrino writes that "if the concern is the liberation o f  the real world from 
its wretched state, theology w ill turn spontaneously to the social sciences. For they analyze the 
concrete m iseiy o f the real world, the mechanisms that create it, and consider possible models o f  
liberation from it." However, throughout his works, Sobrino does not particularly connect social 
sciences with Maixism. In other words, he does not implicitly or explicitly favour any one o f the 
social theories.
 ^ Elisabeth Schussler-Fiorenza, Bread not Stone (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), pp. 14If.
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According to Schussler-Fiorenza, the proper starting point for a theory of 
justice is the juxtaposition of historical consciousness that hears the voices of the 
oppressed, and biblical remembrance that recaptures the meaning of the Scripture as 
understood by the oppressed. This is exactly what I attempted in the last two 
previous parts. Part 1 of this section offers some historical consciousness, consisting 
of both personal stories and the socio-economic data. Part 2a of this section 
emphasizes that the history of Jesus is a history of liberation. Nevertheless, to 
assume that such a juxtaposition is valid is not to assume that direct parallels can be 
found between the history of Jesus and the contemporary world. But it does mean 
that an appropriate understanding of the history of Jesus may illuminate the 
contemporary situation, and that the contemporary situation may illuminate our 
reading of the history of Jesus.'* For instance, the injustice in El Salvador awakens 
Sobrino to interpret the history of Jesus "historically", and the liberating message of 
the history of Jesus helps Sobrino to see the world as it is and as it should not be.'* 
Thus, historical consciousness illuminates biblical remembrance, and biblical 
remembrance in turn illuminates historical consciousness.
Before turning to discuss how Sobrino understands justice, I would like to 
point out tliree important presuppositions in his understanding of justice which may 
not be very obvious in his approach. They are that justice is experiential before it
 ^ In his book, Prophecy and Praxis. Robin Gill discusses this relationship in terms o f  the 
social context o f theology and the social significance o f theology. According to Gill, the social 
context o f theology suggests that theology does not work in a vacuum, but that theologians tend to 
make claims about the society or culture within which they operate and then incorporate these claims 
into their theology. The social significance o f  theology means that theology is both socially 
constructed and a social reality. It may also act as an independent variable and influence its society. 
A summary can be found in Robin Gill ed.. Theology and Sociology (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 
1987), pp.147-148.
 ^ See J.Sobrino, "Awakening from the Sleep o f  Inhumanity." In: The Christian Century. April 
3, 1991, pp.364-370.
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is theoretical because it begins from historical realities; that justice begins with 
narrative because we are asked to recall and pai’ticipate in the history of Jesus; and 
that Jesus is the way of the Son to the Father, and Jesus’ way reveals what justice is 
and how we may be involved in it. Regaining the first presupposition, we will 
discern more fully later that Sobrino’s understanding of justice is a response to the 
experience of the reality of injustice. His concern for justice is not for the sake of 
developing a theory which can help the world run smoothly, but rather is for the sake 
of recovering the humanity of those whose lives are tlireatened and deprived. 
Therefore, Sobrino’s approach to justice is contextual. Because of this, Sobrino 
would not be satisfied with the utilitai’ian understanding of justice represented by 
John Stuart Mill which is concerned about the "greater good" of society^, for this 
theory is detached from the existential experience of the people in El Salvador. It 
does not intend to liberate the poor and the oppressed. On the contrary, it is 
sometimes used as an ideology to defend the interest of the ruling clasess. Sobrino 
would also not completely agree with John Rawl’s understanding of justice as 
fairness^ because it is not radical enough in a situation where injustice is already 
rampant, and rationality itself is distorted by human sin. Does this then mean that 
the contextual approach to justice is itself relative? To say that the corrections of 
injustice will be contextual is not to say that they will be relative. They are 
demanded by circumstances, in accord with a vision of the Kingdom of God. 
However, we admit a basic fact that there are various interpretations of the Kingdom. 
The diversity of interpretation does not necessarily imply that it is invalid to base our 
understanding of justice on the notion of the Kingdom, but rather its diversity is to 
affirm a theological truth that the Kingdom is more than and beyond what we
 ^A summaiy o f M ill’s view can be found in Six Theories o f  Justice (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 
1986), pp. 15-32, by Karen Lebacqz.
Ibid., pp.33-50.
269
understand. Furthermore, in the Bible, justice is always related to a demand of 
practising justice rather than a concept of what it is. In other words, it is a demand 
of correcting what is unjust. Therefore, although we cannot fully grasp what the 
Kingdom is, our vision of the Kingdom cannot be completely denied because we 
have had a foretaste of what it is, and more importantly, we are all already in the 
Kingdom. The Kingdom then offers us a window tlirough which we might glimpse 
injustice and justice [though our glimpses are partial].
With respect to my suggestion that justice begins with narrative, Sobrino 
himself does not explicitly say much about this. Fie perhaps disagrees with it. 
Nevertheless, I suggest this because Sobrino does not base his understanding of 
justice on natural law; on the contrary, he takes the history of Jesus as the point of 
departure, not because functionally it can provide us with a theory of justice, but 
because theologically in Sobrino’s words, "we are the continuation of the history of 
Jesus. In other words, we are a storied people. We are not only called to recall 
Jesus’ story, but we are also requested to shape our stories in accordance with his 
story. The narrative nature of justice is best summarized in Duncan B.Forrester’s 
words;
this story [God’s dealing with his people] shows how God’s people 
have come to know what justice is through their often disturbing and
confusing dealings with the God of justice  Only through the
experience and the memory do we know what love and justice are, and 
we are enabled to love and to do justice by our past and present 
experience of God.
The story and the experience and the memory of God’s dealings are 
prior to our understandings of justice and our endeavours to act justly 
and secure structures of justice, and to reason about justice. The story 
of God who is love and justice disturbs our tidy certainties. It does 
not easily produce a theory of justice, but enlarges our understanding
J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p.
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of, and commitment to, justice.^
I will refer to the narrative nature of justice again in due course.
Finally, Sobrino’s understanding of justice is derived from his interpretation 
of Jesus as the way of the Son. That is to say, Jesus’ way is the revelation of the 
way to God, of the way to become a child o f God. In the preceding section, we have 
already examined how Sobrino interprets christology. For Sobrino, Jesus’ way as the 
way of the Son to the Father is characterized by his commitment to the proclamation 
of the Kingdom of God as good news and the denunciation of all anti-Kingdom 
values which take the form of oppression. According to Sobrino, the Kingdom of 
God is not utopian, but a reality. It embraces both socio-political and personal 
dimensions. Therefore, discipleship is solidarity with the poor by proclaiming the 
good news of God’s Kingdom, by defending their cause, by struggling against 
injustice, and by accepting the consequences of that advocacy. However, this should 
not misinterpret Sobrino by saying that we can deduce the theory of justice from the 
historical Jesus. But what Sobrino intends to say is that Jesus as the way of the Son 
reveals to us how justice is done and understood, and that doing justice is the essence 
of faith. We have to concretize what justice means in our particulai' situation. Jesus 
reveals the way, not the blueprint. In the following, although I will not explicitly 
relate Sobrino’s understanding of justice point to point to his interpretation of 
cluistology, it is obvious that his understanding of justice is christologically 
grounded.
Sobrino does not develop a systematic theory of justice, nor does he provide 
a comprehensive definition of justice. Rather he understands the notion of justice in
 ^ Duncan B.Forrester, "Political Justice and Christian Theology." In: Studies in Christian 
Ethics. 1990, p. 13.
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relation to other concepts, that is, sin, love and humanization. We can now try to see 
how these concepts clarify what Sobrino means by justice.
When Sobrino talks about justice, he always understands it in relation to sin 
[the anti-Kingdom]. He avoids any metaphysical discourse concerning the existential 
nature of sin, and rather emphasizes sin as a historical phenomenon. This emphasis 
makes the ontological interpretation of sin become historical; and the individualistic 
interpretation become collective. In other words, sin is no longer merely understood 
as a characteristic of the weakness of individuals, but it is a structuring power which 
dominates society and its people. Put another way, sin is injustice. Sobrino writes 
that
sin is not just something inside a person. It cannot be described 
adequately if we simply see it as an interior offense against God. Sin 
has an external embodiment that gives shapes and structure to the 
overall situation.*'*
The various anathemas condemn not only sinful conduct in itself, but 
also the sinful behaviour of one social group toward another. Sin is 
condemned in the name of the good news not only as the personal 
failure of the person in his or her relationship with God, but also as 
something preventing the Kingdom of God from becoming a reality for 
the poor. ’ *
This socio-structural interpretation of sin brings a new orientation to Christian 
theology. It suggests that not only an individual needs to be saved, but also, the 
world as well. We are not only liberated from sin through the act o f conversion, but 
we are also liberated to make a historical difference as witnesses to God’s kingdom. 
This interpretation recovers the socio-political dimension of the biblical understanding 
of salvation which prevents any tendency towards the privatisation of the Christian 
faith. Thus, for Sobrino, a concern for justice is not simply a humanitarian concern.
J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroad. p.203. 
J.Sobrino, Jesus in Latin America, pp.133-134.
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but is profoundly and theologically rooted in the doctrine of sin. However, we 
should not misinterpret Sobrino’s view that the Kingdom of God can be historically 
fulfilled by socio-structural liberation. For him, the Kingdom is always 
eschatological.'^ Sin cannot be eradicated from outside ourselves by opposing its 
destructive force with force of our own. Despite this, Sobrino holds that we can and 
are called to overcome particular manifestations of human sinfulness.
Parallel to what the Scripture says about the consequence of sin, the 
consequence of socio-structural sin is also death. This death is not simply a spiritual 
death, but a physical death. Sobrino said that "sin is what dealt death to the Son of 
God, and sin is what continues to deal death to the sons and daughters of God."'^ 
In Latin America, sin is concretized in terms of poverty and violence because they 
deny life. Sobrino reminds us that "if sin reveals itself in the death of human beings, 
then grace reveals itself in the human life that is God’s first and basic gift to us."*'* 
In this sense, the grace of God comes upon those whose lives are deprived. 
Therefore, a call for justice is not simply a concern of just distribution, but rather a 
commitment to protect life.
For Sobrino, justice relates to both a correction of human sinfulness and a 
manifestation of God’s grace. Thus, justice is not only a condemnation of the sinful 
social structures which dehumanize humanity, but is also an affirmation to those 
whose lives are deprived that God is with them. Accordingly, God’s grace is not in 
contrast to his justice, but rather God’s grace is what defines his justice. Justice is
Ibid., pp.94-97.
J.Sobrino, "Awakening from the Sleep o f  Inhumanity." p.366. 
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p. 166.
273
no longer a "purely" human affair, but rather is rooted in the dialectical nature of 
God’s grace; that is, his "YES" and "NO".
Among other Christian ethicists who take the doctrine of sin as a point of 
departure for understanding justice, the views of Reinhold Niebuln are particularity 
significant and provide insights that enhance an understanding of Sobrino’s view.'^ 
One of Niebuhr’s best known epigrams is: "Man’s capacity for justice makes 
democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy 
necessary."'^ The first clause is based on his theological understanding of human 
nature as made in the image of God; the second, on his understanding of sin. 
Therefore, we may say that Niebuhr’s theory of justice, if there is any, is basically 
for the sake of minimizing the influence of human sinfulness. Niebuhr uses the term, 
"original sin", to describe an inevitable fact of human existence, but it is not 
understood in the sense of an inherited corruption. He argues that "if original sin is 
inherited corruption, its inheritance destroys the freedom and therefore the 
responsibility which is basic to the conception of sin. The orthodox doctrine is 
therefore self-destructive."'^ For him, the original sin of humankind is characterized 
by a search for security which has led to the misappropriation of power and the 
egotism of pride. As a result, the misuse of power by humankind leads them to 
injustice and their pride makes them forget that they are creatures of nature. This 
pride of power is revealed by the disordered responses of those who seek to 
overcome their physical insecurity at the expenses of others. Singled out for
In fact, Niebuhr’s analysis o f  human sin was developed out o f  the context o f his concern 
to make relevant the insights o f  the Christian faith to the decisions and structures o f our social life.
R.Niebuhr, The Children o f  Light and the Children o f Darkness (New York; Scribner’s, 
1944), p.xiii.
R.Niebuhr, An Interpretation o f  Christian Ethics (London; SCM, 1936), p. 100. See also 
The Nature and Destinv o f  Man, V ol.l (London: Nisbet & Co., 1941), pp.256-280.
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particular emphasis are the illusions of self-sufficiency, and the vaiious forms of 
greed and exploitation that inevitably make for injustice. In order to minimize the 
impact of the sinfulness of a person on another person, Niebuhr suggests that a more 
realistic goal would be to organize a system of restraints designed to stabilize a 
balance of power in the hopes of minimizing the inordinate expressions of "pride of 
power". He concludes that "justice is basically dependent upon a balance of 
power."*®
Both Sobrino and Niebuhi- agree that the doctrine of sin is their theological 
point of departure (foundation) for understanding justice. Furthermore, they also 
agree that sin, no matter whether it is understood personally and structurally, causes 
injustice to others. Finally, they agree that sin has to be tackled, not only tlirough 
conversion to Chiist, but also through the implementation of social policies. 
Nevertheless, their agreements should not overshadow their differences which lie in 
their different emphases on sin. That is to say, Sobrino emphasizes the socio- 
structural dimension, while Niebulir emphasizes the personal dimension. This 
difference inevitably brings a different theological orientation to their understanding 
of justice. I do not intend to discuss their different theological orientations arising 
from their different emphases on sin because it involves the whole system of their 
thoughts. Rather, I am interested to see how Sobrino’s understanding of justice can 
benefit from Niebuhr’s insights. First of all, Sobrino’s account of sin has a relatively 
more optimistic view on humankind than Niebulir’s. This optimism sometimes tends 
to "idealize" the poor. In other words, the poor ai’e one-sidedly seen as victims 
without referring to the fact that they may be oppressors as well. Therefore, 
Niebulir’s insights on personal sin remind Sobrino that justice should not only be
R.Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Scribner’s 1940), p.26.
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understood in two social classes, namely, the rich and the poor, but also within each 
social class. Secondly, Sobrino’s account of sin suggests that humankind is more 
socially-determined than Niebuhr’s, and therefore, he tends to tackle sin on a 
"historical" level. The danger here is in the temptation to provide an illusionary 
optimism that once the social injustice has gone away, humankind would live in 
harmony. In this way, Niebulir’s insights remind Sobrino that no matter how 
successfully we may overcome social sin, social injustice is still there because we are 
still simiers.
Apart from the use of sin in relation to justice, Sobrino also combines justice
and love together in his writings. He writes that
by justice, I mean the kind of love that seeks effectively to humanize, 
to give life in abundance to the poor and oppressed majorities o f the 
human race. Justice is thus a concrete form of love in which account 
is taken of the quantitative fact that its recipients form majorities and 
of the qualitative fact that they are poor and oppressed.'^
From his writings, we can discern how justice is clarified in terms of three different
uses of love. First, justice is more than a concern for maintaining an objective theory
which suits all situations but rather it has to be involved with the spirituality of the
one who seeks justice.^® In other words, the practice of justice camiot be separated
from the one who practises justice. Thus, justice is related to a spirituality of love.
The necessity of love injustice is because justice, according to Emil Brunner, is that
when we are just, and deal justly, we render to the other what is his 
due. Justice makes no free gift; it gives precisely what is due to the 
other, no more or no less. Its basis is strictly realistic, sober and
rational  Justice is rational because it views man in a rational
system It is sober and realistic in so far as it is impersonal It
does not regard the person as person Justice does not even then say,
"Thou." It knows no "thou"; it knows only the intellectual value, the
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.47. 
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation, pp.34-35.
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intellectual thing- the dignity o f maii7*
We may not necessary totally agree with Brunner’s description, but he does point out
something important. That is to say, in order to be fair, justice seeks to be rational,
impersonal and objective. But the paradox is that the more rational and objective the
demand of justice, the more it may dehumanize humanity. This is especially true
when the practice of justice becomes a legalism. Paul Lehmann remarks: "Justice is
the foundation and the criterion of law; law is not the foundation and criterion of
j u s t i c e . J o s e  Miguez Bonino also agrees that "justice (the objective basis) and
love (the motivating force) together offer a hermeneutical key that enables us to
discern God’s active presence in history and to determine our Cluistian praxis
accordingly."^^ For Sobrino, this motivating force is characterized by "de-centering"
ourselves because a liberating love for the poor demands radical dedication. Thus,
the pain of the poor becomes our pain, and the liberation of the poor becomes ours.
In other words, the liberation of the poor radicalizes the eccentricity of love to the
point of radical forgetfulness of self. Sobrino said that
[the liberation of the poor] calls for that love with a radicality 
unattainable from a point of departure in either a mere loving intention 
or a mere practice as such. The latter provides the setting. But the 
actualization of love is, once again, a question of spirit. '^*
It is this love which leads us to be persecuted among the poor without complaints. 
Sobrino says that the defence of the life of the poor at the price of our own life is 
love to the limit, love with ultimacy. This is the meaning of the cross of Jesus. 
Besides, in Jesus’ teaching on the love for God, he puts love for one’s neighbour
See Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order (London: Lutterworth, 1946), pp. 114-118. 
P.Lelimann, The Transfiguration o f Politics (London: SCM, 1975), pp.250f.
Jose M.Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), p.82. 
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f Liberation, p.33.
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parallel to it. G.Gutierrez writes that
the neighbour is not an occasion, an instrument for becoming closer to
God love for God is expressed in a true love for man himself.
Therefore, justice is no longer a question of imposing a cold and abstract principle 
which would restore the balance of a reality done violence to,^  ^ but rather it is a 
question of love for others with the intention of attending to their needs. Justice 
should be done in a loving fashion. The justice of the Scripture must not be thought 
of as merely a distributive arrangement, allocating goods of various sorts among 
people and groups. The manner in which justice is done, the attitude and motivation, 
matters. In this way, love is a broader and more comprehensive category than 
justice. Still, commitment to justice, that dimension of love that calls us to provide 
for the majority which is poor and oppressed with what they need to achieve a life 
worthy of the name human, is necessary for us to grasp the fullness of God’s loving 
grace. In other words, love may require more, but never less, than justice does.
The second use of love in relation to justice, according to Sobrino, is that love 
should not be limited to a level of inter-personal relationships, but goes beyond it to 
the socio-structural dimension. This is what Sobrino calls "political love".^^ 
Political love seeks to transform the situation of the poor, and so must denounce 
oppression and unmask its structural causes. In Charles Villa-Vicencio’s term, love 
should have a "universal vision".*^ ® He said that "to love one’s neighbour requires 
relating to those in one’s immediate enviromiient in a loving, caring and socially
p.49.
G.Gutierrez, Theology o f  Liberation. p.202.
J.Sobrino, "Latin America: Place o f  Sin and Place o f Forgiveness." In: Concilium, 1986, 
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation, pp.81-82.
Charles Villa-Vicencio, A  Theology o f  Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 174-177.
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responsible manner."^'' In this sense, to love today demands that we become 
engaged in a transforming praxis, seeking to create a more just social order. The 
neighbour in need today is not just an individual but also collectives, social classes 
and nations. Therefore, love can never be individualized, but is an attempt to provide 
fullness of life and the experience of community to the poor and oppressed who have 
been kept marginal. This attempt is not easy because it may bring conflict. But we 
should know that this conflict is unavoidable because our love towards the poor 
demands us to struggle for justice without compromise. This is revealed in Jesus’ 
conflict with the religious leaders as a result of his uncompromising stand for the 
Kingdom of God. If one’s death results from service rendered to the poor, one’s 
death is analogous to the death of Jesus. In this way one shares in crucifixion and, 
consequently, in the hope of resurrection. "Love without justice is in danger of 
becoming sentimental and irrelevant; justice without love easily becomes judgmental 
and uncaring."®'* The relationship between justice and love means, not only that the 
two are mutually supportive so that we cannot have one without the other, but also 
that we should expect each to favour the other.
Thirdly, according to Sobrino, love is characterized by forgiveness. In a 
context marked by serious injustice and unjust killing, love and justice can be one- 
sidedly understood as a defending of the poor against the oppressors. In the conflict, 
the poor are easily identified with "God’s people", while the oppressors are identified 
with "devils". This dualism deepens the hatred between the oppressors and the 
oppressed, the rich and the poor. On the other hand, this dualism also encourages 
a kind of self-righteous mentality among the poor, and leads to a danger of hubris.
Ibid., p.174.
Ducan B.Forrester ed., Just Sharing (London: Epworth, 1988), p.78.
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If this is so, it totally distorts the deepest meaning of liberation. Therefore,
forgiveness is important in the struggle for justice, not only because it helps to
recover the meaning of liberation, but it is also the deepest expression of love.
Sobrino carefully defines forgiveness in two ways, namely, to forgive reality and to
forgive sinners. According to him, to forgive the sin of reality means "converting
it, setting up instead of the anti-Kingdom God’s Kingdom, instead of injustice justice,
instead of oppression freedom, instead of selfishness love, instead of death life."®'
To forgive sinner means that "through love we have to be prepared to welcome the
simier and forgive him; and we have to be prepared to make it impossible for him
to continue with his deeds which dehumanize others and himself."®^ Reinliold
Niebuhr also made such a distinction. He said that
one of the most important results of a spiritual discipline against 
resentment in a social dispute is that it leads to an effort to 
discriminate between the evils of a social system and situation and the 
individuals who are involved in it. Individuals are never as immoral 
as the social situations in which they are involved and which they 
symbolize.®®
Liberation and justice are neither to seek enemies nor to provoke hatred, but rather 
to learn to forgive and to be forgiven. However, forgiveness is possible only if the 
eradication of the sin is taken seriously. It also demands us to build new structures 
of justice. Sobrino argues that "Jesus loves the oppressed by being with them and 
loves the oppressors by being against them."®'* Therefore, an emphasis on 
forgiveness as gratuitous love is an important way of remaining true to what is at the 
origin of liberation movements- love and not vengeance or mere retaliation.
31 J.Sobrino, "Latin America; Place o f  Sin and Place o f Forgiveness." In: Concilium, 1986,
p.48.
Ibid., p.52.
R.Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner’s, 1932), p.248. 
J.Sobrino, "Latin America: Place o f  Sin and Place o f  Forgiveness." p.53.
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If the notions of sin and love help us to realize what injustice is, and to 
understand justice correctly, then the notion of humanization specifies what the 
process of justice involves. According to Sobrino, humanization should be taken in 
three independent but related levels. They are as follows:
1]. on the historical level, which takes in the basic fact that the human 
being is a material and spiritual being, a personal and social being, 
partly the product of history and partly a positive shaper of history;
2]. on the transcendental level, which takes in the fact that the human 
being is referred to something prior and greater than itself, in whom 
it finds its fulfilment;
3]. on the symbolic or liturgical level, which takes in the fact that the 
human being expresses the inner depths of the historical realm and, in 
Clii'istian terms, does so from the standpoint and for the sake of the 
transcendent.®®
Like his understanding of christology, Sobrino takes the historical level as the point 
of departure for his understanding of justice. However, an emphasis on this priority 
is not to depreciate the importance of the other two levels, but rather Sobrino believes 
that the fullness of transcendental life is related to the fullness of historical life. The 
historical level has to be seen in two areas, namely, social structures and the nature 
of human being. First, on the structural level, it means that the structures of society 
have to be humanized so that human beings live in the direction of the Kingdom of 
God. It must try to ensure that they foster the satisfying of primaiy needs, the basic 
equality of human beings, inter-human solidarity and a fair sharing of power.®** In 
El Salvador, it especially means that on the one hand, it has to defend the right to 
life®^ , which is the defence o f the life of the poor. This right is not centred on
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p,186.
Ibid., p.188.
J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation, p .l06 . Since 1970, in ecumenical circles, the catalog 
o f  basic human rights begins with the right to life which includes the means to make continued living 
possible. This shift makes economic and social rights the primaiy concern, while the civil and 
political rights become secondary. A  historical summary o f  this shift o f  emphases on human right can
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individual liberty and dignity, what we call civil rights, but rather the right to life and 
other rights are necessary if life is to be sustained. In this sense, justice is a struggle 
against tlneats to the life of the poor. Therefore, it is not enough to possess a 
doctrine of human rights: structural change in all social, economic and political levels 
has to be demanded. On the other hand, in a decade of civil wai', justice has to be 
related to the humanization of the conflict.®® Sobrino considers that the church’s 
role is not just to pass judgment on the conflict and decide which side is right, but 
its role is also to humanize the conflict from within so that life-fostering values are 
generated and more life results from the resolution of the conflict.
The second area of the historical level of humanization is to transform human
beings in the direction of the "new human being". Sobrino wi'ites that
new human beings are those wise enough to learn, to change, to 
undergo conversion, and to be honest with themselves. They are 
human beings whose values are those of the Sermon on the Mount.
New human beings are clear of eyes and pure of heart, a thirst for 
justice and willing to run the risks entailed. They prefer peace to 
unnecessary elements of strife. They are like Jesus, finding more joy 
in giving than receiving and prepared to offer the greatest proof of 
love. Generous in victory, new human beings are ready to forgive an 
enemy and offer still another chance to a foe. Finally, they are ready 
to celebrate life gratefully, for they believe in life and keep up 
hope/*
Sobrino’s view of the "new human being" is very substantial indeed. It embraces the 
Chi’istian understandings of conversion, sanctification and discipleship. Perhaps 
Sobrino’s view of the "new human being" is best understood in terms of 
"conscientization", which is widely used by Latin American liberation theologians. 
In short, conscientization means "to awaken in individuals and communities.
be found in J.Moltmann, On Human Dignity (London: SCM, 1984), pp.3-18. 
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p .l89.
®* Ibid., p.188.
282
principally tlnough the mass media, a living awareness of justice, infusing in them 
a dynamic sense of responsibility and solidarity."'** In other words, it is concerned 
with empowerment. This empowerment is nothing other than the affirmation of 
human dignity and human responsibility. Nevertheless, Sobrino himself does not 
develop a full concept of conscientization.
In the light of the notions o f sin, love and humanization, how is Sobrino’s 
understanding of justice related to two basic Cliristian concepts or ideals, namely, 
reconciliation and peace?
Justice is a concern for reconciliation because it intends to restore a proper 
relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed. This is why forgiveness plays 
an important role in Sobrino’s theological reflection. In other words, forgiveness is 
an indication to check how far justice is away from its origin- that is, reconciliation. 
Besides, Sobrino always says that love of the oppressed requires us to identify with 
them against the oppressors in order that they may advance to human wholeness, 
while love of the oppressors is shown by struggling against them to save them from 
themselves and from the structures they subserve. A confrontation between the 
oppressors and the oppressed is based on love rather than hatred. The practice of 
justice therefore has to take place before reconciliation of the two sides is possible. 
"Without liberation there is not reconciliation but conciliation."'** In short, 
reconciliation means the bringing again into a harmonious relationship after 
estrangement, while conciliation refers to the gaining of good will by acts which
Dennis P.McCann, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology (MaiyknoU: Orbis, 1982), 
p. 140. A good summary o f conscientization can be found in pp. 164-181. Also see Medellin 
Document 1968, in Joseph Gremillion, The Gospel o f  Justice and Peace (Maiyknoll: Orbis, 1980), 
pp.452-254.
J.G.Davies, Christians, Politics and Violent Reyolution. p. 184.
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induce friendly feeling. The result of conciliation is often that things remain more 
or less as they were before. When reconciliation is misunderstood as conciliation, 
then, it is resurrection without the cross. Reconciliation is a process that is initiated 
by the victims. The victim, not the oppressor, is the proper subject of reconciliation. 
For the victim, "truth" and "voice" are fundamental to reconciliation. Sobrino’s 
account of justice shows us that reconciliation is not to be secured without a price. 
Reconciliation is no cheap option. The cross of Jesus shows that there is no simple 
way o f reconciliation. Jesus was the reconciler precisely because he identified 
himself fully with humankind. As a reconciler, he was no third, neutral party 
mediating between two opponents. Jesus’ liberating action was also his act of 
reconciliation because he was identified with those whom he came to set free. To 
this extent Jesus was partisan. Therefore, the preferential option for the poor is not 
for the sake of provoking further conflict, but this is the only possible way to make 
reconciliation possible.
Since the late 1960s we have been strongly advised that peace cannot be
understood apart from justice.'*^ The prophet, Jeremiah, reminded us that although
Judah was for the time being free from open violence, it was a nation without
integrity. He states it.
For from the least to the greatest of them, everyone is greedy for
unjust gain  They have healed the wound of my people lightly
saying, "Peace, peace." When there is no peace. [Jer.6:13-14]
Therefore, peace has to be accompanied with justice because "poverty is not just a 
denial of life; it is a denial of peace."'*® Peace is not merely cessation of strife, but
See Konrad Raiser, "Reflections about Social Justice within the Ecumenical Movement." 
In: Justice and Righteousness, pp. 154-162, It is interesting to note that during the last four decades, 
the first world often understood peace as the absence o f conflicts and wars because they are threatened 
by the nuclear war, while the third world often understood peace as economic and social injustice.
J.Sobrino, "Unjust and Violent Poverty in Latin America." In: Concilium. 1989, p.56.
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a positive quality of individual and social life. Michael Elliott puts it in this way:
Its dynamic is to create within the community those conditions in 
which people may grow. The quest for peace is therefore the positive 
implementation of conditions and structures which are life-enhancing 
and conversely, the eradication of all those features which are 
destructive of life.'*'*
If we understand peace affirmatively as wholeness rather than negatively as the
absence of war, then in some circumstances the greater threat to peace might come
not from those who were trying to stir up some conflict but from those who supinely
acquiesced in the existing state of affairs. We are called to be peacemakers, not
peace avoiders. As I said earlier, justice may bring conflict and sometimes even war.
This conflict may even destroy the "stability" of society. But this does not
necessarily mean that it brings chaos rather than peace. John Macquarrie writes that
if peace is indeed finally wholeness, then there can be no rest until the 
possibility of wholeness and fulfillment has been opened up for all 
men; and obviously there will have to be a lot of conflict of one kind 
or another before that can happen.'*®
Peace is not something waiting for an infalliable definition, but rather is a process of 
action to make conflicting parties dissociate and associate for common good. In 
summary, reconciliation and peace are the goals of justice, and justice is the concrete 
manifestation of what reconciliation and peace are.
Coming near to the end of our discussion of justice, we may be astonished 
that Sobrino does not appear to have spelled out a theory of justice at all. He talks 
about how justice should be practised in love, but not about how justice should be 
practically operated in the political and economic spheres. His account of justice 
remains vague. It does not offer us a guideline for practising justice in our concrete
Michael C.Elliott, Freedom. Justice and Christian Counter-Culture (London: SCM, 1990),
p.67.
J.MacquaiTle, The Concept o f Peace (London: SCM, 1973), p.33.
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situation. In other words, he says nothing about how power should be balanced, and 
how wealth should be distributed. Does this mean that his account of justice is 
completely contrary to his emphasis on the importance of historical approach? 
However, Sobrino’s "failure" can be explained from two perspectives, namely, 
theological and ethical.
Theologically speaking, Sobrino is not interested in developing a systematic 
theory o f justice because, basically, his theological reflection emphazes on praxis over 
theory. In other words, justice is not a matter of applying a theory of justice to a 
particular situation, but is first related to a matter of doing. Then, our practice 
informs our understanding of justice. However, such an explanation does not solve 
a basic question. That is to say, an emphasis on praxis does need a basic 
understanding of what justice is. Otherwise, praxis is never possible. For Sobrino, 
the Kingdom of God provides us with a vision of justice, but this vision is not a 
theory. This vision informs and directs our praxis. For instance, when the Kingdom 
of God reveals to us that God is life, this insight or vision governs our understanding 
of justice which can extend to a further meaning such as that justice should embrace 
freedom, participation, and fair distribution. Therefore, for Sobrino, justice is a value 
instead of a principle. Because of the fact that it is a value, it demands the agent’s 
character being conformed to this value.
Ethically speaking, justice can be understood from either an extensional 
approach or an intentional approach.'*^ According to C.Frey, an extensional 
approach would try to define justice with reference to some general norm such that
Christofer Frey, "The Impact o f  the Biblical Idea o f Justice on Present Discussions o f  
Social Justice." In; Justice and Righteousness, ed. Henning Graf Reventlow (Sheffied; JSOTS, 1992), 
p.93.
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all relevant cases would seem to be covered by it, while an intentional approach
concentrates on specification and attempts to deepen our understanding of justice by
offering a special case for consideration. Therefore, the extensional approach to
justice is concerned to determine the limits of the concept of justice and the sorts of
cases which may be subsumed under it, while the intentional approach tends to rely
on a particular case which sets our understanding of justice in relief. As a result, the
extensional one is rather objective, while the intentional one is rather subjective.
Here, I suggest that Sobrino adopts an intentional approach to understand justice
because he does not have any attempt to formulate an universal definition of what
justice is, but rather understands it in his social context. This is why he contends the
preferential option for the poor. Clearly, both the extensional and intentional
approaches to justice are necessary and each complements the other. For the
extensional approach, the insight of the intentional approach is needed because justice
has no meaning without a very exact analysis of the actual situation. I argued at the
beginning of this section that justice has to be contextual. At the same time, for the
intentional approach, the insight of the extensional approach is needed because justice
has to have an objective basis. Therefore, it is a mistake to stress that justice has
only to be understood from the extensional approach or that the extensional approach
has a priority over the intentional approach. I agree with what J.G.Davies says that
justice is not primarily a legal term at all. Of course, a legislator, 
when forming a law, should, as a moral agent, take into account 
whether or not the proposal is in accordance with justice, but his or 
her appreciation of justice will not derive from the law itself but from 
ethical consideration.'**'
For Sobrino, justice is both a vision and a concept. It is a vision because it 
has an eschatological character. It belongs to the end, to the fulfilled goal of
J.G.Davies, Christians. Politics and Violent Revolution (London: SCM, 1976), p.80.
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salvation. On the other hand, it is a concept because it makes contact with our actual 
situation or has real purchases on our present policies of action. However, Sobrino’s 
account of justice is not tied up with the question of the distribution of resources. 
But rather he makes a claim that economic activities camiot be immune from ethical 
and moral considerations. Otherwise, humans are simply reduced to "things".
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3. JUSTICE AS A MODEL OF THE KINGDOM
From the previous discussion, we have seen how historical consciousness and 
biblical remembrance weave together in Sobrino’s account of justice. Now, it is time 
for us to assess to what extent justice can be used as a theological model of the 
Kingdom. However, I have to admit that Sobrino never intended to make use of 
justice as a theological model. He therefore never systematically worked out how 
justice can be used as a model. But this does not mean that justice is simply a 
superfluous concept in his theology. On the contrary, it is important and central. 
Sobrino considers that faith and justice are inter-connected.* Faith requires justice 
because faith is not simply a response to the love shown by God, but also a 
conformity to this love. At the same time, justice requires faith because all human 
relationships must be judged in terms of the Kingdom of God. My task here then is 
not to make a critique of whether Sobrino’s use of justice as a theological model is 
valid or not, but rather to discern the possibility of the use o f justice as a theological 
model in the light of our previous exploration of his view.
From what I have said at the beginning of this chapter, I consider that any use 
of model has to refer to one of these questions; that is, either a question of preference 
or reference. In short, a matter of preference is concerned with how we shall decide 
which existing biblical model to use, while a matter of reference is concerned with 
how we can be sure that, if  a non-biblical model is used, the contemporary model 
will remain true to its essence in revelation without distorting the truth of Scripture. 
It is obvious that the issue of whether justice can be used as a theological model of 
the Kingdom is more related to a matter of preference, because in the Bible, justice
 ^ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp.69f.
289
is used to describe the nature o f  God.^
Righteousness and justice are the foundation of thy throne. [Ps.89:14; 
of Deut.32:4; Job 34:4, 12; Isa.5:16; Zeph.3;5; etc.]
Therefore, my task below is to see how justice can be used as a theological model, 
on the one hand, and to discern how justice can be regarded as a preferential model 
in comparison with other models, such as, love, reconciliation and peace, on the 
other. According to what I have said earlier, a preferential model should meet four 
criteria. They are: 1]. it should correlate a high proportion of the related biblical 
material; 2]. it should communicate the clearest and deepest understanding of the 
truth; 3]. it should make the truth of the Scripture relevant to our lives; and 4]. 
finally, it should lead us to have a fresh commitment to Christ. Now, let us take the 
criteria one by one.
Obviously, the first criterion of a model relates to the use of the Bible. 
Cliristofer Frey remarks that there are four possible ways of seeing the Bible in 
relation to ethics. They are:
1]. The isolated critical way which deals with fragments of the biblical 
text by observing the most stringent scholarly methods.
2]. The cumulative interpretation, in which connection especially 
Jewish exegesis, a tradition of many centuries, provides a masterful 
example. It presupposes a hidden systematic hermeneutics, one which, 
however, is hardly ever seen.
3]. The eclectic approach which has historically characterized 
Protestantism in particular, and which is currently popular; it entails 
the constant repetition of the metaphor of the exodus,
4]. The theological way, that is, an attempt to express the core of the 
biblical message; this is not confined to isolated verses, but seeks
 ^ J.Arthur Baird considers that the phrase, justice o f  God, is used 389 times in the Old 
Testament. This notion is related to other concepts like the judging God, the righteousness o f  God, 
the love o f God and the wrath o f  God. See The Justice o f  God in the Teaching o f  Jesus (London: 
SCM, 1963), pp.35-50.
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rather to express a tendency inlierent in the biblical message which 
could point the direction for today’s decisions/
Frey’s clarification draws our attention to a basic fact that our understanding of 
justice should not be wholly dependent upon the study of its appearance in Scripture 
because this provides us only with a partial understanding of what justice is /  But 
justice should be rather understood in a wider context; that is, the relationship 
between God and his people. This is what Frey calls the "theological way".
Sobrino’s account of justice is basically Chiisto-centric; more precisely, his 
account is based on the history of Jesus, That is to say, the history of Jesus defines 
what justice is and should be, and how justice should be done. On the other hand, 
justice is the key to unlock the praxis of Jesus. In the light of Jesus’ praxis, Sobrino 
concludes that first, justice does not merely refer to the proper execution of justice, 
but rather it is bound up with mercy and kindness. In other words, it is a praxis of 
love. Secondly, justice does not merely mean that the judges should judge 
accuiately, but it primarily means that the officials and landowners should act on 
behalf of the poor. It refers salvation to judicial process. This is why Sobrino 
considers that the preferential option for the poor is the hermeneutical point of 
departure to understand Scripture. Thirdly, justice is the necessary element in order 
to have peace and reconciliation among people. For Sobrino, justice is a concept of 
real relation between two parties and not the relationship of an object under the 
consideration to an idea.
Sobrino holds firmly that, because Jesus is God’s fullest revelation, his praxis
 ^ C.Frey, "The Impact o f  the Biblical Idea o f Justice on Present Discussions o f  Social 
Justice." p.92.
For instance, in 2 Sam .l2:l-15, the word justice does not appear, but this passage is an 
important story for us to understand justice.
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discloses the justice of God to us. We are commanded to execute justice because 
God, after whom we in grace and love pattern our lives, executes justice. And our 
justice should correspond to God’s justice, and our love to God’s love, because we 
aie called to be perfect as is God.
Basically, I have no serious question about Sobrino’s insights into justice 
drawn from Jesus’ praxis; that is, justice versus sin, justice as the praxis of love, and 
justice as humanization. But my question is whether our theological understanding 
of justice is to be solely dependent on the praxis of Jesus. I am not suggesting that 
the history of Jesus is inadequate for us to understand what justice is, but rather an 
over-emphasis on the "praxis" of Jesus may give us a distorted meaning of justice 
because justice is primaiily seen as the way to the Father rather than as in the first 
place about how God’s justice comes upon us. In other words, when we talk about 
justice, it is not enough to know what justice is about and how we should practise 
justice, but it is also important for us to experience what justice is. This experience 
is vital in our understanding of justice because we learn to do justice by being 
justified just like we leaiii to forgive by being forgiven. Therefore, I suggest that 
justice should be understood in the context of the covenant between God and 
humankind. In this context, Jesus’ praxis is God’s fullest expression of his covenant 
with humankind, on the one hand, and, it is an example of humankind’s response to 
their covenant with God, on the other. I do not mean that Sobrino ignores this 
aspect, but he assumes rather than analyzes it. In the following, I try to explore how 
the context of covenant illuminates our understanding of justice.
In the Old Testament, the word, justice [mispat] is associated with the word, 
righteousness {tsedeq\. For instance.
But let justice roll down like waters,
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And righteousness like a perennial stream. [Amos 5:24]
Give the king thy justice, O God,
And thy righteousness to the King’s son.
That he may judge thy people with right,
And thine afflicted with justice!
May the mountains bring the people peace,
And the hills righteousness
May he judge the afflicted of the people,
And give deliverance to the poor.
And crush the oppressor. [Ps.72:l-4]
Therefore, our understanding of justice cannot be isolated from God’s righteousness.
God’s righteousness is not primarily used in Scripture to speak of God’s punisliment
for sin^, but rather refers to God’s positive actions in creating and preserving
community, particularly on behalf of marginal members. Peter Stuhlmacher says:
God’s righteousness that is more and intends more than merely the 
carrying out of punishment; it wants to offer and create new life.^
Besides, the word, justice, is not primarily concerned about the judicial institution. 
But it principally means the deliverance of God’s people and the oppressed from 
oppression. Mispat is the defence of the weak, the liberation of the oppressed, doing 
justice to the poor.^ In contemporary use, this is called liberation.
Literally, righteousness and justice, in ‘the Scripture, mean the fulfillment of 
the demands of a relationship, whether that relationship be with humans or with God. 
Each person is set within a multitude of relationships: king with people, judge with 
complainants, priests with worshippers, individual with family, community with 
resident alien and poor, all with God. When God, or a person, fulfils the conditions
® Stephen Charles Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (Osford: Oxford University Press, 
1982), p.63.
® Peter Stuhimacher, Reconciliation. Law and Righteousness (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986),
p.80.
 ^ Jose Porfirio Miranda, Marx and the Bible (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1974), p p .l l l f .
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imposed upon him/her by a relationship, she/he is righteous. For instance, on the 
social level, in Gen.38:26, Judah acknowledged that Tamar was more righteous than 
him because he did not fulfil the demands of a social relationship [this righteousness 
did not have a religious base]. On the religious level, the righteousness of God was 
manifested in his constant faithfulness to his covenant with Israel. This was 
exemplified by his steadfast love even though Israel was more often than not 
unfaithful to him. This particular relationship between God and humankind is called 
a covenant. Within this covenant relationship the law is given as a guide by God to 
his covenant people. Its purpose is to make them holy as God is holy. But the law 
is meaningless outside the relationship, outside the covenant. Whoever receives 
God’s election in faith places their life under God’s lordship, also follows the law, 
because the law is God’s guidance within the covenant relationship. The context of 
the law then, is holiness and lordship. Obedience to the law does not make a person 
righteous. The relationship to God, the relationship of faith, is primary. And though 
humankind’s righteousness fails, God’s endures. He intervenes on behalf of his own, 
saving them from bondage, forgiving their sin, declaring them to be right before him 
and all the world. On the human side, we accept the covenant relationship with God 
by repentance, faith and obedience. Then, righteousness is a matter of our 
relationship to God, not an ethical state. Wlien we are in a positive relationship to 
God, through God’s act in Christ, we are truly righteous because Christ has, by God’s 
act, reintroduced us into a positive relationship to God. The covenant relationship 
between God and humankind, which God by his act in Christ restores and upholds, 
places a demand, as do all relationships, on humankind. This demand is faith. But 
the restored relationship also includes the creation of a new community among 
humankind. Therefore, those who share in the new divine-human relationship also 
share in the new community, and thus the covenant relationship places a demand on 
us over against our fellow humans. Thus, the righteous are those who have met the
294
demands towards others which are laid on us by our participation in the covenant 
relationship. For instance, the demands are: to feed the hungry, give drink to the 
thirsty and perform other acts of mercy. Because of the fact that the nature of the 
relationship between humankind is determined by the nature of the relationship 
between God and humankind, fulfilment of the former is also fulfilment of the 
demands o f the latter.
Within the context of covenant, our understanding of Jesus’ praxis in relation 
to justice would be re-formulated in the following ways. First, for the church, doing 
justice is not simply an ethical decision, but rather is an existential question of faith. 
In other words, doing justice is not simply to meet the needs of the poor, but rather 
is related to our relationship with God. This emphasis does not have any intention 
to "spiritualize" justice or to use justice as a means for achieving our own 
righteousness. But rather it is God’s graciousness which brings us to realize our 
responsibility towards our neighbours and to confess our unfaithfulness towards the 
covenant. Secondly, for the oppressed, God’s covenant is a promise that they will 
be liberated. God intends to restore their rights because God’s righteous judgments 
are saving judgments. Those who are righteous are those who are victims of 
oppressors [Ps.l4:5], of enemies [Ps.69:28], of wicked rulers [Ps.94:21], of violent 
men [Ps.l40:13]. And their hope is the lord because it is he who restores their right. 
Flis judgments are always favourable [Ps. 146:7-9] for the oppressed and the hungry, 
the prisoner and the blind, the widow and the fatherless, the alien and the poor 
[Amos 2:6]. Because his righteousness is his restoration of the right to those from 
whom it has been taken, it at the same time includes punishment of the evil-doer; the 
punishment is an integral part of the restoration. Only because God saves does he 
condemn. "Fie is a righteous God and a Saviour. "[Isa.45:21] Thirdly, for society, 
the notion of covenant provides us with a fundamental but important concept of
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justice. That is to say, justice is concerned with a proper relationship. Both parties 
should respect and obey the conditions which are the essence of sustaining a proper 
relationship, otherwise the covenant is broken and justice is needed. Thus, Justice is 
not simply for the sake of making judgment, but rather for the sake of making 
reconciliation possible.
Basically, my interpretation of justice which lies on God’s covenant with us 
and Sobrino’s account of justice which lies on Jesus’ praxis have no great difference. 
However, this does not mean that we can use either of these as a point of departure 
of understanding justice. I rather consider that God’s covenant with us should be the 
point of departure because within the context of the covenant we experience what 
justice is, and this experience in return shapes our understanding of justice. Besides, 
an emphasis on God’s covenant with us does not turn Jesus’ praxis into a blueprint 
for our pursuit of justice in our contemporary world, but rather understands it as a 
sign of God’s covenant love. Duncan B.Forrester wi'ites that
this story [God’s dealing with his people which I call the covenant] 
shows how God’s people have come to know what justice is through 
their often disturbing and confusing dealings with the God of
justice Only through the experience and memory do we know what
love and justice are, and we are enabled to love and to do justice by 
our past and present experience of God.^
From Sobrino’s account of justice, we realize that justice itself is a very rich 
concept. It provides a vantage point from which to see that the Kingdom cannot be 
primarily understood individually and spiritually, but has a public and socio-political 
dimension. However, a recovery of the public dimension of the Kingdom does not 
necessarily mean that we "politicize" our Christian faith. We have to make a clear
® D.B.Forrester, "Political Justice and Christian Theology." In: Studies in Christian Ethics. 
1990, p .l3 .
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distinction between our involvement in politics and the interpretation of religious 
values as political values. Our involvement in politics does not imply that the church 
is a political institution, but rather the Kingdom challenges us to see that the needs 
of humankind camiot be met individually. Besides, sometimes we may be accused 
that we are saying the same thing as the secular world does. But in depth, we aie 
different. For instance, Sobrino’s account of justice is characterized by a profound 
spirituality.
As previously said, the validity of a model is largely dependent on its 
relevance to its social context. Flowever, this emphasis does not mean that the social 
context itself determines the content o f theology, but rather admits that a model is 
basically constructed so that it has to refer to its social context. Therefore, when we 
talk about the relevance of a model to its social context, we are talking about our 
subjective and partial experience. Thus, when I agree with Sobrino’s view that 
justice is a theological model of the Kingdom in El Salvador, I am not saying that 
justice is the only complete model, because at the same time I realize that other 
churches may find this model irrelevant.^ Does it suggest that we do not have to 
talk about the criterion of relevance because we cannot find an objective base? Of 
course not. Through our partiality and dialogue, I believe that we can better 
understand the truth. In a context marked by injustice and violence, I consider that 
justice should be given preference as a theological model because first, justice relates 
to "hope against hope". It encourages us not to give in to a situation but affirms our 
responsibility to our neighbours. This suggests that God’s justification of sinners and
 ^ We may note that there is a growing number o f  the evangelical churches in El Salvador, 
especially, the pentecostal churches. This growth is related to the result o f  the U.S. evangelical 
movement in El Salvador. More importantly, these churches are characterized by fundamentalism. 
We can imagine that for them, justice is never a theological model, but rather a narrow-minded 
understanding o f  "conversion" is. See Tom Barry, El Salvador, pp.114-115.
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his grace must not be separated from human systems of justice. Secondly, justice has 
a sense of both judgment and salvation. On the one hand, this challenges the 
oppressed authority and, on the other, it reflects the nature of the Gospel; that is, it 
is good news to the poor. Thirdly, within the context of covenant, justice warns the 
church not to retreat from the front line despite being persecuted. I f  it does, the 
church breaks God’s covenant with herself. Finally, justice summarizes the deepest 
feeling of the people. In addition, it has its secular audience so that it can easily 
arouse the consciousness o f the world.
However, Sobrino reminds us that justice is not only a concept, but also has 
to be related to our discipleship. This is why he does not begin from a philosophical 
enquiry of what justice is, but rather praxis is his starting point.
Summing up what we have discussed so far, we have reasons to consider that 
justice can be used as a model o f the Kingdom. This is because it is deeply rooted 
in the biblical truth- that is, the righteousness of God. For God’s righteousness is his 
acting out of the obligation which he took upon himself in creating the world and in 
choosing Israel to be his people. And it consists primarily in drawing human persons 
into the appropriate relationship with himself and in sustaining them in that 
relationship. Thus, the biblical understanding of righteousness/justice involves two 
aspect: righteousness, as both horizontal and vertical, as involving responsibility to 
one’s neighbour as part and parcel of one’s responsibility towards God. However, 
we have to be aware of the fact that justice is not "the" definitive model. Wlien the 
social situation changes, perhaps, justice has to be replaced by other models, such as, 
reconciliation or reconstruction. But we have to bear in mind that this replacement 
has nothing to do with the truth of justice. Rather, in different social contexts, 
different models are needed in order that we can glimpse the Kingdom more clearly
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and be faithful to it.
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D. ASSESSMENT
After a leiigthly explication and discussion of the use of narrative and justice 
as models of the Kingdom, we realize that although both Hauerwas and Sobrino have 
no intention of establishing a full account of the uses of narrative and justice as 
theological models respectively, it is undeniable that their concern is to deliberately 
reveal the deepest meaning of the Kingdom. That is to say, when we attempt to 
understand events or objects in our experience, we inevitably do so by seeking some 
similarity with things already known, by endeavouring to see the new in terms of the 
old, one thing as another. This is the model. For Hauerwas, the concept of narrative 
rooted in human experience appropriately displays the relationship between the 
Kingdom and its agent in terms of vision, virtue and character; while for Sobrino, the 
concept o f justice rooted in human desire signifies the essence of the Kingdom which 
Jesus’ life reveals to us [Lk.4:18~19]. Besides, it is obvious that Hauerwas’ notion 
of narrative is a non-biblical model which deals with a matter of reference, while 
Sobrino’s notion of justice is a biblical model which deals with a matter of 
preference.
Apparently, Hauerwas’ notion of narrative and Sobrino’s notion of justice are 
two completely different notions. Although their use of language and their concern 
are on a tangent, I still discern common features in their reaction towards the 
enlightemnent, the potentiality of being a "macro" model, and the relationship 
between narrative and the metaphorical perspective of the Kingdom,
Firstly, interestingly enough, both Hauerwas’ notion of narrative and 
Sobrino’s notion of justice aie essentially responses to the legacies o f the 
enlightenment. For Hauerwas, the deficiency of the enlightenment is its over­
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emphasis on the primacy of universality and objectivity/ For example, it reduces 
ethics to a standard account of morality: ethics is no longer concerned about the 
moral self, but about what is right. In relation to personhood, it isolates people from 
their histories and, as a result, people become strangers to one another. 
Theologically, it accommodates the Gospel to its own criterion; that is, the primacy 
of objectivity. Theologians attempt to explain the Christian faith in accordance with 
the world’s standard, such as the historical quest of Jesus, and consequently, the 
Christian faith loses its identity and distinctive meaning. Hauerwas’ notion of 
narrative is a response to this fallacy. To emphasize the narrative-dependent ethic 
is not to reject the importance of objectivity, but rather objectivity cannot be 
considered as the ultimate criterion because it distorts the narrative nature of human 
experience and reality.
For Sobrino, the enlightenment has two phases. According to Sobrino, the 
first phase is represented by Kant which aimed at the liberation from all authority, 
while the second phase is represented by Marx which looked to liberation from the 
wretched conditions of the real world.^ These two phases demands two ways of 
doing theology. Broadly speaking, modern European theology has been oriented to 
the first phase of enlightenment. Its main characteristic is its emphasis on the 
philosophical and metaphsyical enquiry of the Christian faith. The justification of the 
faith occurs through the harmony of the faith with some universal truth, with 
historical truth or with itself. Without minimizing its value, Sobrino criticizes this 
emphasis for resulting in "dehistorizing" and "philosophize" the Christian faith. On 
the contrary, Sobrino emphasizes that Latin American theology takes up the challenge
 ^ See my discussion on Hauenvas' concept of char acter, vision and virtue.
 ^ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp. 10-16.
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represented by the second phase of the enlightenment. He says that
in this theology, the liberating function of theological understanding 
does not consist in explaining or giving meaning to an existing reality 
or to the faith as threatened by a particular situation, but in 
transforming a reality so that it may take on meaning and the lost or 
tlireatened of the faith thereby also be recovered.^
G.Fackre, The Christian Story: A Narrative Interpretation o f  Basic Christian Doctrine 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), and The Christian Story: A Pastoral Svstematics (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1987).
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Thus, Sobrino’s emphasis on the notion of justice is a response to the over-emphasis 
on the first phase of enlightenment.
Both Hauerwas and Sobrino find that the Christian faith is one way or another 
distorted by the enlightenment. That is to say, the distinctiveness of the Christian 
faith has been compromised, and the socio-political dimension of the Clnistian faith 
has been ignored. Hauerwas’ notion of narrative and Sobrino’s notion of justice 
intend to correct these distortions and recover the real meaning of faith. Thus, it is
,not a matter o f whether Hauerwas can explain the truth more comprehensibly than 
Sobrino or vice versa, but rather o f what kind of issue we want to address.
Hauerwas’ notion of narrative and Sobrino’s notion of justice are two different 
notions to meet two different issues. Therefore, their proposals are nothing other 
than complementary of the truth.
Secondly, I have previously pointed out that Hauerwas’ notion of narrative 
can be exercised as a macro model because it can be used as a heuristic category for 
introducing Cluistian theology and truth claims. An example of this attempt is 
Gabriel Fackre’s work. The Christian Storv: A Narrative Interpretation of Basic 
Christian Doctrine."* However, the difficulty of Fackre’s work lies in that it is
-------------------------------
Ibid., p .15.
J
unclear whether story refers to a set of narratives in Scripture, a set of doctrines, the 
experience of Christian individuals or communities, or a combination of some or all 
of these. Therefore, the practical significance of the notion of narrative remains 
unresolved.
Regarding the notion of justice, it appears that it primarily refers to one
particular issue, that is, discipleship. But in fact, Sobrino’s account shows that the
notion of justice may lead to the reconstruction of prior beliefs and reinterpretation
of previous data in a new framework of thought because the audience is different.
G.Gutierrez says that
it seems that a good deal of contemporary theology has begun from the
challenge posed by the unbeliever  But in a continent like Latin
America the challenge does not eome principally from the non­
believer, but from the non-person  So the question is not so much
how to speak of God in a world come of age, as how to proclaim the 
Father in an inhuman world, the implications o what it means to tell 
the non-person that he or she is a child o f God.^
For Sobrino, the difference in context determines the difference in the basis of 
liberation theology from that of European or North Atlantic theology. Examples of 
this difference areto be found in liberation theology’s emphasis on Jesus as liberator, 
the church as the church of the poor, the unity of history and salvation.
Consideration thç potential function of both the notions of narrative and 
justice as macro-models reminds us that they are not confined to a particular issue; 
rather they involve the whole framework of Christian theology.
Finally, in order to discuss the relationship of these two models, I suggest a 
shift of our attention to consider the models as representations of two perspectives.
 ^ See R.Gibellini, The Liberation Theoiogy Debate (London; SCM, 1987), pp.13-14.
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In other words, the concept of narrative, according to Hauerwas, suggests a narrative 
perspective of the Kingdom, while the concept of justice, according to Sobrino, is a 
metaphorical persepective of the Kingdom. This shift o f emphasis, I believe, does 
not distort the original meaning of both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s usage, but rather 
it can better reveal what the Kingdom is
® J.Childress, "Scripture and Christian Ethics." p.377.
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The narrative perspective of the Kingdom is characterized by its emphasis on 
the confessional and particular character. It does not see religious understanding as 
a product of detached observation, but rather a product of a process of risk, decision,
self-definition and discovery. This perspective undoubtedly recovers the essence of
the Clu'istian faith- that is, to know who Jesus is, is to follow him. However,
although the narrative perspective highlights the importance of character formation,
the retrieval of this function may be overemphasized. That is to say, it points out the
proper relationship between the Kingdom and the agents, but it discusses the process
of conformity abstractly. Wliat we need is not only a clear understanding of the
relationship, but also how this can be fulfilled in terms of principles and values in a
particular situation. It may then be necessary to take the risk of legalism in order to
.offer an adequate interpretation of responsibility, for we, and others, have to answer 
for our actions in relation to standards and consequences. An emphasis on the 
necessity of principles and values is established on both philosophical and theological 
grounds: "Not only is there a reason-giving capacity; there is also a reason-giving 
necessity imposed by our responsibility to God, to self, and to others, including the 
Cliristian community." Therefore, I can say that the narrative perspective is 
necessary, but not sufficient for us to comprehend what the Kingdom is.
■I.
■I_____________________
The metaphorical perspective of the Kingdom is characterized by using a 
metaphor which is derived from human experience in order to reflect the origin of 
the object, for instance, God is my shepherd, and God is our Father/ It is 
undeniable that the use of metaphor, such as shepherd and father, helps us to grasp 
the image of the original object. But at the same time, when we want to describe 
something which is dynamic the metaphorical perspective can provide only a fixed 
image of that reality which sometimes may distort the image of the original object 
because it focuses upon the immediate moment, but ignores the inevitable historical 
cultural context. In other words, the metaphorical perspective inevitably highlights 
some things but in that same moment others will be obscured. For instance, to speak 
of God as Father has provided a powerful and illuminating picture for our 
understanding of the divine. However, it has also obscured those dimensions of deity 
which would be highlighted in naming God our mother. Its limitation is the absence 
of a sense of history and direction. Nevertheless, this limitation cannot be one- 
sidedly considered as its weakness, provided that we take its "is and is nof'-ness 
characteristic seriously and appropriately. In other words, the "is-not"-ness of 
metaphor most adequately guards against absolutizing our theological 
conceptualizations.
We observe that it is insufficient to understand the Kingdom from either the 
narrative or metaphorical perspective, because these two perspectives are mutually 
related. It is a mistake to consider them in an "either-or" position. Therefore, their 
difference becomes complementary rather than mutually exelusive; what we need is
 ^ I do realize that the notion, o f  justice is another kind o f  metaphor. However, we cannot 
know what the metaphor o f  justice is unless we understand God as liberator, saviour and judge. 
Therefore, the difference between the metaphor o f  justice and the metaphors o f  God as Shepherd and 
Father is not two different things, but rather the former uses more than one o f  the latter metaphors to 
formulate its meaning.
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to restore a balance. That is to say, we have a responsibility within the Christian 
community to direct attention to principles and rules that constitute obligations that 
may otherwise be overlooked and neglected [a metaphorical perspective]. In 
addition, we should direct attention to biblical stories, images and narratives that may 
enable us to recognize obligations [a narrative perspective]. Both foci are necessary 
for an adequate explication of the Kingdom of God. Put analogically, if the concept 
of narrative is like a melody, the concept of metaphor then is like a chord. Without 
either o f them, the music caimot be played. An analysis of music cannot be only 
related to individual chords and notes, but also the whole melody. At the same time, 
an emphasis on the integrity of the melody should never ignore the importance of 
each individual chord and note.
In this chapter, I have discussed how the Kingdom of God is understood. 
This understanding is not primarily about knowledge, but about discipleship. In other 
words, this understanding is both the result and the beginning of the practice of 
discipleship. In the next chapter, I will discuss this relationship in terms of the 
practice of the Kingdom in Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s theology.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PRACTICE OF THE KINGDOM
A. THEOLOGY AND PRAXIS
J.B.Metz comments that "the so-called historical crisis of identity of
Christianity is not a crisis of the contents of faith, but rather a crisis  of the
practical meaning of those contents, the imitation of Clirist."* Metz’s remark is 
primarily concerned about the role of the practice of discipleship, which embraces 
both a personal and a social dimension. His call to the imitation of Christ is a call 
to live out our faith both in our personal moral life and within our socio-political 
context. On the personal level, it is concerned with the irmer animating principle of 
the Christian life conceived in terms of commitment, following, behaviour, doing and 
action, while on the socio-political level, it is concerned with the evaluation of 
societal organization and public policy in the shaping of society. We call the former 
"spirituality", while the latter "social ethics". These two levels do not compete with 
one another, but are rather in a dialectical relationship.^ Ignoring either distorts the 
meaning of discipleship. In contemporary term, this living out of our faith is called 
praxis.^
 ^ J.B.Metz, Faith in History and Society, p. 165.
 ^ See my discussion on spirituality in chapter one.
 ^ I use praxis here because the word, "practice", is often understood in the context o f the 
application o f  theory.
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From the previous two chapters, we realize that both Hauerwas and Sobrino
basically agree with Metz’s viewpoint. For Hauerwas, the Cluistian faith should
involve the agent having a particular character, and a paiticular way of seeing. For
instance, when Hauerwas talks about the truth, he has to refer to the demand of
truthfulness because he considers that we can only Icnow the truth by means of being
shaped by it. This is not suggesting that the truth itself has no self-evident
constituent, but rather "it is impossible to distinguish between "external" and
"internal" evidence as the character o f Christian belief [which] requires the
transformation of the self in order rightly to see the actuality of our world without
illusion or self-deception."'* On the other hand, for Sobrino, the Christian faith
demands our doing justice and practising love. As he sees it, if European theology
attempts to meet the first challenge of the enlightemnent represented by Kant, then
Latin American liberation theology is to meet the second challenge of the
enlightenment illustrated by Marx. If the former is characterized by demonstrating
the truth of revelation at the bar of reason, then the latter is characterized by its
commitment to transforming a reality. Sobrino summarizes the distinctiveness of
Latin American theology as follows:
Latin American theology is interested in liberating the real world from 
its wretched state, since it is this objective situation that has obscured 
the meaning of the faith. Its task is not primaiily to restore meaning 
to the faith in the presence of the wretched conditions of the real 
world. It is to transform this real world and at the same time recover 
the meaning of the faith. The task, therefore, is not to understand the 
faith differently, but to allow a new faith to spring from a new practice.^
S.Hauerwas, "Why the Truth Demands Truthfulness." p. 142. A lso see my discussion in pp.
 ^ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp.20-21. Details o f  his comparison between 
European theology and Latin American theology can be found in this book, pp.7-38. However, 
Alistair Kee makes a serious criticism o f Sobrino’s analysis. For instance, Kee said that "If there aie 
some people who merely inteipret the world and some who work towai'd changing it, who could this 
be but European and Latin American respectively?" "Is liberation theology a theology which 
liberates, or is it theological reflection on a liberating movement?" Details can be found in A.Kee, 
Marx and the Failure o f  Liberation Theology, pp. 189-195. Kee’s criticism has truth in it, but we have 
to realize that, in Sobrino’s comment on European theology, he refers paiticularly to those theologies
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Thus, it is obvious that for both Hauerwas and Sobrino, the Christian faith cannot 
adequately be undertaken and displayed by metaphysical approach and statement 
respectively, because it relates primarily to a matter of truth in practice- that is, 
discipleship. However, an emphasis on truth in practice does not mean that the 
metaphysical approach to truth becomes unimportant, but rather it reformulates the 
proper relationship between theory and practices, that is, from the primacy of theory 
to the primacy of praxis. Although both Hauerwas and Sobrino take the "practical" 
approach as their point of departure for theological reflection, there is a great 
difference in their understanding of Christian praxis. For Hauerwas, in order to serve 
the world faithfully, the church first has to be an alternative society, while for 
Sobrino, In order to be the true church, the church first has to commit itself to the 
preferential option to the poor. This difference does not necessarily depreciate the 
validity of the "practical" approach to the Christian faith because the "practical" 
approach is not primarily concerned with the homogeneity of practice. Rather it is 
concerned with the belief lying behind the practice- that is, the belief that the 
Kingdom of God intersects the course of human history and experience. It is realized 
par excellence neither in the dream world o f apocalyptic nor in temple cult, but in 
personal and community life that is responsive to the call o f God. Such intersection 
promotes a distinctive way of life that has a transcendent horizon and a faith- 
dynamic.
Here, I suggest using the term "praxis" in order to describe both Hauerwas’ 
and Sobrino’s emphasis on the "practical" approach to the Christian faith. In order 
to clai'ify the meaning of praxis, I will refer to its secular use, but I will limit myself 
to a discussion of Aristotle’s and Marx’s usage because the term was first
which emphasize the primacy of orthodoxy.
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systematized by Aiistotle and later revolutionized by Marx^, and because Hauerwas 
and Sobrino are obviously influenced by them respectively. According to Aristotle, 
there are tlri’ee kinds of knowledge, which are designated by the terms theoria, praxis 
and poiesisj In short, theoria is directed to the life of contemplation, and as such 
was regarded by Aristotle as an end in itself. Praxis, on the other hand, is concerned 
with the personal participation o f the individual in the life of the polis. More 
specifically, praxis is directed to the right ordering of human behaviour in the socio­
political world. Poiesis is about production or creation: it is the exercise o f technical 
skills by different people. Although Aristotle wanted to keep politics and philosophy, 
the practical life and the contemplative life, together, he still considered that theoria 
was primary an end in itself. However, it is important to note that for Aristotle, 
theoria was never understood to be the same as the contemporary understanding of 
theory: a pure intellectual activity. Nor is it equivalent to the medieval mysticism 
which encouraged some form of withdrawal from the hurly-burly of daily life. 
Rather it is a form of "practical thinking"^, a concern of the agent’s moral life. That 
is to say, a person shows what he/she thinks is a good life by the kind of life he/she 
actually leads rather than by giving assent to abstract arguments and conclusion. For 
in leading that life, he/she is constantly rendering a practical judgment upon what 
may determine such a concept of good living. It is this lived concept, theoria, which 
lies at the centre of a person’s practical thinking.^
® See Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice (Notre Dame: University o f  Notre Dame,
1967).
 ^ Ibid., pp.3-15.
« Ibid., pp.75.
/  John M.Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1976), pp.61-62.
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In the light of Hegel’s discussion of the concept of Absolute Spirit, Marx 
developed his own peculiai' and complex philosophy of praxis. In brief, Marx’s 
theory of praxis is not merely thought drawn from and tested against practice, but 
also thought that helps practice towards self-cognition and thus contributes to its 
d e v e l o p m e n t . A n d  this is carried out by its concern with the changing of the 
given structures o f the social and political world in which we live out our lives. In 
the time of Marx, this creative praxis was directed towards changing the social 
conditions of the working masses with the basic aim of emancipation. Thus, for 
Marx, praxis must be informed by some critical understanding of the social situation. 
It must never be merely a blind uncritical praxis.** Marx’s eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to change 
it", sums up his programme. That is to say, the role of praxis, in unity with a critical 
understanding of social reality, is to change the world. In this light, knowledge is 
primarily a practical issue; it is something which originates in praxis. Theory, 
therefore, is only an approximation of what is actually happening in the world. It is 
secondary to praxis. Besides, truth caimot be understood simply as some kind of 
correspondence between mind and reality. Instead truth is a practical issue, available 
to us in praxis.*^
From the last two chapters, we can conclude that Sobrino’s practical approach 
to the Clu'istian faith more or less adopts Marx’s understanding of praxis, that is, the 
necessity of and the commitment to social transformation, while Flauerwas’ practical
Ernst Fischer, Marx in His Own Words (London: Penguin, 1978), pp. 152-158.
See Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice. pp.419f.
It is clear that my exposition o f Marx’s usage o f  praxis is limited within its socio-political 
significance. However, according to Marx, praxis is also related to his thesis that humans constitute
themselves through what they do.
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transformation.
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I I
approach to the Christian faith is more or less in line with Aristotle’e emphasis on 
the "practica theoria" rather than praxis, that is, the importance of being virtuous. 
However, this does not mean that Sobrino uses the notion o f praxis in the way in 
which it would be used among Marxists. It is an idea available to him, both 
challenging and relevant because of the influence of Marx’s thought. Nor does it 
mean that Hauerwas’ use of the notion of theoria is identical with the Aristotelians, 
but rather it is an insight available to him, both appropriate and stimulating. For
Sobrino, only those activities which contribute to the humanization of humanity are 
praxis in the strong sense of the term. But the causes of human alienation go far 
beyond the existing system of property-relations, and must include reference to what
traditional theology calls "original sin". Marx was right in drawing attention to the 
.influence of social reality upon human consciousness but wi’ong in insisting that
.consciousness is restricted by social reality. If  that is so, the Christian use of the 
notion of praxis within the Christian community should be "clu istianized". That is 
to say, it should not only be understood exclusively in terms of social praxis, but it 
should also distinctively embrace the Cliristian dimension of personal conversion and 
transformation. This is the contribution of Hauerwas’ practical approach to the 
Christian faith. An emphasis on personal conversion and transformation does not 
necessarily promote any tendency to privatize the Christian faith because it forms part 
of the basic structure of theology. In other words, the origin and continued existence 
of the Chr istian tradition was and is the outcome of the praxis [both personal and 
social] o f the faith of the community. The praxis of faith is the activity o f the human i
*
community responding to the gracious action of God mediated by the church and the 
sacraments. The Cliristian tradition is always a living tradition supported by the 
activity of faith. And this activity of faith embraces both social and personal
If  praxis involves both personal and social transformation, what is the 
relationship between theory and practice in relation to Cliristian religion? Put 
directly, is praxis the criterion of truth? Does it suggest a kind of pragmatism, where 
the validity of an idea is judged by its concrete and external results? Here, I find 
Clodovis B off s work Theologv and Praxis'^  illuminating.
At the beginning, Boff clearly points out that theory and praxis basically are 
two different orders which cannot be compared. Each possesses criteria of truth 
corresponding to itself. Put theologically, the former relates to theological 
criteriology which is of an epistemological order, and is concerned with the rules of 
the theoretical practice of the theologian, while the latter relates to pistic criteriology 
[criteriology of faith] which is of an existential order, and springs from principles that 
orientate the concrete practice of the believer}^
Firstly, regarding the theological criteriology, Boff considers that "theology 
is exempted from any wholly external criterion of truth, any jurisdictional tribunal 
having the right to pronounce from without on the validity of its propositions. 
Theology is a self-policied practice."*^ Therefore, the theological criteriology does 
not intend to establish the truth of revelation, because revelation is entrusted to the 
believer, who responds to it by faith qua existential decision. Rather theology comes 
only afterwards, to explain, explicate, and render intelligible, in the measure of its 
capacities, the order that obtains in the universe of significance opened up by
C.Boff, Theology and Praxis (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987). Although B o f f  s explication o f  
the relationship between praxis and theology is for the sake o f his support o f  social praxis, I find it 
still relevant to my concern here.
All these highlights are B off s own. See Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid., p. 199.
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revelation. This is the "logical" element of theology, in the sense that it clarifies 
what is already believed, and is responsible for the internal consistency of theological 
constructs. Apart from this, theological criteriology also embraces another element, 
namely, verificational, which corresponds to the totality of its material conditions. 
That is to say, a theological proposition is to be judged and validated by an 
examination of its conformity with the canon of faith. In relation to scientific 
knowledge, these two elements of the theological criteriology, logical and 
verificational, are the logic and experimentation of the constitutive principles of 
scientific knowledge.
However, according to Boff, the logical element of theological criteriology
does not necessarily take the historical and current experience of Chiistians into
account. He contends that
praxis is not what explains, but on the contrary, is what is to be 
explained in terms of theology. Praxis prepares the agenda, the 
repertory of questions, that theology is to address. Practices in general 
are not proofs of theological truth. Otherwise it would be legitimate 
to ask which practices are proofs of which truth. The case is rather 
that certain practices are possible signs of faith, in the subjective and 
objective sense. They are not, then, the discourse of faith, they are its 
course. They are invitations to theological deciphering, but they are 
not the deciphering itself. They are on the side of the (objectively 
theological) real, not on that o f its (subjectively theological) 
knowledge.
This explains why there could exist a faith practice accompanied by a very 
"elementary" theology, and there could be great theological progress without a 
corresponding increase of love. But this cannot be used as an excuse for seeking to 
free theological reflection from all these subjective Christian experiences because 
theological reflection also relates to the need o f verification which embraces Christian 
experience. With this, we turn to B off s pistic criteriology.
Ibid., pp.200-201.
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Boff is not satisfied with pragmatism which assigns primacy to practical 
effectiveness, because we must always assign a moral qualification to an action, even 
a successful action. Thus, in relation to social praxis, Boff considers that the duty 
o f political theologians is to determine what ethical quality a political practice ought 
to assume, as well as to evaluate the concrete political action put forward as 
responding to this ethical quality. This ethical quality can only be derived from faith 
and all actions stand in need of correct and appropriate examination. Efficacy would 
not be a pistic criterion. However, faith and practice have a continuous reciprocal 
relationship, according to which faith measures, criticizes, stimulates, and orientates 
social transformation; which in turn expresses, realizes and verifies the truth of faith 
and its values. Thus we do not have "faith in one pocket and transformation in the 
o t h e r . " W h a t  we do have is a vital connection established between faith and 
practice, which proves, or confirms the one by the other. Thus, it is obvious that the 
pistic criteriology is the extension of the verificational element o f the theological 
criteriology.
On this level, praxis is a criterion that judges someone’s faith. This criterion 
is in a way "interior" to faith itself, in the sense that praxis is faith qua operata- qua 
lived, realized- and faith is praxis qua good works, qua liberating practices. Thus, 
theologians who fail to present, beside theoretical titles of credit, the pistic and agapic 
ones as well, in terms of faith engagement and evangelical witness, place obstacles 
in the way of theological truth itself, no matter how scientific they may be. 
Nevertheless, there is no practice possessing absolute self-evidence. All practice must 
be evaluated.
Ibid., p.203.
Ibid., p.203.
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Boff reminds us that there is no immediate and direct term correspondence 
between the pistic criterion and theological criterion. The latter is not the mirror-
image o f the former, or its shadow, or its reflex because, in B off s words, the order 
of theory is not the same as that of praxis. However, they are not independent from 
one another because they meet in the verificational process. Therefore, theology is 
not only to provide public credibility and ecclesial reception o f its theses thr ough its 
logical illustration, but will be judged by its commitments, and what these produce I
in terms of historical and political action. A good example of this is the South 
African Apartheid theology displayed by the Dutch Reformed Church. On the one 
hand, this apartheid theology does not meet the theological criteriology because it 
does not comprehensively display revealed truth. On the other hand, this theology
■does not meet the pistic criteriology because the practice proceeding from it does not 
express and verify the truth of faith and its value.
I
The strength of B off s explication lies in its clar ification of a "metaphysical"
and a practical approach and display of the Christian faith. That is to say, they are
.two different orders which cannot be compared and confused. An emphasis on the 
"practical" approach to, and display of, the Christian faith does not have any tendency 
to depreciate the importance of the "metaphysical" approach to, and display of, the 
Christian faith. Nor does it consider itself opposed to theory. Rather it states that 
faith is to be conceived as being substantially a basic life option; then it will have to 
be said that faith realizes its transcendence only in the order in which it is realized 
itse lf that is, in the existential order. Confession of a creed is more than a simple 
theoretical expression of truths. It engages the living subject of its enunciation, in 
and by the very act of enunciation. Thus, apart from praxis, faith is only words.
The transcendence o f faith is its immanence in history and in the existence of human 
beings, in the form of realizations ever to be renewed, radicalized, and deepened.
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However, although both Hauerwas and Sobrino take the practical approach to 
the Cliristian faith, their emphases are different. For instance, they have different 
views about the relationship between church and state. In order to understand the 
concrete meaning of their practical approach to the Christian faith and their 
differences, I will examine Hauerwas’ pacifism and Sobrino’s practice of 
evangelization because these two issues can better illustrate the relationship between 
theory and praxis in their thoughts and also clarify some misreadings about their 
practice.
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B. TWO CASES 
1. PACIFISM
Hauerwas’ candid confession of his pacifism sometimes makes his stand
difficult to defend and unconvincing. However, his conversion to pacifism is rather
a gradual process. It is clear that from his early writings, he was not totally
convinced of Christian pacifism.’ At that time, he claimed to be a committed
Niebuhrian (Clnistian realism), but gradually, he was convinced by John Howard
Yoder’s work that any adequate account of what it means to be a disciple of Jesus
requires one to take up the way of non-violence. What makes Hauerwas have such
a change? It could have something to do with the horror of the Vietnam war', but
Hauerwas does not consider this as the cause of his conversion. Rather it is his
existential realization that
Christian pacifism was based upon the belief, not that war could be 
eliminated, but that as Christians in a world at war we could not be 
anything other than pacifists. It was not that our commitment to the 
way of non-violence promised to rid the world of war, but rather that 
God has given the world an alternative to war thiough the kind of 
politics present in the church, where reconciliation triumphs over envy 
and hate.^
Thus, Hauerwas’ pacifism not only denounces the use of violence, but also manifests 
what real peace is. In this sense, in order to understand Hauerwas’ pacifism fairly, 
we have to understand it in the context of his view of church and society. As this
 ^ Hauerwas’ early writings refer to "Review Essay o f Violence by Jacques Ellul" (In: The 
American Journal o f  Jurisprudence. 1973, pp.206-215), "Messianic Pacifism" (In: Worldview, 1973, 
pp.29-33), and "The Non-Resistance Church; The Theological Ethics o f  J.H.Yoder (In: Vision and 
Virtue. 1973, pp. 197-221), For instance, in his article on Messianic Pacifism, Hauerwas questioned 
the validity o f  pacifism by saying that "even though Yoder clearly does not recommend societal 
withdrawal, it is not clear how and to what extent the Christian should feel responsible for 
paiticipating in the concerns o f the wider society." (p.33)
 ^ S.Hauerwas, "Pacifism: A  Form o f  Politics." In: Peace Betraved. ed. Michael Cromartie 
(Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1990), p. 135.
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has been previously discussed^, this section will concentrate solely on Hauerwas’ 
pacifism. Also, it should be made clear that pacifism, in this study, is understood in 
contrast to war. My concern in this section is not only to explicate Hauerwas’ 
pacifism, but also to see it as an illustration of his "practical" approach to theology. 
Therefore, in the following, I will discuss Hauerwas’ pacifism in tlnee related ways. 
Firstly, how is his pacifism rooted in chiistology? Does chi'istology suggest 
pacifism? Attention will be given to the interaction of views among Paul Ramsey, 
Sobrino and Flauerwas. Secondly, what are the moral inadequacies of the just war 
theory, according to Hauerwas? If just war is not the option for Christians, how can 
pacifists serve their neighbours? Finally, what does Hauerwas’ pacifism suggest 
about the relationship between theory and praxis in relation to the Chidstian religion? 
Wliat are its strengths and weaknesses?
Unlike Jolin Howard Yoder and Martin Hengef, Hauerwas does not
systematically elaborate and contend how chiistology advocates a pacifist stand even
though he considers that this is of fundamental importance. He basically agrees with
Yoder’s view and explication, and yet he considers that
it is a mistake to assume that pacifism is a position to be found in the 
New Testament. [Hauerwas] suspects the first Christians had no idea 
they were "pacifist". They just thought they were following Jesus.^
Nevertheless, he does sketch out how chiistology and pacifism are related. Like 
Yoder, Hauerwas considers that Christian pacifism is rooted not only in what Jesus 
taught his disciples about non-violence [Mt.5:38-48], but also in the person and work
 ^ See my discussion on Hauerwas’ ecclesiology.
 ^ J.H.Yoder, The Politics o f Jesus (Philadelphia: Eerdmans, 1972), and M.Hengel, Victoi-y 
Over Violence (London; SPCK, 1975).
 ^ S.Hauerwas, "Epilogue: A Pacifist Response to the Bishops." In: Speak Up for Just War or 
Pacifism, by Paul Ramsey (University Paik: Pennsylvania State University, 1988), p. 164.
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of Clu’ist that finds its clearest expression in the cross, where God decisively dealt 
with evil, not by responding in kind, but through self-giving, non-violent love. The 
cross of Clirist is not a strategy of God to deal with evil, but rather is the essence of 
God’s agapic love. Jesus responded to violence, not by a return to violence, but by 
suffering and death. In this sense, the Sermon on the Mount is not simply Jesus’ 
teachings about the moral ideal life, but rather a description of his life. If  the cross 
o f Christ reveals how God deals with evil, then the church is asked to follow Christ’s 
way, of non-violence and even self-giving, to confront evil. If  the cross of Christ is 
the demonstration that love seeks neither effectiveness nor justice, but is willing to 
suffer any loss or seeming defeat for the sake of obedience, then social effectiveness 
should not be the criterion for the church to decide whether it opts for pacifism or 
just war, but rather obedience and faithfulness to God.^ Thus, it is wrong to accuse 
pacifism of mistaking the ethics of Jesus as a series of absolutes or law, because if 
the life of Jesus reveals what the life of the Kingdom is, the church has to follow 
Jesus’ way. Pacifism takes seriously obedient witness to Clirist.
However, a cluistological foundation does not necessarily imply a pacifist 
stand because theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey who advocate the
® See S.Hauerwas, "Pacifism: Some Philosophical Considerations." In: Faith and Philosophy. 
Vol.2 (1986), p. 100. I also find Yoder’s comment on this matter useful. Yoder responds to a 
student’s question about effectiveness by saying, "The longer I look at the question o f  effectiveness, 
the less I trust that way to put the issue to be o f  any help. The longer you look, the more you see 
dimensions o f the question that change the definitions o f terms, so that it is less clear what you are 
asking about. Do we mean short range effectiveness or long range effectiveness? Do w e mean 
guaranteeing a certain result, or just contributing to a statistical mix in which the chances o f a derived 
outcome may increase by so much that you might come out with something? The inteiplay between 
an ethic which cares only about faithfulness regardless o f  cost, and another that is purely pragmatic 
is a caricature that nobody really w ill stay on one end o f  for long. The person who says, "You must 
give up some o f your scruples in order to be effective" is still saying that because the goal for the sake 
o f which to be effective is in principle a good goal. So the argument which takes the clothing o f  
principle versus effectiveness really means this principle versus that principle. It really means that 
goal, for the sake o f  which I want you to give up other scruples, is so overridingly important than 
those other things are less important. That is an ethic o f principle. It differs only in that the choice 
o f  which things you are willing to give up for which other things w ill change." (See S.Hauerwas, 
"Epilogue: A Pacifist Response to the Bishops." p.180)
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just war theory also take the life and teachings of Jesus with utmost seriousness. An
example of this is the life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In his early career, he considered
himself a pacifist. For instance, in 1934, he was a youth secretary of the World
Council for International Friendship Work of Churches, and suggested the
establisliment of an International Christian Peace Council. But in the late 1930s, he
participated in the conspiracy to kill Hitler. This plot was unsuccessful, and he was
arrested. Finally, he was hanged. Was Bonhoeffer a martyr or a betrayer of faith?’
Bonhoeffer’s case poses a dilemma to the validity of pacifism. Does obedience and
faithfulness to God require us to use force in some circumstances instead of pursuing
absolute non-violence? Or does it mean that chiistology is simply used as an excuse
by either side to justify their views rather than as an ultimate to criticize and
recommend their views? I have already suggested that these different interpretations
should be understood dialectically and complementarily because, for instance, there
are four accounts [gospels] of Jesus’ ministry. Nevertheless, even though Hauerwas
considers that non-violence should be the Christian way, he still maintains that
truth is not given but something that is discovered through our 
willingness to believe that the voice of the other might just be the 
voice of God. Therefore, the commitment to non-violence requires the 
pacifists to respect those who think they must use coercion to protect 
the goods we hold in common. This does not mean that pacifists are 
called always to obey those in power; it does mean that we can be 
open to vai'ious political alternatives in the hope that we will discover 
ways of co-operating that make violence less necessary.®
In order not to provide a cheap compromise between the just war theory and 
pacifism, let us turn to see the causes of their differences. Because of the fact that
 ^ Bonhoeffer's use o f  violence may be negatively considered as his life inconsistency. 
However, his friend, Eberhaid Bethge, writes that "I think he would have said: O f course, f m  still in 
your terms pacifist, even in doing this [practising in the conspiracy] and I took the guilt, I took all the 
consequences o f not being on the successful side and being killed for it." (G.Clarke Chapman, "Wliat 
Would Bonhoeffer Say to Christian Peacemakers Today?" In: Theology. Politics and Peace. 1989, 
pp.161-175) See also D.Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp.240-241.
® S.Hauerwas, "Pacifism: A Form of Politics." p.140
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there are many different forms of just war theory and pacifism, I will take Paul
Ramsey as a spokesman of the just war theory^, while I take flauerwas as a
spokesman of pacifism. Basically, it appears to me that their different conclusions
are not a matter of the abuse of Chiistology in accordance with their interests, but lie
.rather in their different degrees of emphasis on Christ’s work. That is to say, both 
Ramsey and Hauerwas agree that Jesus’ life is characterized by non-violence, but for 
Ramsey Cluist is primarily seen as saviour and judge; while for Hauerwas, Christ is 
principally seen as pattern and e x a m p l e . T h e s e  fundamental different emphases 
lead them to different conclusions.
For Ramsey, it is a mistake to take Jesus’ teachings literally without 
understanding them in the context o f their apocalyptic eschatology", a belief and 
an expectation that God will intervene shortly to overcome evil with divine power. 
Ramsey considers that, in the context of the apocalyptic expectation of God’s 
intervention to defeat the forces of evil, it is understandable why Jesus’ teachings 
were only concerned with human relationship, and also why the followers of Jesus 
were asked not to resist evil, because the Kingdom would soon be realized. This 
does not mean that the early Christians had no social ethics, but rather, due to the 
promptness o f the realization of the Kingdom, social ethics were replaced by personal
 ^ 1 take Ramsey as a spokesman because he had written extensively on the issue o f  war. He 
also had a serious dialogue with both Yoder and Hauerwas so that despite his advocacy o f  just war, 
he did not ignore the challenge and importance o f  pacifism. However, I do not intend to fully 
elaborate Ramsey’s position in this study. A critique o f his work can be found in David Attwood, 
Paul Ramsey’s Political Ethics (Rowan & Littlefield, 1992).
To consider Christ as saviour and judge does not necessarily mean using violence, but 
rather it sees that justice and responsibility are prior to non-violence. Therefore, in some 
circumstances, the use o f violence is justifiable. At the same time, to accept Christ as pattern and 
example does not necessarily imply a lack o f concern about justice, but rather that justice should not 
be one-sidedly over-emphasized. It should be understood in the context o f  the cross and resurrection 
o f  Jesus which displays non-violence.
P.Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics. pp.27f..
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ethics. Ramsey comments that
when considering history and affairs of men it would hardly first occur 
to the mind of any man to recommend these sayings [non-resisting, 
unclaiming love, overflowing good even for an enemy, unlimited 
forgiveness for every offense] as the truth, except with eschatological
backing  [Thus,] the radical content of Jesus’ strenuous sayings
depends, it seems, on his apocalyptic expectation.’^
As a result, Ramsey suggests that Chiistians do not share Jesus’ apocalyptic
eschatology, not because we do not expect the Kingdom to come, but because our
expectation is not of God’s early intervention. Therefore, Ramsey suggests that we
have to be careful to interpret Jesus’ teachings intelligently in a fallen world without
danger of serious loss of meaning. For instance, he contends that non-resistance
should not have been turned into non-violent resistance, and generalized to fit perhaps
any age or circumstance, because Jesus’ relation to the Kingdom is not identical to
the relation of his followers to the Kingdom. Accordingly, the issue for us today is
how to transpose the ethics of Jesus to a non-apocalyptic setting. For Ramsey, this
can be bridged by the practice of "neighbour-centered preferential love"’^  which
Jesus reveals to us. This love is not based on the notion o f self-defence; on the
contrary, it is based on the defending of the innocent. Ramsey said that
for Christian ethics generally self-defense is the worst of all possible 
excuses for war or any other form of resistance or any sort o f pretence 
among other people.’'*
When life conflicts with life, the Clnistian’s duty, out of love, may be to conclude 
that he/she is necessarily and legitimately required to act violently, even to take life 
to protect the lives of others. Ramsey concludes that by not sharing Jesus’ 
apocalyptic, we ourselves shduld interpret love as sometimes requiring us to resist
Ibid., pp.34-35. 
Ibid., p.166-184.
14 Ibid., p.I73.
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evil. However, we have to be careful not to suggest that Ramsey is saying that we 
do not need to take Jesus’ teachings seriously. Rather we have to take them seriously 
by acknowledging that we belong to our own cultural and religious tradition, yet we 
also do not belong to this tradition because our horizons have changed.
For Hauerwas, tlirough Jesus Christ, Christians have been offered the
possibility of a different history. Fie says that
the old points backward to history before Clirist; the new points 
forward to the fulfilment o f the Kingdom of God made fully present 
in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus o f Nazar eth. Moreover, 
each aeon has a social manifestation: the former in the world; the latter 
in the church.’^
In the old aeon, war is often considered as an unavoidable by-product and
phenomenon of human relationship. In order to preserve, sustain and protect each
other’s "goods", the use of violence is necessary and permissible. Furthermore,
Hauerwas says that
wars reaffirm our history by offering us the opportunity to be worthy 
of our history by making similar sacrifices. We fight wars because our 
ancestors have fought wars. Wai's provide us a way to realize our 
continuity with our ancestors, to locate ourselves within their 
continuing sage, and in the process, to give to that saga an otherwise 
absent coherence over time.’®
This is the belief and the practice of the old aeon. On the other hand, the new aeon, 
which the church is called to live in, is characterized by love, peace, forgiveness and 
non-violence. Hauerwas considers that Christians are non-violent not because certain 
implications may follow from their beliefs, but because the very shape of their beliefs 
forms them to be non-violent. Pacifism is the form of life that is inlierent in the 
shape of Christian convictions about God and his relation to us. Therefore, non-
S.Haueiwas, "Epilogue: A  Pacifist Response to the Bishops." p. 159. 
S.Hauerwas, Against the Nations, p. 184.
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violence is the character o f God which the church has no alternative but to witness 
to. Apparently, Hauerwas’ view suggests a form of dualism. Unlike Luther’s 
doctrine of the two Kingdoms, there is no ultimate conflict between them, for the 
new aeon in Clirist has now taken primacy over the old, explains the meaning of the 
old, and will finally vanquish the old. But this does not suggest that war will be 
eliminated through non-violent witness. Rather, what is required is not a belief in 
some ideal amid the ambiguities o f history, but a recognition that Christians have 
entered a period in which two ages overlap. That is to say, the church is the 
messianic community which requires a messianic life-style characterized by non­
violence. Non-violence is right not because it works, but because it anticipates the 
triumph of the Lamb that was slain.
Furthermore, Hauerwas insists that the salvation wi'ought in Jesus is not only
about saving individual from sin but also makes present God’s eschatological
Kingdom as a possibility. He continues to say that
all are called to this salvation as individuals, but the salvation itself is 
the socially embodied life o f a community that knows it lives by 
forgiveness. Pacifism, therefore, is not some "teaching" about non­
violence but rather is a way of talking about a community that has 
learned to deal with conflicts tlnough truth rather than violence and 
that truth is no general or universal teaching about agape but the 
presence of a life.’’
This communal understanding of Christ’s salvation sheds light in our understanding 
of the Sermon on the Mount, which is no longer an ethic for individuals, but signifies 
that "a new community has been brought into existence that make a new way of life 
possible."’® Besides, the Sermon does not generate an ethic of non-violence, but
S.Hauei-was, "Epilogue; A Pacifist Response to the Bishops." pp. 162-163.
S.Hauerwas, "The Sermon on the Mount, Just Wai* and the Quest for Peace." In: 
Concilium, 195, p.39.
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rather demands the existence of a commimity of non-violence so that the world might 
know that as God’s creatures we are meant to live peaceably with one another. Thus, 
for Hauerwas, the issue is not how Jesus’ so-called one to one personal ethics work 
in a complex relationship, for it basically distorts the meaning of the doctrine of 
atonement by individualizing and privatizing salvation. Rather Jesus’ ethic, such as
non-violence, is the way God which has shown that he deals with the world and it
is the way to which he therefore calls us to be faithful.
The differences between Ramsey [a just war advocate] and Hauerwas [a 
pacifist] now become clear. Firstly, there is a primary difference relating to their Idifferent degree of emphasis on eschatology. Ramsey’s advocacy of just war leans I
toward "future" eschatology, while Hauerwas’ advocacy of pacifism leans toward 
"realized" eschatology. This difference is only a matter of comparative emphasis; it 
is not to suggest that they ignore altogether the "already, not yet" nature of Cliristian 
eschatology. In other words, Ramsey emphasizes more its "not yet-ness", while 
Hauerwas emphasizes more its "already-ness". Thus, for Ramsey, understanding does 
not consist in placing oneself in the shoes of another; instead it consists in 
recognizing the claim of the apocalyptic eschatology in its otherness as having a 
claim upon one’s own life-practice. Therefore, to use force is not in contradiction 
with the ethic which Jesus taught, not only because the eschatological setting of 
Jesus’ life and teachings is different from ours, but also because force is necessary 
in order to fulfil the concern of Christian love to protect the weak and the unjustly 
oppressed. It is a matter of tactics. On the other hand, for Flauerwas, "the peace for 
which Christian hope is one that we know to be already present for we Christians 
believe we have seen, felt, and live it here and now."’^  Christians pursue non-
violence because God has given us the true and just response to all war in the 
decisive eschatological act- the cross o f Clirist. God is already present and acting to 
make the Kingdom of peace a reality for all peoples. Thus Christians already know 
the end; they are to live now in such a way as to witness to the truth and justice of 
that peace. In summary, we can say that it is a mistake to accuse Ramsey’s just war 
position of being accomniodationalist because just wai* theory, at least Ramsey’s type, 
is not intended to prolong the Constantinian conviction, but rather it takes the 
command of the love to neighbour seriously and realistically. At the same time, it 
is also a mistake to accuse Hauerwas’ pacifism of being fundamentalist because 
pacifism, at least Hauerwas’ type, is not first of all a prohibition, but an affirmation 
that God wills to rule his creation not through violence and coercion but by love.
The second difference between them is in their different degree of emphasis 
on the relationship between the church and world. Ramsey understands that the 
church is for the world in terms of engaging itself in the socio-political reality, while 
Hauerwas understands that this is in terms of being an alternative reality. For 
Ramsey, the just war theory is not against violence, nor does it seek peace; rather just 
war seeks the maintenance of ordered justice through which the innocent are 
protected.^® This is the prophetic role of the church to challenge and to remind the 
state of its responsibility. At the same time, the just war theory is to restrict the 
state’s use of power from being distorted. Thus, Ramsey considers that the primary 
motive for Christian participation in war is the same love that earlier impelled 
Cliristians to reject the use of armed force. On the other hand, for Hauerwas, the 
church as an alternative reality is neither sectarian nor withdrawan: but rather this is 
the best way for the church to serve the world by letting the world realize what it
P.Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, pp. 157-184.
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should be but is not. That is to say, the church’s task is to reveal the unreality of
those that think justice can be secured through war. In summary, for Ramsey, just
war advocates favour the defence of an ordered justice which sometimes may not be
consistent with peace, while for Hauerwas, pacifists are in favour of peace, and peace
and justice are believed never to conflict. However, Ramsey rightly notes:
Niebuhr’s sense of transiency of every human achievement of a 
somewhat more just order, or the prevention of a worse one, suggests 
that effective action and witnessing action are not greatly different 
from one another. The future is radically unpredictable, for pacifist 
and just war warrior alike. We need to affirm the coeval, equally 
worthy, irreducible parting of the ways of Christian pacifism and 
justified war Christians. Neither is able to depend on the consequences 
in the whole of their activities, or discount the effectiveness of other’s 
witness. All this can be said, I believe, while holding that in the 
divine economy for this world, just war is the meaning of statecraft, 
and that pacifism caimot be addressed to states. Still, these are equally 
Christian discipleship.^’
Now, we can conclude that both just war advocates and pacifists, at least of 
Ramsey’s and Hauerwas’ type, are to be obedient witnesses to Christ. Both are ways 
of witnessing to Christ; both intend in fundamentally similar ways to be effective, 
without depending on their effectiveness for justification. Furthermore, they agree 
that the central action of the Christian faith is an act of non-violent resistance, in the 
sense that Jesus refused to buy peace by giving up his claim to preach the Kingdom. 
However, they diverge on the question of the necessity of a defensive form of force 
to protect the imiocent. But this is an issue basically concerning "how" we are to 
resist which is not about our faithfulness to the figure of Jesus. In other words, the 
difficulty is how love is to be understood and how its implications are to be displayed 
when we seem caught between contending values. This does not have a simple 
solution. But what we can do is to respect our differences, be cautious in our stand
P.Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism, pp.122-123.
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and endeavour to make violence less necessary. Before turning to Hauerwas’ critique 
of just wai- and his alternative proposal, it may be interesting to examine how Sobrino 
understands pacifism in terms of violence.
Sobrino’s primary concern is not pacifism, but violence. That is to say, he 
considers that the primary and worst o f all types of violence is structural injustice, 
which generates repressive violence by the state and ultra-right-wing groups to 
maintain it, and the violence of popular insurrections as a response. According to 
Sobrino, only when structural violence is first identified and condemned, can we then 
talk about pacifism. In the Latin American context, Sobrino emphasizes that 
Cluistians cannot deduce from Jesus’ life and his words what he would say about the 
legitimacy of an armed insurrectionary struggle, simply because "Jesus offers [as] an 
alternative to violence the utopia of peace as a goal to achieve and as a means to 
acheiving it."^  ^ Besides, violence, even violence that may be legitimate, is 
potentially dehumanizing. Interestingly enough, according to his methodology of the 
interpretation of Jesus as the way of the Son, we should imagine that Sobrino would 
consider that Cluistians are pacifists because this is the way revealed by Jesus. But 
he does not teach such a conclusion. Rather he interprets that the symbols of peace, 
called for and exemplified by Jesus, as utopian and which cannot be realized in 
history. Therefore, for Sobrino, it cannot be said that an armed revolution is 
automatically anti-Christian, But he adds that "this in itself does not tell us what is 
the most specifically Christian contribution to a revolution. Sobrino’s view 
highlights the ambiguity of the Christian consciousness of the use of violence; that 
is to say, Cliristians do not normally give their specific witness through violence.
---------------------   ÎK. "
J.Sobrino, Jesus. The Liberator. p.216. 
Ibid.
However, Sobrino does not consider that this ambiguity can be eliminated by being
pacifist. Rather Christians have to learn to live in this ambiguity with faith.
Nevertheless, Sobrino considers that
there are different gifts in the church, and different callings from the 
Spirit. While the personal vocation of each individual must be 
respected, provided it is genuine, it does not seem audacious or 
cowardly to claim that the Christian vocation calls for the use of 
peaceful means, which does not mean less effort, to solve the problem 
of injustice and violence in the world, rather than violent means, 
however much these may sometimes be justified. '^*
Before saying anything about Hauerwas’ critique of just war, one important 
point I would like to emphasis is that Hauerwas’ pacifism is fundamentally addressed 
to the Cliristian community rather than a general audience. In other words, his 
critique of just war is to unmask its ambiguity, in order to challenge the 
presuppositions of the Christian just war advocates because so many times society has 
absorbed the church’s action, using it to its own ends and for its own profit which 
the church does not realize. Since the Christian community is his audience, 
Hauerwas does not expect that his view will be completely accepted by the state 
because the state does not shar e Chr istian convictions. But this does not necessarily 
make us conclude that his analysis is exclusive and sectarian, because this can still 
be a challenge to those who do not share Cluistian convictions by asking how they 
think war became or continues to be susceptible to moral analysis.
The just war theory has been defended by a majority o f Christian ethicists, 
both Roman Catholic and Protestant. Their basic argument is that, although non­
violence may be the ideal to which the Gospel points, it cannot deal with the day-to- 
day need to defend a relatively just order, or the life and property of defenceless and
Ibid., p.218.
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innocent people against the forces of anarchy, tyranny and injustice, potentially 
present in all human beings. Nevertheless, most of the just war advocates suggest 
that in order to be fulfilled for the legitimacy of violence from a Christian point of 
view, it has to meet the following conditions. They are:
1. that a war be the last resort to be used only after all other means 
have been exhausted;
2. that a war be clearly an act of redress of rights actually violated or 
defense against unjust demands backed by the threat of force;
3. that war be openly and legally declared by properly constituted 
governments;
4. that there be a reasonable prospect for victory;
5. that the means be proportionate to the ends;
6. that a war be waged in such a way as to distinguish between 
combatants and noncombatants;
7. that the victorious nation not require the utter humiliation of the 
vanquished.^®
These criteria are apparently straightforward and self-explanatory, but in fact they are 
not, because the just war theory at least assumes, firstly, the existence of universal 
moral dispositions; secondly, the need for moral judgments of who/what is 
aggressor/victim, just/unjust, acceptable/unacceptable; and finally, the potential 
efficacy of moral appeals and arguments to stay the hand of force. These 
assumptions make the just war theory less objectifiable and justifiable than it sounds 
to be. These are exactly the grounds on which Hauerwas criticizes the just war 
theory.
Firstly, Hauerwas considers that questions about the justice o f war, for 
example, the Gulf Wai' in 1991, seem to be a matter of whether "the facts" fit these 
criteria. Its mistake is that the burden of proof is supposed to be on those who use 
violence. As a result, these criteria have become a given that can be generated and 
applied by anyone anywhere from any point of view. It is clear that those who
Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Epilogue: Continuing Implications o f the Just War Tradition." In: 
Just War Theory, ed. J.B.Elshtain (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992). p.324.
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defend a war on just war grounds and those who oppose, on the same ground, are in 
fact standing on the same ground. In this sense, Hauerwas comments that "just war 
is not to determine in a legalistic manner what is or what is not a just war, but rather 
to make war as nearly just as it can be."^ ® The difficulty is that just war often 
reveals a bewildering mix of realistic politics. That is to say, it is not always purely 
fought in a manner to protect the physical survival of a people but rather for the 
achievement o f this or that political advantage.
Secondly, Hauerwas questions whether the just wai' position is actually 
determined on an analogy with self-defence or defence of the imiocent. The two aie 
not the same, though admittedly a defence o f self can possibly be justified as a 
defence of the innocent. If  just war is defended on an analogy o f self-defence, 
according to the Pastoral Letter of the American Roman Catholic Bishops, The 
Challenge o f  Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, Hauerwas contends that it 
betrays the Gospel’s message because the Chi'istian is prohibited from killing another 
in order to secure his/lier own survival.^^ On the other hand, if just war is defended 
on the analogy of defence of the imiocent, according to Ramsey and Sobrino, then 
at the very least it would seem that those who use just war to justify resort to 
violence must not be so quick to assume the legitimacy of a violent response simply 
because their side is attacked. Or perhaps more accurately put, they need to be much 
more critical of the assumption that they have a "side".
Thirdly, the just war theory assumes that war is a necessary part of human life 
given the violent tendencies in human nature displayed particularly in relation
Unpublished paper, S.Hauerwas, Whose Just War? Which Peace?. 1991, delivered at the 
University o f  Edinburgh.
See S.Hauerwas, Against the Nations, pp. 169-208.
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between groupsL® Although war is the result of sin and a tragic remedy for sin in
■f
:
the life of political societies, it can serve moral purposes; that is, to achieve relative
'justice within this world. Therefore, if we are for justice, we cannot exclude the use
.of violence and wai\ Is wai' the only alternative to resolve conflicts? Or more 
fundamentally, is just war better understood as a form of state-craft rather than a 
general theory of the justifiable use of violence? According to Hauerwas, if we 
assume that just war is better understood as a form of state-craft, we lose the 
imagination to think of other alternatives to resolve conflicts. But the just war theory 
fails to clarify this matter. It is assumed rather than analyzed. This ambiguity leaves 
the validity of the just war theory problematic and unconvincing.
Î
Finally, there is a great gulf between the theoretical and practical 
understanding of just war. This is not only a matter of how practically we should 
fight a war, but also of whether the just war theory has a built-in element of not 
fighting a war. For instance, the principle o f discrimination suggests that we should 
avoid the direct attack on non-combatants. If so, it assumes that there are some 
things we cannot do in order to win. In other words, war undertaken on just war 
grounds may require those who pursue it to consider the possibility of surrender 
rather than to fight a war unjustly. But this possibility becomes impossible when a 
war is begun. Besides, the principle of proportionality suggests that the damage to 
be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected 
by taking up aims. But this principle hardly applies throughout the conduct of the 
war as well as to the decision to begin warfare. If  these two main principles are hard 
to put into practice, then the just war theory should not be primarily understood as
For instance, Reinhold Niebuhr considers that violence or the threat o f  violence was an 
indispensable element in the dynamics o f  social change. "A responsible relationship to the political 
order, therefore, makes an unqualified disavowal o f  violence impossible." (R.Niebuhr, An 
Interpretation o f Christian Ethics. p .l70)
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the justification of war but rather as a limitation upon war starting. Therefore, the 
just war theory also suggests that surrender is preferable to being engaged in an 
unjust war.
Hauerwas’ critique is significant because it does successfully unmask the
ambiguities of the just war* theory, demonstrating that it cannot determine for us
which war is just, but rather is often used as an excuse to justify war. Besides, he
presents a challenge to the effect that if Christian love can take the form of violence
in the name of preserving ordered liberty, it no longer seems necessary that Jesus
ever lived or died. However, the difficulty is that it seems that we cannot avoid the
reality o f the use o f violence if  we want to maintain law and order. How does
pacifism function in international relations? Does Hauerwas suggest any particulai-
form of government? Or is he an anarchist? Regarding the former question,
J.Moltmami rightly says that
love of the enemy is not retaliation, but creative love. Whoever repays
evil with good no longer retaliates but creates something new  In
love of the enemy one does not wonder, "How can I protect myself 
against the enemy and possible attack?" Thiough love of the enemy 
we make the enemy part of our own responsibility. We learn to look
upon ourselves with the eyes of the other  In a nuclear age,
however, love of the enemy is the only politically realistic alternative.
We cannot secure peace today by eliminating or tlireatening to 
eliminate all our possible enemies, but alone by reducing hostilities and 
taking responsibility for our common security and a lasting
development  We must demilitaiize public consciousness and
political thinking, and apply how we deal with an opponent in a 
democracy to how we deal with so-called "enemies" in international 
relations.^^
Interestingly enough, Hauerwas never offers any theory o f state. For him, Cliristians 
need no theory of state to inform or guide their witness in whatever society they
J.Moltinann, "Political Theology and the Ethics o f Peace." In: Theology, Politics and 
Peace, ed. Theodore Runyon (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989), pp.39-40
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happen to find themselves because "the overriding conflict of our time is not that
between democracies and totalitai'ianism rather it is the conflict between those that
would remain loyal to God’s Kingdom and those that would side with the world.
Therefore, for Hauerwas, it is not the political ideology that matters, but loyalty that
matters. However, he defends his pacifism by saying that
I do not think that one needs a theory of legitimacy in order to 
determine how one will or will not relate to one’s social order or 
government authority. Rather I simply take societies and the state as 
I find them. As a pacifist I will co-operate in all those activities of the 
state that contribute to the common good. Put simply, I do not see 
any in principle reason why I cannot be a good citizen, but much 
depends on how a particular social order determine what being a 
citizen entails. I f  citizenship means that we can only serve others 
thi'ough societal functions if we are willing to kill, then indeed the 
pacifist camiot be a citizen. But at least that tells us much, for such 
a state, whether it be democratic or not, must surely deserve to be 
described as the beast.®'
Nevertheless, the above discussion may not spell out sufficiently what 
Cluistian pacifism is, I will therefore endeavour to further clarify Hauerwas’ 
pacifism. Firstly, it is important to distinguish Christian pacifism from survivalist 
pacifism. The former is built on the eschatological hope made possible by Jesus, as 
previously explicated, while the latter is built on the fear caused by the massive 
destruction of war. Their difference becomes more obvious in relation to their 
responses to nuclear weapons. For Christian pacifists, nuclear war is no different 
from any war- except that if war is bad, nuclear war is worse. The survivalists’ 
concern for total nuclear disarmament is because the very existence of such weapons 
will threaten the existence of the human species. However, they may support 
conventional war by the just war theory. For Hauerwas, the survivalists’ argument
S.Haueiwas, Against the Nations, p .129.
3: S.Hauerwas, "Pacifism: Some Philosophical Considerations." In: Faith and Philosophy, 
vol.2 (1985), p .l04.
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can never be the reason for Christian pacifism because Christians always know that
the world will end and their hope is in the heavenly city. A confusion of this not
only distorts the Gospel’s message, but also fails to provide an alternative reality to
the world. According to Hauerwas, the United Methodist Council of Bishops’
statement on nuclear war, In Defence o f  Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and Just
Peace, is an example o f this confusion.®'  ^ He comments
the peace which they [Methodist’s bishops] mainly speak is not that 
which comes from being schooled by the cross of Christ, but rather is 
a peace that seeks survival rather than justice.®®
Against this, Hauerwas insists that "the Christian pacifist agrees that life cannot be 
an end in and of itself- there are many things for which we should be willing to die 
rather than lose these goods."®'*
Secondly, for Hauerwas, Christian pacifism is not a matter of tactics, but is 
rather a way of life. In other words, the difference between pacifism and non- 
pacifism is not simply a matter of "how", but of two different ways of life. The 
pacifist "is someone committed to never facing the question of whether to use or not 
use violence as a means of securing some good."®® But this distinction is always 
confused. For instance, Richai'd Harries’ book on Christianity and War in the 
Nuclear Age is an example of this. According to him, pacifists and non-pacifists 
unite to affirm the overriding importance of resisting evil. But "their disagreement 
comes in the means [italics mine] which it is morally legitimate to use in so
See S.Hauerwas, "A Pacifist Response to In Defense o f Creation." In: Asbui v Theological 
Journal. Vol.41 (1986), pp.5-14, and "Epilogue: A Pacifist Response to the Bishops." In: Speak Up 
for Just War or Pacifism, pp. 149-182.
S.Haueiwas, "A Pacifist Response to In Defense o f  Creation." p.6 
S.Hauerws, Against the Nations, p. 154.
S.Hauerwas, "Pacifism: Some Philosophical Considerations." p.lOl.
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resisting."®® Therefore, he contends that claims to be non-violent are violent in one 
sense; they cause other people to suffer. An example of this is that boycotts and 
strikes are forms of indirect coercion which can inflict quite severe degrees of 
hardship on others, as the boycott o f Manchester cotton by Gandhi’s followers caused 
the children of Lancashire to suffer. Harries concludes that "there is an important 
moral distinction to be made but it is not between violence and non-violence. It is 
between the direct use of force or coercion and indirect coercion."®^ Harries’ 
comment may be right only i f  pacifism is, as he said, a tactic. However, if pacifism, 
as Hauerwas sees it, is a way of life, then Harris’ comment misses the point because, 
although it may be true that non-violence may create longer and harder suffering, 
pacifism is not basically to avoid the use of force or reduce suffering. Rather it is 
a way of living which cannot be measured by the criterion of consequence. This 
does not mean that pacifism does not take into account of the suffering which it may 
produce into consideration, but this account of the suffering does not justify the 
necessity of the use of force because pacifism is a way of life, not a tactic. Pacifism 
as a way of life suggests that we have to consider the kind of persons we ought to 
be so that certain kinds of decisions are simply excluded from our lives.
Finally, Cliristian pacifism is often misunderstood as putting sacrificial love 
before social responsibility, exalting peace over justice, and failing to appreciate the 
state’s legitimate function to secure order. This may be true for the individualistic 
form of pacifism. However, if  we take the whole theological framework of 
Flauerwas, we realize that these accusations fail to take account o f Hauerwas’ 
position. For Flauerwas, the pacifist never makes non-violence more importance than
R.Harries, Christianity and War in a Nuclear Age (London: Mowbray, 1986), p.41. 
®'' Ibid., p.41.
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justice. It is not to give up justice for peace, and vice versa. Rather the alternatives 
of violence and acceptance of injustice are as false as the assumption that all state 
action partakes of, or depends on, violence. Christian pacifism is concerned about 
peace. But this is not a Pax Romana which "was the result of the political will of 
the Roman Emperor and his highest civil servants and was a peace produced and 
secured by the successful military deployment of his legions."®® On the contrary, 
it is a Pax Christi which is marked by the new relationship with God, and with 
others, that Jesus has given to human beings tlu'ough his death and resurrection. 
Hauerwas believes that this is not carried out by a progressively remodeled, total 
empirical society, but by creating a new community, that is, the church.®  ^ This new 
creation is not a monastic society, but rather the visible manifestation in history of 
a viable society. Therefore, the practice of non-violence is not at all related to giving 
up love of our neighbours, but is to help the world find the habits of peace, whose 
absence often makes violence seem the only alternative. Hauerwas says that pacifism 
is neither easy nor cheap, for no reconciliation is possible unless the wrong is 
confronted and acknowledged.'”*
I believe that the above explanation is a clear and accurate account of 
Hauerwas’ pacifism, although my discussion is more explanatory than critical. This 
is because a critique of Hauerwas’ pacifism is possible only if we also make a 
critique of his ecclesiology and christology, and this has been done. Even though my 
presentation is rather explanatory, it does not mean that my evaluation of Hauerwas’ 
pacifism is partial because I do consider that pacifism is closer than the just war
Ulrich Duclirow, Shalom (Geneva: WCC, 1989), p. 125. 
See my discussion on Hauerwas’ ecclesiology.
See S.Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today, pp.89-100,
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theory to the Gospel’s message. In other words, the major charge against pacifism 
does not lie in its theological foundation, but rather in its relevance to the 
contemporary world. My experience of the Tienamuen Square Massacre (Chinese 
students pro-democracy movement in 1989) convinces me that non-violence is both 
possible and powerful [although I realize that most of the students may consider non­
violence as a tactic rather than a way of life]. Overcoming violence non-violently 
is possible when we rightly understand that non-violence may require martyrdom. 
It is powerful because the cross of Christ shows us that suffering has liberating power 
and can work convincingly in the long term. Nevertheless, I have to admit that in 
some extreme circumstances [e.g defence of family], I will take up "the sword instead 
of the plough".'^* I would not need the just war theory to justify my act, but rather 
I accept what D.Bonhoeffer said about the guilt in responsibility. He said that
if it is responsible action, if  it is action which is concerned solely and 
entirely with the other man, if it arises from selfislmess of love for the 
real man who is our brother, then, precisely because this is so, it
cannot wish to shun the fellowship of human guilt If any man tries
to escape guilt in responsibility he detaches himself from the ultintate
reality of human existence  He sets his own personal innocence
above his responsibility for men, and he is blind to the more 
irredeemable guilt which he incurs precisely in this; he is blind also to 
the fact that real innocence shows itself precisely in a man’s entering 
into the fellowship of guilt for the sake of other men.'^^
After this examination of Hauerwas’ pacifism, we turn to the last issue of this 
section; that is, how Hauerwas’ pacifism displays his practical approach to theology. 
In summary, the characteristics of Hauerwas’ pacifism are: firstly, an emphasis on the 
distinctiveness of Cliristian pacifism, which is rooted in the cross of Christ; secondly,
Here, I am talking about an individual use o f  force rather than a collective use o f  force. 
The main difference between them is that the former is a "free" act, while the latter is not because "the 
average person is unable to disobey the social system to which he or she belongs." (See Dominique 
Barbe, A  Theology o f Conflict, pp.62-71.)
D.Bonhoeffer, Ethics. p.241.
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an emphasis on the possible impossibility of Christian pacifism, which does not give 
in to idealism; and thirdly, an emphasis on the character formation of Christian 
pacifism, which demands particular virtues of Cliristians. Primarily, I consider that 
Hauerwas’ pacifism can be understood as an example of a cultural-linguistic 
tradition/^ According to this model, meaning and practice are inter-related in order 
to make a claim about the foundation of knowledge. Theologically put, an intimate 
relation exists between religious belief and life practices. However, this model 
considers that we should not examine religious discourse by applying external or 
philosophical criteria of truth and meaning. Rather we should base such justifications 
upon principles of framework that define the context in which questions of 
justification might be raised. Therefore, it does not make sense to ask for grounds 
for belief and knowledge outside of the shared practices and shared conception of 
what count as grounds or foundations. Only by participating in a particular language 
game, its rules and practices, its form of life, and its cultural linguistic framework 
does one understand that form of life. More importantly, the meaning of these 
beliefs is exhibited in the shared practices and competences. This model emphasizes 
the formation of character and the narrative repetition of the community’s story.
It is obvious that the whole of Hauerwas’ theological framework is associated 
with this model. For instance, Flauerwas’ pacifism is built solely on christological 
foundation rather than making concession to secular thoughts. Besides, its audience 
is the Christian community rather than a general audience. More importantly, 
Hauerwas emphasizes that we cannot but be pacifists if we share the life of Jesus, for 
pacifism is a way of life. The strength of the model of the cultural-linguistic
43 See Francis Schussler Fiorenza, "Theory and Practice." In: Theological Eclucatjm  
Supplement (1987), p p . l l5 - l l7 ,  George Lindbeck, The Nature o f  Doctrine, and also my discussion 
in pp.l95ff.
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tradition is not to reduce the religious identity of a community to an abstract symbol 
system or to a general religious dimension of common human experience. It points, 
to the specific practices, characteristics, and life story of a particular historical 
religious community. Yet the strength of it also is its weakness. By focusing upon 
the concrete particularity of a community’s life story, character and practice, it tends 
not to emphasize the need to explicate the public dimension of its religious identity. 
This position has been labelled by some as fideistic or as the sectarian temptation in 
theology.'''’ Nevertheless, as indicated previously, this weakness should not be over­
emphasized because the church as an alternative reality is a witness to the Kingdom. 
In other words, Christian contribution to society is not soley depended on its social 
relevance, but also its distinctiveness.
See Gustafson’s critique on Hauerwas, "The Sectarian Temptation." In: Proceedings o f the 
Catholic Theological Society, Vol.40, 1985, pp.83-94, and my discussion on pp.96ff.
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2. EVANGELIZATION
The birth of liberation theology poses a new challenge to our understanding 
and practice of evangelization. That is to say, evangelization is inadequately 
understood primarily in terms of church-planting, soul saving and sending 
missionaries to evangelize, but rather it should be practised in the context of 
involvement, of solidarity and in compassion with the poor. In other words, it is 
inadequate to listen only to the cry of the lost, for the cry of the oppressed must also 
be heard.' Nevertheless, it is not my intention in this section to provide a 
comprehensive pictur e of what evangelization is and involves, but rather to spell out 
the significance of a particular perspective- liberation theology as represented by 
Sobrino- in our contemporary understanding of evangelization. It is also my purpose 
here to show how Sobrino’s view of evangelization reflects his understanding of the 
relationship between theory and praxis in relation to the Cliristian religion. Thus, I 
will discuss Sobrino’s view of evangelization as follows. Firstly, how can we 
understand evangelization in the light of christology, according to Sobrino? 
Secondly, how can we understand the central message of evangelization in terms of 
salvation? [These two issues are closely inter-locked because the former paves the 
way for the latter, and the latter concretizes the former, although I discuss them 
separately.] And finally, what is the relationship between theory and praxis in 
relation to Christianity illustrated by Sobrino’s view of evangelization? What are its 
strengths and weaknesses?
 ^ I do not mean that the challenge posed by the liberation theologians is unique and original 
because, for instance, the social gospel movement in the U.S. had also addressed this issue. 
Nevertheless, I consider that It is new because unlike the social gospel movement, liberation theology 
does not work on an assumption o f  optimistic view o f  humanity, but rather from the perspective o f  
the poor. Besides, unlike the social gospel movement, liberation theology does not give up the 
eschatological view o f salvation, but rather maintains that transcendence cannot be understood without 
giving reference to immanence.
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Christological evangelization means mission in Clirist’s way. This concerns 
how we understand and practise evangelization in terms of Jesus’ evangelization. 
Sobrino writes that "[we] must reproduce Jesus’ evangelization in Jesus’ own 
fashion."^ In order to understand mission in Christ’s way, Sobrino suggests that we 
have to refer to the central message which dominated Jesus’ preaching, and the 
mentality which Jesus had in response to this. In short, the central message was the 
Kingdom of God, and Jesus’ response to the Kingdom was his unconditional love and 
commitment to the poor. It was the Kingdom which defined Jesus’ mission and 
whom Jesus served. However, these two aspects have been previously discussed^ 
and therefore, in the following, I will selectively concentrate on some relevant points 
and further explicate them.
Centrality to Jesus’ mission, was not the preaching of himself, but the 
Kingdom of God. Besides, Jesus’ proclamation was made not only in words, but also 
in terms of his entire life and actions because he was the Kingdom, too. Therefore, 
the basic premise of his mission and the central theme of his preaching was not the 
hope of the coming Kingdom at some predictable date in the future, but the fact that 
in his own person and work the Kingdom was already present among men and 
women in great power. In other words, Jesus concretized the Kingdom in his life 
and took as his main vocation the jubilee year proclamation and its implementation 
in the person of the Suffering Servant. His whole life, till his death on the cross, is 
a complete manifestation o f God’s Kingdom of love. That is to say, God in Clirist 
is showing his passionate concern for the poor; a new eschatological reality is present
 ^J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation, p. 133. A lso see the work. The Beatitudes (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 1984), done by Segundo Galilei.
 ^ The discussion o f the centrality o f  Jesus’ mission can be found in , while the discussion of  
the rationale o f  Jesus’ mission can be found in
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in human history affecting human life not only morally and spiritually, but also 
physically and psychologically, materially and socially. For Jesus, the primary 
beneficiaries of his proclamation were the poor. The poor were those who were 
simied against'', victims of both personal and structural sin. In Jesus, God is the 
defender o f the sinned against. In Jesus, we have the Kingdom in action. 
Furthermore, "for Jesus himself, the Kingdom of God was not a utopian symbol of 
hope, but a utopia for which something had to be done."^ Thus, the Kingdom is a 
utopia to be anticipated and constructed in opposition to historical realities and 
historical sin. Therefore, the proclamation of the Gospel of the Kingdom includes 
an invitation to join the Kingdom, and to participate in its struggle. This 
participation is the affirmation of the poor as having God’s preferential option which 
is the yardstick of faithfulness in evangelization.
Sobrino’s interpretation of mission in Clirisf s way in terms of the Kingdom 
of God clarifies the ambiguous concept of "Missio Dei" because the concept of 
"Missio Dei" may give way to speak only of God’s activities in the world 
independent of the church and its mission®. Also, it is a concept which is primarily 
used in order to acknowledge God’s presence in the world rather than challenging the
 ^ Raymond Fung explains the idea o f  sinned-agalnstness in this way: "If w e define the human 
situation in economic and political terms, then o f  course the answer must also be found in the realm 
o f  economics and politics winch, we know as Christians, do not suffice. It's not enough. It does not 
touch the basic reality that w e are in as human beings. And so I feel that we should use theological 
language. That’s how I come to use o f  the term sinned-against. It includes economic and political 
exploitations, but it is also veiy  much spiritual exploitation." (Evangelisticallv Yours, Geneva: WCC, 
1992, p. 107)
 ^ J.Sobrino, Spirituality o f  Liberation. p .l23 .
G For instance, see J.C.Hoekendljk, The Church Inside Out (Geneva: WCC, 1964). In this 
book, "Missio Dei" was explicated by a theory about the transformation o f  the world and o f history 
not through evangelization and church-planting, but by means o f  a divinely guided immanent historical 
process, somewhat analogous to deistic views o f  the Enlightenment. However, Christians who would 
avoid the temptation to equate their religion with God by making it absolute and final, who desire to 
be open to signs o f the working o f  God’s Spirit among others without denying their own mandate to 
mission, w ill find the "Missio Dei" concept o f  continuing value.
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world to be conformed to God’s will. On the contrary, the concept of the Kingdom
of God signifies God’s rule and presence. It is both a spiritual and an earthly reality.
It is a spiritual reality because it is established primarily by the death-resurrection of
Jesus, when he became irreversibly God’s Kingdom. The proclamation of Jesus
Christ is, at the same time, the proclamation of God’s Kingdom and its values. He
teaches all to let God’s will rule over their hearts and become God’s Kingdom.
God’s Kingdom must be born in the heaifs of individuals. The Kingdom is also an
earthly reality because it finds its expression in the values of justice, peace, freedom
and human dignity for all. The promotion of the Kingdom and its values here on
earth is an essential part of evangelization. Without it, our proclamation would lose
its credibility. Such values are not only symbols, but the beginnings o f the Kingdom
itself. Human activities in all their variety and extension are vital to the mission of
the church in its service to the Kingdom. However, J.Verkuyl comments that
a Kingdom-centered theology worthy of the name is concerned with 
every aspect of life and society. Often in the history of the church and 
theology Jesus has been- and in some cases continues to be- 
proclaimed without His Kingdom. In the face of that kind of 
proclamation, it should not come as a surprise to discover people 
attempting to find the Kingdom and salvation without Christ?
Is Sobrino’s interpretation o f mission in Christ’s way a Kingdom-centred theology 
without Christ? Does his interpretation betray people with false expectations? Does 
his interpretation deliver people into the hands of demonic powers, for whenever a 
particular political programme is identified with the Kingdom of God, those who 
follow become the victims of forces that they cannot control?
It cannot be denied that throughout his writings, Sobrino emphasizes the 
necessity and the importance of the earthly reality of the Kingdom in relation to
J.Verkuyl, "Test o f  Validity for Theology o f Religion." In: The Good N ew s o f  the Kingdom 
(Maiyknoll: Orbis, 1993), p.72.
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evangelization. For instance, he understands the witness of the church in two related
ways, namely, objective and subjective. The objective way entails involvement in
the struggle against injustice, while the subjective way is the holiness of the church
in terms o f its support to the objective way.® But it is unfair to accuse Sobrino of
ignoring the indispensability o f a personal relationship to God, the need for
forgiveness and faith and the longing for eternal life, because evangelization in a
context marked by extreme injustice and poverty may demand a different entry point.
Emilo Castro quotes that
there are historical priorities according to which salvation is anticipated 
in one dimension first, be it the personal, the political or the economic 
dimension.^
Faith for Sobrino is not understood in a "spiritual" or "religious" manner, but is 
practised in real life. Therefore, his emphasis on the earthly reality o f the Kingdom 
does not necessarily mean that it finds the Kingdom without Christ; on the contrary, 
it is to counter the temptation of pursuing Christ without the Kingdom. But does 
Sobrino’s emphasis allow for the "eschatological proviso" (the proviso or reservation 
that the coming eschaton sets against any and every human achievement)? In the 
First World, "eschatological proviso" means that despite the economic and social 
achievements of affluent societies in which the basic problems of human subsistence 
have been resolved, these societies are still not the Kingdom of God. Yet Sobrino 
contends that in the Third World, the situation is completely different because "the 
Kingdom of God has not yet come in its fullness, but this Kingdom is formally 
denied." Fie exclaims that "we have a long way to go before the problem of the 
eschatological proviso becomes relevant in Latin America as it is in the First
® J.Sobrino, "Tlie Witness o f  the Church in Latin America." In: The Challenge o f  Basic 
Christian Communities (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1981), pp.161-188.
® Emilio Castro, Sent Free (Geneva: WCC, 1985), p.23.
346
W o r l d . " D e s p i t e  it, the church in the Third World should be careful not to see 
any particular political ideology, such as Marxism, as the way leading to full 
humanisation, and not to identify the Kingdom as equivalent to socio-economic 
development and progress.
While the Kingdom of God is the central message of Jesus, mission in 
Christ’s way is also concerned with how Jesus served the Kingdom. According to 
Sobrino, there are at least thiee characteristics o f Jesus’ approach. Firstly, Jesus’ way 
of mission displays a dialectical nature of evangelization in terms of its universality 
and particularity" because on the one hand, Jesus came to save all human, and on 
the other, he proclaimed the good news to the poor. The universality of 
evangelization embraces two dimensions; it is to be directed to all human beings, and 
it is to evangelize the whole reality, both the religious reality of the person and the 
socio-political structures. These two dimensions illustrate that God’s plan of 
salvation is to be proclaimed not only thi'ough that which is religious, but also 
tlu’ough any and every human reality, for God is love, and wishes to re-create every 
area of creation. Therefore, evangelization cannot be exclusively understood as a 
matter of personal salvation, but also involves social liberation. Concerning the 
particularity of evangelization, Sobrino argues that Jesus’ message always begins 
concretely with the needy and the poor. The poor are not only the addressees of 
evangelization, but also its privileged addressees. Furthermore, the poor are "also the 
condition for the possibility of evangelization."'^ That is to say, it is in the poor 
that we perceive the nature o f God: not a Being detached from our miseries, but a
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.279.
See my discussion on Sobrino’s ecclesiology and also J.Sobrino, The True Church and the 
Poor, pp.289-299.
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.293.
347
God who hears the cry of the oppressed, a God who acts in history, and constructs 
the reign for men and women in freedom. Thus, evangelization is no longer 
understood as a one-way process from the evangelizer to the evangelized, but rather 
both the evangelizer and the evangelized are the addressees of evangelization. Is then 
the particularity of evangelization (good news to the poor) opposed to its 
universality? Is the partiality of evangelization a form of reductionism? Does the 
partiality of evangelization idealize the poor? These issues have been discussed 
previously, so I do not intend to repeat then here". However, an emphasis on the 
particularity of evangelization [good news to the poor] does not reject the gospel for 
the rich, but rather tluough God’s particularity, the message for the rich is a call to 
be poor, and to be in solidarity with those who are outcasts.
Secondly, Jesus’ way of mission is an illustration o f the unification of faith 
and practice in evangelization. This unification is neither a belief that norms for 
human action come from theoretical knowledge nor a belief that theory is secondary 
to practice. Rather Sobrino states that "faith provides the ultimate Chiistian meaning 
of action; action is the Christian practice of this ultimate meaning."" According to 
Sobrino, the preaching of Jesus is not only a "pure" proclamation which demands a 
response of faith from his hearers, but is also something that by its nature has to be 
done, put into practice. Jesus’ way of mission is accomplished by both preaching and 
signs, for Jesus did not evangelize only through a verbal communication of the good 
news, but also through his activity, his historical situation and his destiny. In other 
words, if what Jesus proclaims in his preaching is the love of God, then Jesus can 
credibly speak this message only if he also puts it into practice. Therefore, his cures,
See my discussion on Sobrino’s ecclesiology.
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.280.
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miracles, and exorcisms; his prophetic gestures in the temple, eating with the
oppressed and breaking social barriers make it possible for him to give verbal
expression to the ultimate reality of God. Jesus’ preaching of faith in God and his
accompanying action are in this way interconnected. L.Newbigin agrees with
Sobrino’s view by saying that
why should people believe our preaching that the Kingdom of God has 
come near in Jesus if they see no sign that anything is happening as a 
result, if  they can see no evidence that disease and ignorance and 
cruelty and injustice are being challenged and overcome? Why should 
they believe our words if  there is nothing happening to authenticate 
them?"
The unification of faith and practice in evangelization is not to suggest that soeial 
effectiveness is the criterion of faith, but that our faith is mere empty words if it does 
not have with it a costly engagement with the powers of evil which rob men and 
women of their humanity, and if it does not call men and women to share in the 
same costly engagement. This is what Bonhoeffer said about costly and cheap grace. 
Sobrino seems to give more weight to the urgency of practice than to the urgency of 
faith, but this does not necessarily propose ortho-practice against ortho-doxy, for 
Sobrino’s emphasis is a consequence of his historical urgency. More importantly, a 
relative emphasis on the urgency of practiceTs a passage from an "abstract" ortho­
doxy to a "concrete" ortho-doxy." If  faith is described as unconditional hope in 
God and the Father o f Jesus, then practice is the making real of the content of this. 
Therefore, the importance of the unification of faith and practice, I consider, in our 
understanding of evangelization, is that in order to evangelize faithfully we must have 
experienced liberation from the power of sin and death, communion with God and 
neighbours, be earnestly and passionately involved in the search for justice and peace
Lesslie Newbigin, M ission in Christ’s Wav (Geneva: WCC, 1987), p. 11. 
See J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp.21-24.
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among the nations and their inhabitants. Evangelization is concerned with both 
personal and public, spiritual and historical, present and future.
Finally, mission in Christ’s way involves the proclamation of the good news,
the witness of one’s life, and the implantating o f the Kingdom. The last two ways
have previously been discussed, therefore I will concentrate on the first way. In
Sobrino’s writing, it appears that he almost ignores the importance of proclamation
in evangelization. His efforts are primarily concentrated on the implantating of the
Kingdom. Does this distort Jesus’ evangelization? In order to clarify this, we have
to understand the meaning of proclamation. Among fundamentalists, proclamation
is often one-sidedly interpreted as a verbal activity to communicate the gospel in
order that humankind can be saved. This is both true and important, yet it is also
inadequate, because Sobrino points out that proclamation cannot be isolated from
denunciation. If proclamation is concerned with the good news, then denunciation
is concerned with all that hinders this good news. This does not mean that
proclamation is a positive act, while denunciation a negative act, but that both are
positive acts because people may grasp the point of proclamation by seeing its
opposite. Sobrino states their relationship in this way:
for those who have been dehumanized by wretched poverty and
oppression the good news begins as a word of hope For those who
have been dehumanized by their own wrongful use of oppressive 
power the good news begins as a call to conversion."
Therefore, Sobrino’s engagement in fighting against injustice does not have any 
tendency to neglect the importance of proclamation, but he does take a different point 
of departure, because for him, proclamation can never be divorced from denunciation. 
Otherwise, the gospel is incomplete.
Ibid., p.273.
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From the above, it is clear that mission in Clnist’s way, according to Sobrino, 
is concerned about both demonstrating and proclaiming the gospel. Evangelization, 
then, is not only primarily understood as a matter of preaching the Kingdom, but also 
as building up the Kingdom; not only concerned with our spiritual salvation, but also 
with the salvation of the whole created order. Obviously, Sobrino emphasizes the 
latter. Before moving to the other related theme, it may be interesting to see how 
Hauerwas understands evangelization.
I have to point out that Hauerwas does not write anything in particular about 
evangelization, but I consider that we can discern his view from his theological 
framework, that is, the concepts of character and narrative. I consider that for 
Hauerwas, evangelization means inviting people into the Clnistian story as the 
definitional story of the life of the proclaimers, and thereby encouraging people to 
give up, abandon, and renounce other stories that have shaped their lives in false or 
distorting ways. Put differently, evangelization is when the Christian story, with its 
core character, permitting people to notice the shallowness of the stories people have 
embraced elsewhere. If my interpretation of Hauerwas’ view is correct, then we 
realize that there is a great difference of emphasis between Sobrino and Hauerwas. 
For the former, evangelization is more concerned about building God’s Kingdom in 
terms of social action; while for Hauerwas, it is more concerned about "evangelism" 
in terms of building the people of God. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to make a 
dichotomy between "evangelism" and "social action" because if  the gospel concerns 
changed governance, then that changed governance concerns all o f life. For the 
victory of God over death is not a victory in some selected zones of life, but over all 
creation and against every threat of chaos. Besides, in a society which denies the 
right to live o f some people, as the church we are to speak what we know, evoke 
resistance and yearning, permit alternative, authorized newness. Then, no matter
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whether we are liberal or conservative, we can settle for a shared acknowledgment 
that the church bears witness to the good news in the face of all brands of fear and 
ideology.
In the preceding paragraphs, I have discussed what is involved in
evangelization, and how it is done. However, evangelization, for some, is primarily
about the proclamation of God’s salvation. In the following, I intend to discuss
evangelization in this term. John Stott considers that salvation is exclusively referred
to the forgiveness of sin and personal spiritual redemption which has nothing related
to the socio-political transformation". He comments that
[for] the salvation offered in the gospel o f Christ concerns persons 
rather than structures. It is deliverance from another kind of yoke than 
political and economic oppressions.
We can have no objection to the use of the word, "salvation", in a 
political sense, provided it is clear that we are not talking theologically 
about God’s salvation in and tlnough Christ."
Nevertheless, he calls those works aiming at the creation o f a better society the 
mission of God. Is salvation exclusively concerned with personal salvation? Is it 
right to distinguish God’s salvation and God’s mission? I hope that my following 
discussion of Sobrino’s view of salvation in terms of the personal and historical level 
will clarify these issues.
For instance, regarding Lk.4:18, he contends that "here three categories o f  people are 
mentioned, the poor, the captives, and blind. It is true that during his ministry, Jesus opened those 
eyes o f  the blind, and certainly the blind should arouse our Christian compassion today. But Christ’s
miraculous restoration o f sight was a sign that he was the light o f  the world  Jesus also ministered
the poor and had some disconcerting things to say to the rich. Yet it is well known that the poor in 
the Old Testament were not just the needy, but the pious whose hope and trust were in God. The first 
Beatitude cannot possibly be understood as making material poverty a condition for receiving God’s
Kingdom There is no evidence that Jesus literally emptied the prison o f Palestine. On the contrary,
John the Baptist was left in prison and was executed. What Jesus did do, however, was to deliver 
people from the spiritual bondage o f sin and satan, and to promise that the truth would set his disciples 
free." (Christian Mission in the Modern World. Downers Grove: IVP, 1975, pp.98-99)
J.Stott, Christian Mission in the Modem World, p.95 & 98.
352
On the personal level, Sobrino’s understanding is closely related to Roman 
Catholic tradition and teaching about salvation. We may be tempted to over-simplify 
this by singling out the trade in Indulgences in the fifteenth century which brought 
Luther into the fray in his protest against it. It is not my purpose here to examine 
this event in detail, but Hans Kung, in his book Justification, contends that the 
Roman Catholic teaching has never stated that justification came partly from God and 
partly from man. Rather it has been sufficiently emphasized that the sinner can do 
nothing without the grace of Jesus Cluist. In his letter to Kung, Karl Barth wrote 
that "if what you have presented in Part Two of this book [Justification] is actually 
the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, then I must certainly admit that my view 
of justification agrees with the Roman Catholic view; if only for the reason that the 
Roman Catholic teaching would then be the most strikingly in accord with mine."^'' 
Yet we have to admit that Kung’s exposition may not really represent the Roman 
Catholic teaching, but this does not mean that we can ignore his work in our attempt 
to understand the Roman Catholic teaching on salvation, because his work was done 
in 1957 far before he was excommunicated in 1979. Besides, he was charged with 
"contempt for the magisterium of the Church" on the issue of papal infallibility 
instead of his view of justification. Nevertheless, at the same time, I also refer to the 
official statement of the Roman Catholic Church; that is, An Agreed Statement bv 
the Anglican-Roman Catholic Internal Commission about Salvation and the 
Churclf k made in 1988.
According to this statement, both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant 
teaching fundamentally agree that "the act of God in bringing salvation to the human
20 Hans Kung, Justification (London; Burns & Oates, 1981), p.xl.
Salvation and the Church with Commentary and Study Guide (London: Catholic Truth 
Society, 1989).
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race and summoning individuals into a community to serve him is due solely to the 
mercy and grace of God, mediated and manifested tlnough Jesus Christ in his 
ministry, atoning death and rising again. However, it also highlights the 
differences between them in regard to the matter of how divine grace related to 
human response. They are, firstly, the understanding of faith through which we are 
justified; secondly, the understanding of justification and the associated concepts of, 
righteousness and justice; and finally, the bearing of good works on salvation.
Firstly, faith, according to the Roman Catholic, is the human response to
God’s initiative which is itself a gift of grace. But our response to this costly grace
is itself a gift while remaining a genuine personal acceptance of Cluist. Salvation is
the gift of grace; it is by faith that it is appropriated. However, Kung points out that
the sinner is justified through faith alone, but not tluough a faith which 
stands opposed to works done in a living community o f will with 
Christ or out of love grounded in faith and all other virtues. Love is 
not missing in justification and it camiot be so. The faith through 
which man is justified is indeed faith in the full sense of the word. It 
is a living faith. It does not insist upon acts of love since it wants to 
receive everything from God. But faith, even "dead" faith, has the 
seed of love in it.^ ^
Obviously, an emphasis on the importance of love in faith does not exclude the 
assurance of faith in the decisive, saving work of the cross and resurrection. But 
rather it is a balance not to give way to the too extreme emphasis on assurance which 
may encourage a neglect of the need for justification to issue in holiness of life. 
Thus, faith is no mere iimer feeling, but involves both understanding and intimate 
trust. It is a living faith because it involves commitment of our will to God in 
repentance and obedience to his call. Kung says that
Ibid., p .l2 .
H.Kung, Justification, p.256.
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living faith, which alone justifies, does not exclude but rather includes 
sorrow for sin. It does not bring about any works in order to justify 
itself. Justification through living faith in no sense means justification 
by faith and works. But it wants to be active in works, "faith working 
tluough love" (Gal.5:6) How should it be otherwise? For "if I have 
all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing."
(1 Cor. 13:2)""
Therefore, living faith is inseparable from love, issues in good works, and grows
deeper in the course of a life of holiness.
Secondly, salvation is an act of both justification and sanctification because 
God promises the removal of our condemnation and gives us a new standing before 
him. Thus justification is indissolubly linked with God’s sanctifying recreation of us 
in grace. The Agreement states that "sanctification is that work o f God which 
actualizes in believers the righteousness and holiness without which no one may see
the Lord justification speaks of a divine declaration of acquittal, o f the love of
God manifested to an alienated and lost humanity prior to any entitlement on our 
part.""^ However, this clarification does not clearly bridge the relationship between 
justification and sanctification. Kung rightly points out that the Roman Catholic 
understands by sanctification primarily the objective and ontological holiness 
[heiligkeit] achieved in humans by God, while the Protestant emphasizes the 
subjective and ethical sanctification [heiligung] brought about by humans. This is 
why the Roman Catholic-understanding is mistaken as a primary activity of humans. 
As justification occurs through faith alone, and not tlirough works of humans, it is 
not identical with sanctification [in the strictly objective and ethical sense]. 
Otherwise, divine justification would become the self-justification of humans. In this
Ibid., pp.256-257.
Salvation and the Church, p.24.
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sense sanctification follows justification. But at the same time, justification
considered as the efficacious divine just judgment, making humans really just or holy,
is identical with sanctification (in the sense of an objective and ontological making
holy brought about by God). Otherwise, divine justification would be an empty,
purely verbal assertion. Thus, he concludes that
justice or holiness given to man through the justification of God is the 
necessary foundation for any moral sanctification of man and vice 
versa. Sanctification is holiness as established through justification 
becoming operative and real. Human sanctification without the 
holiness given by God is worthless- for the former is based on the 
latter. God-given holiness without grace-inspired human sanctification 
is sterile. As faith must be operative in love, so justification must be 
operative in sanctification."®
Nevertheless, Kung does not mention that the inseparable relationship between 
justification and sanctification is also basically related to the Latin translation, 
"iustificare", of the Greek verb, "dikaioun". The former signifies "to make 
righteous", while the latter signifies "to pronounce righteous". Therefore, Roman 
Catholic understanding of justification tends to include elements of salvation which 
Protestant would describe as belonging to sanctification rather than justification.
Finally, we turn to the issue of the relationship between salvation and good 
works. According to Roman Catholic teaching, the good works o f justified Christians 
are the fruits of the Spirit, and do not themselves earn a claim on God. Faith is no 
merely private and interior disposition. Rather our liberation commits us to an order 
of social existence in which the individual finds fulfilment in relationship with others. 
Thus, freedom in Clirist does not imply an isolated life, but rather one lived in a 
community governed by mutual obligations. Life in Christ sets us free from the 
demonic forces manifested not only in individuals, but also in social egoism.
H.Kung, Justification, p.269.
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Therefore, Chr istian good works are not individualistic but inevitably social because
we are committed to each other in Christ. The historical life of Jesus helps us to see
how true it is. However, regarding good works, Roman Catholic teaching introduces
a concept of reward. The agreement states that
the works of the righteous performed in Chr istian freedom and in the 
love of God which the Holy Spirit gives us are the object o f God’s 
commendation and receive his reward (Matt.6:4; 2Tim.4:8; Heb. 10:35,
11:6). In accordance with God’s promise, those who have responded 
to the grace of God and consequently borne fruit for the Kingdom will 
be granted a place in that 
Kingdom when it comes at Christ’s appearing.""
Does the concept of reward suggest an idea o f merit which may be in contrast to the 
primacy of the grace of God? Kung contends that the thought of reward cannot be 
eliminated from the Bible, but should not be understood in terms of the morality of 
merit which was represented by the Pharisee. The Pharisee boasted of his merit and 
spoke before God and humans, but he did not return home justified. Christ spoke out 
sharply against the Pharisaic morality of merit. Kung quotes the work of J. Schmid 
saying that
the distinctions between the teaching of Jesus Christ and Jewish 
thinking on merit are: a], in Jesus merit is thought of in an 
eschatological way; b]. what counts is not the works but the intention 
with which they are done; c]. man confronts God not as a partner with 
equal contractual rights, but always as an unworthy servant who 
receives from God a reward of grace [reward not as a legal claim but 
as promise]; d]. there is no equality between reward and achievement; 
e]. the thought of reward is not the major ethical motive, but is 
subordinated to motives of obedience and especially love, gratitude, 
and the imitation of God."®
Therefore, as Cluistians, we give the glory to God for our reward, since his grace 
enables us, so that we boast only in the Lord rather than in our good works.
S a lv a t io n  and The Church w i th  Commentary and Study Guide , p . 31, 
H.Kung, Justification. p.271.
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In summary, although Roman Catholic teaching emphasizes the importance 
of "works" in salvation, it does not deny a fundamental belief in the total incapacity 
of humans for any kind of self-justification. In justification the sinner can give 
nothing which he/she does not receive by God’s grace. However, justification by 
faith alone should not be set against good works because we cannot have faith 
without love, and vice versa. In the light of this, we have a better vantage point to 
understand Sobrino’s view of evangelization, which is cloaked with a sense of 
"works". An obvious example is his interpretation of spirituality. Spirituality is 
primarily understood for the sake of liberation. Does Sobrino suggest that we can 
earn our salvation? This emphasis does not necessarily promote any tendency to 
ignore God’s grace. Rather it is rooted in the Roman Catholic understanding of 
salvation. That is to say, this is co-operation not in the sense of collaboration, but 
of participation by means of being responsible. Works are asked from those already 
justified. Those yet to be justified are called upon to co-operate in faith. It means 
getting oneself involved in what God alone has put into execution. The God who 
justifies in Cluist remains, even in justification, the God of covenant- wants a true 
partner, not a robot or a puppet, but a human responding to him with a personal, 
responsible, active and heartfelt "Yes". Therefore, an emphasis on our responsibility 
in liberation does not mean that grace is secondary, but rather that the understanding 
of faith as solely equivalent to the imputation to human being of the righteousness 
of Cluist, which leaves the essential sinfulness of the individual unchanged, distorts 
the meaning of salvation. However, this emphasis does not necessarily support a 
thesis that evangelization should have a historical significance in the sense of being 
worked in history. With this, we come to Sobrino’s view of salvation in its relation 
to history.
Evangelization is to proclaim God’s redemption for human salvation. And
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this salvation takes place here and now. Therefore, in order to proclaim God’s plan 
of salvation faithfully, we should take the relationship between salvation history and 
secular history seriously"^. According to James M.Connolly, there are two extremes 
of understanding their relationship. The incarnationalists [those who emphasize the 
continuity of salvation and secular history] concentrate their gaze upon the person of 
Cluist, upon his mission, and upon the church. They may tend to accentuate the 
importance and the relevance o f human achievements here and now in the divine 
plan: they emphasize and accentuate not only the Pauline notion of the building up 
of the church, but also the essential goodness and value of the world as the creation 
of God. When they face the question of the culmination of this period in the 
parousia, they insist upon the transformation of the world, not its destruction. On the 
other hand, the eschatologists [those who emphasize the discontinuity] focus on the 
process o f salvation history and, therefore, the essential transitoriness of this stage in 
which we live. The Kingdom of God in its final perfection is not anticipated by a 
gradual mastery by Christ o f the present world, but by the glorious return of 
Cluist."®
Sobrino’s theological emphases have much in common with the 
incarnationalist’s approach. For instance, he sees liberation and the building up of 
the Kingdom as the task of Cluistians. Furthermore, he may even be inclined toward 
humanism [i.e. Marxism] and the values of this world. But it is wrong to assume 
that he sees the spread of Christianity in terms of scientific progress- the expected
Karl Barth distinguished between the two German words for history, Historié and 
Geschichte. Historié is that which is perceptible to humanity, the series o f  created events that can be 
represented as related created events; Geschichte is the salvific activity o f  God, His mighty acts by 
which He accomplishes His eternal economy.'
J.M.ConnolIy, Human History and the Word of God (New York: Macmillan, 1966),
pp.155-200.
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advance of humanity towards the final form of the Kingdom of God. Ironically
Sobrino considers the relationship between salvation history and secular history in a
dialectical manner in terms of their continuity and discontinuity. He writes that
the two histories [salvation history and secular history] are also related 
in the understanding of the transcendent as the end of history. It is 
clear that history has not yet reached its fulfilment. This fulfilment is 
a utopia and as such cannot be adequately analyzed by human reason 
but can only be grasped through hope. At the same time, faith tells us 
that the present is not simply a time of trial in preparation for a future 
destiny as though there were no continuity between present and future.
As a matter of fact, the present "trial" consists in making present under 
the conditions of history that which we await in hope as the ultimate 
fulfilment: the Kingdom of God. The "trial" consists in making real 
the love, justice and unity among human beings that are symbols used 
to describe the fullness of the end time. Therefore, even though this 
fullness is a free gift brought about by God, and in this sense is 
discontinuous with present history, a profound continuity does exist.
Regarding their relation to evangelization, he says that
when the evangelists proclaim the transcendent in the twofold sense of 
absolute future and absolute meaning of the present, they camiot 
oppose the transcendent to the historical nor can they be satisfied with 
presenting them as parallel. Because we are dealing not with 
evangelization in some vague sense but with Christian evangelization, 
emphasis must be placed on the unity of the two histories, the two 
good news. They are phases of a single reality, the one good news 
being lived in the conditions of historical existence, the other being 
lived under the conditions of the eschaton and therefore able to' be 
grasped only in hope."'
Although throughout his writings Sobrino principally emphasizes the continuity of 
salvation history and secular history, rather than their discontinuity, this emphasis 
does not suggest that the continuity is more important than discontinuity. Since 
theological reflection is not an abstract activity, but is rooted in a specific context, 
a relative emphasis is not only justifiable, but also necessaiy. More importantly, 
Sobrino’s concern for the transformation of the world and the continuity of these two 
histories is related to his emphasis on the doctrine of creation. He says that "the
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp.277-278.
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Spirit signifies the incorporation o f  human beings to the history o f  God and the
immersion of God in the history of human beings. The trinitarian God cannot be
what he is without continuing to create history and not simply interpret it.""" The
doctrine of creation rejects the idea of the total discontinuity of two histories
represented by the one-sided emphasis on the doctrine of redemption. In terms of
social significance, the doctrine of redemption considers that there is no relation
between the justice of the Kingdom of God and the justice of power structures. The
two worlds are separated by an unbridgable gap. But in the light of the doctrine of
creation, the shortcomings of the one sided emphasis on the doctrine of redemption
are that it contrasts the salvation of the individual with the transformation of the
historical group and the universe, contrasts the realm of salvation with the realm of
creation, interprets the symbol of the Kingdom of God as a static supernatural order
into which individuals enter after their death instead o f understanding it as a dynamic
power on earth, and excludes cultures as well as nature from the saving processes in
history. However, it is a mistake to assume that there is no doctrine of redemption
in Sobrino’s theology. Rather in the process of "historicalization", the doctrine of
redemption is considered as equivalent to liberation."" By liberation, it means that
of its very nature, liberation necessarily tends towards its own 
totalization, both in its ultimate goal and in the partial liberations
undertaken in the process of achieving that ultimate goal  The
liberation process must become open to utopia and transcendence.
Only in the utopian ideal do we glimpse, in the distance, the fulfilling 
reconciliation of all the disparate elements of historical liberations, 
elements so difficult to reconcile in history: the personal and the 
structural; a genuine struggle and the longing for peace; justice and 
forgiveness; triumph and reconciliation.""
"" Ibid., p.224.
"" Ibid., p.lO.
J.Sobrino, Soiritualitv of Liberation, p.28.
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According to Sobrino, the continuity and discontinuity of salvation history, 
the relationship between the doctrine of creation and redemption convering at the 
concept of the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom has an inner-historical and a 
transhistorical dimension. As inner-historical, it participates in the dynamic of 
history; as transhistorical, it answers the questions implied in the ambiguities of the 
dynamic of history. Put precisely, the characteristics of the Kingdom are political, 
social, personal and universal. It is political because the Kingdom announces God’s 
lordship over the cosmic. It is social because it includes the ideas of peace and 
justice. It is personal because it gives eternal meaning to the individual person. 
Finally, it is universal because it is a Kingdom not only of humanity, but also 
involves the fulfilment of life in all its dimensions. The Kingdom of God reveals 
that God is the lord of history and that the whole of history, and its details, proceeds 
under the fatherly care of God the creator, whose will is done.
Thus, salvation should not ignore the necessity of the liberation of people 
from the political oppression which enslaves them and makes them less than human. 
Yet it is equally true again that political freedom, of itself, does not ensure a fully 
humane and happy society. However, Emilio Castro reminds us that there are certain 
priorities, and we must use our freedom to discern them. There are historical 
priorities, dimensions, particular gifts which are entry points into the dynamic of the 
Kingdom and the reality of salvation. He points out that "we should not forget the 
other dimensions that will complete the picture, but we need to enter by a particular 
door if we want to be concrete in our missionary obedience.""®
If God’s salvation cannot be isolated from history, the church has to take the
E.Castro, Sent Free (Geneva: WCC, 1985), p.24.
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risk of interpreting history because commitment always implies a decision in favour 
of something and against something else. Also, conscious human life is always 
interpreting. As responsible human beings we can never avoid it. Thus, Christians 
are obliged to take the risk of interpreting their historical situations to the extent that 
this is necessary for their commitment. Their interpretation may be confirmed or 
negated. In either case, faith in God’s guidance remains unshaken, for the Christian 
faith is independent of interpretations. At the same time, in its encounter with the 
ambiguities and decisions of life, it makes interpretations. God calls Christians to 
make their decisions in the light o f his coming Kingdom, against hunger, suffering, 
poverty and oppression. The Cliristian has to know where the forces of the Spirit 
areat work, in order that to join them; and where the forces of darkness at work, in 
order to resist them. The church has no guarantee against mistakes in making 
interpretations, but tluough repentance we are called to partake in God’s saving 
history. Thus, Sobrino takes the risk of interpreting history in order to evangelize.
In the light of the above discussion, we can say, first o f all, that salvation 
implies obedience to the Kingdom of God. It is not the condition for salvation, but 
it is the content of salvation. It is part and parcel of that salvation. Secondly, 
salvation means justification and liberation. The justification that comes tluough faith 
in Cluist frees sinners from their guilty conscience and from their state of death. 
However, it is not just a personal spiritual experience, because as evil works both in 
personal life and in exploitative social structures which humiliate humankind, so 
God’s justice manifests itself both in the justification of the siiuier, and in social and 
political justice. Although salvation is eschatological, we do not have to wait for 
the consummation of the Kingdom in order to discern its justice in the social and 
political sphere and the presence of its liberating power in social structures. Every 
movement that promotes equitable economic relations, and every movement that
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encourages solidarity among individuals and peoples can be said to be a manifestation 
[though partial] o f the saving power of the gospel. Finally, salvation aims at bringing 
communion and reconciliation. In Clirist, we are reconciled to God, to our 
neighbours, and to nations, but we still await the final reconciliation o f all creation. 
This hope impels us to commitment. Hope of the final reconciliation of all things 
tln’ough Clii'ist finds its concrete expression in the search for the unity of the people 
of God as well as for a more fraternal world community. Concern and commitment 
to a more humane life, a more just society, are not foreign to the experience and 
hope of salvation.
We now turn to the final concern of this study- the relationship between
theory and praxis in relation to the Christian religion illustrated by Sobrino’s view
of evangelization. I consider that it belongs to the model of the Marxist tradition.
In short, on the one hand, the Marxist appeal to practice is a critique of a
contemplative oriented philososphy and a purely theoretical view of reality; it orders
theory to action. On the other hand, the concept of practice is related to the Marxist
thesis that humans constitute themselves through what they do. Practice is not only
the goal o f knowledge but also its condition. Therefore, the Marxist concept has two
elements: the practical ordering of theory to the transformation of the world and the
conditioning of knowledge through the practical conditions of life. Both elements
have been more or less adopted and contextualized by Sobrino. Obviously, Sobrino’s
view of evangelization reveals to us that to evangelize is to transform our sinful
world. He says that
the very word of proclamation is already a "doing", but that word must 
also be consciously ordained to other "doings"- deeds through which 
women and men may be able to grasp that truly there is good news of 
God, good news that, because it is God’s, is not only communicated, 
but effective, capable of transforming the misery of personal and
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historical reality
Furthermore, Sobrino considers that
the Church of the poor is in its structure the true way of being a 
church in Jesus; that it provides the structural means of approximating 
ever more closely to the Church of faith.
In other words, the preferential option for the poor and solidarity with the poor, 
expressed in the practical conditions of life, open a new dimension for the 
understanding of the Christian faith. The strengths of the model in the context of 
Marxist tradition are that it gives practice a very strong societal orientation rather 
than a personal or individual orientation, and it provides a hermeneutical privilege, 
criterion and standpoint, by which one can test the interpretation of the Christian 
tradition. Flowever, its weakness, if  political relevance is the only criterion for the 
verification of theology, relates to the truth content of a liberation theology, which 
in a communist context (for instance, China where I come from) is rendered totally 
unable to bring about the liberation of the poor and the oppressed.
J.Sobrino, Spirituality of Liberation, p. 135.
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p.l24.
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C. REFLECTION
Both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that the Cliristian faith is primarily 
related to praxis. For them, we cannot know Christ unless we follow him. 
Discipleship is the key to their theological reflection. However, when we go into 
details to see the relationship between theory and praxis in relation to the Cliristian 
religion, we discern that there is difference between Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s 
approach. For Flauerwas, Chr istian practice is understood in the context of a cultural- 
linguistic tradition, while for Sobrino, Christian practice is understood in the context 
of Marxist tradition. Put differently, Hauerwas’ praxis is primarily concerned about 
Christian identity, while Sobrino’s praxis is principally concerned about the social 
relevance of the Christian faith. Obviously, each of their approaches and concerns 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. It is not necessary for us to determine which 
one of the approaches is closer to our Chi'istian faith, because we simply need both. 
In other words, an over-emphasis on the distinctiveness of Christian identity makes 
the Christian faith remain incomprehensible and hence socially irrelevant in the 
modern world. On the other hand, an over-emphasis on the social relevance makes 
the Christian faith inevitably lose its distinctiveness. However, I am not suggesting 
that Hauerwas’ praxis has no social relevance, or Sobrino’s praxis loses Cliristian 
identity. Rather I realize that they want to make the Christian faith socially relevant, 
and both are adamant that it retains its distinctiveness. But they take different points 
o f departure. That is to say, for Flauerwas, the social relevance of the Christian faith 
can only be achieved by the affirmation of the distinctiveness of the Cliristian 
identity; while for Sobrino, the Christian identity can only be found in its social 
relevance. In the following, I attempt to highlight their insights through dialogue in 
order to shed light on the relationship between theory and praxis in relation to the 
Christian religion.
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Firstly, both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s approaches illustrate a new relationship 
between theory and praxis in relation to the Christian religion; that is, a critical praxis 
correlation.’ This suggests that practice grounds theory because God is not 
intrinsically related to theory, but mainly to practice as in creation, incarnation, and 
salvation. Practice is the foundation in fact as well as the fundamental subject matter 
and goal of theory. For instance, both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that 
clnistology can never be fully understood from a doctrinal perspective because its 
essence is basically a matter of practice, following Jesus. Therefore, they suggest 
that in order to appreciate the value and the importance of dogma [theory] in our 
Cliristian faith, we have to be aware that the aim of dogma [theory’s task] is to serve 
practice. Thus, theory as critical theory is the self-understanding of practice, 
explicating and thematizing its own foundations in practice, and corrected in the light 
of that practice. Theory, then, is a "self-corrective process of reflection for action"^ 
where action and its consequences dictate changes in theory and theory directs 
actions. However, this emphasis does not necessarily submit theory to practice 
because, at the same time, theory directs action. If we recall what we have discussed 
about Clodovis B off s view of theology and praxis, we can say that Hauerwas’ and 
Sobrino’s model of critical praxis correlation is primarily concerned with the pistic 
criteriology. Theology does not only have to meet its logical criterion, but also its 
verificational criterion, because the Christian faith is a way of life- yet not any way 
of life, but one informed by the word of God. Thus, when both Hauerwas and 
Sobrino take practice instead of theory as their point of departure to understand the 
relationship between theory and praxis, it is clear that they are speaking about pistic 
criteriology instead of theological criteriology. Then, when Flauerwas says that
 ^ See Matthew Lamb, "The Theory-Praxis Relationship in Contemporary Christian 
Theologies." In: Catholic Theological Society o f  America Proceedings. Vol.31, 1976, pp. 149-178.
Ibid., p.l73.
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"ethics provides a fruitful territory in which to explore these issues because the sense 
in which the language of Christians is true is similar to the sense in which lives are 
true,"^ he should not be mistaken to be ignoring the importance of a metaphysical 
reflection on the ontological structures o f human experience. Or when Sobrino 
considers that the transformation of this wretched world is a fundamental part of the 
Cliristian witness to the God o f life, he should not be misunderstood as regarding the 
theoretical issues confronting theology [here, philosophy] as unimportant. But rather, 
in B off s words, the theological criteriology and pistic criteriology are inter-related, 
but not to be confused. For both Hauerwas and Sobrino, doing the truth is not 
equivalent to making the truth through praxis, but to practising the truth, which has 
been given to us through revelation.
Secondly, shifting the point of departure from theory to praxis also signifies 
a change of the hermeneutical circle. For both Flauerwas and Sobrino, the 
hermeneutical theory should not stop at the author’s original subjective intention or 
at meaning within the original historical context, but rather should go beyond these 
to explore the relationship between the past and present. For Hauerwas, this can be 
done only by a re-orientation o f the presupposition of the hermeneutical theory; that 
is, to see Scripture from the perspective of the community. In other words, the 
interpretation of Scripture requires a corresponding community [the church] which 
is capable of living a distinctive way of life in accordance with Scripture. This does 
not simply mean a concern to put the Scripture [theory] into practice, but rather that 
without that community, the very idea of Scripture makes no sense. In order to 
establish his thesis about the role of the church in the hermeneutical circle, Hauerwas 
refers to the idea of the moral authority of Scripture. He contends that
 ^S.Hauerwas, "The Ethicist as Theologian," In: The Christian Century. April 23, 1975, p.408.
368
the necessity of authority grows from the fact that morality 
unavoidably involves judgments that by their nature are paiticular and 
contingent- that is, they could be otherwise. Tradition is but the 
history of a community’s sharing of such judgments as they have been 
tested tlii’ough generations. Authority is not an external force that 
commands against our will; rather it proceeds from a common life 
made possible by tradition.'’
Therefore, he suggests that authority requires community, but it is equally true that
community must have authority. If Scripture has to be understood in relation to the
church, then the hermeneutical issue is not only questions about fact or accuracy, but
rather about what kind of community it must be. Furthermore, this hermeneutic
should be done by a community whose life has been shaped by the narratives of the
Scripture. In terms of his pacifism, the role of the community in Hauerwas’
hermeneutical circle becomes obvious. For instance, Hauerwas considers that the
Sermon on the Mount cannot be understood as a "revealed morality". Otherwise, it
gives the impression that Scripture can be known and used apart from a community
which confesses Jesus as its Lord. This makes no difference between those who
believe in Christ and those who do not. Ironically, the Sermon can only be
understood in relation to its community, the church, because the Scripture provides
the resources necessary for the church to be a community sufficiently truthful.
Hauerwas says that
the issue is not just one of interpretation but of what kind of people 
can remember the past and yet know how to go in a changed world.^
This is the practice understood in the context of cultural-linguistic tradition.
For Sobrino, the starting point of the hermeneutical theory camiot be taken 
from the perspective of some overarching theoretical or practical systems, but rather
 ^ S.Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p.62.
 ^ Ibid., p.67.
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through a careful analysis of the concrete structures of domination in church and 
society. He suggests that, first o f all, we have to see and experience the reality 
because it directly affects our hermeneutical skill and praxis.^ This experience will 
lead us to ideological suspicion. In order to see the reality, Sobrino considers that 
theologians have to turn to social sciences, because "they analyze the concrete misery 
of the real world, the mechanisms that create it, and consider possible models of 
liberation from it."^ Then, there is the application of our ideological suspicion to our 
understanding of reality in general and to the Bible and theology in particular. For 
instance, in the context of Latin America, this application makes us to question 
whether the reality of poverty is an unfortunate consequence or a result of a 
deliberate act. In this process, we experience a new way of perceiving reality that 
leads us to the exegetical suspicion that the prevailing interpretation of the Bible has 
not taken important pieces of data into account. This calls for a re-reading of the 
biblical text. An obvious example of this is the discovery of the biblical message 
about the preferential option to the poor. The poor are no longer to be one-sidedly 
understood in a spiritual sense, for the poor are those who are materially inadequate, 
and are victims of economical and political structures. Finally, we develop a new 
hermeneutic, that is, we find a new way of interpreting Scripture with the new 
perceptions of our reality at our disposal. Through the intentional and positive 
formulation of the hermeneutical circle, and by adding particular data to the equation, 
Sobrino offers us a very creative way of linking the Bible and life. It transforms the 
concept of the hermeneutical circle into an intentional, creative and revolutionary 
methodology. However, its difficulty is in reducing this new hermeneutical method 
to a narrow socio-economic and political agenda, due in part to the heavy boiTOwing
 ^ See my discussion on Sobrino’s understanding o f spirituality.
J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, p. 19.
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o f Marxist socio-political theory.
Both Hauerwas and Sobrino have different concerns about hermeneutical 
theory. Hauerwas begins with the basic assumption of the hermeneutical circle by 
suggesting that this has to be developed in the context of a community, while Sobrino 
starts, with a degree of hermeneutical suspicion, by suggesting that the reality of the 
real world plays an essential role in our hermeneutical theory. Obviously, these are 
two different levels of enquiry, but they are not mutually exclusive because we need 
both in order to enrich our understanding of the hermeneutical circle.
Thirdly and finally, both a shift o f the point o f departure from theory to 
praxis, and a change in the hermeneutical circle turns our attention to the subject. 
The individual is regai’ded no longer as object but as subject. The development of 
the person as subject takes place on the individual and social planes. On the 
individual level, we have to work for our salvation in terms of having character and 
sanctification. On the social level, we have to work for the transformation of the 
world in order to enable all subjects to be fully human subjects. Thus, the individual 
as subject is always a free subject, assuming personal responsibility for his/ her 
actions in the world and his/her own life. Therefore, when we talk about praxis we 
are always talking about the praxis of a free responsible subject who participates in 
the shaping of his/her own historical destiny.
An emphasis on the primacy of praxis in theological reflection, however, does 
not necessarily solve the problem of the diversity of theological interpretation. 
Ironically it complicates the problem. But our unity is not primarily dependent on 
our complete agreement over the details o f Jesus’ life or other theological concepts; 
rather, our unity is based on the assumption of what kind of people we must be to
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be Jesus’ followers. Furthermore, both Hauerwas and Sobrino remind us that the 
issues of Christian identity and the social relevance of the Christian faith are not 
primarily theoretical issues, but rather practical. That is to say, we can talk about 
Clnistian identity only if we live in accordance with the Kingdom’s values, and we 
can talk about the social relevance of the Christian faith only if we have a profound 
spirituality to discern the signs of the times. Thus, the issue is not simply a question 
of the application of theory to practice, but is a foundational issue of the church’s 
self-understanding and self-discovery.
In this chapter, I have discussed how the Kingdom demands our response in 
terms of praxis. Praxis is not simply an application of theory, but also it formulates 
theory. The Kingdom of God camiot merely be known by exegesis, but by living out 
the Kingdom’s values. Without this praxis, we camiot fully know the Kingdom. In 
the next chapter, I will continue to examine the relationship between the Kingdom 
and the church in terms of the presence o f the Kingdom in the light of the results of 
this and the preceding two chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PRESENCE OF THE KINGDOM
A. THE KINGDOM OF GOD TODAY
The preceding chapters have implicitly and explicitly demonstrated in different
degrees and different stages, that for Hauerwas and Sobrino the Kingdom of God is
both immediate reality [already] and eschaton [not yet], is both immanent and
transcendent, present and future. However, this common understanding has different
implications for their theological orientations. Despite this, both Hauerwas and
Sobrino agree with one another about the close connexion between the Kingdom and
Jesus, on the one hand, and that the messianic office of Jesus necessarily brings with
it the messianic community, on the other. The former suggests that the Kingdom is
found in the person and work of Jesus, while the latter suggests that apart from Jesus,
the Kingdom is also to be found in the circle of disciples which constitutes the
ekklesia founded by him.’ Thus, the Kingdom does not belong exclusively to the
future, but is also a present reality manifested in the Christian community. The
church then has a special role in both salvation history and the history of humankind.
It is the sign of the Kingdom. Hans Kung says that
the church is not a preliminary stage, but an anticipatory sign of the 
definite reign of God: a sign of the reality of the reign of God already 
present in Jesus Clirist, a sign of the coming completion of the reign
of God  It is the reign of God which the church hopes for, bears
witness to, proclaims. It is not the bringer or bearer o f the reign of 
God which is to come and is at the same time already present, but its
 ^ See Jorgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power o f  the Spirit (London: SCM, 1977). He 
describes his ecclesiology as "messianic ecclesiology". "Messianic ecclesiology" is shorthand for "a 
christologicaliy founded and eschatologically directed doctrine o f the church." (p. 13)
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voice, its announcer, its herald. God alone can bring his reign; the 
church is devoted entirely to its service.^
Therefore, the special role o f the church in the Kingdom is not a matter of privilege, 
but rather a matter o f servanthood. Besides, the Kingdom and the church are not 
identical because the Kingdom is an entirely new, all-embracing reality. The church 
is not a demonstration or presentation o f the Kingdom but a group of people who, 
in following Jesus, place themselves in the service of the Kingdom that is to come. 
Put differently, the church does not bring forth the Kingdom as product, but the
Kingdom creates the church and demands discipleship. Despite this, Moltmann
reminds us that
die church is not yet the Kingdom of God, but it is its anticipation
in history. Christianity is not yet the new creation, but it is the 
working of the Spirit o f the new creation. Cliristiaiiity is not yet the 
new mankind but is its vanguard.^
In an anicipatory and fragmentary form, the church represents the future of the whole 
of reality and so mediates this eschatological future to the world. In order to be 
faithful to its calling of being a sign o f the Kingdom, the church has to take its 
calling seriously.
Nevertheless, the way in which the church can be a sign of the Kingdom 
depends upon how the Kingdom is understood. If  the Kingdom of God is purely 
subjectivity, then the presence of the Kingdom is merely concerned about a change 
of disposition o f people, for whom little or nothing in the affairs o f this world matter 
or can matter, because the Kingdom has not have yet begun for them. On the other 
hand, if the Kingdom is a power which will come from heaven unexpectedly at the 
end of the time, then the church can limit itself to mere fiducial belief with pure
 ^ H.Kung, The Church (London: Search, 1971), p.96.
 ^ J.Moltmann, The Church in the Power o f  the Spirit, p. 196.
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subjectivity, and give the course of the world over to the "devils". If  the Kingdom 
is understood primarily as this- worldly and concerned with earthly affairs in the way 
in which the "social gospel" movement in America did, then the presence of the 
Kingdom relates to a transformation of the social structures which leaves the 
individual with an empty utopia.
However, with the aid of biblical scholarship, we find that the Kingdom 
comes both as process and as climax.'’ Thus, the presence of the Kingdom is both 
a saving invitation and the saving work of God. And yet the complete turning of 
humankind to the Kingdom would renew the face of the earth: for a person cannot 
give himself/herself to Christ and his Kingdom, and then stand indifferent to the great 
work of his/her redemption, which is valid for all creation. It is undeniable that the 
Kingdom is concerned about the transformation of the heart. But this must show 
itself in one’s disposition, in a new basic relation to God and to one’s neighbour and 
to the good. It is no partial act alongside our life, but an incident o f indivisible 
totality. As the coming of the loving dominion and the Kingdom of God also means 
the redemption of the cosmos, of all things- which means the establisliment of the 
saving dominion of God in Clnist over everything that is created- so genuine 
conversion of the individual and of the community always demands and signifies a 
change in the milieu. Therefore, the growth of the new life in individuals must not 
be isolated from the growth of the Kingdom as a whole. The salvation of the 
individual stands in most intimate connection with the fulfilment of the salvation of 
the Kingdom. Each person opens himself/herself to the growth given from above, 
particularly by praying and working for the coming of the Kingdom.
 ^ See the work of J.Weiss, A.Schweitzer, and W.Kumrael.
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Nevertheless, the issue of the meaning of the presence of the Kingdom cannot 
be solved by pointing to the biblical passages which speak of its presence, but this 
can only be addressed if one takes into consideration the fact that the Kingdom brings 
with it a call to repentance and also a gospel of salvation. Rather, accepting the fact 
that the Kingdom is both present and future, I shall attempt to explore how the 
Kingdom creates and demands a particular way of life of its messianic community, 
and in turn how the Christian community is able to be a sign of the Kingdom, with 
reference to the preceding study of Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s theology. The presence 
o f the Kingdom is concerned particularly with the encounter between the Kingdom 
and the world. However, to discuss the presence of the Kingdom does not mean that 
the church is the bridge between the world and the Kingdom, for Jesus Christ is the 
only mediator between God and humankind in terms of historical event and 
continuing spiritual reality. Also, an emphasis on the presence of the Kingdom does 
not suggest that we look for the future to bring the development and completion of 
something that already exists, because the Kingdom is not merely the coming 
Kingdom but also at the same time the eternal Kingdom, that has existed since the 
beginning of the world. Neither does it imply that the futurity o f the Kingdom 
interprets all sayings of its presence, because the Kingdom is to Jesus no ideal but 
reality itself, which dominates and renews the world. Rather to emphasize the 
presence of the Kingdom is to acknowledge that the Kingdom does not merely belong 
to the end-time, but is at the same time "supra-temporally" eternal, so the end-time 
quality of the Kingdom necessitates a definite present-time quality. Because it is 
"supra-temporal", the eternal quality of the Kingdom is present and now. The 
Kingdom therefore is not present merely as a claim, a demand or a tlireat of 
judgment, but it also intervenes in a certain kairos through the very fact o f presence, 
and brings about a decisive change. With this the end time begins, which is at the 
same time the time of salvation. The Kingdom enters into the midst of time and
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transforms it into the time o f fulfilment. Thus, when we talk about the presence of 
the Kingdom, this is based on nothing other than based in the dynamically creative 
realism of the idea of God’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the role of the church 
is nothing other than an acknowledgement of the lordship of Clnist and following 
Jesus to witness to the Kingdom in the world.
If the presence of the Kingdom is concerned with the encounter between the 
Kingdom and the world, it calls the church to discipleship. This involves a 
dialectical process: that is, discipleship o f  the Kingdom and fo r  the Kingdom. The 
former is about the style of life of the people of the Kingdom which primarily relates 
to the ethical dimension, while the latter is about witnessing to the Kingdom which 
principally relates to the missiological dimension.^ Nonetheless, these two processes 
are inter-related at two levels. Firstly, discipleship of the Kingdom cannot be 
understood apart from discipleship for the Kingdom, because discipleship is never for 
the sake of self-perfection. On the contrary, discipleship for the Kingdom is not 
possible without reference to discipleship of the Kingdom because discipleship is not 
merely a matter of doing, but also a matter of being, of following Jesus. Secondly, 
when the church witnesses to the Kingdom, it displays a style of life, and when the 
church has a style of life, it witnesses to the Kingdom. If  discipleship of the 
Kingdom is primarily concerned about the internal life and integrity of the Christian 
community, then discipleship for the Kingdom is principally concerned about the 
external manifestation of the internal life of the Cliristian community. They cannot 
be separated. Besides, it is umiecessary to rank their priority, for example, by saying 
that the belonging and the being aspect come first, because discipleship of and for
 ^ I have to admit that there is a weakness in understanding discipleship o f  the Kingdom 
primal ily in terms o f  life-style, and discipleship for the Kingdom principally in terms o f  mission. But 
for the sake o f  this study, this distinction is necessary, provided that it is not understood exclusively.
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the Kingdom are two sides of a coin. Without either one of them, discipleship is 
incomplete. Interestingly enough, I find that Hauerwas’ theology primarily starts 
from the concern of discipleship of the Kingdom, while Sobrino’s theology 
principally starts from the concern of discipleship for the Kingdom. As said, their 
different point of entry is not to set discipleship of the Kingdom against discipleship 
for the Kingdom and vice versa, but rather their differences are complementary 
aspects of the one truth.
However, I have to clarify that an emphasis on discipleship of and for the 
Kingdom is not to reduce the Kingdom to human achievement, but rather discipleship 
is always a consequence of conversion to the Kingdom and in the Kingdom. Put 
differently, discipleship is a matter of responsibility^. The idea of responsibility is 
fundamentally rooted in the Christian faith as "relationship". It is fellowship with the 
living God. In M.Buber’s words, it is an "I-Thou" relation. On the one hand, God 
takes the individual person seriously, and speaks to him/her; that is, the tremendous 
earnestness of God regarding humanity even to the point of sacrificing his only- 
begotten son for him/her on the cross. On the other hand, humanity must take God 
seriously. His/Her response is his/her responsibility. Thus, responsibility means that 
in a relationship between human beings and God, he/she responds to God’s word 
with the responsibility of his/her personal decision and action. Therefore, 
discipleship is not anthropocentric which centers on the human. Nor is it theocentric 
in a sense alien to humanity and foreign to his/her world. Rather it centres in grace- 
endowed fellowship of humanity with God, in the dialogue of word and response, in 
responsibility. Then, discipleship is never a human effort, but is a response to God’s 
graciousness. K.Barth rightly noted that
® See Bernhard Haring, The Law of Christ, V o l.l (Westminister; Newman Press, 1963), 
pp.35-53.
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there is no discipleship without the One who calls to it. There is no 
discipleship except faith in God as determined by the One who calls 
to it and frees for it. There is no discipleship which does not consist 
in the act o f the obedience of this faith in God and therefore in Him.^
Discipleship is always God’s grace and initiative.
In the following, I will discuss the presence of the Kingdom in three 
correlated ways. Firstly, since the Kingdom of God is a reality instead of a concept, 
we cannot discuss the Kingdom without being challenged by it. Nor can we illustrate 
the Kingdom without first being conformed to it. Therefore, I will explore 
discipleship of the Kingdom in terms of having a messianic lifestyle. Secondly, as 
the kingdom of God is not only about God’s salvation, but also his lordship, then 
discipleship should press toward "public" discipleship. I will examine discipleship 
for the Kingdom in terms of a commitment to mission. Thirdly and finally, if the 
Kingdom of God is concerned about both the discipleship of and for the Kingdom, 
then it orients our way of doing theology in a particular way. I will explore its 
implications for practical theology.
K.Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol.IV 2 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1958), p.537.
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B. DISCIPLESHIP OF THE KINGDOM: A MESSIANIC LIFESTYLE
"Disciple" is the oldest term applied to Clnistians: "In Antioch the disciples 
were for the first time called Christians" (Acts 11:26). We are called to be Jesus’ 
disciples. We are disciples in the Kingdom, followers o f Jesus on the way. 
Incidentally, this was the other name for Clnistians in the Book of Acts: followers 
of "the Way" (Acts 9:2; 19:9, 23; 22:4; 24:14, 22). Although the origin of this self­
designation has not yet been fully explained, most scholars would agree that the 
Clu'istian’s unique lifestyle contributed to the name. The New International 
Dictionary of the New Testament emphasizes this term as a "designation for 
Christians and their proclamation of Jesus Christ, which includes the fact that this 
proclamation also comprises a particular walk or life or way," and the Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament refers to "the mode of life which comes to 
expression in the Christian fellowship."’ Thus, Cliristians at the beginning were 
associated with a particular pattern of life. Their faith produced a discernible 
lifestyle, a way o f life, a process of growth visible to all. This different style of 
living which grew out of their faith gave testimony to that faith. J.Moltmami 
explains this relationship between faith and lifestyle in such words:
When we experience the meaning of our life and adhere to it, we 
develop a personal lifestyle. We seek to orient our life to this 
meaning. We consciously take hold of our life and direct it by seeking 
to make it correspond to this meaning within changing situations and 
demands. The meaning of life gives us a strong heart and this in turn 
shapes our external way of being in the world.^
Thus, the Christian faith and its inspired lifestyle aie insepaiable, unless the Christian 
faith is considered merely as an object for philosophical enquiry.
 ^ See G.Ebel, "Way". In: The New International Dictionai'v o f the New Testament, Vol.3 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978), pp.933-947; and Wilhelm Michaelis, "Hodos". In: Theological 
Dictionary o f the N ew  Testament. Vol.5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), pp.42-114.
 ^ J.Moltmann, The Open Church (London: SCM, 1978), p.37.
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At the time of the early church, Clu*istian convictions became identified with 
a certain kind of behaviour. That style of life followed the main lines of Jesus’ 
Sermon on the Mount and his other teachings. To believe meant to follow Jesus. 
For instance, Aristides described Clnistians to the Roman emperor Hadrian in this 
way:
They love one another. They never fail to help widows; they save 
orphans from those who would hurt them. If  they have something 
they give freely to the man who has nothing; if they see a stranger, 
they take him home, and aie happy, as though he were a real brother.
They don’t consider themselves brothers in the usual sense, but 
brothers instead tlirough the Spirit, in God.^
The early Clnistians were known for the way they lived, not only for what they 
believed. For them, the two were completely inter weaved. The eaiiiest title given 
to them reflected the importance of their Kingdom lifestyle. They were not called 
the people of "the experience" or the people o f "right doctrine". Rather they were 
the people of "the Way". Thus, discipleship, first of all, is concerned with the 
messianic lifestyle.
The correlation between discipleship and lifestyle suggests a close relationship 
between the Chi'istian faith and ethics'*. This does not mean that discipleship is 
nothing other than a list of ethical codes, but rather that ethics is one of the 
indispensable dimensions in which discipleship manifests its meaning. When we look 
at the gospels’ record of Jesus’ call to discipleship, we find that Jesus’ call was not
 ^ Jim Wallis, The Call to Conversion (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 14. It quotes 
from Aristides, "Apology 15". In: Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Allan Menzies (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 9:263-279. See also Henry Chadwick, The Early Church (London: Penguin, 
1988), pp.56-60.
 ^ I prefer "ethics" to "morality" because "morality" is often understood individually, and get 
involved in the details and qualifications. However, "ethics" here does not only mean a philosophical 
study o f  the moral value o f human conduct and rules and principles that ought to govern it, but also 
is understood in terms o f  "being ethical" which is concerned with one’s moral life in a communal 
context.
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just for belief, but for trust in God. In other words, it is a call to recognize the 
reality o f God’s rule, which is the Kingdom. And God’s rule is a reality pressing 
upon those who hear Jesus’ message. For those who respond to Jesus’ call positively, 
it means the beginning of faith. But faith also means faithfulness. In both Hebrew 
and Greek the same word covers both meanings. In Jewish thought Abraham was 
a prime example of such faith- faithfulness, as expressed in his readiness to offer up 
Isaac. The Epistles to the Hebrews and to James reflect the same understanding 
(Heb. 11:17-18 James 2:21-22). Faith comes to expression in faithfulness, faithful 
obedience to God’s will. Faith which does not manifest itself in action is a 
contradiction in terms. Thus, having faith and believing in God is a life lived in the 
light of God’s coming Kingdom, lived out of the resources of God’s rule, with habits 
and responsibilities, conduct and relationships, needs and ambitions, ordered by its 
priorities. Therefore, it is impossible to be Jesus’ disciple without being ethical.
However, when I suggest that Jesus’ call to discipleship has a significant 
ethical implication, this implication should not be understood in terms of goodness 
and rightness in a general ethical theory, but rather in a "messianic" context. That 
is to say, on the one hand in the power of the Holy Spirit, the down payment and 
guarantee of the Kingdom’s presence, Christians can live lives that are different from 
their surrounding world. For instance, the Sermon on the Mount is not a utopian 
vision, but rather is a reality, at least among those who are in the Kingdom. On the 
other hand, a messianic context suggests that Cliristians are called to be faithful to 
God, which is not always the same as being morally good. Therefore, the 
relationship between the Christian faith and ethics is distinct and interrelated. They 
are distinct because they operate in different levels in terms of accountability, 
responsibility and relationship. But they are interrelated because the Christian faith 
is a life option which should affect one’s ethical life, and ethics can help display
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Cluistian convictions.
■I
Primarily speaking, the messianic lifestyle is a life which is parallel to and is 
shaped by the "already, and not yet" nature of the Kingdom. As previously indicated, 
the Kingdom of God is both a present and a future reality. Thus, history and 
eschatology cannot be divided, as this world and the next, in the world and out of the 
world. Through his mission and resurrection, Jesus has brought the Kingdom of God 
into history. As the eschatological future, the Kingdom has become the power that 
determines the present. This future has already begun. At the same time, the 
messianic lifestyle signifies that Cln istians have already lived in the light o f the "new
■
era" in the circumstances of the "old" one. Since the eschatological becomes 
historical in this way, the historical also becomes eschatological. Hope becomes 
realistic and reality becomes hopeful. Thus, the messianic lifestyle is not a life in 
constant deferment, but a life in anticipation. An anticipation is not yet a fulfilment, 
but it is already the presence of the future in the conditions of history. It is a 
fragment of the coming whole, it is a payment made in advance of complete 
fulfilment and part-possession of what is still to come. Thus, the messianic lifestyle 
no longer stands under the law and in the midst of the compulsions of this transient 
world; it has already stood in the sunrise of Christ’s new day. Its freedom lies in its 
transcending of the present through the power of hope for what is to come, and the 
actual in the light of the potential. But at the same time, it has to seize the new 
against the resistance of the old, so that a new beginning cannot be made without an 
ending, and freedom camiot be realized without struggle. Nevertheless, the messianic 
lifestyle cannot be exclusively understood on an individual level because the word 
"messianic" is used for a description of the people of the Kingdom in order that they 
represent what is to come. I will come to this point again when I discuss discipleship 
as a commitment to mission.
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Obviously, both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider discipleship of the Kingdom
as the messianic lifestyle. The church is called to live out the Kingdom’s values in
the world. For Hauerwas, truth and truthfulness camiot be separated. It does not
mean that Chi'istian convictions are proved meaningful or true by showing their
ethical implications, but rather they are both true and ethical in that they force us to
a true understanding of ourselves and om' existence. Hauerwas says that
the claims they make about the way things are involve convictions 
about the way we should be if we are to be able to see truthfully the 
way things are.^
Therefore, Chi’istian convictions cannot be understood apait from discipleship, and 
discipleship is nothing other than a truthful way of life shaped by the Cluistian faith. 
This emphasis is fully expressed in our preceding study of Hauerwas’ theological 
themes. For instance, when Hauerwas talks about the marks of the church, he 
particularly refers to the Christian life rather than the concepts of the unity, holiness, 
catholicity and apostolicity of the church. Or when he talks about narrative, he 
illustrates it in terms of chaiacter and vision. Furthermore, his practice of pacifism 
is nothing other than one of the concrete manifestations of what the messianic 
lifestyle is. Unlike Hauerwas, Sobrino understands the messianic lifestyle in terms
■ * I V f  I * ’ t  ^of its social manifestation. His emphases on justice and liberation are not simply the
results of his humanitarian compassion, but rather are the consequences o f his
experience of how gracious and promising the Kingdom of God is. In other words,
it is the Kingdom which inspires and demands him to work for justice and for
solidarity with the poor, Sobrino says that
when all is said and done, without the spiritual life, apostolic work 
would be threatened from within. It would be cut off from its deepest 
roots.
Wlien all is said and done, the spiritual life must be efficacious for the
® S.Hauemas, A Community o f Character. p.90.
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transformation of the secular reality around us, helping us steer that 
reality in the direction of the reign of God.^
Thus, the messianic lifestyle is characterized by doing justice which is rooted in a 
profound spirituality. In the following, I attempt to explicate what discipleship as the 
messianic lifestyle is and involves with reference to the preceding study of Hauerwas’ 
and Sobrino’s theology. In short, it is a life of conversion, worshipping, following 
Jesus, being an alternative community, and a life which brings transvaluation.
Firstly, the messianic lifestyle is a life of conversion. Conversion is both the 
first step of entry into the Kingdom and the continuous mark of the Christian life. 
In other words, it is not only the conversion of non-believers, but also of believers. 
It not only brings people into the Kingdom, but also occurs inside the community of 
the Kingdom. Both Hauerwas and Sobrino agree with this.^ Besides, Hauerwas’ 
view of character, virtue and vision, and Sobrino’s suggestion of the preferential 
option to the poor, suggest that conversion means a radical change not only in 
outlook but in posture, not only in mind but in heart, not only in worldview but in 
behaviour, not only in thoughts but in action. Conversion is more than a changed 
intellectual position, but rather it is a whole new beginning. It is far more than an 
emotional release and much more than an intellectual adherence to correct doctrine. 
Rather, it is a basic change in life direction. Hauerwas calls this fundamental change 
"vision" and "narrative". While Sobrino considers being in solidarity with the poor as 
the result of this change.^ This fundamental change involves a process of "being 
turned from" and "a turning to". In short, it is from sin to salvation, from idols to
 ^ J.Sobrino, Solrttualitv o f  Liberation, pp. 1-2.
See my discussion on both Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s views o f  spirituality in chapter one.
® See my discussion on Hauei-was’ concept o f character, vision and virtue and Sobrino’s
concept o f the spirituality in chapter one.
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God, from slavery to freedom, from injustice to justice, from guilt to forgiveness, 
from death to life and much more. This "turning to" means to surrender ourselves 
to God in every sphere o f human existence: the personal and social, the spiritual and 
economic, the psychological and political. However, Sobrino reminds us that the 
"turning to" is never private, albeit deeply personal. It has to be both historical and 
particular to each situation. On the one hand, we are called to respond to God 
always in the particulars of our own personal, social and political circumstances. On 
the other hand, the "turning to" is historical because it entails a reversal o f the 
historical givens, whatever we may be at any place and time. Then, conversion is 
basically about a new relationship. That is to say, no longer are our lives organized 
around our own needs or the dictates of the ruling powers. Rather, we have 
identified ourselves with the Kingdom of God in the world, and the measures of our 
existence in doing God’s will. Turning to God brings a change in all our 
relationships: to God, to our neighbour, to the world, to our possessions and so on. 
But conversion cannot be an end in itself. It is the begimiing of active solidaiity with 
the purposes o f the Kingdom of God in the world.
The concept o f conversion suggests that the messianic lifestyle has to be 
radical because it deeply reaches to and transforms even the basic relationship; it has 
to be comprehensive because it is a matter of life and death, so there are no half­
answers and half-commitment; and finally, it has to be unconditional because it 
attempts no justification, but positively responds to God’s lovingkindness. We can 
conclude that a life of conversion is a submission to the rule of God before all other 
claims on affection or commitment.
Secondly, the messianic lifestyle is a life of worshipping. Discipleship is 
never a discipline of anxiety, but comes from joy and love. I suggest that the
386
 ^ K.Barth, Church Dogmatics. IV 1, pp.643f.
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Christian life is a life of worshipping because we are the messianic people. We are
already in God’s Kingdom. Although the Kingdom of God is not yet fully realized
in this world, we experience its presence in worship, particularly. In a section of
Church Dogmatics on the "The Holy Spirit and the Gathering of the Clnistian
community," Karl Barth writes:
It is not only in worship that the community is edified But it is here
first that this continually takes place. If  it does not edify itself here, 
it certainly will not do so in daily life, nor in the execution of its 
ministry in the world.^
Worship and the Christian’s daily life of obedience are not two separate spheres but
two concentric circles, o f which worship is the inner and gives to the outer its content
and character. The nature of our corporate worship will ultimately be a test of our
other involvements in the world. The quality of our worship will reflect the quality
o f everything that we do, including whether we will serve and minister rightly in the
world. If  we are not experiencing the power o f God in our worship with each other,
we will not experience the power of God in our involvement in the world.
For Hauerwas, the Christian worship is characterized by sacraments: that is, 
baptism and eucharist. Tlirough baptism we do not simply learn God’s story, but we 
become part of the story. The eucharist is the eschatological meal of God’s 
continuing presence. At that meal we become part of his Kingdom. His presence, 
his peace, is a living reality in the world. As his people we become part of his 
sacrifice in order that the world might be saved from sin and death. However, 
Hauerwas insists that an emphasis on being a holy people and being a sacramental 
people cannot be separated because "it is in baptism and eucharist that we see most 
clearly the marks of God’s Kingdom in the world. They set our standard, as we try
to bring every aspect of our lives under their sway."*° For Sobrino, the Christian 
worship has to flow out o f discipleship. His reasoning is based upon the chi’istology 
of the letter to the Flebrews, in which Jesus is called by God to be a priest. But for 
that author, Jesus defines what it means to be a priest; Jesus does not offer sacrifices, 
he offers himself. He does not operate in the realm o f the sacred, but in the realm 
of history. His mediation was an advocacy of love and justice among human beings. 
As the exalted Lord, Jesus ought to be acclaimed; but worship alone does not give 
access to God. Only when it is preceded by the following of Jesus, by advocating 
justice and love, can worship have any meaning.’* Both Hauerwas and Sobrino 
suggest that the messianic lifestyle is a eucharistie way of life. Christians are the 
sacramental people. Then, the Cluistian worship requires a community which 
understands itself as a messianic community in terms of having a life with new 
quality and presence in the human suffering. Without worship, discipleship is a form 
of human asceticism; without discipleship, worship is idol worship.
Thirdly, the messianic lifestyle is a life of following Jesus because Jesus calls 
us to follow him. Jesus is a model for discipleship. To be a disciple of Jesus means 
something more than being a student of a teacher.’^  To be a disciple means to
S.Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 108. 
J.Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, pp.300-304.
Orlando E.Costas quotes Juan Stain’s saying that there are seven basic differences between 
following Jesus and following the rabbis. They are as follows:
1]. Following Jesus was by invitation, whereas with the rabbis it was by request.
2]. Becoming a disciple o f  Jesus involved a practical education that encompassed one’s entire way o f  
life. With the rabbis, it was purely intellectual, theoretical and abstract. 3]. Jesus’ invitation to follow  
was grounded on a personal relationship. That o f the rabbis was basically doctrinal.
4]. Following Jesus was a gift o f  grace. With the rabbis, it was in some sense a commercial 
enterprise, since their disciples were obligated to pay for their instruction.
5]. The discipleship o f  Jesus demanded absolute commitment. The rabbis did not and could not make 
such a demand.
6]. With Jesus, the life discipleship was a communal reality. With the rabbis, there was haardly any 
room for fellowship.
7]. The discipleship o f  Jesus was permanent. The invitation was for life. The goal o f  the rabbinic
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"follow after". This is what Paul said, "Be imitators o f Christ." (ICor. 11:1) Both 
Hauerwas and Sobrino take this seriously.*^ Despite this similarity, they have 
different interpretations and practice of following Jesus. As this has already been 
illustrated and discussed previously, I do not intend to repeat it here. Nevertheless, 
for both Hauerwas and Sobrino, following Jesus is what distinguishes Cliristians from 
other disciples and supporters of great men, in the sense that Christians are ultimately 
dependent on this person, not only on his teaching, but also on his life, death and 
new life. But we understand the real meaning of the Gospels, the teaching [message] 
of Jesus only in the light of his life, death and new life: in the New Testament as a 
whole his teaching caimot be separated from his person. For Christians then Jesus 
is certainly a teacher, but at the same time also essentially more than a teacher: he 
is in person the living, archetypal embodiment of his cause. This living Christ is and 
remains Jesus of Nazareth as he lived and preached, acted and suffered. The living 
Christ does not call merely for inconsequential adoration or even mystical union. 
Nor of course does he call for literal imitation. But he does call for personal and 
practical discipleship. This witnesses to a Christlikeness in terms of having the mind 
of Cliiist instead of externally duplicating of the words and deeds of Jesus. To 
possess the mind of Clirist includes much more than acquaintance with the story of 
His life and words. But following Jesus should not be misconstrued as implying 
some naive ability on the individual’s part to attain to His perfection. K.Baith rightly 
warns us that
there can be no question of a conformity which means equality, of 
anything in the nature of a deification of man, of making him a second
Christ Jesus Christ will reign, and men will be subject to Him, and
they will always be different in, and in spite of, the closet fellowship
disciples was to become rabbis themselves. (See Costas, The Integrity o f  Mission. San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1979, p. 15)
See my discussion on Hauerwas’ view o f the imitation o f  Christ and Sobrino’s view o f  
following the historical Jesus.
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between Him and His imitators. There will be no more Clirists the
Unique will always be unique, and the distances will remain.....
However, R.Bultmann challenged the possibility of following the historical Jesus by 
saying:
I do indeed think that we can now know almost nothing concerning the 
life and personality o f Jesus, since the early Cliristian sources show no 
interest in either, and are moreover fragmentary and often legendary; 
and other sources about Jesus do not exist..... We can strictly speaking 
know nothing about the personality of Jesus.
Is then it possible for us to follow Jesus? Bultmann is right that we should
distinguish between the Jesus o f history and the Christ of faith. However, their
difference is not unbridgable, because in Jesus we encounter Clirist, and in Clirist we
encounter Jesus. The two cannot convincingly be divided, and christology cannot
sustain a radical breach between what we know by faith and what we know through
historical investigation. William Barclay said that
the fact is that from the Gospels a recognisable person emerges, and 
it is equally true that the personality there depicted is in accordance 
with the facts.... This does not mean that I must literally and exactly 
and meclinically accept everything: but it does beyond all doubt mean 
that I must be able to regard the picture o f the Gospels as historically 
and factually reliable in general... The Gospels are certainly the 
product of the faith o f the early church; but the Gospels are equally 
certainly the reliable record of the events on which that faith is 
founded.... no matter what historical research and analysis can do to 
that record, they cannot alter the historical rightness of its total 
impression in the mind and heart.
Barclay suggests that historical investigation cannot create faith, and it must not seek 
to extend its role in this respect. It cannot demonstrate on its own that God is 
involved in a quite special way in the person of Jesus Chr ist. This is the decision of 
faith. However, at the same time, faith cannot create the Jesus event, but it is
K.Barth, Church Dogmatics, II 2, pp.577f.
R.Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (Collins: Fontana, 1962), p .l 1. See also Martin Kahler, 
W.Barclay, Gospels and Acts (London: SCM, 1976), p. 17 & 23.
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dependent on it. Therefore, in order to know who Jesus is, we have to follow him 
[i.e. have faith] without giving in and up the historical investigation.
Fourthly, the messianic lifestyle is a communal life. It has two levels. On 
the first level, it suggests that the messianic lifestyle is not merely an individualistic 
concern, but it is also to be understood in terms of participating in an alternative 
society. This is what Hauerwas emphasizes.’^  On this level, more than just 
individuals who have been converted, Christian disciples are now a people, a new 
community of faith, which has embarked on a new way of life. From the begimiing, 
the Kingdom is made manifest tlirough a people who share a common life. Their 
visible fellowship is the sign and the first fruits of God’s new order begun in Jesus 
Christ. The message o f the Kingdom becomes more than an idea. A new human 
society has sprung up. Here love is given daily expression; reconciliation is actually 
occurring. Not an individualistic vision, it creates a new community, an alternative 
community or alternative culture. The new life produces a new social reality, 
initially the movement and then the church. As an alternative culture where
the Spirit is known, the chureh exists in part to nurture the new life tlirough its 
shared pereeptions, values, and worship, confirming and sustaining the new way of 
seeing and being. But the new community is also meant to embody the new way of 
being. In its own life, it is to live the alternative values generated by life in the 
Spirit and becomes a witness to compassion by incarnating the ethos of compassion. 
There is a radicalism to the alternative community of Jesus. If the church is to take 
seriously the double movement of withdrawal from culture and entry into an 
alternative culture, it will increasingly see itself as a community which knows that 
its lord is different from the lord of culture, its loyalties and values very different
See my discussion on Hauerwas’ ecclesiology.
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from the dominant consciousness of our culture. It lives the life referred to in John’s 
description of Jesus’ followers as in the world, but not of the world, grounded not 
in the world, but in God. The insistence on the sharp dichotomy between the 
Kingdom of darkness and the Kingdom of light will help us to avoid the mistakes of 
liberalism’s theology of the Kingdom. To insist that the church must be a counter 
culture is not to argue that culture is bad. Culture is part o f the good creation. 
Rather the church lives as a new model in the very heart of the perverted culture, 
pointing by their words and life to God’s alternative.
On the second level, the communal nature of the messianic lifestyle suggests 
that discipleship is not merely a matter of what the individual does with his/her 
aloneness before God, but rather it calls for love of neighbour as well as for love of 
God. The two go together, and the latter cannot be professed without the former, just 
as the former cannot be sustained without the latter. This is what Sobrino 
emphasizes.*® Since Jesus’ call to discipleship involves and demands participation 
in the life o f God’s new people, then the messianic community should not be an 
exclusive and self-interested community. Ironically, it should actively participate in 
the daily life of the people in terms of proclaiming the good news and denouncing 
dehumanizing activities. The new covenant has a horizontal as well as a vertical 
dimension. I will come to this aspect again when I talk about discipleship as a 
commitment to mission.
Finally, the messianic lifestyle is a life which eventually brings transvaluation 
o f oneself and one’s praetice of love. This is a result o f a life of conversion, 
worshipping, following Jesus and being an alternative community. Regarding the
See pp.339-346.
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matter of transvaluation, I confine my discussion to two points; that is, faithfiilness 
instead of effectiveness, justice above security, and peace above economic growth. 
Hauerwas strongly holds that the Christian social ethic is first of all concerned with 
our faithfulness to Jesus instead of social effectiveness. It is true that faithfulness and 
effectiveness are not necessarily in contrast. But Christians are so often tempted to 
abandon Jesus’ call to honesty and love for enemies, for the sake of quick results or 
to advance an ethic that everyone can accept. This is especially true in the case of 
wars fought to secure justice or preserve liberty and security. For Hauerwas, 
Christian pacifism is neither a form of survivalism nor a form of indifference. 
Rather, it is a matter of faithfulness.*^ Christians should never sacrifice obedience 
for short term effectiveness because they know that the Kingdom is the ultimate clue 
to the nature o f reality.
This transvaluation also challenges the market economy’s understanding of 
justice and peace. For Sobrino, justice is never simply a matter of distribution. 
Rather, it is a matter of defending the life of the poor. Society cannot be one-sidedly 
dominated by the concern o f economic growth and national security without reference 
to the virtue of justice, peace and brotherhood/sisterhood. Peace is not simply a 
condition without war, but rather is a condition with respect to human dignity. The 
real threat to modern civilization is not necessarily about communism, but is a system 
of institutionalized injustice, which benefits the wealthy and oppresses the poor. 
Therefore, the messianic lifestyle brings us to practise justice at a new level.^®
The above explication of the messianic lifestyle demonstrates that the creation
See my discussion on pacifism in chapter three.
See pp.279ff.
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of the messianic lifestyle is a work that is both individual and collective. It is a fact 
for each Christian, who really tries to express his/lier faith in the concrete forms of 
his/her life. It is also the task of Christians as a corporate body. Nevertheless, the 
formation of the messianic lifestyle could not be the result o f a doctrine, firmly and 
clearly established. On the contrary, it is the fact of living in faith. That is to say, 
discipleship is a kind of behaviour, action and decision which springs from one’s 
innermost realization of God’s sovereignty. It begins with a recognition of God, that 
God is the ultimate, the hidden reality behind all reality, the power beside which our 
power shrinks to infinitesimal insignificance. It is a readiness to acknowledge the 
importance o f the rule o f God as a factor in daily living and as a fact of enormous 
power. This suggests that we cannot have given ourselves to Jesus and ignore the 
meaning of his Kingdom on our lives and the world. But rather we become the 
people of the new order. Thus, discipleship of the Kingdom should include the way 
we think about present political questions, as well as our way of practising 
hospitality. It also affects the way we dress and the food we eat as well as the way 
in which we manage our financial affairs. It includes being faithful to one’s wife as 
well as being accessible to one’s neighbour. It includes the position one ought to 
take on current social and political questions, as well as the decisions which relate 
to the personal employment o f our time. But we cannot make the Christian lifestyle. 
It is created by the Spirit when we personally and communally bind our life with the 
life of Chi’ist and understand our life-history as a small part of God’s great history.
Nevertheless, no proclamation of the Kingdom will make sense for the world 
if the Kingdom with all its implications is not taken seriously by Christians 
themselves. There is no genuine evangelization without Kingdom discipleship. It is 
not only a matter of credibility, but of authenticity and faithfulness to the gospel. 
J.Moltmann notes that "it is alone important that our life, our life-experiences, and
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their expression in speaking and remaining silent, in doing and suffering, become 
messianic sign to others."^* A Christian is a visible sign of the new covenant which 
God has made with this world in Jesus Clii’ist. In his/her life and words he/she 
would allow this covenant to be manifest in the eyes of other. He/She reveals to the 
world the truth about its condition, and witnesses to the salvation of which he/she is 
an instrument.
J.Moltmann, The Open Church (London; SCM, 1978), p.49.
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C. DISCIPLESHIP FOR THE KINGDOM: A COMMITMENT TO MISSION
111 this thesis, I emphasize the centrality of following Jesus in Christian 
discipleship. If  Jesus does not preach himself but the Kingdom, then Christian 
discipleship is not only concerned with one’s inner life, but it also has to be oriented 
towards the service of the Kingdom. If  for Jesus the Kingdom is about God’s 
sovereignty over, and his love toward, the world, then Christian discipleship cannot 
be exclusively confined to a personal and private level, but has to relate to the whole 
world. Put precisely, since Jesus’ call is to demand the world both structurally and 
personally to repent, then discipleship is to affirm that Cliristians are sent to the 
world in the service of the Kingdom for the world. In other words, Clnistian 
discipleship involves mission. K.Barth, in an exhaustive Bible study, convincingly 
demonstrates that in every instance recorded in Scripture where a man or a woman 
is called by God to faith in Christ he or she is simultaneously commissioned by God 
to perform a task in the world.* Therefore, mission is the essence of theology 
instead of merely being a model or a paradigm because mission expresses at the 
deepest level the purpose of Jesus’ call. Besides, mission is defined not by its 
objective, but rather by its origin. It is mission which defines and creates 
discipleship, not vice versa. If we see the agent of discipleship as the church, then 
the vision of mission means that the church does not exist for itself. The church is 
called to be a community at the service of the world. On the other hand, however, 
it also means that the life and growth of the church is a necessary condition of its 
service. Without the church there is no service, and thus no mission. Without 
mission, there is no church, for the church is missionary by its very nature.
Both Hauerwas and Sobrino unanimously agree that the church is mission, and
 ^ K.Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV 3, p.592,
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mission has to be oriented in the service of the Kingdom. For Hauerwas, his 
emphases on character, virtue, narrative and pacifism do not involve any tendency to 
privatize the Christian faith. Rather he believes that in order to witness to the 
Kingdom faithfully, the church has first to be an alternative society so that the world 
can know and experience what the Kingdom is.  ^ For Sobrino, his emphases on the 
preferential option to the poor, justice and liberation do not in any sense reduce the 
Christian faith to a series of humanitarian programmes. Rather his commitment is 
the consequence of his experience of what the Kingdom is. The Kingdom becomes 
a vision and a yardstick to challenge the world.^ However, the different practice of 
mission between Hauerwas and Sobrino may induce a sense of ambiguity what 
mission is and what it involves.
Mission is always God’s mission instead of the church’s mission. Mission is 
the movement in which God sends Jesus to the world as Jesus sends the church to 
the world. The movements of sending and being sent give the meaning of mission. 
Thus, in order to be faithful to God’s mission, the church has to come to the self- 
understanding of its nature as the continuation of the mission of Jesus in the world. 
Thus, the meaning of mission is primarily clnistologically grounded. This foundation 
suggests that both in Jesus’ life and ministry we learn the meaning of mission, and 
Jesus’ life and ministry shows us what mission is.'*
In the preceding chapters, we have already discussed how Flauerwas and
 ^ See my discussion on Hauerwas’ ecclesiology.
 ^ See pp.332ff.
 ^ Here, I do not have any intention to isolate Jesus’ mission from God’s mission. But rather 
mission is always a concrete practice instead o f  a concept. Therefore, w e can only better know what 
God’s mission is through the life o f Jesus because incarnation is the most concrete practice o f God’s 
mission.
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Sobrino illustrate how discipleship finds its meaning in terms of following Jesus. 
Nevertheless, they have different emphases on it. For instance, Flauerwas considers 
the Sermon on the Mount as the summary of Jesus’ life and ministry, while Sobrino 
considers the jubilee proclamation as the outline of Jesus’ life and ministry.^ 
Obviously, these different points of departure result in different orientations of their 
ecclesiologies. In short, Flauerwas’ ecclesiology is rather a centripetal and inward 
looking activity, while Sobrino’s ecclesiology is rather a centrifugal outreach and 
concern. At the same time, their different emphases on ecclesiology also result in 
different practice of mission. How do their different emphases help us understand 
the meaning of mission? I consider that in order to understand the meaning of 
mission, we have to shift our attention from the study of Jesus’ life to the promises 
of Jesus to be present. This does not mean separating mission from Jesus’ life; rather 
an approach to mission in terms of the promises of Jesus to be present avoids any 
temptation o f reductionism which reduces Jesus’ story to either the concept o f 
liberation or the practice of pacifism. Positively stated, to understand mission in 
terms of the promises of Jesus to be present suggests that Jesus’ mission and his 
presence are inseparable. His mission leads him to where he is present, and where 
his presence is concretizes what his mission is. For instance, if we accept Sobrino’s 
interpretation of Jesus’ story in terms of the jubilee proclamation, then Jesus’ mission 
is found among the poor and the outcast. But at the same time, when we look at the 
Scripture we notice that wherever Jesus is, he creates mission. Therefore, in order 
to avoid any kind of reductionism, we also have to understand Jesus’ mission in 
terms of his promise of presence so that it allows Jesus’ story to speak to us. 
However, to see Jesus’ mission in terms of his promise of presence does not discredit 
any approach which sees Jesus’ mission under a theme, but rather it is a different
 ^ See p.72.
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perspective to complement the truth. In short, Jesus promises to be present in the 
apostolate, the sacrament and in the fellowship of the Christians, in "the least of the 
brethren", and in his parousia. I consider that Flauerwas’ understanding is more 
inclined towards the view that Jesus promises to be present in the apostolate, while 
Sobrino’s understanding is more inclined towards the view that Jesus promises to be 
present in "the least of the brethren". These different emphases result in then- 
different emphases on Jesus’ promise to be present in his parousia.
Firstly, Jesus promises to be present in the apostolate [Matt. 28:18ff], the 
sacrament [ICor. 1 l:23ff] and in the fellowship of the Christians [Matt. 18:20]. The 
word "apostolate" is here used to sum up the medium of the proclamation through 
word and sacrament, as well as the persons and community of the proclaimers. An 
emphasis on Jesus’ presence in this aspect suggests that the church is a sign of God’s 
salvation. If the church is a sign of God’s salvation to the particular society in which 
it exists, attention is often given to the quality of church life. However, this 
emphasis does not necessai'ily mean that it privatizes the Christian faith. Rather, it 
considers that the church cannot be the agent of the Kingdom if it itself does not 
become the sign of the Kingdom by means of an embodiment of the Kingdom’s 
values. In a sense, this understanding promotes a rather inward-looking attitude, but 
it does not necessarily mean that it distorts the gospel in terms of spiritualization and 
privatization, because its particular practice is undoubtedly for the sake of witnessing 
to the Kingdom. Apparently, this is a "passive" way of mission, but no one can deny 
its radicalness and seriousness. Also, this suggests that the meaning of mission is not 
first o f all about what the church does, but about what the church is and should be. 
Generally speaking, Hauerwas’ theology represents this perspective, especially his 
view of narrative. For Hauerwas, the Christian faith is better understood in terms of 
narrative because, on the one hand, it clarifies the distinctiveness of the Christian
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faith apart from other religious faiths, and on the other it requires one’s life to be 
conformed to a particular story, namely the Clnistian one.^ The concept of narrative 
reminds us that the first duty of the church is to be faithful to its story. This 
faithfulness takes the form of personal lifestyle, which becomes a powerful witness 
to the Kingdom of God. Thus, the Kingdom of God is the church living in the will 
of God within society. This is the breaking-in of a new order in society, a 
community within the larger community. It is the church, when truly living under 
the cross, which expresses the Kingdom of God in the world. Thus, mission is often 
understood in terms of pastoral activity and missionary activity.^ It is a pastoral 
activity because mission Is about nurturing the Christian community in the direction 
of the Kingdom. It is a missionary activity because it invites other people to enjoy 
and experience the richness of the Kingdom.
Secondly, Jesus promises to be found in "the least o f the bretliren" [Matt. 
25:31-46]. The "least of the brethren" are those who are poor, despised and outcast. 
Jesus’ promise of presence does not only mean that he is present in the poor, but also 
he identifies himself with the poor. Put strongly, we find Jesus in the poor because 
he is poor.® This does not simply mean that the poor are those people who have 
privilege in God’s Kingdom, or that our goodwill to the poor is a matter of 
sympathy. Rather they are the latent presence of the coming Saviour, the touchstone 
which determines salvation and damnation, according to Sobrino.^0 The hidden 
presence of the coming Christ in the poor therefore belongs to ecclesiology first of
 ^ See my discussion on Hauerwas’ use o f  narrative. 
 ^ See pp.99-100.
® Here, 1 do not mean that Jesus is imperfect, but rather according to 2Cor. 8:9, "though he 
was rich, yet for your sake he became poor".
 ^ See my discussion on Sobrino’ view of the church of the poor.
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all, and only after that to ethics. Clearly, to see Jesus’ presence in the "least of the 
brethren" suggests that mission is primarily to bring forth justice to the poor, and the 
church has to be engaged in this struggle. Thus, a commitment to mission is not 
only concerned with conversion and individual salvation, but rather relates to the 
practice of justice. Primarily speaking, Sobrino’s theology represents this perspective. 
Sobrino considers that if  Jesus promises to be present in the "least o f the bretliren", 
then the church is the servant of God in service for human existence, and its ministry 
to human existence is a ministry to human freedom. Mission cannot be isolated from 
the practice of humanization. Mission is a commitment to the world, and history 
is a sphere for a possible building for a better human order. This understanding 
removes the church from the centre of human history and sees it as subservient to the 
broader concept of the unfolding of God’s Kingdom in the world.
Sobrino considers that if  mission involves humanization, then the promotion 
of humanization is both an individual act and a community act which operates both 
at an individual level and a structural level.** It is an individual act because, on the 
one hand, we are so often tempted to consider that the problems are so enormous that 
there is little we can do. As a result, we give in. We must not allow ourselves to 
be swayed by visions of success or failure. We are not responsible, as individuals, 
for the success of the Kingdom. But we are responsible as individuals to work 
within the Kingdom. On the other hand, a commitment to humanization is not a 
slogan, but it demands the transformation of the agent. In other words, we cannot 
promote justice without first being just. We cannot be in solidarity with the poor 
without first being poor.*** In order to arouse the consciousness and responsibility
See my discussion on Sobrino’s understanding o f Justice.
See my discussion on Sobrino’s view of spirituality and ecclesiology.
See my discussion on Sobrino’s view of the church of the poor.
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of individuals Sobrino, like other liberation theologians, introduces the idea of 
conscientization. However, the concept o f conscientization cannot be exclusively 
understood for the sake of political awareness, but also for the sake of an existential 
awareness of God’s sovereignty. This awareness brings us to see that God is on the 
side of the poor and is struggling with the poor.*^ Besides, there is no place in 
which God’s sovereignty is not there. This awareness brings us to discern what 
mission is and inspires us to commit ourselves to it. In terms of mission, the concept 
of conscientization can be illustrated in the following diagram:
--------- >........ — experience of the rea lity  —>------ -
involvement a new reading of the Bible
 <---------------  commitment  <----
Although this is a circular diagram, according to Sobrino and to the practice of the 
base Christian communities, the point of departure is the experience o f the reality. 
Sobrino calls this "theological locus".*'* This experience influences our way of 
reading the Bible because we bring our experience into the Bible. For instance, if 
we read the Bible through the eyes of the poor, oui' concern no longer concentrates 
on the philosophical issues of the existence of God. But rather it will reinforce our 
convictions that God is intensely concerned about the welfare of the poor; that he 
sides consistently with the poor against their oppressors; that the pervasive injustice 
of the world towaid the poor is rooted not only in individual but also in institutions 
and systems, the present world order; that the Kingdom of God, the new order, is 
designed especially with the poor in view; that the grace o f God is manifest in the 
death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ who, though himself rich, became 
poor; and that the gospel is meant to be preached paiticularly to the poor. These new
Ibid.
See my discussion on Sobrino’s view o f spirituality.
4 0 2
15
readings o f the Bible will inevitably lead us to a new commitment to the poor in the 
context of a fresh act of dedication to the Lord and his Kingdom. This solidarity 
with the poor does not imply that poverty is a virtue, but an evil which constitutes 
a challenge to the justice of the Lord who is King of creation. This solidarity 
eventually leads us to be involved in the struggle with the poor for a better world.
However, the promotion of humanization cannot only be an individual act 
because discipleship is a life of being an alternative society. Therefore, it is also a 
corporate action. Sobrino considers that this corporate action is undertaken by the 
institutional church.*^ In Latin America, this function is fulfilled by the base 
Christian communities. The final document of the Conference of Latin American 
Bishops in Puebla, Mexico in February 1979 lauded the base Christian communities 
as "the focal point of evangelization, the motor of liberation." Some of them 
concentrate on strictly "spiritual" pursuits like Bible reading or training lay people to 
lead services in remote rural area. Others, perhaps the majority, focus the immediate 
needs of their neighbourhoods [potable water, rapacious landlords, rising bus fares] 
and social implications of the gospel. However, the Bible reading group should not 
be ignored because they can be the initiative of a new reading of the Bible. The 
importance o f the base Cliristian communities is that they reflect the needs of a 
particular group of people. They are of, for and by the people.
The promotion of humanization involves both individual action and communal 
action in terms of the church. This action should not only provide appropriate help 
to individual persons, but also challenge the structure of society as a whole, because
I
See my discussion on Sobrino’s view o f  the church o f  the poor. 
Ibid.
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sin penetrates into social structures. But at the same time, the promotion of 
humanization cannot be understood primarily politically. Otherwise, it turns humans 
become the means for the political aim.
Finally, Jesus promises to be present in his parousia [Acts 1:11]. The word 
"parousia" is often understood in terms of the second coming of Jesus. But this is 
not a correct understanding because Jesus is already present. Therefore, when we 
talk about Jesus’ parousia, what we really mean is "what is to come". It is close to 
what will be, but is not totally absorbed by that. It stands in relationship both to the 
future and to the present and past. "What is to come" does not only emerge out of 
the forces and trends of growth and decay, but also comes in liberation to meet what 
is becoming, what has become, and what has passed away. When they conceived of 
the coming of Clnist in messianic glory, the New Testament writers were 
simultaneously thinking o f the end of the world. Consequently, Clirist’s coming 
parousia is expected in universal, all embracing and openly manifest form. However, 
this is not merely about the close of history, but also the key to an understanding of 
the history of Clirist and of the world. In other words, we see world history in the 
light of his future. The hope of the parousia brings the historical present of the Word 
and faith into the dynamism of the not yet which thrusts forward to what is ahead. 
Hence the Spirit is understood as the earnest, advance payment and foretaste of the 
coming glory. The presence of Christ in baptism and eucharist is hence believed as 
the hidden presence on the way to his direct presence. Thus, the relationship between 
Jesus’ promise to be present in parousia and mission suggests that mission is a 
proclamation of God’s universal salvific will because Jesus’ delay o f parousia is to 
reflect God’s will- that is, no one is to perish, but all will be saved. Also, mission 
is a recognition of the lordship of Clirist because there are not two histories, but one 
single history, which is God’s history. Although Christ is still to come, he is present
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in human history here and now. He is the lord of history. However, Jesus’ promise 
of presence in parousia reminds us that humanity is not limited to the finiteness of 
history. No matter how unfavourable our situation is, we have hope. This 
transcendental dimension of humanity carmot be ignored.
Jesus’ promise to be present in his parousia has different implications for 
Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s thought. In terms of eschatology, both of them basically 
agree that Jesus’ parousia is a realized eschatology. However, in his theological 
framework which is a cultural-linguistic model reference to previously, Hauerwas 
primarily considers that Jesus’ promise is first realized in his church. This is why 
he calls the church "an alternative society". In this understanding, Hauerwas does not 
see the impossibility of Christian pacifism. Christians do not need to give in to 
realism, for they are an eschatological people.*^ For Sobrino, Jesus’ parousia in 
terms of a realized eschatology operates on another level. In his theological 
framework, that of liberation theology, Sobrino considers that salvation history and 
humankind history are not dualistic. Rather they are in continuity, not in the sense 
that humankind can establish the Kingdom of God on earth, but in the sense that God 
transforms the history of humankind in accordance with his Kingdom.*® Therefore, 
a commitment to and an involvement in social justice is nothing other than the 
awareness and acknowledgement o f Jesus’ parousia.
As previously indicated*^, this difference between Hauerwas and Sobrino is 
not a difference of faith, but a difference o f entry point. In short, Hauerwas is more
See my discussion on Hauerwas’ ecclesiology.
See my discussion on Sobrino’s view o f the church o f  the poor. 
See pp.101-102.
4 0 5
concerned about God’s redemption, while Sobrino is more concerned about God’s 
creation. They are not in contradiction with one another, but they complement the 
profound meaning of Jesus’ parousia.
These three promises of Jesus to be present should be understood in unity 
instead of as separate optional elements. If any one of these promises of Jesus’ 
presence is omitted, the truth will be obscured. However, it is true that we may give 
one of these promises more weight than others, but it is a matter of relative emphasis. 
Therefore, if we were to confine ourselves to Jesus’ promise to be present in the 
apostolate, then we would not be able to expect the one who was crucified in the 
coming lord. If we were only to direct our gaze towards the promise of Jesus in "the 
least of the bretlnen", then we would be subject to historical fatalism and fail to 
appreciate the transcendental dimension of human nature. If we were only to see the 
promise of Jesus to be present in paiousia, then we would all too easily wait for the 
coming lord as apocalyptic angel of revenge on behalf of those who are oppressed 
on earth. We have to emphasize that the fellowship of Clnist lives simultaneously 
in the presence of the exalted one and of the one who was humiliated. Because of 
that, we expect from his appearance in glory, the end of history o f suffering and the 
consummation of the history of liberation. The one who is to come is then already 
present in an anticipatory sense in the Spirit and the Word, and in the miserable and 
helpless. His future ends the world’s history of suffering and completes the 
fragments and anticipations of his Kingdom which are called the church.
Therefore, discipleship for the Kingdom in terms of commitment to mission 
relates to the fact that Jesus conducted a cosmic mission. He was not, and is not, 
merely a personal saviour, or a therapist, or a healer, or a social critic, or a victor 
over demons and death- although he is surely at least each of these things. But he
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is also all of them and more. His mission was as lai'ge as the whole o f création. His 
redeeming power reaches to wherever oppression, violence, and injustice are found. 
He has come to rescue the entire cosmos, in all its dimensions and activities, from 
bonds of sin. Therefore, discipleship for the Kingdom has to relate to that cosmic 
mission of Jesus at least in two ways. Firstly, we must give evidence that we are a 
community of character who are ourselves experiencing the healing, calming, 
reconciling work of Jesus. This is the concern of the messianic lifestyle. We must 
be acted upon by the power o f Jesus. This suggests that although the forces of chaos 
are at work in politics and everywhere else, and although it seems that we cannot 
overcome such a situation, Jesus is in our midst, the forces of evil are doomed. As 
Christians we experience that power. We sense the victory in a personal way. His 
power is present in our personal struggles and dealings. But it is also a presence we 
know and celebrate communally, as a people whom God has visited as Saviour and 
healer. Secondly, we are called to promote Jesus’ healing work in the world. 
Having experienced the firstfruits of his healing mission, we must become vehicles 
o f his power in the larger society. Having been acted upon by divine grace, we 
become agents of that grace. We are not called to transform the world completely 
here and now. If that were our goal, we would still have to be very realistic about 
the ways in which our sin and fmitude touch all our efforts. But we are not even 
called to build the Kingdom of God on earth. Rather, it is our task to live and act 
in such a way that our deeds point to the final victory.
However, we cannot divide these two dimensions into neatly separated time 
segments. It is not as if the disciples were, for a time, acted upon by Jesus, only to 
enter a period in which they were forevermore "pure" agents of his power. They had 
to return frequently to the posture o f observers and receivers o f God’s grace in 
Chiist. And so must we. We must be acting while we are being acted upon. We
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must be continually giving while we are at the same time receiving. We must be 
healers who are still in the process of being healed. In other words, we are disciples 
o f the Kingdom, and at the same time we are disciples for the Kingdom.
Before ending this discussion, I would like to clarify the mission of the church 
in terms of goal and function. A goal statement refers to some outcome or to some 
goal toward which certain activities are directed. For example, when a woodpecker 
pecks, its goal is to discover the larvae insects. Functional statements are 
descriptions of the effects of an activity within an organism. The heart valves have 
the function of giving direction to blood. Function and goal are distinct. In terms 
of the mission of the church, if mission is seen as a goal, then all the church’s 
activities will be directed to the ultimate goal of the beatific vision of God. 
Consequently, it is concluded that all activities that are anticipations of this goal are 
Christian activities. However, if the mission of the church relates to the church’s 
function within this world rather than the goal, then the distinction between the world 
and the church is not that the world has a natural goal, while the church has a 
supernatural goal. Rather the church is seen within the world, and it exhibits this 
intertwining in its proclamation, praxis and ministry which may include social and 
political mission, I consider that the mission of the church relates more to the 
church’s function because the church is a "sign" of the Kingdom which is a matter 
of function.
This distinction is important because if we regard the mission of the church 
as relating to a matter o f goal, then we may find that it is very hard to take 
Hauerwas’ and Sobrino’s account of mission together as an expression of Christian 
mission because their goals are different. However, if we consider that the mission 
of the church relates to a matter of function, then the difference between Hauerwas’
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and Sobrino’s account is complementary because they represent the different 
dimensions of mission.
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D. DISCIPLESHIP AND THEOLOGY
In this thesis, I emphasize that both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that the 
Cliristian faith is not primarily an intellectual activity, but rather is a way of life, that 
is, discipleship. If this is so, then the essence of the Clnistian community is not to 
pursue theology, but to believe and obey the Word of God. This does not mean that 
we do not need to have theology. Rather, theology has to be done both in the 
context of a response of the existential experience of the Cliristian community and 
as a medium which contributes a vital dimension to the struggle for truth and 
faithfulness in the present. Put differently, for both Hauerwas and Sobrino theology 
fundamentally relates to practical theology. Nevertheless, this emphasis does not 
mean that other theologies such as fundamental and systematic theology are 
unimportant. Rather, according to David Tracy, fundamental theology deals with 
foundational questions o f faith at a relatively abstract level; systematic theology is the 
interpretation of the Christian tradition in and for a particular situation; practical 
theology is the interface between the tradition and concrete engagement in the life of 
the world, in which critical theory and praxis are in a mutually critical relationship.* 
Thus, to consider theology as primarily practical is nothing other than to recognize 
the interrelatedness and interdependency of fundamental, systematic and practical 
theology, on the one hand and, to recognize that they may be undertaken by different 
people within different areas but interdependently, on the other. If, according to 
Hauerwas and Sobrino, discipleship is the essence of theology, then my attempt is to 
show how this enriches our understanding and practice of practical theology.
Firstly, both Hauerwas and Sobrino consider that practical theology is not a
 ^ D.Tracy, "The Foundations o f  Practical Theology." In: Practical Theology, ed. Don S. 
Browning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), p.66ff.
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"know-how" subject, applied theology, in which the Cliristian seeks to apply theory 
to the tasks or praxis of ministry. Rather, praxis is one of the criteria of theology. 
In terms of narrative, Hauerwas considers that truthful lives ai'c the criterion of 
truth.** For Sobrino, ortho-practice is a way to "concrete" orthodoxy.® Although 
both Hauerwas and Sobrino emphasize the importance and primacy of praxis in the 
Clnistian faith, they have no intention o f reducing the Christian faith to a form of 
pragmatism. That is to say, the validity of the Christian faith is not ultimately judged 
by the practice of the Cliristian. Rather what they intend to do is to challenge the 
inadequacy and inappropriateness of traditional fundamental theology.
For instance, in terms of Jesus’ resurrection, traditional fundamental theology 
sought to demonstrate the truth of Christianity by historical arguments for the 
factuality of Jesus’ resurrection, while transcendental fundamental theology sought 
to demonstrate the meaningfuliiess of Jesus’ resurrection. Fundamental theology 
seeks to address the hermeneutical issue of the meaning and truth of the Christian 
vision. It considers that the truth of Christianity is a theoretical problem, and the 
practice of Chiistians and of the Christian chinches is a practical issue. No matter 
what the de facto practice of the church in its social and political ministry, the 
credibility of Christianity is based upon a historical or transcendental demonstration. 
Both Flauerwas and Sobrino challenge this understanding, and consider that a theory 
is valid only in relation to its practice.'* Meaning and truth do not exist as 
independent identities, but rather in their reception. The importance of reception is 
not that there is a clear cut meaning whose reception gives it its truth, but rather that
 ^ See pp. 182-183.
 ^ J.Sobrino, The True Church and the Poor, pp.21-24.
 ^ See pp.296ff.
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the meaning o f a religions vision depends on how it is continually received and 
transformed into a living belief and praxis. If  beliefs provide the warrant for certain 
practices in relation to our society, then to affirm the belief is, at the same time, to 
point out the differences that the beliefs make for the community of believers and 
how the community relates to society, to the world and to one another. To the extent 
that a religious vision is offered as a warrant for a particular praxis, then that 
particular praxis in its perception as illuminative, right and true, especially in 
comparison with alternatives, warrants the religious vision. Besides, there is an 
equilibrium between the warrant of the hermeneutical disclosure o f the religious 
tradition and the wairant o f the practice of this tradition. This pertains not only to 
the justification o f truth but also to the discovery of truth. In classical philosophy 
and theology, it was argued that personal purgation was necessary for the discovery 
of the truth. Unless one desired the good, one could not know the good. Unless one 
disciplined oneself to the love of the other and the transcendent, one could not 
uncover the meaning of the love of the other and the love of the transcendent. In the 
wake of scientific methodology and technocratic rationality, this interrelation between 
praxis and truth has become overlooked and neglected. The church’s commitment 
to truth, justice and charity is essential to its discovery of the meaning of its religious 
tradition’s vision of truth, justice and chai'ity. Consequently, praxis is not simply a 
warrant that discloses the truth of its religious tradition, but that praxis is a source of 
the discovery of such meaning and truth in the church’s religious vision. 
Nevertheless, to emphasize the centrality o f praxis in Christian theology does not 
mean that Christians can get a unanimous understanding of the truth, but rather it 
affirms that the truth is not only a matter of thinking and knowing, but also a matter 
of doing.
Secondly, both Hauerwas and Sobrino show that practical theology should be
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formulated in the direction of, for, of and by the people. For Flauerwas, if theology 
is primarily done in response to the world’s agenda, it betrays its identity because it 
accommodates the gospel to the world. For Sobrino, theology has often been taught 
and written by those who are very closely tied to the interests of the clergy; 
theological issues have often been formulated and explored from that point of view, 
from within that context. As a result, theology is gradually separated from the 
people. Obviously, Hauerwas and Sobrino have different understandings of the word 
"people". For Flauerwas, people refers to God’s people, that is, Christians. In this 
context, practical theology is ecclesial theology. For Sobrino, people refers to those 
who are poor, exploited and outcast. In this context, practical theology is a 
contextual theology.
To consider that a people’s theology is an ecclesial theology is to suggest that 
theology has to be done in the context of a cultural-linguistic model, according to 
Hauerwas.^ This means that Clnistian convictions can only be better understood in 
terms of the internal rules and procedures of their own language. This way of doing 
theology stresses the distinctiveness of Clnistian identity. However, this emphasis 
is a matter of claiification rather than a matter of superiority. Besides, it does not 
necessarily ignore the reality of pluralism. On the contrary, it takes pluralism 
seriously by having an honest dialogue without falling into the temptations of 
syncretism and relativism. So often the principle of pluralism implies that everyone 
has the right to choose the values, the lifestyle, the religious or non-religious 
orientation, which he or she finds suitable. No one has the right to judge another in 
this matter. The individual in his or her autonomy is free to choose. Thus, pluralism 
means being tolerant in terms of co-existence, on the one hand, and it means that no
 ^ See my discussion on Hauerwas’ use of narrative and view o f pacifisim.
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single truth is the whole truth, on the other. If  pluralism is concerned with co­
existence, then I do not see any discrepancy between the emphasis on the cultural- 
linguistic character of Christian convictions and pluralism. On the contrary, pluralism 
even demands one to be faithful and consistent to one’s faith and practice. On the 
other hand, if pluralism means that truth camiot be found only in one’s own truth, 
to a certain extent I agree to this. This is why I consider the importance and the 
necessity of dialogue. Nevertheless, dialogue is not only a matter of exchange, but 
also a matter of obstinacy. On matters of "fact" we do not acknowledge pluralism. 
We argue and we work at our disagreement until we reach agreement [although it is 
not always possible]. Therefore, a people’s theology is not a theology of 
"ghettoism", but a theology of the people, God’s people.
A people’s theology is also a theology which belongs to those who suffer,
who are exploited and outcast. Sobrino calls this a theology o f the poor.^ A
people’s theology suggests that tlieology should be done in the context of the
suffering of the people simply because Jesus proclaims good news to the poor. The
reality of the people is the hermeneutical principle of theology. Thus, theology is no
longer primarily confined to a philosophical enquiry, but rather it is deeply rooted in
the historical context of the people. This shift o f emphasis brings new insights to our
understanding and practice of our faith. Liberation theology is a theology sensitive
to the most urgent demands of history, Paulo Freire says that
it seems to me, must be the basic task, the prime concern, of the 
theologians of the Third World: to be men of the Third World. To 
steep themselves in it, so that they can be men of the world- utopian, 
prophetic, hoping men of the world.^
 ^ See my disucssion on Sobrino' use o f  justice and understanding o f  evangelization. 
Hugo Assmann, Practical Theology o f  Liberation (London: Search, 1975), p.?5.
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Thus, a people’s theology is a theology which first belongs to the people, not to the 
academics. It does not mean that the academics play no role in it. Rather, it 
suggests that their working context should not be the library but the living experience 
of the people. Sobrino’s interpretation of the people results in contextual theology 
because theology takes place in specific contexts. It is not merely being argued that 
theology ought to be contextualized. The contention is that all theology is 
contextualized. Thus, a people’s theology emphasizes that its agenda has to be set 
by the needs, dilemmas, and problems of the people, and it is a theology done by the 
people. This recognition suggests that there is a basically different concern between 
theologians and the people. For example, much traditional Western theology has 
been written by professors working at European universities. Imagine a white male 
university professor in nineteenth century Germany who is beginning to write a book 
about God. Typically, he begins by writing about God’s "attributes": God is 
omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, and so on. Now imagine a 
black slave woman in nineteenth century North America. As she begins to reflect 
on and articulate her faith in God, she begins at a very different point. She speaks 
of a suffering God, a God who identifies with the pain of his oppressed people. The 
very first thing she thinks to say about God is that he shares in her humiliation; he 
is acquainted with her grief. Therefore, a people’s theology realizes the different 
contexts among people, theologians and clergy. It demands that theology has to be 
done in the context and in the interests of the people so that the people are no longer 
secondary, but they aie the integral part of the church.
The different emphasis on people between Flauerwas and Sobrino cannot be 
regarded as an "either-or". As previously said, Hauerwas’ emphasis is more 
concerned about Christian identity, while Sobrino’s emphasis is more concerned 
about the relevant of the Christian faith. Hauerwas shows that when the Christian
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identity is affirmed, then we can find the relevance of the Cirri stian faith to the 
world. At the same time, Sobrino illustrates that our Clrristian identity is affirmed 
when our faith is relevant to the world. Clearly, these different points of departure 
result in different theological significance, but they are not in contradiction with one 
another because they are united in the sense that theology building up the church as 
God’s people so that the church can be a sign of the Kingdom.
Finally, both Hauerwas and Sobrino illustrate that practical theology concerns 
the formation of human selves and the transformation of society. These two 
dimensions have been respectively examined in the sections on "Discipleship of the 
Kingdom" and of "Discipleship for the Kingdom". Therefore, I do not want to repeat 
that discussion here. However, to consider that practical theology concerns the 
formation of human selves and the transformation of society means that theology is 
practical in the sense that it concerns the most basic issues of human existence. It 
has to do with the human pilgrimage in its totality: with its meaning and significance, 
with the determination of appropriate responses to the realities we confront during 
its course, with the growth of person in community, with the construction of 
institutions suited to human well-being.
The relationship between discipleship and theology is fundamentally the issue 
"who is Jesus Christ for us, today?" In other words, the real theological task is not 
to prove the existence of God, for that must ultimately be a matter of faith, but to 
enable the community of faith to critically to understand its faith and express answers 
to the questions: who is God, where is God to be found today, and what does this 
God require o f us here and now? The academic theologian may well provide 
resources for answering these questions. But it is the practical theologian within the 
community of faith who has to help the community day by day and week by week
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discover the answers in relation to the praxis and witness of the church in the world, 
and so help it find the direction which enables it to be faithful to its task.
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